ORDER Shivdayal, J. 1. This appeal arises from proceedings under section 7 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The landlord-respondent claimed an increase in the rent alleging that Rs. 61 was the rent which the suit-shop actually fetched on January 1, 1948 and she was entitled to an increase of seventy per cent on it, and the house-tax which was Rs. 16 has been increased to Rs. 74, As. 8. 2. The tenant opposed the petition. The learned Rent Controlling Authority held that the rent-note (Ex. P-1) which was executed by one Babulal on Chaitra Badi 6 Samvat 2003 (1947 A.D.) was only for Rs. 50. The landlord appealed. The learned District Judge, Gwalior, found that the Rent Controlling Authority had misread the rent-note (Ex. P-1); it was not for Rs. 50, but it was for Rs. 50 plus Rs. 11, total Rs. 61. The rent for three-door shop was Rs. 50 while the rent of one room (Kotha) was Rs. 11, Thus he found that according to the rent-note the monthly rent which the suit accommodation actually fetched was Rs. 61 on January 1, 1948 and this was the rent which the appellant-tenant had been paying as was borne out by the entries in his account-books. The appeal Court, therefore, held Rs. 61 to be the basic rent on January 1, 1948 within the meaning of section 7 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. He allowed an increase according to section 7 because he further held that the suit accommodation was kept in good and tenantable repairs. In the result he held the mandard rent to be Rs. 104.69 per month. 3. In this second appeal Shri Bhagwandas Gupta, Learned Counsel for the the appellant tenant has contended that the landlord could not succeed because he did not produce the entries from the Municipal Assessment register although admittedly the house-tax was fixed at Rs. 16. It is argued that there are two criteria in section 7(2) and the standard rent is to be the lesser rate. It is, therefore, the duty of the landlord to produce the evidence of both the criteria. In this case there is at material on record to show that there was any entry of rent of that accommodation in a Municipal Assessment Register. The landlord produced the rent-note (Ex. It is, therefore, the duty of the landlord to produce the evidence of both the criteria. In this case there is at material on record to show that there was any entry of rent of that accommodation in a Municipal Assessment Register. The landlord produced the rent-note (Ex. P-1) and proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the accommodation was let out on or before January 1, 1948 and the rent it fetched was Rs. 61 per month. 4. There can be no doubt from the language of section 7(2) that the sub-section will apply if one of the two criteria is proved. Since one of the two criteria is proved the standard rent will be fixed on that basis. However, in a case where both the criteria are proved then it is the lesser rate which will be the standard rent. Therefore, if the tenant wanted to rely on the other criteria it was his duty to prove it. 5. Even before me there is no material produced to show that there was any entry of rent of that accommodation in the Municipal Assessment Register and whether such entries were at all made in such register then. The Learned Counsel for the appellant-tenant argues that because on January 1, 1948 the house-tax was Rs. 32 of the entire building and Rs. 16 of the portion concerned in these proceedings, therefore the rental value should be deemed to be Rs. 420 per year. This contention has no substance. Section 7(2) of the Act does not provide for any such calculation. The criterion is that there must be an actual entry "of rent" of that accommodation in the Municipal Assessment Register. If there is no entry "of the rent", one cannot be presumed nor calculated on an alleged basis. The first contention is, therefore, rejected. 6. The second contention is that the landlord did not prove that the suit accommodation was repaired by him from time to time. This contention too is without substance in asmuch as the learned District Judge has relied on the evidence of Madhusudan Das (P.W. 6) (wrongly written in para 9 of the appellate court's judgment, his father's name i.e., 'Narayandas'). The witness said that he kept the premises in tenantable repairs. The appellate court believed his evidence. This contention too is without substance in asmuch as the learned District Judge has relied on the evidence of Madhusudan Das (P.W. 6) (wrongly written in para 9 of the appellate court's judgment, his father's name i.e., 'Narayandas'). The witness said that he kept the premises in tenantable repairs. The appellate court believed his evidence. It was also supported by the evidence of Sudama (P.W. 2) in the sens, that this defendant's witness stated that the suit premises were in good and tenantable condition. It is argued that according to Sudama (P.W. 2) the repairs were made by the tenant. But Laxman Das appellant who examined himself did not say anything about it. I see no ground for interference on this point in second appeal. 7. The third contention is that since there was no evidence produced by either party of the entry in the Municipal Assessment Register section 10(4) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act was attracted and reasonable rent ought to have been assessed on that basis. This contention cannot be accepted when the case falls squarely within the purview of section 7(2) of the Act. 8. The fourth contention is that under section 9 of the Act the proceedings could not be entertained before the expiry of one month. But there is no such provision in this section. 9. Lastly, it is urged that the standard rent fixed by the learned District Judge ought to have been directed to take effect after one month of the date of the notice. It is clear from the order of the learned District Judge that he has not fixed any point of time from which the standard rent became payable and in fact this was not necessary in view of the clear language of section 9 of the Act. 10. Reliance was placed on Banaram v. Rupi Bai (C.R. No. 593/62 dated 18-7-1963, 1961 MPLJ SN 259), so also on the dictum laid down in Sushila Devi Jagtole v. Y.P. Mishra (M.P. No. 251/60, dated 16-2-1961 1961 MPLJ Note 94) and Shiromal v. Shaikh Mohammad (C.R. No. 583/60, dated 8-3-1961 1961 MPLJ Note 102). The cases relied on by the Learned Counsel for the appellant are not apposite to this case. 11. Before I could sign this order Shri B.D. Gupta filed a certified copy of a decision of Razzaque J. in Misc. The cases relied on by the Learned Counsel for the appellant are not apposite to this case. 11. Before I could sign this order Shri B.D. Gupta filed a certified copy of a decision of Razzaque J. in Misc. Appeal No. 14 of 1966 (Ramkrishna v. Takhatmal) dated 8-8-1966 in support of his contention that if the plaintiff does not file copy of the Municipal Assessment Register, nor state specifically in his plaint the fact that Municipal Register of the year 1948 was in existence, the suit under section 7 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act is liable to be dismissed. With great respect I am unable to agree to that view. I have already given reasons in paragraphs 4 and 5 above 12. The appeal is admitted. Let the papers be therefore laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to consider this question. OPINION Raina, J. 1. This is a reference by Shivdayal J., in a Second Appeal arising out of an application by the landlord under section 10 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for fixation of standard rent. 2. The appellant Laxmandas has been occupying the shop in suit as a tenant of the respondent Mst. Barfi Bai on a monthly rent of Rs. 55 per month. The respondent filed an application before the Rent Controlling Authority under section 10 of the Act for fixation of standard rent. Her case was that the monthly rent of the shop on 1-1-48 was Rs. 61 per month while the house-tax of the entire building of which the shop in suit was a part was Rs. 16 on 1-1-48. The tax had since been raised to Rs. 74.50 Paise. The respondent claimed that the standard rent should be fixed at Rs. 104.69 Paise per month by allowing an increase of 70 per cent under section 7 of the Act. The application was dismissed by the Rent Controlling. Authority. Being aggrieved thereby the respondent filed an appeal before the District Judge who determined the standerd rent at Rs. 104.69 P. per month. The appellant (tenant) thereupon filed a second appeal which came up for hearing before Shivdayal, J. 3. The application was dismissed by the Rent Controlling. Authority. Being aggrieved thereby the respondent filed an appeal before the District Judge who determined the standerd rent at Rs. 104.69 P. per month. The appellant (tenant) thereupon filed a second appeal which came up for hearing before Shivdayal, J. 3. The main point urged before him was that as no evidence was adduced by either party of the entry in Municipal Assessment Register the standard rent cannot be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in Section 7(1) of the Act, and, therefore, it should have been determined under section 10(4) of the Act. Shivdayal J., was not prepared to accept this contention and was about to dismiss the appeal sum warily, but he referred the question are a larger Bench in view of the decision of Razzaque, J., in Misc. Appel No. 14 of 1906 (Ramkrishna v. Takhatmal) dated 8-8-66. 4. Thus the point for consideration in whether the standard rent can be fixed under clause 12 of section 7 in the absence of any evidence as to what was the rent oi the commodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register on 1-1-1948 and if not whether the standard rent in such a case should be determined under sub-section (4) of section 10 of the Act. For a a proper consideration of this question it is necessary to refer to the provisions of section 7. This section is divided into three clauses. Clause (1) provides that where the reasonable annual rent or fair rent of any accommodation has been fixed by a competent authority under the repealed Act such rent shall be the standard rent of such accommodation. We are not concerned with this clause because it is not applicable to this case. Clause (3) provides for standard rent of accommodation not failing under Clause (1) or (2). This is a residuary clause. This clause is also not applicable to this case. 5. Clause: (2) is the relevant clause for the purposes of this case and it is reproduced here for locality of reference :-- "7. Standard rent "Standard rent" in relation to any accommodation means -- (1)................ This is a residuary clause. This clause is also not applicable to this case. 5. Clause: (2) is the relevant clause for the purposes of this case and it is reproduced here for locality of reference :-- "7. Standard rent "Standard rent" in relation to any accommodation means -- (1)................ (2) (i) where the accommodation was let out or: or before the Ist day of January, 1948, and the reasonable annual rent or fair rent has not been so fixed, the rent of that accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register or as was realised on the 1st day of January, 1948, whichever is less; or (ii) Where the accommodation was not let out on or before the: 1st day of January. 1948, the rert of that accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessement Register or as could be realised on the 1st day of January, 1948, whichever is less; increased- (a) in the case of a residential accommodation and accommodation used for education purposes, by thirty-five per cent of such rent; (b) in the case of other accommodation, by seventy per cent of such rent; and (c) in case the tenant is not liable to pay the municipal tax and there has been any increase in municipal tax subsequent to 1st day of January, 1948, by an amount equal to such increase : Provided that the increase specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be permissible only if the accommodation has been kept in good and tenantable repairs;" It would appear from the language of the aforesaid Clause that it ts applicable to accommodation which was in existence on 1-1-48. As Clause (3) is the residuary Clause it apparently relates to accommodation which was constructed after 1-1-48. 5. In the instant case, Sub-clause (1) of Clause (2) is applicable because the accommodation was let out on 1-1-48. According to this sub-clause the rent of the accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register or as was realised on 1st day of January, 1948, whichever is less shall be the basis for determining the standard rent after taking into account the increase permissible under Clause (2). According to this sub-clause the rent of the accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register or as was realised on 1st day of January, 1948, whichever is less shall be the basis for determining the standard rent after taking into account the increase permissible under Clause (2). Shivdayai J., was of the view that the said sub-clause will apply even if only one of the two criteria namely, rent realised on 1-1-48 and rent shown in the Municipal Assessment Register on 1-1-48, is proved, and the standard rent can be fixed on that basis. According to him in a case where both the criteria are proved it is the lesser rent which will be the basis for the standard rent, but the question of lesser rent would not arise where only one of the criteria is proved, it is for the tenant to prove the other criterion if he wants to take advantage of the lesser rate. 6. Razzaque J., in Ramkrishna v. Takhatmal (supra) observed as under while dealing with this question :-- "In other words, the prescribed comparison to ascertain the amount 'whichever is less' as contemplated by sub-section 2(i) of section 7 is necessary. And this cannot be reached unless a landlord mentions in his application as to what amount of rent was realised by him on the first day of January 1948 and what was shown in the municipal assessment register on that date. In the instant case, the landlord has simply shown that Rs. 60 per month used to be realised by him as rent of the premises in question on 1st day of January, 1948, but he did not say a word in his plaint regarding the fact as to what amount of rent was shown in the municipal assessment register of that year. In other words, the very foundation required for the prescribed comparison was wanting in his application. Accordingly, in the absence of that no standard rent could be fixed." 7. After carefully examining the entire scheme of the Act and relevant provisions having a bearing on the matter we are inclined to agree with the view expressed by Razzaque J., and our reasons are as follows. The preamble of the Act describes it as an Act to provide for the regulation and control of letting and rent of accommodation and eviction of tenants therefrom. The preamble of the Act describes it as an Act to provide for the regulation and control of letting and rent of accommodation and eviction of tenants therefrom. The relations between landlords and tenants are normally regulated by the law of contract. Bui on account of enormous increase of population in urban areas and paucity of accommodation the owners of buildings in such areas are in a position to exploit the tenants by charging exorbitant tent. The object of the Act is to save a tenant from such exploitation and to allow a landlord to charge only reasonable rent of the accommodation from a tenant. The standard rent to be fixed under section 10 represents the reasonable rent to be determined by the rent-controlling authority in accordance with the principles laid down in section 7 and other provisions of the Act. If we carefully scrutinise the provisions of section 7 it would appear that the rent of the accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register provides the crucial test for determining what should be the standard rent. According to Clause (2) of section 7 the agreed rent on 1-1-48 or the rent which could be realised on 1-1-48 can form the basis for determination of standard rent only if it is less or equal to the rent of the accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register and not otherwise. The reason is obvious. The rent as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register usually represents the fair rent of the building and, therefore, it is absolutely necessary to take it into account for the purpose of determining the standard rent. 8. A careful examination of the provisions of Clause (3) of section 7 fortifies the aforesaid view. Under sub-clause (a) of Clause (3) if the accommodation is separately assessed to Municipal Assessment, the annual rent according to such assessment plus 15 per cent shall be the standard rent. Sub-clause (c) of Clause (3) provides that if the accommodation is not so assessed the standard rent has to be determined by taking into account the agreed rent and the annual rent calculated on the basis of cost of construction whichever is less. Sub-clause (c) of Clause (3) provides that if the accommodation is not so assessed the standard rent has to be determined by taking into account the agreed rent and the annual rent calculated on the basis of cost of construction whichever is less. The words "whichever is less" occurring in Clause (2) and sub-clause (c) of Clause (3) make it clear that both the criteria laid down therein must be proved because a comparison of the two is essential and the standard rent has to be determined on the basis of the one, which is less. In our view, it would not be correct to treat the words "whichever is less" to be applicable only where both the criteria are proved and leaving it to the choice of the party concerned to ignore these words by proving only one of the two criteria. It appears to us that for purposes of both Clause (2) as well as sub-clause (c) of Clause (3) the words "whichever is less" are of great significance, making it obligatory on the party which wants to have the standard rent determined on the principles laid down in the said Clause to prove both the criteria. 9. The question, therefore, arises as to how the Rent Controlling Authority is to proceed where the party concerned is able to prove only one criterion either because it is not in a position to adduce necessary evidence relating to the other criterion or because it is not possible to do so. For example, in a case falling within the purview of Clause (2) there may be no entry of rent in the Municipal Assessment Register on 1-1-48 or a copy of the entry may not be available for some reason. It appears to us that in such a case the only course open to the Rent Controlling Authority would be to determine the standard rent under sub-section (4) of section 10 of the Act which reads as follows :-- "Sec. 10. Rent Controlling Authority to fix standard etc. (1).................. (2)................ (3).................. It appears to us that in such a case the only course open to the Rent Controlling Authority would be to determine the standard rent under sub-section (4) of section 10 of the Act which reads as follows :-- "Sec. 10. Rent Controlling Authority to fix standard etc. (1).................. (2)................ (3).................. (4) Where for any reason it is not possible to determine the standard rent of any accommodation on the principles set forth under section 7, the Rent Controlling Authority may fix such rent as would be reasonable having regard to the situation, locality and condition of the accommodation and the amenities provided therein and where there are similar or nearly similar accommodations in the locality, having regard also to standard rent payable in respect of such accommodation." 10. It is clear from the aforesaid sub-section that it is attracted where it is not possible for the Rent Controlling Authority to determine the standard rent in accordance with the principles set forth in section 7. Section 7 covers all sorts of accommodation and it appears to us that the only situation in which sub-section (4) of section 10 will be attracted is when both the criteria laid down in section 7 are not proved. In fact Learned Counsel for both the sides were unable to point out to us any other situation in which this subsection may be attracted. 11. Thus reading sub-section (4) of section 10 with section 7 it would appear that both the criteria laid down in Clause (2) and Sub-clause (c) of Clause (3) of section 7 are essential and vital for the determination of standard rent and where either of them is missing, it is not possible to determine the standard rent on the principles set forth therein and the case would fall under sub-section (4) of section 10 which provides for the determination of the standard rent on the basis of the situation, locality, condition etc., and the standard rent payable for a similar accommodation in the vicinity. 12. It would be of some interest to refer in this connection to the provisions in the previous enactments of this nature. 12. It would be of some interest to refer in this connection to the provisions in the previous enactments of this nature. In the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955, the relevant provisions relating to reasonable annual rent are contained in Clause (e) of section 3 which reads as follows :-- "Reasonable annual rent "means the rent of that accommodation as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register or as was realised or could be realised on the 1st of January, 1941, or could have been so realised if the accommodation were completed on the 1st of January, 1941, whichever is less, increased by 35 per cent if it is a residential accommodation and by 70 per cent if it is not a residential accommodation: Provided that the above increases shall be allowed only if the landlord has kept the accommodation in good condition by necessary repairs. Provided further that if there is any increase in the tax assessed to the accommodation, the landlord may collect that amount from the tenant by proportionally adding it to the rent." The aforesaid clause corresponds to section 7 of the present Act, which lays down the principles for determining the reasonable annual rent or in other words the standard rent. In Sushila Devi v. Y.P. Mishra, M.P. No. 251/1960 (j), decided on 16-2-61, 1961 MPLJ SN 94, a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with a case under section 3(e) read with section 9 of the Act of 1955, held that under Clause (e) evidence about the annual rent entered in the Municipal Assessment Register is necessary. It was further held therein that if evidence of the Municipal Assessment Register was not available and the property was also not in occupation of any tenant on that date then the Rent Controlling Authority could fix reasonable annual rent on the basis of the rent which could be realised on 1-1-41. A similar view was expressed in Shiromal v. Sheikh Mohammad 1961 MPLJ SN 102. Thus it was consistently held under the old enactment that the rent as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register was essential for determination of the reasonable rent and that it could be determined on the basis of the other criteria only where the evidence relating to the rent as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register was not available. 13. Thus it was consistently held under the old enactment that the rent as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register was essential for determination of the reasonable rent and that it could be determined on the basis of the other criteria only where the evidence relating to the rent as shown in the Municipal Assessment Register was not available. 13. It may here be noted that under the old Act of 1955 there was no provision corresponding to sub-section (4) of section 10 of the present Act. In the absence of such a provision it could be contended that various modes for determining "reasonable rent" provided in Clause (e) of section 3 of the Act of 1955 were alternative modes and the reasonable rent could be determined in accordance with any one of them where the evidence relating to other modes was not available. But in view of the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 10 of the present Act it is clear that where the evidence relating to both the criteria is not available the standard rent must be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in sub-section (4) of section 10 of the present Act. 14. Thus in our view, it would not be correct to hold that the determination of standard rent with referent to the rent entered in the Municipal Assessment Register under section 7 is only one of the various alternatives and it is open to the Rent Controlling Authority to determine the rent on the basis of any of the alternatives. In our view such a construction would render the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 10 of the present Act otiose and will also give a very restricted meaning to the expression "whichever is less" in section 7 of the Act. It is a settled principle of construction of statutes that they should be so construed as not o render any part thereof redundant or meaningless. 15. In Aswani Kumar v. Arbindo Bose AIR 1952 SC 369 , their Lordships observed in paragraph No. 26 that it is not a sould principle of construction to brush aside the words in a statute as being in opposite surpluses. 15. In Aswani Kumar v. Arbindo Bose AIR 1952 SC 369 , their Lordships observed in paragraph No. 26 that it is not a sould principle of construction to brush aside the words in a statute as being in opposite surpluses. Similarly in Shiv Bahadursingh v. State of V.P. AIR 1953 SC 394 their Lordships observed in paragraph 5 that it is incumbent on the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. 16. It was also contended on behalf of the respondents that the Court could determine the rent as entered in the Municipal Assessnent Register on the basis of the house-tax, keeping in view the provisions of sections 52 and 54 of the Gwalior Municipalities Act. We are unable to accept this contention. In accordance with the principles laid down in section 7 what is necessary is to see what rent was actually entered in the Municipal Assessment Register on 1-1-48. It is not permissible to arrive at a conclusion regarding such rent on the basis of tax or other evidence. We may here point out that in Sushila Devi v. Y.P. Mishra (supra) it was held that the evidence of the entry in the Municipal Assessment Register could not be replaced by an inference about the probable rent on the basis of an entry in the Municipal Assessment Register in the subsequent years. Thus we are of the view that where a party wants to have the standard rent determined on the principles laid down in Clause (2) of section 7 of the Act he must produce a copy of the entry in the Municipal Assessment Register of 1-1-48. If he fails to do so the standard rent cannot be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in section 7 and it may, therefore, be determined in accordance with provisions of sub-section (4) of section 10 of the Act. 17. We answer the reference accordingly.