Judgment :- 1. This revision petition arises from the order of the Executive 1st Class Magistrate, Trichur directing the revision petitioners (counter petitioners before the Magistrate) to remove the obstruction caused by them to the chal known as 'Neelara thodu' used by the respondent and others for drainage and irrigation purposes. A petition was filed before the Executive 1st class Magistrate by the present respondent complaining of the obstruction and the consequent difficulty caused in raising the cultivation in the adjoining paddy fields. The counter petitioners revision petitioners herein) appeared before the Magistrate on receipt of the notice and denied the alleged obstruction. Revision petitioner No. 2 is a labourer employed by the revision petitioner No. 1. The petition was field on 17 5 68 and on 31 7 68 the court issued a preliminary notice calling upon the counter petitioners (revision petitioner herein) to remove the obstruction or to appear before the Magistrate at 11 a.m. on 23 8 68. On receipt of the notice the counter petitioners appeared and filed written objections (written statement was filed on 16 11 68). Thereupon arguments were heard and the learned Magistrate passed a confirmation order under S.137 (3) Cr. P.C. That order was passed on 24 4 70 From that order Cr. R.P. 214/70 was filed before this court and this court by its order dated 26th of June, 1970 set aside the order of the learned Magistrate and remanded the case for disposal afresh after taking evidence on the question whether the charge in question was a public chal. After remand pw.1 was recalled and examined. He deposed that the chal was a public chal and that it was used by the public of the place for agricultural purposes. In addition, pws. 4 and 5 were also examined. They also deposed on similar lines. Counter petitioners did not adduce any evidence. They did not even deny the fact that the chal is a public chal. All that they stated was that no obstruction was caused by them to the chal and the chal continued to exist as it was before. The learned Magistrate, therefore, passed the present order on 1812 70 making absolute the order passed by him on 317 68. Under the present order, the counter-petitioners have been directed to remove the obstruction within 15 days failing which they shall be liable to penalty provided under S.188 C.P.C. 2. The learned Magistrate, therefore, passed the present order on 1812 70 making absolute the order passed by him on 317 68. Under the present order, the counter-petitioners have been directed to remove the obstruction within 15 days failing which they shall be liable to penalty provided under S.188 C.P.C. 2. The main point argued before me by the learned counsel is that the requirement of S.139A of the Code has not been complied with in the present case. S.139A provides "that the Magistrate shall, on the appearance before him of the person against whom the order was made, question him as to whether he denies the existence of any public right in respect of the way, river, channel or place, and if he does so, the Magistrate shall, before proceeding under S.137 or S.138, inquire into the matter." In other words, according to the learned counsel if S.139A is not complied with the learned Magistrate will get no jurisdiction to proceed further with the matter. AIR. 1956 Cal. 24 and a few other decisions were cited in support of this position, viz„ that S.139A should be expressly complied with. Upon the opposite party's denial of the existence of the alleged public right the matter should be enquired into by the Magistrate and appropriate orders passed as required by the other connected sections of the Code. This court, however, has held in Narayanan v. Govindan (1962 KLT. 420) that the provision in S.139A (1) is only directory. The learned Single Judge has observed: "The provision in S.139A (1) being only directory and the Magistrate having substantially complied with the law and no prejudice having been caused, the Magistrate's final order cannot be impugned. An irregularity by not following the procedure laid down under S.139A could be cured under S-537 of the Code Unless the finding is manifestly perverse or patently erroneous the High court will not interfere with the findings arrived at by the lower court. The High Court will interfere in revision when there is complete paucity of evidence or when substantial injustice has been done." In the present case it would be incorrect to say that the requirement of S.139A has not been complied with. In pursuance of the notice the counter petitioners appeared and filed written statements covering all the aspects of the case. In pursuance of the notice the counter petitioners appeared and filed written statements covering all the aspects of the case. It must be presumed in the circumstances that on their appearance in pursuance of the notice, they were questioned by the Magistrate under S.139A; but even if they were not so questioned, the defect will stand cured by the fact that written statements were filed by them. "It is unnecessary for the Magistrate to put any question when a party, directly upon appearance, has put in a statement denying the existence of any public right." (vide Ram Kripal Singh v. Superintendent AIR. 1945 Pat, 309; Trivedi v. State AIR. 1954 All, 203). "Even if the Magistrate is technically wrong in not asking the question at the first hearing, that would be a curable irregularity." (vide Sadasheo v. Chintaman AIR. 1945 Nag. 226; Sohoni's Cr, P. C., 16th Edn. Vol. 1. p, 515). I do not see, therefore, any defect in jurisdiction in passing the present order by the learned Magistrate. Moreover, the revision petitioners cannot have any grievance as according to them the chal in question is still there in tact and that no obstruction has been caused by them. They have no case that the chal is a private one intended for their own exclusive use. On the other hand, it is their own case that the chal is a public one. In the circumstances, I see no point in. the revision and the revision petition is accordingly dismissed. A. N. K. Dismissed.