JUDGMENT 1. THE appeal is directed against an order made by Sabyasachi Mukharji J. on July 24, 1969, by which the learned judge corrected, as he himself says in his judgment, or modified, as is contended by the appellant, an earlier order he had made. On November 6, 1968, a suit was instituted by the respondent against the appellant Soon thereafter, the appellant made an application asking for leave to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. On that application an order was made on December 12. 1968. The order as pronounced by the learned Judge was as follows : "leave granted to the petitioner to withdraw the suit and with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. It is further ordered that the applicant do pay costs of the application assessed at Rs. 170/-, certified for counsel. " the order after it had been drawn up and settled, read : "it is ordered that the plaintiff company be at liberty to withdraw from this suit with liberty to it to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action (upon payment of the costs of the suit incurred herein as a condition precedent to the defendant) and it is further ordered that the plaintiff company do pay to the defendant company its costs of and incidental to this application assessed at Rs. 170/-and this Court doth certify that this is a fit application for employment of advocate. " 2. IT is clear that the order as drawn up and settled differs from the order as pronounced, in one important respect, that is to say, in the matter of direction for payment of costs. The reason will be found in Rule 26 of Chapter 16 of the Original Side Rules of the High Court. That rule provides : "where a suit is allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter, unless the Court or a Judge shall otherwise direct, the order shall be drawn up so as to make the payment of the costs of the suit a condition precedent to the plaintiff bringing a fresh suit" The order as settled was signed by the Assistant Registrar on or about january 30, 1969. It is not in dispute that the order has not yet been filed. 3. ON January 6, 1969, the respondent instituted a fresh suit in this Court on the same cause of action. Thereafter, the respondent says, it discovered that the order as settled and signed provided for payment of costs of the suit as a condition precedent to the institution of a fresh suit on the same cause of action. 4. ON February 18, 1969, the respondent made an application for variation or rectification of the signed order of 12th December, 1968, by deleting therefrom the words : "upon payment of the costs of this suit incurred herein as a condition precedent to the defendant. " on that application, the learned Judge stayed the filing of the order till the disposal of the application. On July 24, 1969, the learned judge disposed of the application by the order under appeal. It reads: "it is ordered that the order made herein and dated the 12th day of December last be correctly drawn up, completed and filed by deleting therefrom the words upon payment of the costs of the suit incurred therein as condition precedent to the defendant. " It is further ordered that the plaintiff company do pay to the defendant company its costs of and incidental to the application assessed at 50 gold mohurs. " 5. IN his judgment the learned judge says that his attention was not drawn to rules 25 and 26 of Chapter 16 of the Original Side Rules, and it was not his intention to make any order for payment of costs apart from the costs of the application which he assessed at rs. 170/ -. He observed in his judgment "mr. Ghose was, of course, right in his contention that the direction must not be silent but if such direction can be inferred from the order itself, I am of the opinion that under Rule 26 it can be given and the direction need not be an express direction as submitted by Mr. Ghose. In the background of the facts and circumstances of this case and in the manner in which the order of the 12th December, 1968 was passed, I have no doubt in my mind that it was implied that save and except the costs that have been directed to be paid, there would be no further direction for costs. Ghose. In the background of the facts and circumstances of this case and in the manner in which the order of the 12th December, 1968 was passed, I have no doubt in my mind that it was implied that save and except the costs that have been directed to be paid, there would be no further direction for costs. It necessarily follows therefore that the Court directed that the payment of the costs of the suit would not be a condition precedent to either of the withdrawal of the suit or institution of the fresh suit. Though such a direction is not eloquent in the order, it is sufficiently articulate". We are unable to agree with the learned judge on his interpretation of the order. No doubt he had directed costs of the application to be paid which he had assessed but at the same time, he was completely silent on the question of payment of costs of the suit. If Rules 25 and 26 of Chapter 16 are left out of consideration the order can only, mean that the learned Judge made no order for payment of costs of the suit. In the context of Rule 26, however, the silence of the learned judge assumes a different completion. It implies that an order for costs has been made as condition precedent. In that view of the matter we are unable to agree that the order as settled by the department is incorrect or that it requires correction or rectification. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the appellant, contended that as the order had been correctly drawn up and settled in conformity with Rule 26, the learned Judge, in directing that the order be correctly drawn up, completed and filed, was acting under a misapprehension. Furthermore, he argued that the order having been drawn up, settled signed and sealed, has been completed or perfected and the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to recall or vary the order. Therefore, in so far as the learned Judge sought under his inherent powers, to modify the order, he was exercising a jurisdiction which he no longer possessed. Furthermore, he argued that the order having been drawn up, settled signed and sealed, has been completed or perfected and the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to recall or vary the order. Therefore, in so far as the learned Judge sought under his inherent powers, to modify the order, he was exercising a jurisdiction which he no longer possessed. He then contended that assuming the learned Judge had not lost his jurisdiction by reason of the fact that the order had not been filed, he was not exercising that jurisdiction which inheres in a Court to recall or vary an order it had made, before the order had been perfected. He had taken the view that the order had not been correctly drawn up and therefore he directed that the order be correctly drawn up by deleting the direction for costs. 6. MR. Chatterjee contended that an order is perfected the moment it is signed. It seems that the words 'perfected' and 'completed' are used conterminously. Rule 32 of Chapter 16 of the Original Side Rules speaks of "completion of the decree or order". The phrase "perfecting the order" or 'the order being perfected", is used more often. In re. (1) Harrison's Settlement 1955 All. E. R. Vol. 1 page 185 Jenkins L. J. said, with reference to the order he was considering : "at the date of the House of Lords' decision, these orders had not yet been entered, or in other words, had not been perfected as formal acts of the Court. " in England an order has to be entered. Until and unless it is entered, it is not perfected as a formal act of the Court. In this connection, reference may be made to Rule 1 of Order 41 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of England, then in force. It provided "every judgment shall be entered by the proper officer in the book to be kept for the purpose. The party entering the judgment shall deliver to the officer a copy of the whole of the pleadings in the case. . . . . . " it is, therefore, clear that a judgment has to be entered by an officer of Court on the initiative of a party. Entering the judgment is not a judicial act but a purely ministerial act as is made clear in O. 41 r. 1. . . . . . " it is, therefore, clear that a judgment has to be entered by an officer of Court on the initiative of a party. Entering the judgment is not a judicial act but a purely ministerial act as is made clear in O. 41 r. 1. Until and unless that ministerial act is done, the order is not completed or perfected The Original Side Rules do not speak of entering an order or a judgment but in Rule 24 of Chapter 16 it enjoins that every order after being signed shall be sealed and filed forthwith. Filing in the context of the Original Side Rules is a purely ministerial act as entering a judgment is, in the context of Rule 1 of Order 41 of the Supreme Court Rules in England. I am dwelling on this aspect of the matter only because Mr. Chatterjee contended that an order is perfected the moment the last judicial act is done, namely, subscription of the signature of the Judge to the order. 7. MR. Chatterjee relied on a decision of Chakravartti C. J. in (2) T. Bhagwandas v. Sitaram Srigopal 53 CWN page 303 at page 312. The learned Chief Justice said, "i would add that the practice of a Judge recalling an order on just grounds before he has signed it, is not peculiar to the Original Side of this Court, but obtains in other Courts as well". Relying on this statement Mr. Chatterjee contended that a judge can recall an order only before he has signed it and not afterwards. In other words, an order is perfected or completed as soon as the order is signed by the Judge who makes it. It has to be remembered that in the case before Chakravartti C. J., the order had not been signed and the application was disposed of not in the exercise of any inherent power to recall or modify an order but under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In our opinion, the learned Chief Justice, in observing that a judge can recall an order before he has signed it, had in mind the facts of the case with which he was concerned. In our opinion, the learned Chief Justice, in observing that a judge can recall an order before he has signed it, had in mind the facts of the case with which he was concerned. That he did not intend to say that an order is perfected as soon as it is signed, is clear from the fact that he cited in his judgment, the case of in re. (1) Harrison's Settlement without a demur where Jenkins L. J. said : "we think that an order pronounced by the Judge can always be withdrawn, or altered or modified by him until it is drawn up, passed and entered. In the meantime, it is provisionally effective, and can be treated as a subsisting order in cases where the justice of the case requires it, and the right of withdrawal would not be thereby prevented or prejudiced. " 8. FOR a decision of this Court on the point, reference may be made to (3] In the Matter of Steel Construction Co. . Ltd. 39 CWN 1259 where Mcnair J., said : "the order has been drawn up but has not been completed or filed and it has been definitely laid down by this Court in the case of (4) Sarupchand Hukumchand v. Madhoram Raghumall 28 CWN 755 that an order which has not been perfected may be reconsidered by the learned Judge who made it". Mr. Chatterjee relied on the short judgment in the case reported in (5) 1887, Weekly Notes at page 231. The observations made there are clearly referable to the facts of that case. The case did not decide that an order is perfected before it is entered. 9. RELIANCE was placed on Rule 32 of Chapter 16 of the Original Side Rules, which provides that where a party is dissatisfied with any decree or order as settled by the officer, and intends to mention the matter to the Court, the officer shall not proceed to complete the order without allowing such party sufficient time to apply to the Court. The Rule merely indicates that an order is not completed on being settled, for something still remains to be done. We fail to see how the Rule is of any assistance to the appellant. 10. The Rule merely indicates that an order is not completed on being settled, for something still remains to be done. We fail to see how the Rule is of any assistance to the appellant. 10. THERE is no decision, Indian or English, we know of or which has been cited at the Bar where it has been held that an order is completed or perfected as soon as it is signed. To give Rule 24 of Chapter 16 of the High Court Rules its full effect, an order cannot be said to be perfected before it is filed, because until it is filed all the requirements of procedure cannot be said to have been complied with. We are, therefore, of opinion that the order had not been perfected at the time the application was made. In the view we have taken of the matter, we must also hold that the learned Judge had plenty of jurisdiction to recall or modify the order. 11. MR. Chatterjee's contention that assuming that the learned Judge had jurisdiction to recall or vary the order, he made the order not in the exercise of that jurisdiction but under the misapprehension that he was correcting an order which had not been properly drawn up. The argument ignores the substance of the matter. It is true that the learned Judge in his judgment expressed the view that the order was not correctly drawn up. At the same time, it is equally clear that he relied upon his jurisdiction to correct the order. In a sense, the learned Judge was correcting the order because the order as drawn up and settled, did not implement his intention not to give any direction for payment of costs. It was only with the aid of a technical rule that the order was drawn up as it was. As the learned Judge found that the order had not carried out his intention, and did not reflect the real sense of the order, he was amply justified in modifying it so long as he had the jurisdiction to do so. We have held that he had such jurisdiction. 12. MR. R. C. Deb, appearing for the respondent, contended that the appeal is not maintainable. The appeal is directed not against the order of December 12, 1968 but against the order of 24th of July, 1969. We have held that he had such jurisdiction. 12. MR. R. C. Deb, appearing for the respondent, contended that the appeal is not maintainable. The appeal is directed not against the order of December 12, 1968 but against the order of 24th of July, 1969. In other words, the appeal is against an order by which a direction for payment of costs was withdrawn. That is an order which does not affect the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability nor does it have the effect of disposing of or terminating the proceeding as a whole or in part. The appeal, however, involves a question of jurisdiction. It involves a question of jurisdiction not merely be cause a question of jurisdiction has been raised by one of the parties, but because, in our opinion, Mr. Chatterjee has an arguable case on the question of jurisdiction. He relied on the judgment of a Division Bench presided over by Chakravartti C. J. in (6) National textiles v. Premraj Ganpatraj 62 CWN 418. There, in the context of extension of time to make a Report by a Special reference, the learned Chief Justice said : "if the appellant' contends that the Court which granted the extension had no jurisdiction to grant it, being functus officio at the time, while the other side necessarily contends that it had such jurisdiction, an order deciding in favour of jurisdiction decides a question touching the merits of the controversy between the parties and is, in my view, appealable. " We hold that the order, though not ordinarily appealable as a judgment under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is appealable by reason of the fact that it involves a question of jurisdiction. In the view we have taken, the appeal fails. There will be no order for costs. All ad interim orders are hereby vacated. There will be a stay of the actual hearing of the Suit No. 162 of 1969 for six weeks from date. Certified for two Counsel as against their respective clients.