Judgment :- 1. The quarrel over these writ petitions is not as to whether they should be allowed or not, but as to how, and in what manner they have to be allowed. The challenge made in these writ petitions is against the legality of the levy of licence-fee for use of the petitioner's premises situated in the local limits of the Respondent-Panchayat (the same in both the writ petitions) for the purposes specified in the rules made under S.96 of the Kerala Panchayats Act, namely the Kerala Panchayats (Licensing of Dangerous and Offensive Trades and Factories) R.1963. That the levy in question is a fee and not a tax is not disputed. As a fee that it should bear a sufficient quid pro quo or co-relation to the special benefits conferred on those called upon to pay the fee or the special services enjoyed by them, is again a proposition that should be regarded as well established. It was laid down by the Supreme Court in the Liberty Cinema's case (AIR. 1965 SC. 1107) and has since been affirmed in several full bench decisions of this Court See for instance The Travancore Tea Estates Ltd. v. The Executive Officer, Elappara (1968 KLT. 776) and, (probably, the latest) ruling in the Vaniamkulam Panchayat's case (1971 KLT. 264). Tested in the light of the principles thus laid down, no special benefit is seen conferred or enjoyed by the payer of the licence fee and no special services are seen being rendered for them, over and above those enjoyed or received by the general public from the Panchayat in the discharge of its general statutory obligations. This is a sufficient and clear enough ground to allow these writ petitions; and we have no doubt that the petitions have to be allowed on this ground. But Counsel for the petitioners commended to us that they should be allowed on a larger and a more basic ground, namely that S.96 and 97 of the Kerala Panchayats Act and the Rules framed thereunder and referred to earlier, which authorise the levy of the fee, have themselves been pronounced invalid by a Division Bench of this Court in Executive Officer, Elavally Panchayat v. Rosa (1969 KLT. 387). 387). If this decision were correct these writ petitions have to be straightaway allowed without any investigation into the question as to whether there is sufficient quid pro quo for the levy by conferment of any special benefi or rendering of any special services. But a consideration of the said decision leaves us in no doubt that the observations declaring the sections and the Rules invalid were no part of the ratio of the decision. The Division Bench found as a fact that there was no co-relation between the levy and the services and pronounced the levy invalid on that ground. There was neither any argument nor any finding that the sections and the rules were invalid; and the observations in the case declaring them to be so, were inadvertent. They were indeed treated as such by a later Division Bench in O.P. No. 4860/68, judgment in which was delivered by. one of the judges who was himself a party to Rosa's case (1969 KLT. 387). But lest it should, with any plausibility be contended that one decision of a Division Bench cannot explain away or whittle down the effect of a decision by another bench of co-equal strength and authority, the matter has been placed before a Full Beach. It there fore becomes necessary for us to say that the decision in Rosa's case (1969 KLT. 387) to the extent to which it observed that S.96 and 97 of the Kerala Panchayats Act and the Licensing of Dangerous Trades and Factories Rules framed there-under, are invalid, cannot be accepted as correct and must be treated as overruled. We do so. 2. On the undisputed ground that the levy in question is not supported by any sufficient quid pro quo and that the Respondent Panchayat in these cases has not shown that it conferred any special benefit or rendered any special services to the petitioners and others called upon to pay the fee, other than what has been enjoyed by the general public in discharge of the statutory obligations of the Pauchayat, these writ petitions must succeed. We accordingly allow these writ petitions and quash the demand notices Exts. P-6 and P-7 in O. P. No. 82 of 1968 and Ext. P-6 in O. P. No. 529 of 1968. There will be no order as to costs.