B. K. MEHTA, J. M. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal filed by the original plaintiffs Trustees of Charotar Pradesh Arya Samaj Trust against the respondent defendant against the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge Nadiad in Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1963. By that judgment and decree the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 321 of 1961 of the Court of the Civil Judge Junior Division Anand were reversed. ( 2 ) THE aforesaid trust is a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 The said trust owned survey No. 1032/1 admeasuring 1 acre and 39 gunthas and survey No. 1035 admeasuring 4 acres and 18 gunthas situate in village Vadod Taluka Anand. Two contiguous portions of these survey numbers admeasuring 1 acre and 17 gunthas and 2 acres and 4 gunthas respectively were leased by the said trust to the respondent defendant. The said trust obtained an Exemption Certificate under sec. 88b of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (which will be hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The Certificate is granted by the Collector under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 88b of the Act. The said trust requires the said land for the purposes of constructing a Gaushala one of the objects of the trust. The said trust gave notice Ex. 35 for determining the tenancy. Notice is dated 29th December 1960 The tenant was called upon to hand over possession of the leased lands on the expiry of the date 31st March 1961 The respondent did not comply with that notice and did not hand over possession and consequently the appellants filed Regular Civil Suit No. 321 of 1961 in the Court of the Civil Judge Junior Division Anand for recovery of possession and mesne profits. ( 3 ) THE respondent defendant by his written statement Ex. 10 raised several contentions. One of the main contentions with which we are concerned in this second appeal was that in view of the provisions of sec. 4b of the Act the appellants were not entitled to get possession of the suit lands from him. The legality of the notice was also challenged. It was also contended in the trial Court that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. ( 4 ) ISSUES were raised at Ex. 11 by the trial Court. 4b of the Act the appellants were not entitled to get possession of the suit lands from him. The legality of the notice was also challenged. It was also contended in the trial Court that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. ( 4 ) ISSUES were raised at Ex. 11 by the trial Court. All the issues were decided against the respondent defendant and the plaintiffs suit for possession of the suit lands was decreed with costs. The defendant was directed to hand over possession of the suit lands on or before 1st April 1963 ( 5 ) IN the appeal filed by the respondent defendant the learned District Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit on the ground that in view of the provisions of sec. 4b of the Act the plaintiffs were not entitled to possession of the suit lands. ( 6 ) OUR learned Brother Patel J. referred the matter to a Division Bench. That is how the appeal has come for hearing before us. ( 7 ) MR. M. C. Shah learned advocate appearing for the plaintiffs appellants contended that the learned District Judge committed a serious error in interpreting sec. 4b of the Act. He concedes to the position that in view of the provisions of sec. 88b of the Act secs. 3 4 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 11 13 and 27 shall apply to the suit lands which are the property of the trust of the nature contemplated by clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 88b. ( 8 ) IT is an admitted position that under sec. 88b (2) the present plaintiffs have obtained a certificate and that certificate is conclusive evidence. That sub-section reads:-FOR the purposes of this section a certificate granted by the Collector after holding an inquiry that the conditions in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) are satisfied by any trust shall be conclusive evidence in that behalf. That proviso reads:- provided that (I) such trust is or is deemed to be registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 and (ii) the entire income of such lands is appropriated for the purposes of such trust. Sec. 4b of the Act reads:-NO tenancy of any land shall be terminated merely on the ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration has expired. IT is submitted by Mr. Sec. 4b of the Act reads:-NO tenancy of any land shall be terminated merely on the ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration has expired. IT is submitted by Mr. Shah that the only consequence of the application of sec. 4b to the suit lands would be that the tenancy of such lands could not be terminated merely on the ground that the period of the lease had expired. ( 9 ) SEC. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act provides several modes of terminating the tenancy. One of such modes of determination of lease of immovable property is that a lease of immovable property determines by efflux of the time limited thereby. That is contemplated by clause (a) of sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. There are other clauses (b) to (h) of that sec. 111 which contemplate other modes of determination of the tenancy. Clause (h) which is material for our purposes reads that a lease of immovable property could be determined by giving a requisite notice to determine the lease. That clause reads:-111 A lease of immovable property determines (H) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease or to quit or of intention to quit the property leased duly given by one party to the other. Sec. 4b of the Act only restricts the power of the landlord to determine the tenancy on the ground that the period of lease has expired. It does not restrict the right of the landlord to determine the tenancy by adopting other modes referred to in clauses (b) to (h) of sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 10 ) IT is submitted by Mr. Shah that if the reasoning adopted by the learned District Judge is accepted as sound reasoning the result would be that we would be importing the words sec. 14 of the Act in sec. 88b of the Act. If the Legislature really intended that the tenancy could not be determined on any of the grounds contemplated by sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act and such tenants were to be protected the Legislature would have referred to sec. 14 while it referred to other sections viz. secs. 3 4 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 11 13 and 27 of the Act. ( 11 ) IN support of his arguments Mr. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act and such tenants were to be protected the Legislature would have referred to sec. 14 while it referred to other sections viz. secs. 3 4 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 11 13 and 27 of the Act. ( 11 ) IN support of his arguments Mr. Shah relied upon an unreported decision of our learned brother J. B. Mehta J. in second Appeal No. 847 of 1960 decided on 27th February 1967 (Patel Ramdas Narottamdas v Thakorebhai Shankerbhai ). ( 12 ) IN reply to these arguments Mr. B. K. Amin appearing for the respondent defendant urged that the view taken by the learned District Judge was fully justified. He urged that if such a narrow meaning is given to the provisions of sec. 4b of the Act as has been suggested on behalf of the plaintiffs and the tenancy could be determined by adopting any other modes contemplated by clauses (b) to (h) of sec. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act the whole object of the Act in securing the tenancy and fixity of tenure will be frustrated. Even if the tenant gets the rent fixed as contemplated by some of the provisions of the Act and there is fixity of rent the landlord could make it nugatory by determining the tenancy by adopting the mode contemplated by sec. 111 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act. That could not have been the intention of the Legislature. The Legislature did not merely intend to see that the tenants avail of the fixity of rent but it intended that the tenant should also avail of the fixity of tenure that is security or protection of tenancy. It was further submitted by Mr. Amin that the Legislature while framing this sec. 4b of the Act had lost sight of some of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act which indicate that the tenancy could be determined by adopting different modes other than the mode of determining the period of tenancy by efflux of the lease period. It has been vehemently urged by Mr. Amin that that was the reason why the Legislature only mentioned this ground for the determination of tenancy while enacting this sec. 4b of the Act. ( 13 ) IN our opinion the arguments advanced by Mr. It has been vehemently urged by Mr. Amin that that was the reason why the Legislature only mentioned this ground for the determination of tenancy while enacting this sec. 4b of the Act. ( 13 ) IN our opinion the arguments advanced by Mr. Amin are not well founded and the arguments advanced by Mr. Shah are well founded. ( 14 ) A plain reading of sec. 4b of the Act leaves no doubt that by enacting this section the Legislature intended to make it clear that the of a landlord and tenant will not be terminated merely on the ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration has expired. The word tenancy has been defined in sec. 2 (17)of the Act as under:-TENANCY means the relationship of landlord and tenant. IN our opinion in view of these provisions of sec. 4b of the Act the consequence that would follow would be that even if the lease period has expired by mere efflux of such lease period the relationship of landlord and tenant would not automatically cease. ( 15 ) SEC. . 4 of the Act which is a very important section of the Act reads:- (1) Notwithstanding any law agreement or usage or the decree or order of a court the tenancy of any land shall not be terminated. (a) unless the tenant (I) has failed to pay the rent for any revenue year before the 31st day of May thereof; (II) has done any act which is destructive of permanently injurious to the land; (III) has sub divided sub let or assigned the land in contravention of sec. 27; (IV) has failed to cultivate it personally; or (v) has used such land for a purpose other than agriculture or allied pursuits; and (VI) unless the landlord has given three months notice in writing informing the tenant of his decision to terminate the tenancy and the ground for such termination and within that period the tenant has failed to remedy the breach for which the tenancy is liable to be terminated. (2) Nothing in sub-sec. (1) shall apply to the tenancy of any land held by a permanent tenant unless by the conditions of such tenancy the tenancy is liable to be terminated on any of the grounds mentioned in the said sub-section. (2) Nothing in sub-sec. (1) shall apply to the tenancy of any land held by a permanent tenant unless by the conditions of such tenancy the tenancy is liable to be terminated on any of the grounds mentioned in the said sub-section. IF the Legislature intended to give the same protection to the tenants of such lands the Legislature in our opinion would have included sec. 14 in sec. 88b as has been done in respect of other sections referred to earlier by us. Even in sec. 4b of the Act itself we find some indication. The use of the word merely clearly points to the conclusion that the Legislature was not oblivious of the position of law that the tenancy can be determined on a ground other than that of the efflux of lease period. That appears to be the reason why it has used the word merely. The provisions of sec. 4b of the Act only prohibit the determination of the tenancy merely on the ground namely efflux of lease period. ( 16 ) J. B. Mehta J. in the aforesaid un-reported decision has held that in view of the provisions of sec. 3 of the Act the provisions of Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 will apply to such agricultural leases and it will not be necessary in view of these provisions that a notification should have been issued by the Government as contemplated by sec. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act. After referring to the provisions of sec. 88b of the Act our learned Brother J. B. Mehta J. has considered a similar submission made before him. The relevant observations made are:-MR. Amin next argued that even if sec. 88b applied to the suit lands which was the property of the Ramji Mandir public Trust there was no exemption from the provisions of sec. 4b of the Act because that section was specifically excluded from the other foregoing provisions from which exemption was granted under sec. 88b (1 ). sec. 4b provides that no tenancy of any land shall be terminated merely on the ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration has expired. This section could not help Mr. Amin because it creates a bar of termination of tenancy only on the ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration had expired. This section could not help Mr. Amin because it creates a bar of termination of tenancy only on the ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration had expired. This is only one of the modes of the determination of the leases under see. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act which provides in sec. 111 (a) that a lease of immoveable property shall be determined by efflux of time limited thereby. This section however does not prohibit termination of the lease on other ground or by other modes. sec. 111 (h) specifically provides for termination of lease on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease or to quit or of intention to quit the property leased duly given by one party to the other. In the present case the lease had been terminated not on the ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration had expired but on the ground that notice to terminate the lease had been given as required under sec. 84. This mode of termination by notice to quit is not prohibited under sec. 4b of the Act. IN our opinion this is the correct view taken. Merely because the Legislature provided for the availability of benefits contemplated by sec. 8 of the Act in regard to fixation of maximum and minimum rent fixation of rent by Mamlatdar under sec. 9 of the Act quantum of rent payable by tenant to landlord under sec. 9a of the Act stipulating that the landlord would not be liable to make any contribution towards the cost of cultivation under sec. 9b liability of tenant to pay the agreed rent to the landlord until rent is fixed under preceding sections under sec. 9-C of the Act refund of rent recovered in contravention of the provisions of the Act and other penalties under sec. 10 of the Act liability of tenant to pay land revenue and certain other cesses under sec. 10a disability of the landlord to recover any cess etc. under sec. 11 of the Act from the tenant in respect of such land will not necessarily lead to a deduction that the Legislature intended the fixity of tenure that is security or protection of tenancy in respect of such lands also. No such intention can be gathered from the relevant provisions of the Act. By enacting this sec. under sec. 11 of the Act from the tenant in respect of such land will not necessarily lead to a deduction that the Legislature intended the fixity of tenure that is security or protection of tenancy in respect of such lands also. No such intention can be gathered from the relevant provisions of the Act. By enacting this sec. 4b as said earlier the Legislature only provides that the relationship of a landlord and tenant will not cease or will not be terminated merely on the ground that the lease period has expired. Other modes of determining the tenancy would be available to the landlord in respect of such lands. In the instant case the landlords have adopted one of such modes viz. mode contemplated under sec. III clause (h) of the Transfer of Property Act. That mode is available to the landlord. The learned trial Judge has rightly in our opinion held that the tenancy was terminated by the notice Ex. 35 and the plaintiffs were entitled to get possession of the suit lands from the respondent defendant. ( 17 ) WE may at this stage also consider one another submission made by Mr. Amin which was made on behalf of the respondent defendant in the courts below and the courts below have negatived that contention. The submission made by him was that in the notice Ex. 35 there was no clear and definite averment made that by this notice the plaintiffs were determining the tenancy. In our opinion this argument is devoid of any merits. It is clearly stated in this notice that by this notice the landlords intimate their decision of terminating the defendants tenancy. Further more it is stated therein that on the expiry of the date 31st March 1961 the defendants should hand over possession of the leased lands to the plaintiffs and in case if he made any defaults after 31st March 1961 they would take legal steps in getting the possession of the lands. It is thus evident that the landlords have clearly stated their intention of determination of the tenancy and the tenancy has been validly terminated by giving the requisite notice. sec. 84 of the Land Revenue Code would apply and notice as contemplated therein has been given. No contention in that behalf has been urged by Mr. Amin before us. We therefore need not dilate on that point. sec. 84 of the Land Revenue Code would apply and notice as contemplated therein has been given. No contention in that behalf has been urged by Mr. Amin before us. We therefore need not dilate on that point. ( 18 ) THE result is that the appeal succeeds. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court are set aside and the decree for possession passed by the trial Court is restored. In view of the special circumstances of the case each party is ordered to bear its own costs throughout. The respondent defendant to handover possession of the suit lands to the plaintiff appellants on or before 1st April 1971. .