( 1 ) IN the village of Malgi in the District of North Kanara, there was a. certain Vithal Shabayya, who had four sons by name Ramachandra, venkatrao, Govind and Vaman. These five persons were members of a joint hindu Family. Govind separated from the joint family in the year 1906. Varma , died in the year 1915, leaving an only son by name Gajanan. After the death of Vithal Shabayya, Ramachandra, Venkatrao, and Gajanan, son or Varnan, entered into a partition and divided the joint family properties belonging to them onder a partition deed dt. 21-7-1930 marked as Ex. 76 in the suit. Ramachandra had three sons by name Sheshgiri, Shrinivas and nagesh, Sheshgiri having been given away in adoption to another family. The branch of Ramachandra consisted of Ramachandra, Shrinivas and Nagesh. Nagesh died in the year 1938, leaving behind him his widow Shantabai, who is defendant 7, his son Vishnu, the plaintiff and Shakuntala and sheshikala, his two daughters. Ramachandra died on 8-4-1956. At the time of his death, the surviving members of his branch were Shrinivas, defendant 1, Gowribai. his wife, (defendant 2), Sarojini, daughter of shrinivas (defendant 3), Viswanath (defendant 4), Hari (defendant 5) and jagadeesh (defendant 6), sons of Shrinivas, Shantabai (defendant 7) and vishnu, the plaintiff. It may be mentioned here that Shankuntala and shasikala the two sisters of the plaintiff had been given in marriage by march 1961. ( 2 ) VISHNU, son of Nagesh, referred to above, filed Spl. C. S. No. 55 of 1962, out of which this appeal arises, on the file of the Civil Judge, Sr. Dn. , Karwar, for partition and separate possession of his half share in the properties described in the schedule attached to the plaint, claiming that all those properties were joint family properties. By the time the suit was filed, his two sisters Shakuntala and Shasikala had been given away in marriage and had ceased to be members of a joint Hindu family. The suit was originally instituted against defendants 1 to 6 only. Later on, shantabai, the mother of the plaintiff was added as the 7th defendant. In the plaint, the plaintiff alleged that even though Ramachandra was the senior male member of the family, the first defendant, who was the elder son of Ramachandra, was managing the family properties since Ramachandra was too old to manage and was an invalid. Later on, shantabai, the mother of the plaintiff was added as the 7th defendant. In the plaint, the plaintiff alleged that even though Ramachandra was the senior male member of the family, the first defendant, who was the elder son of Ramachandra, was managing the family properties since Ramachandra was too old to manage and was an invalid. It was urged in the plaint that the family owned large number of properties, which included not merely the properties that were allotted to the branch of Ramachandra under the partition which took pace in the year 1930, but also certain other items of properties which had been acquired from out of the joint family funds. The plaintiff stated in his plaint that his father was staying away from the family for some time before his death, at Hubli where he was practising as a doctor and after his death, he and his mother continued to stay away from the family. According to him, the joint family was getting a large income from the family, properties, including a rice mill which was situated on item No. 13 of plaint 'a' schedule, bearing S. No. 3 of Malgi village. The plaint refers to some correspondence, to which we will advert later, which had taken place between the plaintiff and defendant 1 before the institution of the suit, regarding the settlement of their respective claims in the joint family properties. The plaintiff urged that all the properties in schedule were liable to be partitioned between himself and his mother on the one hand and defendants 1 to 6 on the other in equal shares and the parties must be put in possession of their respective shares in the joint family properties. When the suit was instituted, a commissioner was appointed by the Court to take an inventory ef the moveables in the family house and the report of the Commissioner is marked as Ex. 26 in the suit. When the suit was instituted, a commissioner was appointed by the Court to take an inventory ef the moveables in the family house and the report of the Commissioner is marked as Ex. 26 in the suit. We should have stated earlier that there was a further averment in the plaint that besides the ancestral lands obtained under the family partition of 1930, the family bad come into possession of the properties inherited by defendant 2 from her parents and that defendant 2 did not look upon those properties as her own separate estate, but gave them for the use and management of the joint family and that the income derived from both the sets of lands was brought to the common stock and for all practical purposes the property of defendant 2 and its income became the joint family property. ( 3 ) DEFENDANTS 1 and 2 filed a common written statement. They admitted the relationship between the parties set out in the plaint. But they denied the case of the plaintiff that all the plaint schedule properties were joint family properties, which were liable to be partitioned. They denied that the first defendant was the manager of the family from 1930. On the other hand, according to them it was Ramachandra, who was functioning as the manager of the family till his death in the year 1956. Ramachandra was stated to be hale and healthy and capable of managing the affairs of the family till his death. It was denied that the second defendant had parted with the properties, which she had inherited from her father in favour of the joint family. It was urged that in the year 1930, when the partition took place in the family, the income which the family was deriving from the properties which fell to its share, was very meagre and was not enough to maintain the joint family. It was further urged that defendant 2 got large number of properties from her father and very often, the income which they derived from the properties of the second defendant had to be used in order to supplement the income of the joint family for its maintenance. It was further urged that defendant 2 got large number of properties from her father and very often, the income which they derived from the properties of the second defendant had to be used in order to supplement the income of the joint family for its maintenance. They pleaded that ths properties which are purchased after 1930 either in the name of first defendant or in the names of defendants 3 to 5 were acquired from out of the monies belonging to the defendant 2, and they could not, therefore, be the properties of the joint family. So far as the rice mill, which is constructed on item No. 13 of the 'a' schedule and which is also shown as item No. 1 of the plaint 'b' schedule, and other moveables are concerned, it is pleaded that they all belong to defendants 1 to 6 alone. It was also urged that in or about the year 1958 or 1959, there was an oral partition between the plaintiff on the one hand and defendants 1, 3, 4 and 5 on the other, under which the plaintiff agreed to take certain items of properties to his share in addition to one bit of land belonging to defendant 2, in lieu of certain item of joint family property, which he agreed to give up in favour of defendant 1, and that a sum of Rs. 400 was sent immediately thereafter to the plaintiff, who was at the time in Bombay being the income from the share, which had been allotted to the plaintiff at the oral partition. Defendants 1 and 2 also aver in the course of their written statement that there were some discussions and correspondence which had taken place between the plaintiff, defendant 1 and some others, who were interested in the plaintiff. It is urged that in the belief that the plaintiff had separated himself from the family at the time of the oral partition referred to above, a registered partition deed (Ex. 81) had been executed by defendants 1 to 6, distributing the properties of the joint family, which according to them had fallen to their share under the oral partition and some other properties, which belonged to defendant 1 and his branch and defendant 2. 81) had been executed by defendants 1 to 6, distributing the properties of the joint family, which according to them had fallen to their share under the oral partition and some other properties, which belonged to defendant 1 and his branch and defendant 2. In substance, their case was that apart from the properties which fell to Ramachandra's branch in the partition, no other property was liable to be divided. Defendants 4 and 5 adopted the written statement of defendants 1 and 2. Defendant 7, the mother of the plaintiff, supported the case of the plaintiff. On the basis of the allegations in the pleadings referred to above, the court below framed a number of issues. Of them, the two material issues, according to us, were the following: (1 ). Whether the plaintiff establishes that defendant 1 was de facto manager of the joint family from 1930 onwards? (2a ). Does plaintiff prove that there was sufficient nucleus of the ancestral property, to facilitate the acquisition of the suit properties? (2b ). If so, does defendant 1 prove that all the suit properties except serial No. 6 are his separate and self acquired properties? the rest of the issues, in a way, are dependent on the answers to the above two issues. ( 4 ) THE trial Court, on the material before it, came to the conclusion, that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration that in all the immoveable properties of the joint family mentioned in the plaint schedule except s. Nos. 41/1, 41/2, 41/3 and 41/4 and the moveable properties of the joint family, mentioned in the plaint schedules and in the Commissioner's report ex. 26, the plaintiff had a half share and he was entitled to a decree for a partition and separate possession in respect of them. It also held that defendant 1 was liable to render account in respect of the income of the joint family properties from the year 1958-59 till the date of a suit. After making a decree as stated above, the lower Court ia said to have amended the decree by making a further order that defendant 1 was liable to pay a sum of Rs. 5,400 by way of past mesne profits and Re. 2,000 towards the marriage expenses of one of the sisters of the plaintiff, which had taken place in the year 1961. 5,400 by way of past mesne profits and Re. 2,000 towards the marriage expenses of one of the sisters of the plaintiff, which had taken place in the year 1961. Aggrieved by the above decree, defendants 1 to 5 have filed this appeal. ( 5 ) BEFORE proceeding further, we shall dispose of matters on which there is not much controversy. Even though defendants 1 and 2 alleged in their written statement that there was an oral partition in or about the year 1958 between the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant 1 and his branch on the other, and that there is a reference to the said oral partition in Ex. 81, in the absence of a registered partition deed evidencing partition and any other material to show that the plaintiff was communicated about the unequivocal intention of defendant 1 and members of his branch to separate from the plaintiff, we have to negative the said contention of defendants 1 and 2 and hold that the family continued to be undivided until Ex. 70 dt. 26-9-1960 was written by the plaintiff to defendant 1. ( 6 ) IN that letter (Ex. 70), the plaintiff has communicated his unequivocal intention to separate from the family and has called upon defendant 1 to deliver to him his rightful share in the joint family properties. We, therefore, hold that the division of status between the plaintiff on the one hand and defendants 1, 4, 5 and 6 on the other took place on 26-9-1960. It may also be mentioned at this stage that there is no dispute between the parties about items 1 to 9, 14, 16, 17, 19 and 20 of plaint A schedule. Both the parties agree that they are joint family properties which are liable to be partitioned in equal shares between the plaintiff and defendants 1, 4, 5 and 6. With regard to two items of property which were admittedly properties belonging to the joint family prior to the date of partition in the year 1930, viz. , items Nos. 12 and 15, there appears to be some controversy and we shall advert to it later. ( 7 ) THE first question which we propose to dispose of is one arising out of issue No. 7 in the case. , items Nos. 12 and 15, there appears to be some controversy and we shall advert to it later. ( 7 ) THE first question which we propose to dispose of is one arising out of issue No. 7 in the case. In paragraph 3 of the plaint, the plaintiff has alleged that Ramachandra was too old to manage and was an invalid and thereforeilhe actual management of all the properties was in the hands of defendant 1 since 1930. This allegation has been denied by the first defendant. Ordinarily, in a joint Hindu family, the seniormost male member is the Karta of family. It is, no doubt, true that it is open to him to renounce his right to be the manager in favour of another coparcener. But, until there is such renunciation by him of his right to be the manager of the family,, he continues to be the manager. Admittedly in this case, ramachandra iwas the seniormost male member in the coparcenary consisting of Ramachandra, defendant 1 and his branch and Nagesh and his son the plaintiff. One piece of evidence on which Mr. Ramadas, learned counsel for the plaintiff relied is a statement found in Ex. 81, which is a partition deed entered into amongst defendant 1 to 6 on 22-8-1959 in which, according to Mr. Ramadas, there is an admission made by the executants of the said document that defendant 1 was managing the properties of the joint family as manager from 1930. The relevant portion of the said document marked as Ex. 81a reads as follows:"ramachandra who remained with his sons died about 4 years ago. Out of us Srinivasarao went on making Vahiwat of the undivided family as manager from 1930. "shri Ramadas contended that an admission by a party is a very strong piece of evidence on which his adversary can rely and the person who has made such an admission should not be permitted to resile from his position. The law relating to appreciation of statements which are in the nature of admissions is well established. S. 31 of the Indian Evidence Act states "that admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but, they may operate as estoppels under the provisions hereinafter contained. The law relating to appreciation of statements which are in the nature of admissions is well established. S. 31 of the Indian Evidence Act states "that admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but, they may operate as estoppels under the provisions hereinafter contained. " as long as a party who relies upon the admission made by the other has not altered his position to his prejudice on the basis of the statement which is considered as an admission, it may be open to the party who is said to have made that admission, to show that the statement on which reliance is placed is not true or wholly true and can show by other material on record that the Court should not act upon the said admission. The statements which are in the nature of admissions should be unqualified and should not be ambiguous. They no doubt give rise to a presumption that what is stated therein is true. But, if the admissions on which reliance is placed conflicts with the other evidence in the case, it would be open to the court, on an appreciation of the entire material to come to a different conclusion and if a Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, feels that effect should not be given to that admission, then no Court of justice should hesitate to do so if the material before it warrants such a conclusion. Now, in this case, apart from the statement that is contained in ex. 81 which was entered into by defendants 1 to 6 on the assumption that there was an earlier oral partition and the plaintiff had gone out of the family having taken his share in the joint family properties, there is no other reliable evidence placed by the plaintiff in support of his case that defendant 1 was acting as the manager of the joint family from the year 1930 and it is also not shown that the plaintiff in any way altered his position to his prejudice in the belief that defendant 1 was the manager of the family. In this case, we have some evidence about this aspect of the matter. In Ex. 71 dt. In this case, we have some evidence about this aspect of the matter. In Ex. 71 dt. 26-9-1960, in which the plaintiff claimed his share of the property, the plaintiff stated with regard to this matter as follows:"as my grandfather was old during the time it was you who were managing and dealing with the family estate as a Vaiwatdar later on, a registered notice was sent on behalf of the plaintiff by a Pleader of Sirsi, demanding the plaintiff's share in the joint family properties on 11-1-1961 (Ex. 74 ). "in that notice, this is what has been stated on benalf of the plaintiff. "after the death of Ramachandra, Srinivas being the eldest of the joint family his name was entered in the record of rights to all the properties of the joint family and he began to make vahiwat of those properties on behalf of the joint family". What was meant by this statement in Ex. 74 was that until Ramachandra was alive, Ramachandra was the manager of the family and after his death, which admittedly took place on 8-4-1956, the name of the first defendant was entered in the record of rights in respect of the joint family properties and defendant 1 began to function as manager of those properties on behalf of the joint family. In view of the above, it is difficult to hold that from the year 1930 upto 8-4-1956 defendant 1 acted as the manager of the family instead of Ramachandra. We may mention that the statement in Ex. 81 on which reliance was placed by the plaintiff, is neutralised by the statement in Ex. 74 in which the plaintiff has stated it was only after the death of Ramachandra,. defendant 1 began to manage the affairs of the family. It is a well known principle of law that when parties are in possession of information regarding the true state of affairs, nothing much would turn upon statements similar to those found in Ex. 81a. The Court has to examine the entire evidence and come to a conclusion on the basis of the entire material, We may also observe at this stage that issue No. 7, which was framed by the court after hearing both the parties, is not also happily worded. The issue should have been, whether defendant 1 was the manager of the family from 1930 or from 1956. The issue should have been, whether defendant 1 was the manager of the family from 1930 or from 1956. But, the Court below has framed an issue, viz. , whether the plaintiff establishes that defendant 1 was de facto manager of a joint family from 1930 onwards. In Hindu Law, we do not have a concept of a de facto manager of a joint family. The Court below probably thought, while it framed that issue, that it was called upon to determine as to who was in fact managing the property even though some body else was the manager of the joint family in the eye of law. We, therefore, hold that the finding of the Court below on issue No. 7 is liable to be set aside and we further hold that it was Ramachandra who was manager of the joint family till he died on 8-4-1956. The next question for determination in this case is, whether or not the properties that were purchased or acquired in the name of defendants 1, 4, 5 and 6 which are mentioned in the plaint schedule are joint family properties. The rules governing the question whether a property acquired by a member of the joint Hindu family is a joint family property or not are well settled. The several presumptions in respect of this question which are evolved by Courts are based on dictates of common sense. These questions have been settled by the Supreme Court in Srinivas v. Narayan, AIR 1954 SC 379 the Supreme Court observed in that case as follows:"proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint, and the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item ot property was joint to establish the fact. But where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property Whether the evidence adduced by the plaintiff was sufficient to shift the burden which initially rested on him of establishing that there was adequate nucleus out of which the acquisitions could have been made is one of fact depending on the nature and the extent of the nucleus. The important thing to consider is the income which the nucleus yields. A building in the occupation of the members of a family and yielding no income eould not be nucleus out of which acquisitions could be made, even though it might be of considerable value. On the other hand, a running business in which the capital invested is comparatively small might conceivably produce substantial income, which may well form the foundation of the subsequent acquisitions. These are not abstract questions of law, but questions of fact to be determined on the evidence in the case. "it was further observed in the course of that judgment, on the basis of the facts proved in that case that;-"but in the present case, the finding of the Courts is that the income from the lands was not sufficient even for the maintenance of the members, and on that, they were right in holding that the plaintiff had not discharged the initial burden which lay on him. But even if we are to accept the contention of the appellant that on proof f the existence of the Watan lands, the burden had shifted on to the defendants to prove that the acquisitions were made without the aid of joint family funds, we must hold on the facts that that burden had been discharged. "we may as well at this stage refer to another decision of the Supreme court in which the question related to a property said to have been acquired by the manager of a joint Hindu family to which he laid an exclusive claim. The said question came up for consideration in Mallesappq v. Desai mallappa , AIR. "we may as well at this stage refer to another decision of the Supreme court in which the question related to a property said to have been acquired by the manager of a joint Hindu family to which he laid an exclusive claim. The said question came up for consideration in Mallesappq v. Desai mallappa , AIR. 1961 SC, 1268 in which it was observed as follows:"but, in our opinion, there is no doubt that where a manager claims that any immoveable property has been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of the joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, it is for him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchase money proceeded from his separate funds. The onus of proof must in such a case be placed on the manager and not on his coparceners. "we shall examine the facts of this case in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court, extracted above. The first document to which reference should be made is a partition deed which came into existence amongst the members of the family in the year 1930, which is marked as ex. 76 in the case. The parties to this partition deed were, Ramachandra and his brother Venkatrao and Gajanan the son ot the deceased brother of Ramachandra. Under that deed, all the properties belonging to the joint family were partitioned amongst those three persons named above. Under that deed, Ramachandra got in all about 50 acres, 2 guntas of land paying an annual assessment of Rs. 75-11-0 to the Government and Gajanan got 29 acres 10 guntas, paying an annual assessment of Rs. 58 and Venkatrao retained for his share only 18 acres 19 guntas paying annual assessment of rs. 27 and odd. It must be assumed that in the said partition, the parties were allotted equitably 1/3 share to which each of them was entitled to there is some evidence, no doubt, in the case to show that Venkatrao parted with 6 acres of land which he should have got in favour of Ramachandra because Ramachandra's branch consisted of more number of persons. But, so far as Gajanan was concerned, he was given his legitimate share. But, so far as Gajanan was concerned, he was given his legitimate share. It would be necessary at this stage to refer to the recitals in the said partition deed in order to determine the income yielding capacity of the properties of the joint family. In one part of the said deed, it is stated that on one of the items of the joint family property which is shown as item No. 12 in the plaint A schedule in this suit, a house had been constructed with the monies belonging to Gouribai defendant 2 in the case, and on another item of property which is shown as item No. 15 in plaint A schedule in this suit, some shops had been constructed with the monies belonging to Gouribai. Defendant 1 has stated in his evidence that the family had no house at all and a hut in which they were residing had fallen down and the family had to move into the house which was constructed with the money belonging to Gouribai on item No. 12 in the plaint schedule. In view of the construction of the house and the shops on items nos. 12 and 15 with the monies belonging to Gouribai, the partition agreed that those two items should be excluded from division. It is, no doubt, true that those two items have remained with Ramachandra's branch. In respect of the property which fell to the share of Gajanan, this is what is found in the said deed;- "the Vahivat of the property of minor No. 3 out of us should be carried on by his guardian No. 2 Venkatrao for a period of four years from today. The said person is at present studying in a college at dharwar. The expenses of his education cannot be met out from the income of the property allotted to his share. Hence No. 2 out of us should take the income of the property of the Said person and he should meet the expenses of education of the said person for four vears that is to say, upto his getting a B. A. degree of the Bombay University. The said responsibility will not be on No. 2 for more than four years. To the above effect is this partition agreement executed. The said responsibility will not be on No. 2 for more than four years. To the above effect is this partition agreement executed. " if, as already observed by us, these was an equitable division of the family properties amongst the three branches and Gajanan who was a minor was given his due share, it is possible to find out from the portion of the deed extracted above, what was possibly the income of 1/3 of the joint family properties which were the subject matter of Ex. 76. The income from that 118 was not even sufficient to meet the expenses of the education of gajanan at Dharwar up to B. A. degree, examination. The income which could be got from the share which was allotted to Ramachandra could be about the same or a little more, because six acres of land, which should have gone to Venkatrao's share, was allotted to Ramachandra's branch in addition to his 1/3 share. It may be mentioned here that In Ramachandra's branch, at the time of partition, there were Ramachandra's mother, Ramachandra defendant 1, delendant 2, defendant 3 and Nagesh; defendants 5 and 6 had not born at the time of partition. It is, no doubt, true that Nagesh moved after some time to Hubli along with his wife and set up practice there as a doctor. But, the other members of the family continued to stay in the house constructed on item No. 12 of the plaint A schedule and live upon the income that they were deriving from the properties which were allotted to ramachandra's share. Defendant 1 has stated in his written state ' ment that the income from the properies belonging to his branch was in the order of Rs. 1,100 per year and he has also sworn to the same effect in the course of his evidence. We may also refer at this stage to a document marked as Ex. 99 in this case, under which Gajanan sold all the seven items which fell to his share for a sum of Rs. 8,500 in lavour of defendants 4, 5 and 6 in the year 1948. This fact may be taken into account to determine the value of the properties which fell to Ramachandra's share. If the market value of the properties itself was Rs. 8,500 in lavour of defendants 4, 5 and 6 in the year 1948. This fact may be taken into account to determine the value of the properties which fell to Ramachandra's share. If the market value of the properties itself was Rs. 8,500 in the year 1948, we can very well imagine what would have been the income from that property. Shri Ramadas learned Counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon a statement in Ex. 81, in which it is stated that the properties of Gouribai were unyielding and there was need to spend the income from the joint family properties of plaintiff and defendants 1, 4 to 6 for their upkeep and Shri ramadas, urges that this being in the nature of an admission, should be given due weight and that position alone should be accepted by the Court. We have already adverted to the law relating to the evidentiary value to be attached to statements which are in the nature of admissions made by parties. It is, no doubt, true that that statement would have been accepted by us, if there had been no other evidence in this case. When we have the undisputed evidence with regard to the nature and the income yielding capacity of the properties in Ex. 76 which came into existence at or about the time which is relevant for our purpose, it is not possible for us to hold that the properties of the joint famliy were yielding more than what was necessary for the family during the time when the properties in question were acquired and whatever was saved by the family was invested or spent for the improvement of the properties belonging to Gouribai. Even though defendant 1 has not given such an explanation in the course of his evidence in this case, we feel that a recital of that nature must have been introduced by the parties only to make the properties belonging to Gouribai subject matter of partition amongst the coporceners, viz. , defendants 1, 4 to 6. Otherwise, the properties of Gowribai could not have been the subject matter of partition and they should have been the subject matter of a settlement deed or a deed gift. , defendants 1, 4 to 6. Otherwise, the properties of Gowribai could not have been the subject matter of partition and they should have been the subject matter of a settlement deed or a deed gift. But whatever may be the reason which prompted defendants 1 to 6 to mention so in the said document, the evidence at any rate in this case is clear and unambiguous about the position of the family in the year 1930. As all the properties which are the subject matter of dispute- in this case are properties acquired between 1930 and 1951, we feel that recitals in a document of 1930 should be given greater weight then recitals in the document of 1959. The recitals in the document of 1930 are as much binding on defendants 1 to 6 as on the plaintiff and defendant 7, that document having been executed by Ramachandra the Karta of their branch. ( 8 ) THE first item of property, about whose nature we have to examine, is a rice mill which is situated on S. No. 3 (new) (S. No. 5 old) of Malagi village. This item is shown as item Number 13 in the plaint A schedule and item Number 1 in the plaint B schedule. This rice mill must have been installed some time prior to 26-8-1936, the date of mortgage deed (Ex. 108) under which defendants 1 to 5 raised a loan from the North Kanaia District Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd. , karwar of a sum of Rs. 8,500 on the basis of the security of the above rice mill and some other properties belonging to Gouribai. It is admitted that the licence of this rice mill stands in the name of defendant 1. At the lime of the execution of this mortgage deed, Nagesh the father of the plaintiff probably at the request of defendant 1 gave a letter which is marked as Ex. 98 in the case dt. 23-8-1936 which reads as follows:"i wish to hereby intimate to you for your information that I am no way concerned with the loan proposed to be raised in your Bank by my undivided brother Mr. Srinivas Ram Chandra Nadig of Malgi. the loan is taken for his own independent purpose and is not meant for the use of our joint family. Srinivas Ram Chandra Nadig of Malgi. the loan is taken for his own independent purpose and is not meant for the use of our joint family. The property proposed to be mortgaged belonging to his wife and himself only and our joint family has no interest whatsoever in the same S. No. 3. Virapur 5/2, 37/1 Gansur 33, plea 63 / 2-3, Haraganahalli 70 /1 are my brother's self acquired properties not belonging to the joint family. "as already stated, one of the items of property which was mortgaged under under Ex. 108 was the rice mill which was situated on S. No. 3 (new) of malgi village. There is no deed showing the acquisition of that property by either the plaintiff or defendants 1 to 6. In the said circumstances, it has to be assumed that the land must have been acquired by defendants 1 and 2 to whom the mill belonged. We may also mention here that the family of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 was not a family carrying on. any business in the year 1930. Apparently, the rice mill business was a new business which was started after the partition. The law on the question, whether a new business started by a member of joint Hindu family belongs to the joint family or not is also not res Integra, It is not open, to a junior member of the family to start a new business and to foist it on the family if the other members of the joint family did not agree to it. It is significant that the plaintiff who was very well aware of the properties belonging to the family, did not refer to this rice mill which was fetching about Rs. 3. 000 by way of rent in the year 1960, as evidenced by Ext. 90, in any of his letters or notice written by him to defendant 1 before the institution of the suit. On the other hand, the admission of Nagesh the father of the plaintiff in Ext. 93 is that the properties mortgaged belonged to defendant 1 and 2. The question whether the rice mill belonged to the joint family or not must have arisen for consideration at the time of discussion which took place between Islur and Nadkarni representing the plaintiff and defendant 1. Yet no reference is made to it either in Ex. 93 is that the properties mortgaged belonged to defendant 1 and 2. The question whether the rice mill belonged to the joint family or not must have arisen for consideration at the time of discussion which took place between Islur and Nadkarni representing the plaintiff and defendant 1. Yet no reference is made to it either in Ex. 117 or Ex. 74. The aforesaid circumstances clearly go to show that the family did not own the rice mill and it belonged to defendants 1, 2 and other members of their branch and not certainly to plaintiff or Ramachandra. The installation of the rice mill must have cost considerable amount and the said amount must have come from the income which defendant 1 and defendant 2 were deriving from the properties exclusively belonging to gouribai and that must have been the reason which prompted Nagesh the father of the plaintiff to make a statement as per Ex. 93 which has been extracted above. ( 9 ) THE next item of the property which is in dispute, is the one acquired under Ex. 96 dt. 3-7-1937 under which defendant 1 acquired item No. 25 for a sum of Rs. 200. The other properties which are acquired by the defendants are the following: these items of properties, as already indicated above, stand in the name of either the first defendant or defendants 4, 5 and 6. In order to acquire them, they have paid in all Rs. 23,600. In the absence of any evidence that the family properties which belonged to the joint family of the plaintiff and defendants 1, 4 to 6 yielded sufficient income with the help of which it was possible to acquire these properties, it is not possible to hold that these properties are joint family properties. All these properties have been acquired during the life time of Ramachandra and during that period defendants 1 and 4 to 6 were only junior members of the family. Applying the principle enunciated by the Supreme court regarding the presumptions that should be raised in respect of a joint family property when acquired by junior members of the family which have been referred to above, we have to hold that the plaintiff has not discharged the burden which initially lies upon him, viz. , adducing sufficient proof that the income of the family properties was sufficient to acquire these properties. . , adducing sufficient proof that the income of the family properties was sufficient to acquire these properties. . On the other hand, we have the positive evidence in this case that defendants 1 to 6 had alternative source of income consisting of a large extent of lands which defendant 2 had inherited from her mother and also the income which they were deriving from the rice mill. As already stated, trie income from the rice mill was quite substantial. It may be mentioned here that the loan which was taken under ex. 108 was discharged by them as early as 1943. They could do so only on account of the income that they were deriving from the properties of Gouribai and the rice mill. In the absence of the evidence regarding the income that the family properties were yielding, the presumption awaiable in law cannot be invoked by the plaintiff. The only other way in which he could prove that these properties were joint family properties was by proving by independent evidence that monies of the joint family actually went into the acquisition of these properties; on that question, there is hardly any evidence on the side of the plaintiff. We, therefore, hold that none of these properties referred to above can be considered as joint family properties in which the plaintiff and defendant 7 can claim a share. We further hold that even if defendant 1 was the manager of the family from 1930 he has discharged the burden by establishing that the properties acquired subsequent to 1930 were not acquired out of joint family funds, which, as already held by us, was hardly sufficient to maintain the family. One strong circumstance which cannot be overlooked by us is the absence of reference To these items either in Ex. 117 which is the draft partition deed to which the plaintiff had agreed and Ex. 74 the notice sent by the plaintiff, when reference has been made to admitted items of the family property in both these exhibits, even though the plaintiff knew about their existence since admittedly he had the knowledge of Ex. 81 which referred to all these items even as early as Ex. 70 dt. 26-9-1960. ( 10 ) THERE are two ether items of joint family to which reference will have to be made. They are, items 24 and 27. 81 which referred to all these items even as early as Ex. 70 dt. 26-9-1960. ( 10 ) THERE are two ether items of joint family to which reference will have to be made. They are, items 24 and 27. The first defendant has stated that they do not belong to the joint family. The plaintiff has not adduced any evidence to show that they belong to the family. Hence, we have to hold that, in the absence of any evidence on behalf of the plaintiff that these two items do not belong to the family and cannot be subject matter ot partition. ( 11 ) WHAT we have stated above in respect of subsequent acquisitions would also apply to the truck bearing No. MYZ. 1393, motor car bearing no. MYK. . 1092 and sugarcane crusher which are set out in plaint B schedule. Those items also do not belong to the joint family of the plaintiff and the defendants. But, in regard to bullocks and other agricultural implements and utensils which are shown at serial Nos. 4 and 6 in plaint b schedule, the plaintiff has claimed half share in them, and in the plaint their value is shown as Rs. 2,500. We are of the opinion that these items belong to the family and that the value of these items can be reasonably fixed at Rs. 2,500 and the plaintiff is entitled to Rs. 1,250 being the value cf half share in that amount in respect of these two items. After the preliminary decree was passed, the lower Court modified that decree by ordering payment ot Rs. 5,400 towards past mesne profits and Rs. 2,000 towards the marriage expenses of Shashikala one of the sisters of the plaintiff, which took place in the year 1961 after the plaintiff became divided from defendants 1, 4 5 and 6. In view of our findings on the divisibility or otherwise of the several properties which are the subject matter of this suit, the order passed by the Court below will have to be set aside. Defendant 1 is not liable to pay mesne profits. No case has been made out by the plaintiff to mulct him with that liability. He has only to render accounts under Order XX, Rule 18 of the CPC. Defendant 1 is not liable to pay mesne profits. No case has been made out by the plaintiff to mulct him with that liability. He has only to render accounts under Order XX, Rule 18 of the CPC. in respect of the joint family properties from the date on which the severance of status took place i. e. , from 26-9-1960. The plaintiff would be entitled to half share of the amount that is determined by the Court as the net income from these properties on taking account in accordance with Order XX, Rule 18 of the CPC. The plaintiff is not entitled to claim a sum of Rs. 2,000 by way of marriage expenses, when his share is determined as on 26-9-1960 and defendant I is ordered to render account in respect of the income of the properties. That part of the decree by which defendant 1 was ordered to pay Rs. 5,400 and Rs. 2,000 is set aside. ( 12 ) WE have now to deal with two items of property viz. , items 12 and 15 on which a house and some shops have been built with the help of the monies belonging to Gouribai. It is admitted by both the parties that the two items of land on which these buildings are constructed orignially belonged to the joint family. If that is so, there is no reason why the land, on which these buildings are situate, should not be treated as joint family properties which should be subject matter of partiton between the plaintiff and the defendants in this case. Mr. V. Krishnamurthi rightly conceded that if those two pieces of land in items 12 and 15 are allotted to the share of defendant 1 and his branch he has no objection for those two lands being treated as joint family properties even though in the trial court defendants 1 and 2 contested that position. Mr. V. Krishnamurthi rightly conceded that if those two pieces of land in items 12 and 15 are allotted to the share of defendant 1 and his branch he has no objection for those two lands being treated as joint family properties even though in the trial court defendants 1 and 2 contested that position. ( 13 ) WE, therefore, set aside the decree passed by the Court below and make, in substitution thereof, a preliminary decree declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to a half share in items 1 to 9, 12 (excluding the house), 14, 15 (excluding the shops), 16, 17, 19 and 20 of plaint 'a' schedule and they shall be divided on an equitable basis between the plaintiff and defendants 1, 4, 5 and 6 and the plaintiff be put in possession of the half share. We further direct that while allotting the properties, the two pieces of land in items 12 and 15 shall be allotted to the share of defendants 1, 4, 5 and 6 and an equivalent share in another family property may be allotted to the plaintiff. Defendant 1 shall pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 1,250 being the half share of moveables, viz. , the bullocks, agricultural implements and utensils of the joint family. Defendant 1 shall render account under Order XX, Rule 18 of the CPC. in respect of the income that he derived from the properties which are held to be joint family properties and pay half of the net income from those properties with effect from 26-9-1960. Defendant 1 is not liable pay mesne profits for the period prior to 26-9-1960. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs both in this Court as well as in the Court below. --- *** --- .