Judgment.- Petitioner, the Vellore Shrof Kumaraswami Chetty Choultry by Executive Trustee Sri V. K. Kannappa Chettiar seeks to revise the decree and order of the District Judge, in C.R.P. No. 16 of 1968 on his file, setting aside the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the appellate Authority, on the ground of sub-letting. 2. The petitioner and the respondent entered into the lease Exhibit A-1, for the respondent carrying on a laundry business in the leasehold premises. The petitioner came forward with the case that the respondent-tenant sub-let the premises to one Mani for running a tea shop. The respondent denied sub-letting and stated that as the income from his laundry business was not sufficient for the maintenance of his increasing family, he started the tea shop agreeing to pay additional rent. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence in this case., the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have in detailed and well-considered orders accepted the case of the petitioner and ordered eviction. The learned District Judge has, in revision, filed by the tenant, concurred with the finding of the Rent Controller and affirmed by the Appellate Authority, that the tea shop was run in the demised premises itself and not in the vacant municipal site as put forward by the respondent-tenant in the course on his evidence. However, for the reasons stated in paragraph 6 of his order, the learned District Judge found that there was no sub-letting and set aside the orders of the Rent Controller and the appellate Authority and dismissed the eviction petition. 3. I entirely agree with the contentions of Sri K. Parasaran that it is for the landlord to establish independently his plea that the respondent-tenant has sublet the premises. It is really unnecessary to refer to the decision in M. K. Palaniappa Chettiar and another v. A. Ponnuswami Pillai1, in support of the said obvious proposition. But, as already pointed out, the Rent Controller and the appellate authority have in well-considered orders accepted the case of the landlord. It is really unnecessary to refer to the decision in M. K. Palaniappa Chettiar and another v. A. Ponnuswami Pillai1, in support of the said obvious proposition. But, as already pointed out, the Rent Controller and the appellate authority have in well-considered orders accepted the case of the landlord. Even a reading of paragraph 6 of the order of the learned District Judge will show that the reasons given by him are not sufficient and would not justify interference with the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority, even giving full scope to the words in section 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act defining the revisional jurisdiction of the District Court. 4. The learned District Judge has observed on the strength of the evidence of the Sanitary Inspector, P.W. 2, that both the laundry and the tea shop were simultaneously run in the demised premises and that the tea shop was run by one Mani in whose name the licence had been obtained and the said Mani should have been working under the tenant. I fail to appreciate the reasoning as to how the fact the licence was taken in the name of Mani would show that he was working under the tenant. If the respondent-tenant had been running the tea shop as his own, he would have taken the licence in his name. The reasoning of the learned District Judge is obviously perverse. The next observation made by the learned District Judge is that Mani would not have easily agreed to the transfer of the licence in the name of the tenant. He relied on the application Exhibit A-4 wherein Mani, who is referred to as Subramani has admitted that he was working under the tenant only for wages.The respondent-tenant has got into trouble by sub-letting the premises to Mani, who obtained a licence for running a tea shop and the respondent has made a clumsy attempt to improve his case by getting a transfer of the licence in his own name The learned District Judge has not considered whether the statement of Mani in his application would be admissible at all as evidence in this case. Both according to the petitioner and the respondent, Mani has no independent title According to the petitioner, he is a subtenant and according to the respondent-tenant, Mani is only his employee. Both according to the petitioner and the respondent, Mani has no independent title According to the petitioner, he is a subtenant and according to the respondent-tenant, Mani is only his employee. The admission made by such a person cannot be made use of in favour of the respondent-tenant unless it could be brought within section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act dealing with proof of admissions against persons making them and by or on their behalf. It is true that if Mani were dead, the statement could be used under clause (2) of section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act and as such it would be admissible as evidence. But here again the learned District Judge has not adverted to the fact pointed out by the learned Subordinate Judge that the transfer application was made after the Rent Control application was filed. Sri Parasaran fairly conceded that he could not support this part of the order of the learned District Judge. 5. A. reading of the order of the learned District Judge leaves an impression that sub-letting a part of the leasehold premises will not entail liability for eviction But it is clear from section 10 (2) (ii) (a) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act that a tenant cannot without the written consent of the landlord transfer his right under the lease or sublet the entire building or any portion thereof, if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so. Hence if a tenant sub-lets even a portion of the lease hold premises, it will entail liability for eviction. Therefore, the observation of the learned District Judge, “even if Mani had paid any rent for running his tea stall in one portion of the demised premises (for which there is absolutely no evidence), while the tenant was running his laundry in another portion, even then it will not amount to sub-letting” is not correct. 6. It is clear from the observation of the learned District Judge extracted above that in his opinion there is no evidence about payment of rent. The learned Rent Controller has rightly pointed out that it is difficult to get direct evidence about the sub lease by the tenant and it is a fact which can be proved as much by circumstantial evidence as by direct evidence. The learned Rent Controller has rightly pointed out that it is difficult to get direct evidence about the sub lease by the tenant and it is a fact which can be proved as much by circumstantial evidence as by direct evidence. It is really unnecessary to deal with this matter in detail, having regard to the pleadings of the parties. In paragraph 5 of the petition for eviction, it is stated: " the petitioner-landlord finds that the respondent-tenant seems to have sublet the entire premises demised to him to one Mani who is having a tea shop in the premises in question and has obtained a licence also for running the tea shop." Sri Parasaran commented on the use of the words " seems to have sub-let". It is true that the use of the said words creates some doubt whether the petitioner was sure of his case of sub letting. But no plea has been taken in respect of the same either in the counter or before any of the Courts below. Even in the next sentence in paragraph 5 of the petition for eviction it is averred: "The petitioner states that the sub-letting has been done by the respondent without the consent of the landlord (either oral or written) and the same is also opposed to the terms of the lease deed filed (with the petition)". Thus, there is affirmative averment in the petition about the sub-letting. The use of the words, "seems to have sublet " in the first sentence in paragraph 5 of the petition for eviction cannot be strictly construed having regard to the laxity of the mofussil pleadings about which this Court has repeatedly pointed out. In his counter, the tenant has stated that he stopped running the laundry business on account of his "inability to maintain his increasing family and commenced the tea shop business with the consent of the landlord. In his evidence, he went to the extent of stating that the tea shop was conducted by Mani in a vacant space belonging to the Municipality. But the Sanitary inspector, P.W.2, was examined to prove the falsity of his version. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority and even the learned District Judge have concurred in finding that the tea shop business is being conducted in the demised premises. But the Sanitary inspector, P.W.2, was examined to prove the falsity of his version. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority and even the learned District Judge have concurred in finding that the tea shop business is being conducted in the demised premises. Hence the only relevant question is, whether there was sub letting by the tenant in favour of Mani. P.W. 1 has stated in his evidence that the respondent took the premises for running a laundry and that he ceased to run it and let it to one Mani for running a tea shop. The suggestion in his cross-examination is that the respondent-tenant himself was running the tea shop. It is significant to note that no suggestions were made to P.W. 1 that no rent was paid by Mani to the respondent-tenant. Having regard to the several facts, which it is really needless to repeat, it is open to the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority to find that there was sub-letting. There is the evidence of P.W. 1 about it. There is the false plea of the tenant that the tea shop was run by the tenant in a vacant site belonging to the Municipality. There is also another version of the respondent that Mani was the servant of the tenant in running the tea shop. But the licence for the tea shop stood in the name of Mani and it is only after the eviction proceedings were started, the tenant obtained a transfer of the licence. There is nothing illegal or improper in the orders of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the appellate authority which would justify an interference in revision by the learned District Judge. 7. Sri Parasaran, relied on paragraph 1221 (at page 523) of Wood fall’s Law of Landlord and Tenant, Volume I, in support of his contention that " so long as the lessee remains in possession, he may permit another person to use the demised premises without committing a breach of a covenant ‘not to assign, under-let or part with the possession of the demised premises. ‘" Thus in Venkatarama Chettiar v. Duraiswami Mudaliar and Company1, it was held by this Court that where the evidence only established that the tenant of a premises permitted another to sell vegetables in baskets in a pial of the building on payment of daily rent, it would not amount to sub-letting as there was no parting with possession by the tenant or giving exclusive possession to the sub tenant. The above passage in Woodfall’s Law of Landlord and Tenant and the decision proceed on the footing that there was no sub-lease, but only a licence. It is enough to point out that the tenant has not put forward any plea at any time that Mani was only a licensee. Once the petitioner has established that there was sub-letting by the respondent-tenant to Mani, there is really no need to go into the question of any licence, unless it is specifically urged and eidence adduced in respect of the same. 8. Sri Parasaran has referred to the decisions in Hari Shankar v. Girdhari Lal1, and Pooran Chand v. Motilal2, as regards the scope of revision by District Court under section 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and by this Court under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. Though these two decisions of the Supreme Court have dealt with the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, the principles therein are equally applicable in deciding cases arising under section 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and under section 115 Code of Civil Procedure. 9. It is clear from what I have already stated that the orders passed by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority are legal and proper and there was therefore no jurisdiction for the District Judge to interfere in revision under section 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Therefore, this is a fit case for this Court to interfere in revision and restore the orders of the Rent Controller affirmed by the appellate authority. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is allowed, the order of the learned District Judge is set aside and the order of the Rent Controller, affirmed by the appellate authority is restored. The petitioner is entitled to costs throughout. P.S.P. ----- Petition allowed.