JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This appeal is at the instance of the State of Orissa against the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar. The Respondent was tried for an offence u/s 307, Indian Penal Code. 2. The short facts of the prosecution case were these: The victim Rajkishore Sahu is a goldsmith by profession and a resident of the town of Bhubaneswar. The Respondent was a resident of village Kapaleswar in the suburbs of Bhubaneswar town. Once upon a time he was a substantial person but gradually his assets were sold away and ultimately he mortgaged with possession his own residential house. He was known to Rajkishore?s son (p.w. 2) and on the persuasion of p.w. 2, Rajkishore (p.w. 9) had agreed to accommodate the Respondent for some time. The house of p.w. 9 consisted of three rooms and the outer one abutting the road was the shop-room where the Respondent was living during that period. Initially, the Respondent was accommodated for a brief period but he prolonged his stay p.w. 9 found that p.w. 2 was becoming wayward in the company of the Respondent. Often, there used to be disputes over the continued stay of .the Respondent in the house. In the last lap, the Respondent had been given ten days time expiring on 19-9-1966 for going away from the premises p.w. 9 was in the habit of taking tea early morning. There are some shops at a distance of 4 to 5 hundred cubits from his house p.w. 9 used to go for tea to that place and, on his way back, used to pick up the milk from the Government supply depot for his family. In the morning of 19.9.1966 about 6. A.M. p.w. 9 had gone for tea. While returning on cycle, he met the Respondent standing at the Badheibanka crossing. When p.w. 9 came near about the Respondent, the latter suddenly poured nitric acid from a bottle on p.w. 9. P.w. 9 fell from the cycle. The Respondent stabbed p.w. 9 at different parts of his body with a knife. p.w. 9 managed in that injured condition to go home which was at some distance from that place and disclosed about the incident including the name of the Respondent as his assailant to his wife and son (p.w. 2). Thereafter, he fainted and became unconscious. The Respondent stabbed p.w. 9 at different parts of his body with a knife. p.w. 9 managed in that injured condition to go home which was at some distance from that place and disclosed about the incident including the name of the Respondent as his assailant to his wife and son (p.w. 2). Thereafter, he fainted and became unconscious. Soon after 8 ?O? clock in the morning when the Police came to the house of p.w. 9, the First Information Report was lodged by p.w. 2. p.w. 9 was removed to the hospital where he regained senses around 11 ?O? clock. His condition was serious and being apprehensive of his life, a dying declaration (Ext. 6) was taken from him. 3. The defence was one of complete denial. 4. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge held that the First Information Report (Ext. 1) was not admissible in evidence. He did not attach any importance to the dying declaration (Ext. 6). He was not prepared to convict the accused on the) basis of the evidence of p.w. 9 alone. According to him, the conduct of the accused as deposed to by some of the prosecution witnesses did not fit in with the normal human conduct of a guilty person. He accepted the explanation of the accused in regard to the three injuries on his person as having been caused during the cooking in the previous night from spilling of hot oil and concluded: In the circumstances, though suspicion arises as against the accused (as he stayed with the victim at the material time), it cannot be said that he is the culprit. Conviction cannot be based or founded on suspicion and in the doubtful circumstances discussed above the accused is at best entitled to benefit of doubt. 5. Against this judgment of acquittal, the State has come up in appeal. 6. The learned Additional Government Advocate for the Appellant, contends that the learned trial Judge has clearly gone wrong in his conclusions. Each of the reasons given by the trial Court to discard the prosecution case is challenged. It is contended that Ext. 1 was admissible in evidence and was a corroborative material. 6. The learned Additional Government Advocate for the Appellant, contends that the learned trial Judge has clearly gone wrong in his conclusions. Each of the reasons given by the trial Court to discard the prosecution case is challenged. It is contended that Ext. 1 was admissible in evidence and was a corroborative material. The prosecution case received support not only from the evidence of p.w. 9 who directly implicated the accused as his assailant but also from the evidence of p.w. 2 before whom p.w. 9, the victim, soon after the occurrence narrated about the incident naming the Respondent as his assailant. The bottle of acid (M.O. II) which was seized from the place of occurrence has been proved to be of p.w. 9. His claim at the trial that M.O. II was in his shop has not been disputed by cross-examining him on that point The bottle from the shop of the victim could not have been made use by a stranger. The relationship of the victim (p.w. 9) and the responded had become somewhat strained. There is abundant evidence on record, the learned Additional Government Advocate contends, to show that p.w. 9 had been objecting to the continued stay of the Respondent in his house and the date of occurrence was the last day given to the Respondent to vacate the house. The learned Additional Government Advocate emphasises on the evidence of the doctor (p.w. 8) who has clearly indicated that the injuries on the person of the Respondent could not be burn wounds from hot oil. He has referred to the reasons given by the doctor and has criticised the conclusions of the learned trial Judge who has relied upon some of the observations in Modi?s medical jurisprudence to come to a different conclusion. 7. We shall now proceed to examine the various contentions. This report was made to the Police Officer who had come to the house of p.w. 9 on getting some information about the occurrence. The police officer has been examined in this case as p.w. 11. He has stated: While taking charge at about 7 A.M. my predecessor in Office Sri G.C. Patra, informed me to verify the information recorded by him in the station diary as per entry No. 476 of that day. Ext. The police officer has been examined in this case as p.w. 11. He has stated: While taking charge at about 7 A.M. my predecessor in Office Sri G.C. Patra, informed me to verify the information recorded by him in the station diary as per entry No. 476 of that day. Ext. 13 is the entry in the handwriting of Sri Patra to the effect that he was informed by a constable that the latter heard about somebody causing stab injuries to one Raju Sahu, a goldsmith. Soon after, I visited the house of the victim Rajkishore Sahu and found him laying unconscious with multiple bleeding injuries. There, I recorded the F.I.R. as per statement of Sukant Sahu, p.w. 2 on plain paper and sent it to the police station to draw up the formal F.I.R Ext. 1 is the plain paper F.I.R. and Ext. 1/1 is the formal F.I.R. Ext. 13 is to the following effect: 476/7 A.M. At this house C/26 P. Mohanty informed me that be heard from some pandas of Bhubaneswar at bus stand that one Bania named Raju Sahu has been stabbed by Borne one. As such the latter sustained serious injuries. As this is hearsay information, I asked my successor Sri B. Sarangi and C/1188 to proceed to the spot for immediate enquiry. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge seems to be of the view that investigation bad started on the basis of Ext. 13 and therefore, Ext. 1 cannot be said to be the First Information Report coming within the meaning of Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure. We find, it difficult to accept the view of the learned trial judge. It is welt settled that a vague or indefinite information which does not make it incumbent on the police to start investigation is not an information within the meaning of Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure and as such the subsequent regular F.I.R. cannot be held to be inadmissible u/s 162, Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case of The State of Orissa v. Banmali Moharana and Ors. 25 C.L.T. 433, a Division Bench of this Court has taken this view. As was indicated by Subba Rao, J. (as his Lordship then was) in the State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry and Anr. AIR 1960 S.C. 391 . The first information report is the information recorded u/s 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 25 C.L.T. 433, a Division Bench of this Court has taken this view. As was indicated by Subba Rao, J. (as his Lordship then was) in the State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry and Anr. AIR 1960 S.C. 391 . The first information report is the information recorded u/s 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is also an information given by an informant on which the investigation is commenced. It must be distinguished from information received after the commencement of the investigation which is covered by Section 161 and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The first information report is not substantive evidence, but can only be used to corroborate or contradict the evidence of the information given in Court or to impeach his credit...Where a document is not a first information report, not being the first complaint by the informant made to the police, it is hit by Sections 161 and 162. The position was clarified by a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of State of Kerala v. Samuel AIR 1961 Ker. 99 , where it was stated: Whether or not a particular statement would constitute the first information in a case is question of fact and would depend on the circumstances of that case. However it can be stated as a general principle that it is not every piece of information however vague, indefinite and authenticated it may be, that should be recorded as the first information for the sole reason that such information was the first, in point of time, to be received by the police regarding the commission of an offence. On the other hand it is equally clear that to permit a preliminary enquiry before recording the first information is to diminish, if not destroy The value of The first information report itself. The special significance of the first Information report lis in the fact that it is a record of the earliest information about an alleged offence, a statement given before the circumstances of the crime can be forgotten or embellished. The provision in Section 154 regarding the reduction of oral statements to writing and obtaining The signature of the informant to it, indicates that some similar procedure may be adopted to authenticate information received by other methods also. But this should be the limit of the enquiry. The provision in Section 154 regarding the reduction of oral statements to writing and obtaining The signature of the informant to it, indicates that some similar procedure may be adopted to authenticate information received by other methods also. But this should be the limit of the enquiry. Any further probing into the matter will have no legal basis. 8. In The present case, the information that bad reached the police station was not at the instance of the accused. There may be cases where the statement of the accused would be taken as the First Information Report about an offence, as in the case of Lachhuman Munda v. The Stata of Bihar AIR 1964 Pd. 210 and during investigation on the basis is of such report, if a statement is made by the accused, the admissibility thereof under the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act would become doubtful. Keeping in view the facts of the case and the legal position as indicated above, we have no doubts in our mind that Ext. 1 is the First Information Report and is admissible in evidence for the purpose of corroboration. 9. The evidence of p.w. 9 receives corroboration from the evidence of p.w. 2. The evidence is clear with reference to the statements made by these two witnesses that after p.w. 9 returned home be made a disclosure about the incident by naming the Respondent as The assailant. In view of the contemporaneous nature of the statement made by p.w. 9, this certainly is a corroborative feature. 10. The recovery of the bottle of acid from the scene of occurrence and the unchallenged evidence of p.w. 9 that the bottle was his which was in the shop goes a long way to show that the Respondent must have brought the bottle from there. One who has no access to the shop cannot be expected to carry the bottle away from the shop. p.w. 9 has indicated that as he was coming, the Respondent was on his right side and he threw acid and even made the attack from that side. The injuries on the person of p.w. 9 are all supporting this contention i.e. the injuries both from the throw of acid as also stabbing are on the right side of his body. 11. The injuries on p.w. 9 are admitted. The injuries on the person of p.w. 9 are all supporting this contention i.e. the injuries both from the throw of acid as also stabbing are on the right side of his body. 11. The injuries on p.w. 9 are admitted. In fact, the Respondent in his examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure has stated that he came to know about it soon after the occurrence. In view of the medical evidence, there is hardly scope to doubt that p.w. 9 was not injured by throw f acid as also assaults with a knife. The prosecution evidence is clear in regard to p.w. 9 accommodating the Respondent in his house at the instance of his son p.w. 2 and the rift that came about subsequently on account of the continued stay of the Respondent. The prosecution evidence is also definite that 19th September, 1966 (i.e. the day of occurrence) had been set as the limit for the Respondent to vacate occupation of the premises. The Respondent had an immediate grievance and that probablises the prosecution case. 12. The injuries on the person of the Respondent cannot be explained away in the manner the learned trial judge has p.w. 8, the doctor has clearly stated: I had not made any chemical test in connection with my opinion that the injuries on the accused were acid burns. I have read the police requisition Ext. 8 mentioning the cause of the injury as nitric acid. But my opinion is not influenced by that statement. I do not agree to the suggestion that the injuries on the accused could have been caused by boiling oil. I have not noted the characteristics of the injuries on which I based my opinion. In injury caused by hot oil, there would be blisters whereas in acid burns, there would be no blisters but corrosion. Acid burn leaves raw skin where new skin can grow to the extent 1". After such healing an injury of 33/4th size might leave a scar within 1 to 2. In injury caused by hot oil, there would be blisters whereas in acid burns, there would be no blisters but corrosion. Acid burn leaves raw skin where new skin can grow to the extent 1". After such healing an injury of 33/4th size might leave a scar within 1 to 2. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge discarded the medical evidence by relying upon the view expressed Modi?s Medioal in Jurisprudence the following effect: Burns with hot oil or such substance when sticks to the body may have the same appearance as acid burns; That being so, in the absence of any note of characteristic, the burns on the person of the accused cannot be held as acid burns. The view of the learned trial judge does not impress us at all. The doctor has clearly indicated the distinguishing features, namely that blisters would be The result from the burns on account of hot oil whereas acid would have the effect of corroding the skin. The presence of these three injuries on the accused Cannot be explained away in the manner the Respondent has. It would, therefore, follow that the Respondent had acid injuries on his person. That highly probablises the prosecution case that it is he who bad used the acid bottle at the place of occurrence and therefore, had received the injuries during his attack on p.w. 9. The doctor?s evidence is very specific that the injuries of the Respondent were too recent. That lends full support to the proposition that the Respondent must have received the injuries only at the same point of time when p.w. 9 received the acid burns. The learned trial judge has referred to the conduct of the accused and has held: P.W. 1 says that he saw the accused at about 8.30 to 9 A.M. going on the main road towards bazar. p.w. 4, the brother of victim also confirms the fact. He says that he saw accused at about 8.30 A.M. to 9 A.M. in front of his house going somewhere in a rickshaw and the police had come to the house of his brother at about 8 A.M. and the victim had been taken to the hospital at about 8.30 A.M. Thus the accused was moving freely like an innocent person near the house of the victim near about the time of police investigation. The offence had been committed and as in the F.I.R. (Ex. 1), others also must have had information that the accused was connected wit the crime. If this was a fact, the natural conduct of p.w. 4, the brother of the victim or any neighbour, would have been to apprehend the accused. But instead, every body including p.w. 4, his brother kept silent. This all the more creates doubts and suggests that till that time nobody had any information about the accused being connected with the crime. We have already found that The evidence of p.w. 9 has to be accepted that he had come back home and narrated to his wife p.w. 2 that the Respondent was the assailant. The police may have arrived in The village and the victim may have been rushed to the hospital by the time the Respondent was found on the streets. As we have already noticed, the Respondent was once upon a time a substantial person but had already sold away all his assets and ultimately had even mortgaged his own residential house with possession. He did not bother about making any provision for himself even for his residence. By normal standards, this certainly is a very unusual conduct. The Respondent appears to us to be a man of peculiar approach and nature and care-free sort of person. It is quite possible that not bothered about the consequences he had moved in the street in the manner indicated, posing to pass of as an innocent person. It is one matter to say that p.w. 4 had not by then known the accused to be the assailant of his brother; but it is very different to hold, as the learned trial judge has, that the conduct of the accused justified the conclusion that be was not the assailant. The police seems to have come to the locality at about 8 A.M. and p.w. 9 was rushed to the hospital sometime thereafter. Almost by that time, the Respondent was found moving in the public street. Thus, merely from the conduct of the accused in being present near about the locality, DO presumption of his innocence can, be gathered. On the other hand, that fits in with his care-free conduct and an attempt by him to give to the people at large an appearance that he was innocent. Thus, merely from the conduct of the accused in being present near about the locality, DO presumption of his innocence can, be gathered. On the other hand, that fits in with his care-free conduct and an attempt by him to give to the people at large an appearance that he was innocent. The conclusion of the learned trial judge on this score is, therefore, not justified. The obvious conclusion is that the Respondent was p.w. 9?s assailant. 13. Mr. Hazra for the Respondent sought to support the judgment of the learned trial judge and contended that we should not ignore the fact that with the acquittal of the Respondent by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, the presumption of innocence of the accused has become doubled. The extent of powers of the appellate court in a case of appeal against acquittal has been recently indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramabhupala Reddy and Ors. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1971 S.C. 460 . It has been said: The scope of an appeal against an order of acquittal has been the subject of some controversy in Courts for a long time. But that controversy is now settled by the decision of this Court in Sanwant Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1961 S.C. 715 . In that case, this Court summarised the legal position thus: 1. An appellate Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; 2. The principles laid down in Sheo Swarup?s case AIR 1934 P.C. 227 , afforded a correct guide for the appellate Court?s approach to a case of disposing of such an appeal; 3. The different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court such as: (a) "substantial and compelling reasons" (b) "good and sufficiently cogent reasons" (c) "strong reasons". are not intended to our tail the undoubted power of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by The Court below in support of its order of acquittal but should express the reasons in its judgment which led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified. Their Lordships added: To these tests we may add, as laid down by this Court in several decisions that the appellate Court should also bear in mind the fact that the trial Court had the benefit of seeing the witnesses in the witnesses box and the presumption of innocence is not weekend by the order of acquittal. We have kept these observations in view but we are of the opinion that in the facts of this case it is not possible for us to endorse the conclusions of the trial Court. We agree that if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record we should not disturb the findings. As we have already shown, it has not been passible for us to agree with the conclusion of the trial Court. 14. The learned trial judge did not keep in view the broad features of the case and arrived at an erroneous conclusion. As we find, the prosecution has successfully brought home the charge u/s 307, Indian Penal Code. 15. We would accordingly hold that the learned trial judge went wrong in acquitting the Respondent. His judgment is set a side and the appeal is allowed. The Respondent is convicted u/s 307, Indian Penal Code. 16. We are of the view that this case warrants a heavy sentence in the ends of justice. The Respondent had reasons to be grateful to p.w. 9 for accommodating him (though a stranger), in a part of his house. Not only be has not been grateful but he has done irreparable damage to him. The injuries were very serious and at one stage p.w. 9 was apprehended to die. He remained in the hospital for two and a half months and came out permanently maimed. He has said: As a result of the knife injury, my fingers have been affected and I am unable to close my left fist. The middle finger of my left hand has remained bent and cannot be straightened. Due to acid burn and the consequent injuries, my right forearm and upper arm have been 80 affected that even now they remain at about right angle and cannot be straightened. They had previously almost joint together. Again the right upper arm has joined the right side of the chest near the arm-pit and, therefore, the right hand also cannot be lifted side-wise. They had previously almost joint together. Again the right upper arm has joined the right side of the chest near the arm-pit and, therefore, the right hand also cannot be lifted side-wise. The right wrist joint has been affected and it does not move properly. I am also unable to close .the right fist. The right thumb remains hanging. P.w. 9 who was a skilled artisan has become permanently disabled on account of the dastardly attack of the Respondent. We are of the view that nothing less than five years R.I. would meet the ends of justice. We accordingly, while convicting the Respondent u/s 307, Indian Penal Code, sentence him to R.I. for five years. He shall now surrender to his bail bond to undergo the sentence. B.K. Patra, J. 17. I agree. Final Result : Allowed