Judgment :- The Petitioner is an employer aggrieved by the order of the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation dated 22nd December 1970 whereunder he rejected his application to set aside an ex parte order made under the Workmens Compensation Act for payment of compensation to the second respondent without assigning any reasons whatever. The facts as alleged in the petition and which are not disputed are as follows: The second respondent as a dependent claimed a sum of Rs. 7,000 as compensation on the ground that her husband died in the course of employment with the petitioner and as a result of injuries sustained by him in an accident when he was unloading a lorry belonging to the petitioner. The second respondents case was that her husband was employed as workman in the service of the petitioner and in the course of such employment he sustained serious injuries which ultimately proved fatal. The second respondents husband died on 7th November 1967. Thereafter, the second respondent claimed through her lawyer a compensation of Rs. 7000. As no settlement was possible, she filed a petition under the Workmens Compensation Act and sought for a compensation of Rs. 7,000. The second respondents case was that the petitioner did not reply to the lawyers notice, but it happened that the petitioner took up the position before the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation that the deceased was a casual employee and not his workman, and denied that the accident occurred in the course of employment. The further contention of the petitioner was that the Insurance Company was a necessary party, as insurers were liable in law to take over the liability once the Commissioner found that compensation was payable. On such pleadings and after framing of the issues, the case was adjourned from time to time and, finally to 27th June 1970. On that date the counsel for the petitioner informed the petitioner that he was unable to be present and that he would make arrangements for getting the case postponed. According to the petitioner, he was instructed by his counsel not to be present on that date and so the petitioner absented himself from court. On the adjourned date the Commissioner in the absence of the petitioner took up the case for enquiry, took evidence and found that the deceased was a workman and he died in the course of employment. On the adjourned date the Commissioner in the absence of the petitioner took up the case for enquiry, took evidence and found that the deceased was a workman and he died in the course of employment. The Commissioner set the petitioner ex parte and passed orders. The order of the Commissioner does not disclose that there was any cross examination of the only witness examined by him. He also decided the question whether the Insurance Company was a necessary party or not without hearing the parties in full. Ultimately he passed an order granting a compensation of Rs. 7,000 to the wife of the deceased. The petitioner was called upon by the additional Commissioner in his letter dated 20th August, 1970 to pay the said amount, failing which action was threatened. It is on the said information the petitioner failed an application before the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation under O. 9, R. 13, C.P.C. stating that there was sufficient cause for his absence on the date of the final hearing of the application, that he was misguided by his lawyer, and that he was unable to be present in person on the last hearing date when the case was set for hearing. The first respondent, on this application, passed a non-speaking order to the effect: “Your request to restore the case has been rejected.” It is as against this the present writ petition has been filed. The learned counsel for the petitioner says that, as Or. 9 R. 13 C.P. Code is expressly made applicable to proceedings before the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, the first respondent did not exercise his jurisdiction at all in having made a non-speaking order, and that the petitioner should be given an opportunity to state his objections to the claim in the usual manner and conduct the case. The learned counsel for the second respondent raised two contentions. The first is that the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation is a court which is subordinate to the High Court, and, that being so, no writ under Art. 226 will lie and the petitioners remedy can only be by way of a revision petition under Sec. 115, C.P. Code. The learned counsel for the second respondent raised two contentions. The first is that the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation is a court which is subordinate to the High Court, and, that being so, no writ under Art. 226 will lie and the petitioners remedy can only be by way of a revision petition under Sec. 115, C.P. Code. The second which is on merits, is that the Commissioner went through the records, heard the affected party and was satisfied that the claim was genuine, and that the records do not disclose that the petitioner had sufficient cause for absenting himself. On the first question the learned counsel for the second respondent relied upon the decisions in Dirji v. Coalin A.I.R. 1942 Pat. 33, and in Issardas S. Lulla v. Smt. Hari A.I.R. 1962 Mad. 458. However, she would state that for the purpose of the order which is now challenged in this court, even if the first respondent was not acting as a court subordinate to this court, the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court cannot be invoked even if justice has failed in the hands of the Commissioner. The argument of the learned counsel for the second respondent is no doubt interesting. Sec. 30 of the Workmens Compensation (hereinafter referred to as the Act) provides appeals to the High Court from certain specified orders of the Commissioner functioning under the Act. The various sub-clauses in Sec. 30 do not include an order under which the Commissioner refuses to set aside an ex parte order. Sec. 30 deals with normal orders passed by the Commissioner as a court subordinate to the High Court after hearing the parties and after following the prescribed procedure. But in a case where no such order, as is contemplated under Sec. 30, is passed, it cannot be said that even in such circumstances the Commissioner should be expected to have acted as a court subordinate to this Court or in any event as a civil court. Sec. 23 of the Act provides some guidance as to what are the powers of a Commissioner functioning under the Workmens Compensation Act. Sec. 23 of the Act provides some guidance as to what are the powers of a Commissioner functioning under the Workmens Compensation Act. While applying certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Sec. 23 provides that the Commissioner shall have all the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, for certain purposes and the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of Sec. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For certain purposes, therefore, the Commissioner is deemed to be a court, and, for the purpose of scrutinising an order made by him under Sec. 30 of the Art which is in substance and in effect one passed in exercise of his jurisdiction as a statutory functionary under the Act, he has to be characterised as a court functioning as one subordinate to the High Court. But would that circumstance be sufficient to hold that this court acting under Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot have jurisdiction to set aside an order passed by such a Commissioner refusing to set aside an ex parte order? R. 41 of the Workmens Compensation Rules, 1924, makes O. 9 applicable to all proceedings before the Commissioner. The present order is the result of an application made under O. 9, R. 13. The order passed by him ex facie is a non-speaking order not supported by any reason whatever. It cannot be said that in a case where a person who is deemed to be a court for certain reasons but who refused as a quasi-judicial tribunal to set aside an ex parte order, can even then be considered as a court subordinate to this court, so that the visitorial jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 is totally ousted to the detriment of the aggrieved party. Here is a case in which the records disclose that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, since the Commissioner did not exercise his jurisdiction at all when he made the non-speaking order and without even considering the pros and cons or the merits of the application before him. The law has advanced very far so as to deem such orders, which are violative of principles of natural justice or fair play, as orders which are to be treated as nullity or as non est. The law has advanced very far so as to deem such orders, which are violative of principles of natural justice or fair play, as orders which are to be treated as nullity or as non est. In those circumstances, I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the second respondent that the ratio in the two cases referred to by her squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of this case. Dirji v. Goalin A.I.R. 1942 Pat. 33 is a case where the normal order was passed by the Commissioner and the aggrieved party, instead of filing an appeal as provided under S. 30 of the Act, desired that the memorandum of appeal should be treated as an application in revision. This was because the question which mainly arose in that case was about the status of the dependent. After holding that the Commissioner had power to decide the question of status, the Division Bench of the Patna High Court took the view that he having failed to exercise that power, a revision under S. 115 would lie to the High Court and it was not necessary to file an appeal under S. 30. It was in those circumstances the Division Bench went into the question as to the real legal character of the Commissioner functioning under the Workmens Compensation Act. In Issardas S. Lulla v. Smt. Hari A.I.R. 1962 Mad. 458, the Division Bench of this Court pointed out the distinction between Arts. 226 and 227. That was a case which was directed against an order of Subordinate Civil Court, orders of whom are susceptible to appeal or revision. In those circumstances, after pointing out the distinction between Arts. 226 and 227 the learned Judges held that orders of Subordinate Civil Courts are not susceptible to prerogative writs of prohibition and certiorari. In the instant case, O. 9 of the Civil Procedure Code is made applicable to the proceedings before the Commissioner. S. 30 does not provide for an appeal against an order passed by the Commissioner while dealing with an application under O. 9, C.P.C. It, therefore, follows that such an order is not an appealble order. But the argument is that the petitioner ought to have filed a revision, as generally the Commissioner is deemed to function as a civil court and a petition under Art. 226 will not lie. But the argument is that the petitioner ought to have filed a revision, as generally the Commissioner is deemed to function as a civil court and a petition under Art. 226 will not lie. This is a hyper technical objection which, if accepted, would cause injustice to the petitioner Here is a case where the first respondent did not even consider whether there was sufficient cause for the petitioner to absent himself on the date of enquiry. On the other hand, the application was summarily rejected without giving any adequate reason whatever. This non-speaking order, if it were to remain on record, would mean that justice has not been done and there has not been a fair trial by an authority whether he be a court or quasi judicial Tribunal, and the principles of natural justice and fair play have been violated. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, in my discretion, I treat this matter as one falling under the well known principle that certiorari will issue to correct a record which contains an error apparent on the face of record and where principles of fair-play have not been observed. The dependent, however rightful her claim may be, cannot maintain on ex parte decree for all time without giving the opposite party an opportunity to speak and let in evidence and seek the appropriate relief. In those circumstances, as the record brought before me contains an error apparent, I make the rule nisi absolute on condition that the petitioner deposits a sum of Rs. 7,000 within a month from this date. On such deposit being made, the second respondent is permitted to withdraw a sum of Rs. 1,000 without furnishing security. The Commissioner is directed to restore the application on file and pass the necessary orders after hearing the parties. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.