Judgment :- (RAMAPRASADA RAO, J.) The petitioner is one K.A. Meera Saibo. His son swears to the affidavit in support of this application. It is said that the petitioner is carrying on business under the name and style of K.A.M.P. Meera Saibo and Brothers, Kandy, Ceylon. The deponent of the affidavit is a partner in the said Company. In respect of the income earned by the said firm in Ceylon, it is said that the said income was assessed in India to tax for the years 1950-1951 to 1957-1958. Even so, the firms liability to pay income-tax such income was also reckoned. It is said that the income earned in Ceylon was not remitted to India. The assessment proceedings for the years in question were finally concluded for the last year in about January 1964. It is admitted that a major portion of the income on which tax has been levied is relatable to income earned in Ceyeon. In or about, 1947, due to exchange control regulations which came into force in Ceylon, no money could be remitted from Ceylon to India without a permit obtained from the appropriate authorities for such remittance. The petitioners case is that in spite of his best efforts to secure such a remittance on due applications made by him for the purpose, he could not secure the amounts by way of repatriation to enable him to pay the tax in India. The respondents, however, on the foot of the finalised assessment order, took recovery proceedings for the realisation of the amounts due from the petitioner as an assessee in default. In furtherance of such recovery proceedings, the properties of the petitioner in India were attached and brought to sale. The proclamation of sale proclaims that the petitioner is a defaulter under Sec. 220 (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. At this stage, when his Indian properties were about to be brought to sale pursuant to the aforesaid proclamation of sale, the petitioner has come before this Court for the issue of a writ of prohibition or such other appropriate direction to restrain the respondents from taking revenue recovery proceedings against him, as his main contention is that in view of the prevailing law, he cannot be deemed to be an assessee in default. The answer to this by the respondents is that it does not appear that the petitioner has taken all reasonable precautions and steps to see that he has approached the appropriate authority in Ceylon for the repatriation of funds from the other country to India, and if the petitioner had clearly explained the position, the authorities would not have refused remittance. It is on this ground the issue of the rule is opposed. The petitioner, on being apprised of the attachment of his Indian property and the proposal to sell the same publicly pursuant to the proclamation of sale settled there for, applied to the Controller of Exchange, Department of Exchange Control, Central Bank of Ceylon, Colombo, for permission to purchase Indian currency representing the tax demanded by the Indian authority both in respect of the partners liability as well as the firms liability. This application was made on the 6th February, 1964, after the last assessment order was made for the last assessment year referred to above. The petitioner had to remind the Controller of Exchange several times and ultimately the Controller of Exchange replied on the 7th October 1964, stating “In terms of current exchange control procedure, investment income does not qualify for remittance. In the circumstances, we are unable to agree to the payment of land income-tax out of their Ceylon funds”. It is on this basis that the petitioner contends that he cannot be treated as an assessee in default. The provisions which govern the situation have been considered in more than one decision of our Court and it would be sufficient for us to notice them in brief. Sec. 45 of the earlier Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which corresponds to Sec. 220 of the later Act, 1961, deals with recovery of the tax and penalties. The provisions which govern the situation have been considered in more than one decision of our Court and it would be sufficient for us to notice them in brief. Sec. 45 of the earlier Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which corresponds to Sec. 220 of the later Act, 1961, deals with recovery of the tax and penalties. The proviso to Sec. 45, which is the Section dealing with the position as to which tax is payable, provides as follows: “Provided further that where an assessee has been assessed in respect of income arising outside the taxable territories in a country the laws of which prohibit or restrict the remittance of money to the taxable territories, the Income-tax Officer shall not treat the assessee as in default in respect of that part of the tax which is due in respect of that amount of his income which by reason of such prohibition or restriction cannot be brought into the taxable territories and shall continue to treat the assessee as not in default in respect of such part of the tax until the prohibition or restriction is removed. Explanation : For the purpose of this section income shall be deemed to have been brought into the taxable territories if it has been utilised or could have been utilised for the purpose of any expenditure actually incurred by the assessee without the taxable territories or if the income whether captialised or not has been brought into the taxable territories in any form”. The text of Sec. 220, Clause 7 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is in pari materia with the text of the proviso to Sec. 45 of the earlier Act. The purport of the above provisions is that if income has arisen outside India and if a person has been assessed in respect of such income in India then such a person shall not be treated as an assessee in default in respect of that part of the tax which is due in respect of that amount of his outside income, if the laws of the country outside India in which such income has been earned prohibits or restricts the remittance of money to India. The explanation to the provisions as above deems certain moneys as having been brought to India. In the instant case, it is not alleged that the petitioner has earned such constructive income either. The explanation to the provisions as above deems certain moneys as having been brought to India. In the instant case, it is not alleged that the petitioner has earned such constructive income either. Dealing with these provisions, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Veeraswami J., (as he then was) and one of us, expressed the view that the High Court can weigh the evidence and scrutinise the material placed before it by the assessee and also find that such material does or does not establish that the assessee concerned did or did not make full, complete, and bona fide attempts for repatriation of the money into India. Therefore, the position is that unless the materials placed before us permit us judicially to find that the steps already taken by the petitioner should be deemed to be complete and full, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief asked for. The circumstances placed before us should be such that a reasonable and well-instructed individual should be in a position to conclude without any element of doubt that the petitioner has taken all the steps possible and the result is that he cannot be reasonably badged as a person in default. The question is whether such steps have been taken in the instant case. The answer given to the application though belatedly made by the petitioner, which in so far as it relates to the earlier, assessment year, such as 1950-1951 and 1951-1952, etc., does not clearly give the impression that every possible and available step for repatriation has been exhausted. The Controller of Exchange would say that in terms of the exchange control in prevalence on the date when he wrote the letter dated 7th October, 1964, he was of the view that investment income does not qualify for remittance. It has not been made clear before us as to what ‘investment income’ means under the provisions of the exchange control provisions of Ceylon, Further, when a similar situation was noticed by another Division Bench to which the learned Chief Justice was a party, it was brought to their notice that there was an Act which regulated the situation and particularly dealt with matters of remittance and repatriation of money from C eylon to India. In D. Subramanian v. Asst. Controller of Estate Duty, Madurai and another , Veeraswami, C.J., says: “Ss. In D. Subramanian v. Asst. Controller of Estate Duty, Madurai and another , Veeraswami, C.J., says: “Ss. 7, 8 and 22 of the Exchange Control Act of Ceylon do show that there is restriction of remittance of money from Ceylon to this country without the permission of the Central Bank of Ceylon But this leaves the impression that once the petitioner proves that out of Indian assets, he would not be able to pay the duty, the Ceylon authorities might possibly be persuaded to release the exchange. Ss. 7, 8, and 22 do not prevent the Central Bank of Ceylon from granting permission if it is convinced that it was necessary”. In this decision we see that the permission of the Central Bank of Ceylon appears to be a condition precedent before the subject of remittance could be completely and fully thrashed out. In the instant case, it is only the Exchange Controller who looked into the matter and he appears to be functioning as a department of the Central Bank of Ceylon. It is not therefore clear from the record whether the Central Bank of Ceylon, which appears to be the primary and the actual authority under the Exchange Control Act to give or refuse permission for remittance of moneys from Ceylon to India for payment towards the arrears of tax over the Ceylon income earned by the assessee has refused repatriation. Hence it cannot be said that there has been an exhaustion of all the steps which ought to be taken by the petitioner for repatriating money from Ceylon to India. In this view we are unable to issue the rule, but in the circumstances of this case, it appears to be just that the following direction be given. The petitioner is given an opportunity to again apply to the correct authority and seek for repatriation of the moneys. If, in spite of such an effort, the repatriation or remittance is refused by the Central Bank of Ceylon under the provisions of the above Act referred to, then the petitioner is at liberty to take such steps as are necessary to prove that he is not an assessee in default. But as matters stand, we are not satisfied that the petitioner could be classified as a person not in default within the meaning of Sec. 220(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. But as matters stand, we are not satisfied that the petitioner could be classified as a person not in default within the meaning of Sec. 220(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioner is granted six months time from this date to make the necessary applications and seek for remittance of funds for payment of income-tax in India. The attachment of the properties in India already effected by the Revenue shall continue. If, however, no such proof in a manner known to law is secured by the petitioner, which would clinchingly establish the existence of a prohibition or restriction in the matter of such remittance, then the respondents are at liberty to proceed further in the recovery proceedings by sale of the properties already attached. The writ petition is dismissed with the above directions. No costs.