A. A. DAVE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal raises a very important question of law. In order to appreciate the implications involved in this appeal it will be worthwhile to state the facts giving rise to this appeal in a nut shell. ( 2 ) THE appellant before this court is the husband of the present respondent Nirmalaben. The appellant had filed a petition No. 8 of 1966 under sec. 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights on the ground that she had withdrawn herself from the society without any reasonable cause. During the pendency of the said petition the present respondent gave an application under sec. 24 of the Act for getting maintenance pendente lite and expenses of the proceeding. The learned trial Judge held that the present respondent had proved that she had no income of her own and that her husband was earning Rs. 100 to 125/per month. In the opinion of the learned trial Judge therefore she was entitled to receive Rs. 25/per month as maintenance and Rs. 50/as costs of the proceeding. However the learned trial Judge dismissed the application of the respondent for interim maintenance on the ground that she was disentitled to receive the same on account of her conduct. Against the said order of the learned trial Judge an appeal was preferred in the district court and the learned District Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the trial court. He ordered that the present respondent should receive Rs. 25/as monthly maintenance and Rs. 50/as expenses for defending herself in the main proceeding. Against the said order of the learned District Judge the present appeal has been preferred to this court. ( 3 ) MR. I. C. Bhatt learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the learned District Judge bad no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the order passed by the court under sec 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In support of his say he referred to the case of Prithvirajsinhji Mansingh v. Shivprabhakumari and another A. I R. 1960 Bombay 315. In order. therefore to understand the implication it will be necessary to refer to secs. 24 and 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In support of his say he referred to the case of Prithvirajsinhji Mansingh v. Shivprabhakumari and another A. I R. 1960 Bombay 315. In order. therefore to understand the implication it will be necessary to refer to secs. 24 and 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Sec. 24 sayswhere in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband as the case may be has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding it may on the application of the wife or the husband order the respondent to pay the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding and monthly during the proceeding such sum as having regard to the petitioners own income and the income of the respondent it may seem to the court to be reasonable. THUS whenever any proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act is pending before the court it is competent for that court to pass interim order with regard to the maintenance and expenses of the proceeding of either party if the court came to the conclusion that the husband or wife as the case may be had no independent income sufficient for his or Support Apparently this section is independent of other provisions of the Act and is not controlled by sec. 23 thereof Even the learned trial Judge negatived the contention of the learned advocate for the present appellant that sec. 24 was controlled by the provisions of sec. 23. Curiously however the learned Judge observed that the conduct of the wife is borne out from her own evidence which prevents her from getting any relief under sec. 24 of the Act and taking into consideration her conduct the learned trial Judge dismissed the application for maintenance pendente lite. The learned District Judge who heard the appeal against the said order was of the opinion that provisions of sec. 24 of the Act were not controlled by sec. 23 or any other section and ordered the present appellant to pay Rs. 25/per month as maintenance pendente lite and Rs. 50/towards the expenses of the proceeding. In my opinion the view taken by the learned District Judge is correct. Provisions of sec. 24 as seen from the wordings of the section itself clearly indicate that they are not controlled by the provisions contained in any other section of the Act. 25/per month as maintenance pendente lite and Rs. 50/towards the expenses of the proceeding. In my opinion the view taken by the learned District Judge is correct. Provisions of sec. 24 as seen from the wordings of the section itself clearly indicate that they are not controlled by the provisions contained in any other section of the Act. In order to award maintenance pendente lite to the wife or the husband as the case may be the court has merely to consider whether he or she has any independent income sufficient for his or her support. If the court from the evidence before it holds that he or she had no independent income for his or her support the court is competent to pass an order for maintenance pendente lite. In order to award maintenance pendente lite under sec. 24 of the Act conduct of either party is immaterial. In fact sec. 24 of the Act does not entitle the court to look into the conduct of the either party at all before passing any such order. If the conduct of a party was to be taken into consideration for passing any order there would have been appropriate provisions in the section itself as is found in sec. 25 the Act. Sec. 25 (1) states -ANY Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband as the case may be. order that the respondent shall while the applicant remains unmarried pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as having regard to the respondents own income and other property if any the income and other property of the applicant and the conduct of the parties it may seem to the court to be just and any such payment may be secured if necessary by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent. THUS while passing an order for maintenance under sec. 25 of the Act it would be open to the court to take into consideration the conduct of the parties. Sec. 24 does not include any such words. THUS while passing an order for maintenance under sec. 25 of the Act it would be open to the court to take into consideration the conduct of the parties. Sec. 24 does not include any such words. Therefore while passing an order for maintenance pendente lite the court cannot look into the question of conduct of the parties. As stated earlier only while passing an order for maintenance under sec. 25 of the Act conduct of the parties would be relevant. In my opinion therefore the learned trial Judge was clearly in error in refusing to pass an order for maintenance pendente lite and expenses of the proceeding on the ground of alleged conduct of the wife. ( 4 ) MR. Bhatt however urged that if the order of the learned trial Judge was wrong it was open to the wife to file a revision petition before this court. He urged that no appeal to the district court was provided against an interim order under the Act and therefore the order passed by the learned District Judge was clearly without jurisdiction. In order to appreciate the submissions made by Mr. Bhatt it will be profitable to refer to sec. 28 of the Act which saysall decrees and orders made by the courts in any proceeding under this Act shall be enforced in like manner as the decrees and order of the court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction are enforced and may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force:-PROVIDED that there shall be no appeal on the subject of costs only. Sec. 28 therefore envisages that all decrees and orders under this Act shall be enforced in like manner as the decrees and orders of the court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. Similarly it envisages that all decrees and orders made by the court in any proceeding under this Act may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force. The only restriction is that no appeal shall lie on the subject of costs only. The learned advocate for the appellant however submitted that it is not that each and every order made by the court in a proceeding would be appealable but only such order which was under any law for the time being in force would be appealable. The only restriction is that no appeal shall lie on the subject of costs only. The learned advocate for the appellant however submitted that it is not that each and every order made by the court in a proceeding would be appealable but only such order which was under any law for the time being in force would be appealable. He submitted that the words under any law for the time being in force would indicate Civil Procedure Code. Therefore he submitted that the interim order passed by the court in any proceeding cannot be the subject matter of an appeal unless it came within the provisions of sec. 104 or order 43 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. In my opinion the construction put upon sec. 28 of the Act by Mr. Bhatt is very narrow and unwarranted. The Civil Procedure Code would be applicable only with regard to the procedure governing an appeal and has notes to do with the right of an appeal. Sec. 21 of the Act sayssubject to the other provisions contained in this Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated as far as may be by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908in my opinion therefore that applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure to the proceedings under this Act will be only for laying down procedure and no more. The Civil Procedure Code does not contain any provision for a right to appeal under any other law. The right to appeal under the Hindu Marriage Act is provided in sec. 28. It clearly says that all decrees and orders may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force. In my opinion the words under any law for the time being in force would mean that the procedure governing an appeal will be the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code and the law for the time being in force for determining the forum of appeal is the Bombay Civil Courts Act. In the case of Gangadhar Rakhamaji v. Manjulal Gangadhar A. I. R. 1960 Bombay 42 the question about the interpretation of the words law for the time being in force arose and the division bench of the Bombay High Court after considering sec. 28 of the Act observed as follows: -. . In the case of Gangadhar Rakhamaji v. Manjulal Gangadhar A. I. R. 1960 Bombay 42 the question about the interpretation of the words law for the time being in force arose and the division bench of the Bombay High Court after considering sec. 28 of the Act observed as follows: -. . . LAW for the time being in force for determining the forum of appeal is the Bombay Civil Courts Act. Under sec. 8 of that Act an appeal from the decree or order of a Civil Judge Senior Division lies to the District Court except in the case of decisions in suits where the amount or value of the subject matter exceeds ten thousand rupees. Under the Bombay Civil Courts Act a District Court is presided over a District Judge and is the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the district within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case the decree having been passed by the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division of Ahmednagar in a petition under the Hindu Marriage Act the appeal should lie to District Court of Ahmednagar. MR. Bhatt however submitted that there was no direct question before the division bench whether the appeal would lie to the district court against the order passed by the court under sec. 24 of the Act. The point involved in that case was confined to the question whether an appeal against the decree passed by the court should be in the District Court or in the High Court. Mr. Bhatt agreed that an appeal against that decree passed by the court under the Hindu Marriage Act would lie in the District Court or in the High Court according to the amount or value of the subject matter of the appeal. In the instant case there was no decree The order under sec. 24 was an interim order and therefore Mr. Bhatt submitted that only a revision application would lie to the High Court and no appeal could lie in the District Court. In support of his say he referred to the case of Prithvirajsinhji Mansinhji v. Shivprabhakumari and another A. I. R. 1960 Bombay 315 wherein Gokhale J. observed thatwhat the Legislature intended by referring to the words any law for the time being in force in sec. In support of his say he referred to the case of Prithvirajsinhji Mansinhji v. Shivprabhakumari and another A. I. R. 1960 Bombay 315 wherein Gokhale J. observed thatwhat the Legislature intended by referring to the words any law for the time being in force in sec. 28 was that the appealability of decrees and orders should be determined by the provisions of the Code of civil Procedure. Thus sec 28 does not provide for an appeal against every order made by the court in the proceedings under the Act but only such orders which can fall within the definition of decrees under sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code or with regard to which an appeal Is provided under the Code. An order granting interim relief under sec. 24 has to be distinguished from an order granting permanent alimony and maintenance which the court can pass under sec. 25. such an order cannot amount to a decree as defined in sec. 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code and therefore would not be appealable as decree. Such ail order does not fall also within sec. 104 nor under order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. It would not be therefore appealable under the Civil Procedure Code. Hence revision application will be maintainable against such order. WITH great respect I am unable to agree with this view. In my opinion under sec. 28 of the Act all decrees and orders made by the court in any proceeding under the Act are made subject to an appeal. If it was not so the words all decrees and orders may be appealed from would not have been used. Reference to any law for the time being in force seems to be for the purpose of prescribing procedure which would govern such appeals and forum where the appeal is to be preferred The question whether an appeal lies against an order passed under sec. 24 of the Act is not to be determined by reference to any law for the time being in force such as Civil Procedure Code. In fact an appeal is already provided for by sec. 28 itself and the procedure governing that appeal will be the procedure laid done in the Civil Procedure Code. 24 of the Act is not to be determined by reference to any law for the time being in force such as Civil Procedure Code. In fact an appeal is already provided for by sec. 28 itself and the procedure governing that appeal will be the procedure laid done in the Civil Procedure Code. In my view the words for the time being in force seem to have been inserted only for determining the forum of an appeal and for regulating the procedure. In fact the Bombay High Court in the earlier case impliedly was inclined to hold that an appeal was provided in sec. 28 of the Act. In the case of Smt. Kamala w/o Shama v. Shama Rupchand and others A. I. R. 1958 Bombay 466 the Bombay High Court considered the object of see. 24 of the Act in miscellaneous first appeal No. 197 of 1958. No doubt no direct question arose before the High Court that an appeal against an order passed under sec. 24 of the Act was not maintainable. But as stated earlier the High Court impliedly was inclined to take a view that such an appeal would lie. The effect of sec. 28 of the Act has been considered by a division bench of this court in the case of Umiyaben d/o. Chhotabhai Tulsibhai and w/o. Ambalal Laxmidas v. Ambalal Laxmidas VI G. L. R. 714 wherein it was observed thata right of second appeal against an appellate decree made by the Court in a petition for judicial separation under sec. 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be found in the Civil Procedure Code. THE decrees and orders which form the subject matter of legislation under sec. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 must include not only original decrees and orders but also appellate decrees and orders. SEC. 28 of the Act undoubtedly confers a right of appeal by using the words may be appealed from but that right of appeal is to be exercised under any law for the lime being in force. The procedure for filing the appeal and the jurisdiction and power of the Court in dealing with the appeal are governed by the law for the time being in force which would include inter alia the civil Procedure Code. The procedure for filing the appeal and the jurisdiction and power of the Court in dealing with the appeal are governed by the law for the time being in force which would include inter alia the civil Procedure Code. The words under any law for the time being in force provide not only the procedure for filing the appeal and the Forum in which the appeal must be filed. but also the jurisdiction and power of the court in dealing with the appeal so filed. The right of appeal is conferred by the section but the nature and extent of the right which depend on the procedure jurisdiction and powers of the Court in dealing with the appeal are governed by the law for the time being in force which includes inter alia the Civil Procedure Code. THE right of second appeal conferred by sec. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 is limited to the grounds set out in sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore can be exercised only on questions of law and not on questions of fact. THE ratio of this case clearly states that right of an appeal is conferred by the section. In my view therefore sec. 28 confers a right of appeal against all decrees and orders passed by the court in the proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act. The Civil Procedure Code or the Bombay Civil Courts Act is only for governing the procedure and determining the forum in which the appeal is to be preferred. ( 5 ) THE view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Prithvirajsinhji Mansinhji referred to above was not accepted by the division bench of this court in the case of Kadia Harilal Purshottam v. Kadia Lilavati Gokuldas II G. L. R. 536 where it was pointed out that if those words were interpreted in the same meaning as the words decree and order used in the Civil Procedure Code then none of the decrees made under the Act would be appealable and the object of sec. 28 would be rendered nugatory in so far as it deals with the questions of appeal from the decrees and orders. At page 541 the following observations were made_no doubt the language of the section is not very happy. 28 would be rendered nugatory in so far as it deals with the questions of appeal from the decrees and orders. At page 541 the following observations were made_no doubt the language of the section is not very happy. The words may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force are capable of bearing the meaning which Mr. Chhaya desires us to give. If we given such a meaning to those words the provisions relating to appeal are liable to be rendered nugatory. That could not possibly be the intention of the Legislature. It could not be the intention of the Legislature to confer a right of appeal against decrees and orders passed under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 by reference to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is in fact no provision in the Code or in any other law under which any appeal could be filed from any orders passed under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 It seems to us that the Legislature intended to confer a right of appeal by the provisions of sec. 28 itself by using the words All decrees and orders made by the court in any proceeding under this Act. . . . may be appealed from. . . . and that the intention of the Legislature was not to refer parties to any other enactment for the purpose of ascertaining whether the decrees or orders passed under the Act were appealable or not. Having regard to the language used by the Legislature which we are painfully conscious is not very apt some meaning has to be given to the words under any law for the time being in force. Those words on a true construction of the Act are intended to provide for the forum before which the appeal is to be preferred. They may well relate to the procedure in consecution with the appeals which may be filed under sec. 28. THIS case was referred to with approval in the case of Prahladbhai Satamdas v. Ashabai Trikamji 5 G. L R 417 wherein at page 423 Miabhoy J. observed as under:-AS pointed out by the division bench in Kadia Harilals case the decrees which are to be passed by the matrimonial court do not satisfy the definition of the expression decree as used in the Civil Procedure Code. The Act itself for passing of specific decrees and specific orders such as decrees for restitution of conjugal rights for judicial separation for nullity of marriage and for divorce and orders for interim maintenance for expenses of proceedings for permanent alimony for permanent maintenance custody of children and disposal of property. Therefore for the purpose of enforceability of decrees and orders it is quite clear that the Legislature has in mind these decrees and orders which are mentioned specifically in the Act and in respect of which jurisdiction has been conferred by the Act upon the matrimonial court. If once the meaning of the expression decrees and orders has been so ascertained then it is not difficult to answer the question as to which decrees and orders are made appealable under the Act. It will be noticed that the Legislature has made the same decrees and orders appealable which have been made enforceable in the manner in which decrees and orders of the Court exercising original civil jurisdiction are enforceable. That appears to be the plain and grammatical meaning of the provision contained in see. 28 of the Act relating to the appealability of decrees. Reliance was placed on the case reported in A. I. R. 1962 Calcutta 88 ( 6 ) WITH respect I am in entire agreement with the view taken in both these cases. In my opinion the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case referred to above therefore cannot be accepted as good law. In my opinion the District Court was quite competent to hear an appeal filed against an order of the learned trial Judge under sec. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. ( 7 ) IN the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. .