ORDER Shivdayal, J.- l. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution from an order of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, jabalpur, under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 2. In conciliation proceedings there was a settlement between the parties on December 15, 1966. It was agreed that the petitioner M/s Om Builders & Miners would pay 50 paise per day or Rs. 13 per month to all whether piece rated, daily rated or monthly rated, by way of monthly wage relief as recommended by the Wage Board. This payment was to be made from April 1, 1966. It was further agreed that minimum bonus under section 10 of the Payment of Bonus Act and other dues would be paid before December 30, 1966. Besides this it was specifically agreed that all such payments would be made in the presence of L.E.O. (Central) and the Labour Welfare Officer, opposite party No.2. 3. On behalf of the workmen an application was made under section 33-C (2) before the Tribunal, alleging that no payment had been made by the petitioner. The petitioner resisted the application. As calculations had to be made and the number of workmen was large, one Shri K.L. Khare, Retired Collector, was appointed Commissioner. The Commissioner recorded evidence on the objection raised by the petitioner that payment had already been made, as had been agreed before the Conciliation Officer. The Commissioner submitted his report. The petitioner filed objections. After considering those objections the learned Presiding Officer, by order dated February 20, 1970, rejected the objections and accepted the Commissioner's report. Every work-man was held entitled to the payment as aforesaid together with Rs.10 each as costs of the proceedings. 4. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order, of the Tribunal. Learned counsel for the petitioner first contended that a joint application could not be made on behalf of all the workmen particularly when the person who had signed the application was not one of the workmen who were to be paid. This objection was not raised before the Tribunal. It is a technical objection pertaining to mere form. Learned counsel for the petitioner first contended that a joint application could not be made on behalf of all the workmen particularly when the person who had signed the application was not one of the workmen who were to be paid. This objection was not raised before the Tribunal. It is a technical objection pertaining to mere form. Where a technical objection pertains to form, and does not go to the root of the matter nor relates to something which causes substantial injustice or prejudice, it cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in a writ petition if it was not raised before the Tribunal. 5. Moreover, section 33-C (5) reads as follows: "An application for recovery of the 'amount due may be made on behalf or in respect of any number of such workmen." This Sub-section enables a person to make a single application on behalf of a number of workmen and there are no fetters imposed in it so that only one of the workmen concerned can make it. We are of the view that any person authorised by the workmen concerned can make an application under section 33-C (2). In the present case it is not denied that the person who made the application had the authority from the workmen concerned to make it. The language of sub-section (5) does not support the petitioner's contention that if a single application is made it must be made only by one of the workmen. The first contention is, therefore, rejected on the merits as well. 6. It is then urged on behalf of the petitioner that a Commissioner could not have been appointed for recording evidence. It is clear to us that under sub-section (3) of section 33-C a Commissioner may be appointed for the purpose of computing the money value of a benefit. The Commissioner after recording evidence, if necessary, has to submit his report. Then it is the Labour Court which, after considering the report of the Commissioner, determines the amount at which such benefit should be computed. The expression 'the amount at which such benefit should be computed' is the same as in section 33-C (2). Therefore, there is no difference in the scope of enquiry. Whatever can be enquired into by the Tribunal under section 33-C (2) will also be within the scope of enquiry by the Commissioner. The expression 'the amount at which such benefit should be computed' is the same as in section 33-C (2). Therefore, there is no difference in the scope of enquiry. Whatever can be enquired into by the Tribunal under section 33-C (2) will also be within the scope of enquiry by the Commissioner. However, there is this difference that the ultimate decision has to be given by the Tribunal. The report or finding of the Commissioner does not by itself decide any matter in controversy. The appointment of a Commissioner is for assisting the Tribunal and to facilitate the enquiry. 7. We do not accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the present case the Commissioner actually decided questions of law and fact. He submitted report along with the objections raised by the petitioner. And, even if the Commissioner had arrogated to his report the function of deciding matters, it would have, all the same, remained a 'report' to be considered by the Tribunal. 8. On a perusal of the impugned order we are satisfied that it is elaborate and discusses all objections raised by the petitioner, parawise. Therefore, the petitioner's third objection that the Tribunal merely adopted the report of the Commissioner without applying its own mind, must also be rejected as devoid of substance. All contentions raised before the Tribunal have been decided in the impugned order. 9. The last objection raised before us is that the quantum has been determined without any evidence. In fact evidence was recorded by the Commissioner. It was re-appreciated by the Tribunal and findings were given on it. It is merely a question of fact whether the evidence of one party was to be believed or disbelieved. The Tribunal, among other things, has found that the vouchers of atleast 16 persons, who were in the witness-box before the Commissioner, were false and, on that basis, if the Tribunal has disbelieved the petitioner, it cannot be said that there was any error for which interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is called for. It may also be mentioned that admittedly the alleged payment was not made before the L.E.O. (Central) as had been agreed. It may also be mentioned that admittedly the alleged payment was not made before the L.E.O. (Central) as had been agreed. The excuse that the petitioner's Labour Welfare Officer was on leave has been found by the Tribunal to be lame, inasmuch as another officer of the petitioner company could have gone before the L.E.O. (Central) to make the payment. 10. The petition is dismissed. Parties are, however, directed to bear their own coats. Security for costs deposited by the petitioner in this Court shall be refunded.