Judgment ANWAR AHMAD, J. 1. The petitioner in this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, with its head office at 14, Old Court House Street, Calcutta, and local office at Dumri Road, Mazaffarpur. It is carrying on the business of generating, distributing, transmitting and supplying electrical energy to the different consumers of Mazaffarpur town. The Municipality of Mazaffarpur is one of the biggest consumers of electricity inasmuch as the petitioner supplies electrical energy to the street lamps and water-supply system, both under the control and supervision of Muzaffarpur Municipality, on payment of consumption charges to the petitioner every month. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the Municipality of Muzaffarpur is a habitual defaulter and the amount of dues against the Municipality have by this date swollen to more than four lacs. As the Special Officer of the Muzaffarpur Municipality, in spite of repeated reminders did not take care to pay off the dues, the petitioner served a notice on the Special Officer under Sec.24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 on the 24th October, 1968, asking him to pay up the dues otherwise the supply of electricity to the Municipality would be discontinued. Nothing was done by the Special Officer (opposite party No. 3) to make payment of the dues; on the contrary, a title suit (Title Suit No. 274 of 1968) was instituted by him on the 31st October, 1968 in the Court at Munsif I, Muzaffarpur, where in a permanent injunction against the petitioner was prayed for, restraining the petitioner from disconnecting the supply of electricity. An order of ad interim injunction was granted and it continued for more than two years but the suit itself was dismissed as not maintainable. Even after the dismissal of the suit efforts were made by opposite party No. 3 to get an order of stay under Order 41, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure, staying disconnection of the supply of electricity to the petitioner but this also was rejected on the 25th January, 1971. The petitioner again served a notice under Sec.24 of the Indian Electricity Act but just thereafter a proceeding under Sec.144, Code of Criminal Procedure, was started against the Resident Engineer and the Director of the petitioner-company. The petitioner again served a notice under Sec.24 of the Indian Electricity Act but just thereafter a proceeding under Sec.144, Code of Criminal Procedure, was started against the Resident Engineer and the Director of the petitioner-company. The notice issued to them ran as follows:- "Whereas from the report of the Officer I/C Town P. S. Muzaffarpur, it appears to me that you have either disconnected or (are) bent upon disconnecting the supply of electric energy to the Muzaffarpur water system and street lights for non-payment of dues of the Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Company by the Muzaffarpur Municipality which amounts to serious consequences from the point of endangering the life of the citizens of Muzaffarpur town and it will also pose serious law and order problem. You are hereby restrained under Sec.144, Criminal Procedure Code from disconnecting the supply of electric energy to the Muzaffarpur water system and street lights. You are also directed to restore the electric energy if already disconnected. You are hereby directed to appear in person on 2-2-71 at 10.30 a. m. in the Court of the undersigned and to show cause as to why the rule should not be made absolute against you." As would appear from the notice quoted above in the first instance, the petitioner was restrained under Sec.144, Code of Criminal Procedure "from disconnecting the supply of electric energy to the Muzaffarpur water system and street lights. "By the second part of the notice the petitioner was directed "to restore the electric energy if already disconnected." 3. The case was argued at great length by Mr. K. D. Chatterji, Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S. P. Srivastava, Counsel for the Muzaffarpur Municipality (Opposite Party No. 3). It will not be necessary to refer to all the cases cited at the Bar by the learned Counsel for the parties. In the latter part of the notice quoted above a direction has been given to the petitioner to restore the electric energy if already disconnected. The effect of this is that a positive direction which partakes of the character of a permanent nature has been given to the petitioner and according to that in spite of the order having spent its force, the supply of electric energy would continue. Thus, the future rights of the parties would be affected. The effect of this is that a positive direction which partakes of the character of a permanent nature has been given to the petitioner and according to that in spite of the order having spent its force, the supply of electric energy would continue. Thus, the future rights of the parties would be affected. Orders under Sec.144, Code of Criminal Procedure, should always be passed in the general interest of the society and may validly interfere, within the limitations laid down, with private rights of enjoyment of property, vide Bykuntaram Shaha Roy V/s. Meajan, (1872) 18 Suth WR 47 (Cr) and Tekait Kunj Behari Narain Deo V/s. Bhiko Singh 5 Cal WN 329; but care should be taken that the jurisdiction under Sec.144 is exercised carefully and interference with private rights reduced to a minimum and regulated by a full observance of the limitations imposed by the section itself. The Magistrate is authorised in proper cases to "direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management". The abstention from certain acts must obviously not be carried too far. In the case Emperor V/s. B. N. Sasmal, (1931) ILR 58 Cal 1037 : (1931) 32 Cri LJ 592, Rankin, C. J. held that the expression does not empower Magistrates to make a positive order requiring a person to do particular things. This view was expressed by Chatterji, J. in Bimala Kanta Bagchi V/s. Sanat Kumar Ghose, AIR 1938 Pat 610 by saying that only restrictive orders could be passed under Sec.144 and the Magistrate could not for instance, as in that case, order a party to remove a fence created by him in enclose property marked off by boundary pillars erected by himself, nor use Sec.144 to dispossess such party. Any order under Sec.144, whether it directs a party to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession etc. must be of a temporary character, which means that it must not be irrevocable in its nature or partake of the character of a perpetual injunction. Any order under Sec.144, whether it directs a party to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession etc. must be of a temporary character, which means that it must not be irrevocable in its nature or partake of the character of a perpetual injunction. In the case of Tilak Kohar V/s. Emperor, AIR 1929 Pat 523, Fazal Ali, J. (with whom Courtney, Terrell, C. J. concurred) observed that it is well established law that it is beyond the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to pass an order under Sec.144 requiring people who had erected a bund to remove it. In the present case the direction to restore the supply of electric energy. If already disconnected, amounts to imposition of an obligation on the petitioner not warranted by the words of Sec.144. As already stated in the present case, the suit filed by the Muzaffarpur Municipality for permanent injunction has already been dismissed as not maintainable. Sec.24 of the Indian Electricity Act provides that in case a person neglects to pay any charge for energy or any sum due from him to a licensee in respect of the supply of energy to him, the licensee may, after giving not less than seven clear days notice in writing to such person, discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and re-connecting the supply, are paid. By virtue of this statutory right given to the petitioner it was well within its rights to disconnect "the supply of electric energy to the Muzaffarpur water system and street lights" and also to refuse the restoration "the electric energy if already disconnected," unless the sum of money due was paid in full as laid down in Sec.24 (1) of the Indian Electricity Act. It is thus clear that the notice issued by the sub-divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Muzaffarpur was also in direct contravention of Sec.24 (1) of the Indian Electricity Act and must be set aside. 4. Counsel for the Munzaffarpur Municipality (opposite party No. 3) strongly urged that as the order has already spent its force, it could not be set aside. It is not possible for me to accept this submission of learned Counsel. 4. Counsel for the Munzaffarpur Municipality (opposite party No. 3) strongly urged that as the order has already spent its force, it could not be set aside. It is not possible for me to accept this submission of learned Counsel. In spite of the fact that the order had spent its force a rule was issued in the case of Saligram Singh V/s. Baijnath Singh, AIR 1934 Patna 104 : (35 Cri LJ 1057) with a view to examine the legality or otherwise of the order. In that case the order passed, although spent by lapse of time before the hearing of the rule, was set aside on the ground that no wrongful act of the petitioner (of that case) has been alleged or found. On the same lines is the decision in Hansraj Prasad Singh V/s. Abdul Jabbar AIR 1935 Pat 461 : (36 Cri LJ 1268). In the case Panchkesar Kuer V/s. Madho Singh (1938) 19 pat LT 796 the order was set aside with the following observations (Per Varma, J.): "I am aware of the fact that the order has by now spent itself, but it may affect the future rights of the parties in any subsequent litigations." In Bindeshwari Singh V/s. Raghunandan Mahto AIR 1940 Pat 559 : (41 Cri LJ 578), it was held that if the order was not properly passed, it must be set aside even though it had spent its force. Similarly, in Dewan Singh V/s. Deo Narain Singh, AIR 1951 Pat 253 : (52 Cri LJ 809) Ramaswami, J (as he then was) interfered with an illegal order even though the order had spent its force, on the ground that it would affect the future rights of the parties. 5. Learned Counsel for opposite party No. 3 (Muzaffarpur Municipality), lastly submitted that no writ quashing the order could be passed as the impugned order had spent its force. Further, this Court should not examine the legality or otherwise of the order passed by the Subdivisional Magistrate. In answer to the last submission of learned Counsel. I would better quote the words of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. N. Guruswamy V/s. State of Mysore AIR 1954 SC 592 . Further, this Court should not examine the legality or otherwise of the order passed by the Subdivisional Magistrate. In answer to the last submission of learned Counsel. I would better quote the words of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. N. Guruswamy V/s. State of Mysore AIR 1954 SC 592 . "A writ would, therefore, be ineffectual and it is our practice not to issue meaningless writs; we must dismiss the appeal and leave the appellant content with an enunciation of law." In that case their Lordships refused to issue a writ of certiorari on the ground that the order which was sought to be quashed had almost spent its force; but nevertheless the points urged in the case were decided by their Lordships (See also Nand Kishore Saraf V/s. State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 1992 ). 6 In the result, therefore, the application is dismissed subject to the observations made above. P.K.BANERJI, J. 7 I agree.