JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an application for a certificate under Article 133 (1) (a) (b) and (c) of the Constitution. The judgment and order from which an appeal is proposed to be preferred to the Supreme Court is a judgment of reversal. Therefore the only two questions to be considered are whether the order is a final order and secondly whether the valuation test required by Article 133 (1) (a) or (b) is satisfied. 2. THE matter in which the judgment was delivered, arose out of a contract for sale of 51 per cent Ordinary Shares in the capital of Turner Morrison and co. Private Limited (respondent No. 4 ). A suit was filed by Haridas Mundhra (respondent No. 1) against the applicant and others for specific performance of the agreement for sale of the shares. By a judgment and decree dated february 25, 1964, a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff for specific performance of the agreement. By this decree the defendants were directed to deliver up to the plaintiff the shares against payment of the consideration. The total number of shares involved in the contract was 2295 shares, the value of which at the agreed rate is rs. 86,60,000/ -. Numerous proceedings were taken by the parties arising out of the agreement and the decree, to which it is not necessary to refer for the purpose of this application. On August 30, 1965, an application was made for an order directing the respondent No. 1 to carry out the decree by paying Rs. 86,60,000/- and an order on the applicant to make over proper transfer deeds in respect of the shares within a time to be fixed by the court and in dafault of payment of the sum of Rs. 86,60,000/- the contract should stand rescinded. This application was dismissed on September 28, 1965, and an appeal against the order of dismissal was also dismissed on august 18, 1966. Thereafter on March 21, 1967, the applicant made another application for an order that the agreement for sale of the shares do stand rescinded, for appointment of a Receiver who was to tender to the respondent no. 1 the shares upon payment of rs. 86,60,000/- and for various other reliefs. Thereafter on March 21, 1967, the applicant made another application for an order that the agreement for sale of the shares do stand rescinded, for appointment of a Receiver who was to tender to the respondent no. 1 the shares upon payment of rs. 86,60,000/- and for various other reliefs. This application was disposed of by Masud J. by an order made on july 14, 1969, by which it was held that the respondent No. 1 committed breach of the contract, which was directed to be specifically performed by the decree, and that he created a situation which showed that he was never anxious to perform his part of the contract. Against this order an appeal was preferred which was disposed of by us by a judgment and order dated september 14, 1970, whereby the appeal and the cross-objection were allowed in part. The order of Masud J. was set aside in its entirety. 3. MR. Sankar Ghose counsel for the respondent No. 4 strenuously contended that no certificate should be granted because the order was not a final order and secondly because the subject-matter of the dispute between the parties still in dispute in appeal was incapable of valuation and in any event the valuation could not be held to be Rs. 20,000/- or above. 4. WITH regard to the first point namely that the order was not a final order Mr. Ghose argued that the order was made in an application for rescission of the contract, and that in spite of the order, the suit still remained alive because it was open to both the parties in the suit to apply for execution of the decree for specific performance or to make a fresh application for rescission of the contract on fresh and new materials. It was argued that the order did not finally dispose of the dispute between the parties, which according to counsel still remain outstanding. In support of this contention reliance was placed by counsel for the rspondent No. 4 on several decisions to which I will briefly refer. It was argued that the order did not finally dispose of the dispute between the parties, which according to counsel still remain outstanding. In support of this contention reliance was placed by counsel for the rspondent No. 4 on several decisions to which I will briefly refer. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Judicial committee reported in (1) A. I. R. (1933), p. C. 58, in which it was held that the test of finality was whether the order "finally disposes of the rights of the parties" and that where such order did not finally dispose of those rights but left them to be determined by the court in the ordinary way, the order was not a final order. In that case one of the parties was adjudged insolvent. The official assignee who was brought on the record asked for security which not having been furnished, the suit was dismissed. On appeal the decree of dismissal was set aside and the suit was restored for trial. Against this order an appeal was preferred to the judicial Committee on a certificate under S. 110 of the Code. It was held that the order of remand no doubt decided an important issue, and even a vital point in the case but it left the suit alive and directed its trial in ihe ordinary way and therefore the order of the appellate Court was not a final order. Reliance was also placed on another decision of the Judicial Com mittee reported in (2) A. I. R. (1920)P. C. 86, in which it was held that the test of finality was whether the order finally disposed of the rights of ihe parties, and that if it did not but leave those rights to be determined by ihe court in the ordinary way the order could not be treated to be a final order. In that case an order was passed by the high Court refusing stay of a suit. under S. 19 of the Arbitration Act. It was held that by the order refusing stay of the suit the High Court did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties to the suit but left them to be determined in the ordinary way. Reliance was next placed on a decision of the Allahabad. High Court reported in (3) A. I. R. (1964) All. It was held that by the order refusing stay of the suit the High Court did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties to the suit but left them to be determined in the ordinary way. Reliance was next placed on a decision of the Allahabad. High Court reported in (3) A. I. R. (1964) All. 49 in which it was held that a final order must be the final order in the civil proceedings and not the final order in the case disposed of by the High Court, and that merely because the High Court disposed of the appeal before it, the order of the High Court did not become a final order in a civil proceeding, if the civil proceeding remained pending in the trial court in spite of the order passed by the High Court, which was not the final order in the civil proceeding, though it might be the final order in the appeal before the High Court. Reliance was next placed on a decision of this Court reported in (4) A. I. R. (1963) Cal. 515, in which it was held that an order was final if it amounted to a final decision relating to the rights of the parties in dispute in the civil proceeding, but if after the order the civil proceeding remained to be tried and the rights between the parties to be determined, the order was not a final order within the meaning of Art. 133. The only question before the Court in that case was whether the execution proceedings were to be conducted in a certain way namely by the appointment of a receiver. Reliance was next placed on another decision of this Court reported in (5) A. I. R. (1966) Cal. 107 for the proposition that the decree in a suit for specific performance was in the nature of a preliminary decree, and the original court kept control over the action and had full power to make any just and necessary orders therein including an order for extension of time. 107 for the proposition that the decree in a suit for specific performance was in the nature of a preliminary decree, and the original court kept control over the action and had full power to make any just and necessary orders therein including an order for extension of time. The next case relied upon was a decision of the federal Court reported in (6) A. I. R. (1949) F. C. 1, in which it was held that a final order was an order which finally determined the points in dispute and that to constitute a final order it was not sufficient merely to decide an important or even a vital issue in the case but the decision must not keep the matter alive and provide for its trial in the ordinary way. The next case relied on was a decision of the allahabad High Court reported in (7) A. I. R. (1961) All. 245. In that case it was held that an order of the High court in appeal reversing the order of the trial Court recording a compromise was neither a judgment nor a final order within the meaning of Article 133 and that such an order was an interlocutory order. The next case relied upon was a decision of the Judicial Committee reported in (8) 52 I. A. 207. In that case there was a contract for sale of goods, and dispute having arisen, the matter was referred to an Arbitrator who awarded Rs. 81,000/- to the petitioner and Rs. 3,900/- to the respondent. The Award in favour of the petitioner was set aside and thereupon he brought a suit to set aside the award in favour of the respondent. This suit was dismissed and an application for a certificate under S. 110 of the Code was refused. Thereupon the petitioner applied for special leave and contended that he had a right of appeal, since if the appeal succeeded he could proceed with the suit which had been stayed claiming Rs. 81,000/- as damages. It was held that the petitioner's claim upon the contract was too remote to be considered as being property indirectly involved. Reliance was next placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (9) A. I. R. (1970) S. C. 1168. 81,000/- as damages. It was held that the petitioner's claim upon the contract was too remote to be considered as being property indirectly involved. Reliance was next placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (9) A. I. R. (1970) S. C. 1168. In that case it was held that the expression "final order" meant a final decision on the rights of the parties in dispute in a suit or proceeding and if such rights remained to be tried after the order, it was not a final order. The next contention of Mr. Ghose was that the application for rescission was held to be not maintainable, and that it was for that reason that the applicant was held not to be entitled to any relief. That was the ground, it was argued, on which the appeal was allowed, and the order made by the trial Court was set aside, and therefore the contentions raised on behalf of the applicant were not adjudicated upon, and were thus left open. It was therefore submitted that there was no final decision on the rights in dispute between the parties. It was argued that the dispute between the parties, with regard to the claim for rescission still remained outstanding, as there was no decision on the merits of the dispute, as this Court came to the conclusion that the application was not maintainable. In support of this contention reliance was placed by Mr. Ghose on a Bench decision of the Mysore High court reported in (10) A. I. R. (1960)Mys. 261. That was an application under article 226 of the Constitution. It was dismissed in limine and thereafter an application was made for a certificate under Article 133. It was held that the test for determining the finality of an order. was whether the order finally disposed of the rights of the parties and in dismissing the writ petition in limine the Court did not finally dispose of such rights of the parties and therefor such an order was not a final order within the meaning of Art. 133 (1 ). The next case relied on in support of this branch of the case was a decision of the madras High Court reported in 1 (11) A. I. R. (1958) Mad. The next case relied on in support of this branch of the case was a decision of the madras High Court reported in 1 (11) A. I. R. (1958) Mad. 151 in which it was held that an order dismissing a writ petition for restraining the Collector from proceeding to attach or sell the petitioner's property for realisation of arrears of income-tax, without going into the question of title of the petitioner to the property, was not a final order as it could not be said that the order dismissing the petition had terminated the proceedings taken by the Collector to attach the petitioner's property. Reliance was next placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (12) A. I. R. (1951) S. C. 14. In that case it was held that an order of the high Court declining to call upon the board of Revenue to start a case under s. 21 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act was not a final order passed in exercise of either Original or Appellate Jurisdiction. It was also held that the High court exercised consultative jurisdiction and that such jurisdiction was neither original nor appellate. 5. MR. R. C. Deb counsel for the respondent No. 1 supported Mr. Ghose and referred to several other decisions. Reliance was placed on a decision of the supreme Court reported in (13) A. I. R. (1954) S,c. 236 for the proposition that a contract for sale was not at an and until the vendor was paid, and the contract was fully discharged. This decision was relied upon in support of the contention that the contract was still a subsisting contract, and remained undischarged. Reliance was next placed on another decision of the Supreme court reported in (14) A. I. R. (1970)S. C. 406 in support of the contention that in the judgment and order made by this Court there was no adjudication on the merits of the controversy between the parties, but the appeal was disposed of on the ground that the application was not maintainable. Reliance was next placed on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in (7) A. I. R. (1961) All. 245 (which was earlier referred to by Mr. Reliance was next placed on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in (7) A. I. R. (1961) All. 245 (which was earlier referred to by Mr. Ghose) for the proposition that a judgment contemplated by Art. 133 should fulfil three conditions namely it should terminate the proceedings, it should determine the rights and liabilities of the parties sand the determination should be on merits and should be final and conclusive so as to cover the entire range of substantive rights and liabilities which formed the subject-matter of the controversy in the proceedings. The next Base relied upon was a decision of this Court reported in (15) A. I. R. (1963) Cal. 1281. In that case an application for a certificate under Article 133 (1) of the constitution was made in order to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court from a Bench decision of this Court, whereby the applicant's writ petition challenging a notice under S. 34 of the indian Income Tax Act, 1922, was dismissed. It was held that in the notice under S. 34 nothing had been done and it was open to the petitioner to convince the Income Tax Officer that there had been no under-assessment and that the entire proceedings by way of re-assessment remained to be gone through and there was no consideration at all of the merits. It was further held that the merits could not be affected by reason of the decision of the High Court in the writ appeal and for that reason the decision proposed to be appealed from was not a final order. The next case relied on was a full Bench decision of the Nagpur high Court reported in (16) A. I. R. (1952) Nag. 305 in which it was held that the test of finality of an order was whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the parties and that the mere fact that the order decided an important and vital issue was not material in deciding the question of finality of an order. It was also held that the finality must be a finality in relation to the suit, and the judgment and order must affect the merits of the case between the parties by determining some right or liability. It was also held that the finality must be a finality in relation to the suit, and the judgment and order must affect the merits of the case between the parties by determining some right or liability. The next case relied on was a decision of the Supreme court reported in (17) A. I. R. (1971)S. C. 100 in which it was held that an order dismissing a writ petition challenging the validity of an industrial award, though such award disposed of only one item of a charter of demand, leaving the rest to be adjudicated upon by a subsequent award, was a final order in a civil proceeding within the meaning of Article 133 (1) and was appealable to the Supreme Court. It was further held that the petition was a civil proceeding which was independent of the original controversy between the parties and that the order dismissing the writ petition finally determined the controversy between the parties on the question raised on the petition and was therefore appealable. It seems to us that this decision is against the contention advanced on behalf of the respondent No. 1 namely that the order is not a final order. The next case relied on was also a decision of the Supreme; court reported in (18) A. I. R. (1965)S. C. 1818 in which it was held that the words civil proceeding covered all proceedings in which a party asserted the existence of a civil right conferred by civil law or by statute, and claimed relief for breach thereof. It was argued that according to this test, the rescission application was not a civil proceeding. We cannot accept this contention of counsel for the respondents. The applicant in this case certainly asserted the existence of a civil right conferred upon him by civil law namely the right to an order for rescission of the contract for sale of shares which was the subject-matter of a decree. 6. MR. Mukherjee on the other hand contended relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (18) A. I. R. (1965) S. C. 1818 (supra)that there could be no doubt that the applicant asserted a civil right conferred upon him by the civil law and he claimed relief for the. breach of such right. 6. MR. Mukherjee on the other hand contended relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (18) A. I. R. (1965) S. C. 1818 (supra)that there could be no doubt that the applicant asserted a civil right conferred upon him by the civil law and he claimed relief for the. breach of such right. He submitted that it was not only a civil proceeding but the order made by this Court was also a final order as nothing was left outstanding with regard to the dispute between the parties relating to a claim for rescission of the contract. In support of his contention that the order is a final order Mr. Mukherjee relied on a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in (3) A. I. R. (1964) All. 49 (supra) in which it was held that a final order within the meaning of Art. 133 (1) was an order in the civil proceeding and not the final order in the case disposed of by the High court. It was further held that merely because the High Court disposed of the appeal before it, it did not become a final order in a civil proceeding and that if the civil proceeding still remained pending in the trial Court in spite of the order passed by the High Court, it was not a final order in the civil proceeding, though it might be the final order in the appeal before the High court. Reliance was next placed by counsel for the applicant on another decision of the Supreme Court reported in (19) A. I. R. (1968) S. C. 733 for the proposition that a judgment and order which determined the principal matter in question was a final order, though it directed inquiries or was made on an interlocutory application or reserved a right to apply. Reliance was next placed by Mr. Reliance was next placed by Mr. Mukherjee on a decision reported in (20) A. I. R. (1956) Andhra 126 in which it was held that an order could be held to be a final order only if it finally disposed of the rights of the parties in the suit or proceeding, and that what is material is not the form but the substance and if in substance no right of the parties are outstanding to be decided in the suit, it could not be said that the mere pendency of the suit deprived the otherwise final adjudication of the rights of the parties of its finality. Reliance was also placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. LR. (1965) S. C. 576. In that case the order made by the High Court remanding the suit to the trial Court for proceeding according to law was held to be a final order although the suit still remained to be disposed of by the trial Court. 7. THE various decisions discussed above indicate the circumstances and the conditions in which an order may be said to be a final order in a civil proceeding. It is in the light of those principles that ws have to decide if the order in this case is a final order within the meaning of Article 133 (1 ). The proceeding in which the order was made in this case, was an appeal from an order made in an application for rescission of a contract. In that application besides rescission, various other reliefs were also sought for. Counsel for the appellant pressed the claim for rescission and not the other prayers, which however were not abandoned. The prayer for rescission was based on events which happened subsequent to the decree. This Court came to the conclusion that the application was not maintainable. So far as the claim to an order of rescission is concerned, the order made in our view, is a final order. Nothing remained outstanding with regard to the claim for rescission. It is to be remembered, that in the appeal, counsel for the appellant made it clear that he was not pressing the other prayers in the petition (except the prayer for injunction) though he did not abandon such other prayers. Nothing remained outstanding with regard to the claim for rescission. It is to be remembered, that in the appeal, counsel for the appellant made it clear that he was not pressing the other prayers in the petition (except the prayer for injunction) though he did not abandon such other prayers. That being so, the only question before the court was whether the applicant was entitled to an order for rescission of the contract. It may be that the applicant has a right to apply for execution of the decree. It may as well be that he may move a fresh application for rescission of the contract cm fresh grounds. But the existence of other right of the applicant and the possibility of his exercising such other rights including the) right to move a fresh application for rescission on fresh grounds, does not make the order any the less a final order in the proceeding in which that order was made. That proceeding in our view cannot but be said to be a civil proceeding contemplated by Article 133 (1 ). It was a proceeding in which relief was claimad for breach of a civil right conferred upon the appellant under the civil law of the land. So far as the claim to an order for rescission was concerned, the order left nothing outstanding or undisposed of. Even though the merits of the dispute between the parties were not gone into, and the application was rejected on the ground that it was not maintainable, it must be held to be a final order, as the applicant's claim was finally disposed of, and the rights of the parties so far as the rescission of the contract was concerned were finally adjudicated upon. All in all the order made by this Court is a final order within the meaning of Article 133 (1)of the Constitution, the proceeding in which the order was made was an independent original proceeding, the suit itself having come to an end upon a decree passed thereon. That proceeding was terminated by the order made. The statute contemplated such an application being made after the suit was disposed of and it cannot therefore be said to be an application in the suit itself. That proceeding was terminated by the order made. The statute contemplated such an application being made after the suit was disposed of and it cannot therefore be said to be an application in the suit itself. The proceeding therefore must be held to be an independent original proceeding, though the right to apply for rescission was claimed by the applicant for events which happened subsequent to the decree. 8. TURNING now to the question of valuation, it is to be noticed that the contract of which a rescission was claimed was a contract for transfer of 2295 shares. The agreed value of these shares is Rs. 86,60,000/ -. The claim for rescission and the opposition to such a claim, make it clear that the dispute between the parties in the Court of first instance and still in dispute relates to transfer of shares, the value of which was far in excess of Rs. 20,000/ -. So far as by the judgment and order of this Court it was held that the appellant was not entitled to an order for rescission of the contract, it cannot but be held that the order made by this court involved directly a claim regarding property, the value of which was in excess of Rs. 20,000/ -. The bone of contention between the parties was whether the appellant was entitled to rescission of a contract for sale of shares the agreed value of which is rs. 86,60,000/ -. Mr. Deb Counsel for the respondent No. 1 however, contended that a claim for rescission of a contract was incapable of valuation. He argued that the agreed price of the shares was not a matter to be taken into consideration, as the only question between the parties was whether the appellant was entitled to an order for rescission of the contract. In support of this contention he referred to the provisions in the Court Fees act Schedule II Item 17 (vi), which prescribes a Court Fee of Rs. 10/- in the case of a suit for rescission. In support of this contention he referred to the provisions in the Court Fees act Schedule II Item 17 (vi), which prescribes a Court Fee of Rs. 10/- in the case of a suit for rescission. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (21) A. I. R. (1965) S. C. 1440 in which it was held that if in a proposed appeal there was no claim or question raised respecting property other than the subject-matter, clause (a) of Art. 133 (1) would apply; and if the appeal involved a claim or question respecting property of an amount or value of not less than Rs. 20,000/- in addition to or other than the subject-matter of the dispute, clause (b) of article 133 (1) would apply. Reliance was also placed by counsel for the respondent No. 1 on another decision of the Supreme Court reported in (22) A. I. R. (1970) S. C. 2041 in which it was held that where the subject-matter of the dispute was grant of a licence for supply of liquor, the grant of a certificate by the High Court under Article 133 (1) (a) was erroneous. It was held that the dispute relating to the grant of a licence for supply of liquor was incapable of valuation. Reliance was also placed on a Bench decision of this Court reported in (23) A. I. R. (1968) Cal. 316. 9. MR. Mukherjee on the other hand, contended that in this case the test required by both clauses (a) and (b) of Article 133 (1) were satisfied because the subject-matter of the dispute was whether the applicant was entitled to an order of rescission of a contract under which the respondent no. 1 was liable to pay Rs. 86,60,000/-as the value of the shares which were to be transferred under the decree by the appellant to the respondent No. 1. He argued that in any event the requirement of clause (b) was amply satisfied because the order involved directly a claim regarding transfer of shares, the value of which was admittedly more than. Rs. 20,000/ -. In support of this contention Mr. Mukherjee relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (24) A. I. R. (1966) S. C. 1935. Rs. 20,000/ -. In support of this contention Mr. Mukherjee relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (24) A. I. R. (1966) S. C. 1935. In that case the Supreme Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of the High court refusing a certificate under article 133 (a) or (b) held that in a case where the dispute was whether the property was private property and alienable or whether the property was a public temple for public religious worship, the High Court having come to the conclusion that this dispute was incapable of valuatibn, should not have refused leave to appeal to the Supreme court, as the subject-matter had to be ascertained with reference to the claim in the plaint, namely that the property was private property capable of alienation. It was held that the High Court: should have valued the claim on that basis. In our opinion the judgment and order made by this Bench directly involved some claim or question respecting property the value of which is over Rs. 20,000/- and therefore the requirement of Article 133 (1) (b) is satisfied in this case. We cannot however accept Mr. Mukherjee's contention that the requirement of Art. 133 (1) (a) is satisfied. 10. MR. Mukherjee, however, also urged that it was a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court as difficult and substantial questions of law were involved relating to rescission of a contract which had merged in a decree for specific performance. We do not think there is any merit in this contention of counsel for the applicant and we cannot certify that it is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme court. For the reasons mentioned above this application succeeds. Let a certificate be issued under Article 133 (1) (b) of the Constitution. There will also be an order in terms of prayer (d) of the petition. Costs of this application will be costs in the Supreme Court appeal.