Judgment Kanhaiyaji, J. 1. In this writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner Sri Shyam Sundar Prasad has challenged the validity of the order dated the 18th July, 1970 (Annexure 1) made by the President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the President of the Board)" and the order dated the 23rd October, 1970 (Annexure 3) made by the Appellate Authority. 2. There is a High School at Islampur in the district of Patna named Netaji Shri Subhas High School (herein-after referred to as the School). The school was managed by a Managing Committee with effect from the 1st August, 1964, constituted in accordance with the provisions of Bihar High Schools (Constitution. Powers and Functions of Managing Committee) Rules- 1964, hereinafter called the Rules. The petitioner was the President of the Managing Committee. Subsequently, in 1967, the Rules were amended and the amended Rules came into force with effect from the 24th May. 1967. Rule 37 requires that "for each school a Managing Committee shall be constituted in accordance with these rules, within a period of two years from the date of publication of these rules in the Official Gazette" and Rule 39 thereof provides that "where a Managing Committee is not constituted, in accordance with these rules, within the period specified in the Rule 37, the powers and duties of the Managing Committee, President and Secretary shall, until its constitution in accordance therewith be exercised and performed by such person as may be appointed by the President of the Board of Secondary Education for the purpose". No Managing Committee was constituted according to the new Rules within the prescribed period aforesaid and by notification No. 1158 dated the 22nd May, 1969, the President of the Board (respondent No. 11 acting under the aforesaid Rule 39 appointed the petitioner the President of the then Managing Committee to exercise and perform the powers and duties of the Managing Committee, President and Secretary with effect from the 24th May, 1969 until the constitution of a Managing Committee in accordance with the rules. The petitioner was functioning as the Managing Committee. President and Secretary, of the said school. The President of the Board in the meantime changed the constitution of the ad hoc committee by a fresh notification issued in continuation of the earlier notification. The petitioner was functioning as the Managing Committee. President and Secretary, of the said school. The President of the Board in the meantime changed the constitution of the ad hoc committee by a fresh notification issued in continuation of the earlier notification. He constituted an ad hoc Committee consisting of respondents 2 to 5 and the petitioner with the Block Development Officer, Tslampur (respondent No. 2) as its President. A copy of the said order and communication dated the 18th July, 1970 is Annexure 1 to the writ application. The petitioner was aggrieved by this order and he preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority appointed under Section 6 of the Bihar High Schools (Control and Regulation of Administration) Act 1960. hereinafter referred to as the Act. Shri N. D. J. Rao, Secretary to the Government. Education Department. Bihar and Appellate Authority under the Act admitted the appeal and stayed the operation of the aforesaid order of respondent No. 1. A copy of the order is Annexure 2 to the writ application. The Appellate Authority on final hearing dismissed the appeal by its order dated the 23rd October, 1970. A copy of the said order is Annexure 3 to the writ application. The petitioner has moved this Court for quashisg these orders by issuance of writ of certiorari. 3. It is claimed in the petition that under Rule 39 respondent No, 1 is empowered to appoint only one person who is to function as the Managing Committee. President and Secretary of the School concerned, and the said Rule 39 does not contemplate the appointment of more than one person as member of the ad hoc Committee. At any rate, it is said that the said rule does not envisage the exercise of the power of appointing ad hoc committee on more than one occasion, nor does it make the appointment of the appointee as perilous as to render him removable from the office at the pleasure of the President of the Board. In paragraph 15 of the writ application, it is said that at the time of argument of the appeal before the learned Appellate Authority it appeared from the relevant file that the aforesaid order (Annexure 1) was passed by respondent No. 1 at the instance of the State Minister for Education. Government of Bihar. In paragraph 15 of the writ application, it is said that at the time of argument of the appeal before the learned Appellate Authority it appeared from the relevant file that the aforesaid order (Annexure 1) was passed by respondent No. 1 at the instance of the State Minister for Education. Government of Bihar. In paragraph 16 of the writ application, a short history of the political rivalry between the petitioner and respondent No. 5. Sri Ramsharan Prasad Singh is given; and in paragraph 17 it is stated that respondent No. 5 supports the present Ministry, and as such the State Minister for Education has under his influence, mala fide interfered with the working of the President of the Board which is an autonomous body and caused the said order dated the 18th July, 1970 (Annexure 1) passed against the petitioner. 4. Cause has been shown by Sri Ram Sharan Prasad Singh, respondent No. 5, to whom the notice of the writ application was ordered to be issued. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, it has been asserted that the President of the Board (respondent. No. 1) had full authority to appoint more than one person to constitute ad hoc committee to exercise powers and carry on duties of the Managing Committee. It is also stated that the statements made in paragraph 17 of the writ application are unwarranted, false and baseless. 5. Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, raised three contentions: (1) that Rule 39 does not contemplate formation of an ad hoc committee of more than one person; (2) that since once the power has been exercised by the President of the Board under Rule 39. he cannot exercise it again for removing the appointed persons without observing the procedure laid down by Sec. 5 (2) of the Act; and (3) that the act of re constitution of the ad hoc committee by the President of the Board on the behest of the Minister is mala fide. 6. Learned Counsel urged that the powers and duties of the Managing Committee, the President and Secretary are one and can be performed by only one person who may be appointed by the President of the Board. 6. Learned Counsel urged that the powers and duties of the Managing Committee, the President and Secretary are one and can be performed by only one person who may be appointed by the President of the Board. According to learned Counsel, the word person has been used in singular number in Rule 39 by the framers of the Rules intentionally in order to empower such person to exercise powers and carry on duties of the Managing Committee. President and Secretary whose functions are unified. Learned Counsel pointed out that the word person can be read as persons in plural under the General Clauses Act but the word person used in Rule 39 has to be read in its context. In my opinion, it is not possible to accept the contention. There are different functions of the Managing Committee. President and Secretary under the Rules. It is for the President of the Board to decide that where a Managing Committee is not constituted, in accordance with the rules, within the period specified in Rule 37, the powers and duties of the Managing Committee. President and Secretary shall, until its constitution in accordance therewith, be exercised and performed by such person or persons as may be appointed by him. A simple construction of Rule 39 indicates that it is left to the discretion of the President of the Board to appoint an ad hoc committee of one person or more than one person assigning functions of the Managing Committee. President of the outgoing Managing Committee in the beginning was appointed by the President of the Board for the purpose of carrying on the cent bined affairs of the Managing Committee, President and Secretary. The President of the Board, perhaps due to delay in the formation of a regular Managing Committee, considered that the ad hoc committee should be expanded in the interest of better management of the affairs of the school. This is amplified by the distribution of powers and functions of the Managing Committee. President and Secretary. The Block Development Officer of Islampur was made the President, the Consolidation Officer, Ekangarsarai, Dr. Rashid Khan and the petitioner the members and Sri Ramsharan Prasad Singh, M. L. A. (respondent No. 5) the Secretary. This constitution of the ad hoc Committee is valid and in consonance with the objects of Rule 39. 7. President and Secretary. The Block Development Officer of Islampur was made the President, the Consolidation Officer, Ekangarsarai, Dr. Rashid Khan and the petitioner the members and Sri Ramsharan Prasad Singh, M. L. A. (respondent No. 5) the Secretary. This constitution of the ad hoc Committee is valid and in consonance with the objects of Rule 39. 7. Sec. 5 (1) of the Act provides that "for every high school there shall be a managing committee constituted in such manner as may be prescribed", and Clause (2) provides that "if the Board is of the opinion that the managing committee of a high school is not functioning in a way conducive to the maintenance of discipline among its teachers and pupils and is not carrying out the directions of the Board or administering the financing of such school properly it may by en order, after giving the managing committee a reasonable opportunity of being heard, suspend for a period not exceeding six months or dissolve the managing committee". Clause (3) of the aforesaid Sec.3 lays down that "where the Board suspends or dissolves a managing committee under Sub-section (2), the powers and duties of the managing committee shall be exercised and performed by such person or persons as may be appointed by the Board until the expiry of the period of suspension or the reconstitution of the managing committee, as the case may be" and, Clause 4 lays down that "where a managing committee is dissolved under Sub-section (2), a new managing committee shall be constituted in accordance with the rules made in this behalf within one year of such dissolution". Sec. 6. Clause (1) provides that "any person aggrieved by an order made by the Board under Clause (b) of Sec. 4 or under Section 5 may, within sixty days of such order, prefer an appeal to the authority appointed in this behalf by the State Government; and the appeal shall be disposed of in the prescribed manner". A plain reading of Sec. 5 of the Act makes it clear that there is a difference between the powers exercised by the Board under Sec. 5 of the Act and the powers exercised by the President of the Board under Rule 39 of the Rules. A plain reading of Sec. 5 of the Act makes it clear that there is a difference between the powers exercised by the Board under Sec. 5 of the Act and the powers exercised by the President of the Board under Rule 39 of the Rules. The provisions of Sec. 5 of the Act are applicable only in a case where the President of the Board decides to suspend or dissolve any managing committee. In the present case, the President of the Board has done neither of these. The ad hoc committee consisting of the sole member namely, the petitioner, was neither suspended nor dissolved, but the ad hoc committee has been only expanded by the addition of four new members. Now, when the ad hoc committee has five members, the various functions have to be distributed among these members. The expansion of the ad hoc committee is covered by the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Act. It is not possible to accept that any action in regard to removing a person from authority is covered by Section 5 (2) of the Act. All that has been done by Annexure 1 is to add four persons to be members of the ad hoc committee. Re-constitution of an ad hoc committee under Rule 39 is not as a result of dissolution or suspension of the Managing Committee constituted according to the rules. For the same reason. I cannot accept that an ad hoc committee once formed can never be varied. There is no warrant in law to hold that this power must be exercised once for all for formation of a particular ad hoc committee and that thereafter so long as that committee is in existence, no member can be added to it. This point raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner must, therefore, fail. 8. In my opinion, the petitioner stands on an even weaker ground on the question of the order being mala fide. The foundation of mala fide is contained in paragraph 15 of the writ petition. I have already referred to the same in which it is stated that the impugned order (Annexure 1) was passed by respondent No 1 at the instance of the State Minister of Education. Government of Bihar, Mr. The foundation of mala fide is contained in paragraph 15 of the writ petition. I have already referred to the same in which it is stated that the impugned order (Annexure 1) was passed by respondent No 1 at the instance of the State Minister of Education. Government of Bihar, Mr. S. K. Jha, learned Government Pleader No. 2 produced before me the relevant case record from the office of the President of the Board. There is nothing in the record to show that the aforesaid ad hoc managing Committee was reconstituted with five persons at the instance of the Minister concerned. In this connection, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Commr, of Police V/s. Gordhandas Bhanji, ( AIR 1952 SC 16 )3 but the facts of that case are entirely different. In that case, the Commissioner of Police was the only person vested with authority to grant or refuse licence for erection of a building for the purpose of public amusement. The power to do so was vested in the Commissioner of Police and not in the State Government, it was held that the order of cancellation was not an order by the Commissioner but merely intimation by him of an order passed by another authority, namely, the Government of Bombay. As the only person who could effect the cancellation was the Commissioner of Police, there was no valid order of cancellation. I do not think in the circumstances of this case that the order passed by the President of the Board is mala fide. 9. For the reasons given above, I find no merit in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. As a result, the application fails and is dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order for cost.