JUDGMENT K.N. Srivastava, J. - This is an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by Sri A. S. Srivastava, Additional Civil Judge, Gorakhpur dismissing the appeal filed by the defendant-appellant against the judgment and decree passed by the 1 Additional Munsif, Gorakhpur, decreeing the plaintiff's suit for demolition of construction shown by letters ABCDE and PGHI and for possession of the out-house shown in the map of the Commissioner. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows : Shrimati Ushangini Devi was the owner of plots Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 and 70 detailed at the foot of the plaint. She executed a deed of Thekha to different Thekedars regarding different properties. This property remained in the possession of the Thekedars till 19. 6. 1951. Shrimati Ushangini Devi died in the year 1945. The plaintiffs respondents are the heirs of shrimati Ushangini Devi. After her death, the plaintiff filed this suit with the allegation that the father of defendant-appellant as a Mali and as such he was permitted to reside in the out-House. The father of the defendant-appellant died in 1917. The appellant remained in possession over the house. According to the plaintiff, his possession was that of a licensee. The appellant is said to have made unauthorised construction without the permission of the Thekedar of the plaintiff. The suit was, therefore, brought for the removal of the unauthorised construction and for ejectment of the defendant from the out-house as the plaintiff had terminated the licence. 3. The defendant contested the suit and inter alia pleaded that he was the owner of the out-house and the constructions were old. 4. The learned trial court and the learned lower appellate court held that the constructions which were ordered to be demolished were new and the possession of the defendant over the out-house was that of a licensee and as the licence had been terminated by the plaintiff, therefore, the defendant-appellant was liable to ejectment. 5. Even if it be admitted that Kaulesher Pandey, the father of the defendant-appellant was a licensee of the out-house, this would not mean that the defendant also become the licensee of the out-house because the licence came to an end in 1917 when Kaulesher Pandey died. 6. 5. Even if it be admitted that Kaulesher Pandey, the father of the defendant-appellant was a licensee of the out-house, this would not mean that the defendant also become the licensee of the out-house because the licence came to an end in 1917 when Kaulesher Pandey died. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents-contended that after Kaulesher Pandey's death, the defendant-appellant was permitted to reside in the house as licensee and, therefore, his possession was also that of a licensee. Even if this contention is taken at its face value, there are certain other facts and circumstances which clearly go to show that the defendant-appellant denied his possession over the out-House and the land adjoining the out-house as licensee. He filed a suit in 1936 that he was the grove-holder of the rest of the area of plot No. 68 and he had his house in some of the areas of that plot. This suit was withdrawn with permission to bring a fresh suit. The defendant-appellant then filed a suit under Section 123 of the Agra Tenancy Act in 1926. In this suit, he prayed for a declaration and he clearly mentioned in the plaint that he had constructed a house on the part of the land and was in possession of the same. A reading of this plaint leaves no room for doubt that even if the defendant appellant was a licensee, he repudiated his possession as a licensee and in the plaint which he filed in the revenue court in 1936. He claimed to be the owner of the house with Sahan and the adjoining land appertaining to plot 7. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that when he challenged the plaintiff's right as a licenser and no suit was brought within the statutory period of limitation, therefore, the plaintiff would not be permitted to eject the appellant from the out-house and the land which was his Sahan, after the expiry of the period of limitation. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that in 1936, the Thekedars were managing the property and paying a certain rent to Shrimati Ushangini Devi, the lessor and as such during the subsistence of the Theka, Shrimati Ushangini Devi could not file a suit. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that in 1936, the Thekedars were managing the property and paying a certain rent to Shrimati Ushangini Devi, the lessor and as such during the subsistence of the Theka, Shrimati Ushangini Devi could not file a suit. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the Theka was terminated in 1951 and, therefore, the period of limitation for ejectment of the defendant-appellant started running from the date of the termination of the Theka and as such the present suit was well within time. 8. Under Section 108 (n) of the Transfer of Property Act, a lessee is bound to give notice to the lessor if the lessor's right is in any way in jeopardy or some cloud is cast on his right. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that no such notice was given by the Thekedar to Shrimati Ushangini Devi and, therefore, the allegations made by the defendant-appellant in the civil suit which was filed against Thekedar would not start the period of time running against Shrimati Ushangini Devi. On behalf of the respondents, reliance was placed on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sharat Sundri Dabia (defendant) v. Bhobo Prasad Khan Chowdhri (plaintiffs), I.L.R. XIII Cal. 101. It was held in this case that possession taken by trespasser during the currency of a lease does not become adverse to the zamindar-lessor until upon the expiration of the term and a suit for possession may be brought within twelve years of that date. In this reported case, the principle laid down was that when the land was in possession of the Thekedar or a lessee, the lessor was not likely to know as to whether a trespasser had taken possession over the land specially when the lessor received rent continuously and without any interruption. This is not a case where the lessor too had a notice of the fact that a trespasser was laying adverse claim to some of the leased property. 9. In the other case which was in support of the above contention i.e. Thamman Panda (defendant) v. The Maharaja of Viziangram (plaintiff), I.L.R. XXIX All. 593, a Division Bench of this Court held that possession acquired during the continuance of the lease was not adverse to the lessor but facts of this reported case were different from the facts of the present case. 593, a Division Bench of this Court held that possession acquired during the continuance of the lease was not adverse to the lessor but facts of this reported case were different from the facts of the present case. In this reported case, also, the lessor had no knowledge that a trespasser was laying claim to a part of the leased property. While dealing with this case, it was observed as follows :- "It would be unjust to hold that a lessor, who was regularly in receipt of the rent reserved by the lease for a long term of years, and who, therefore, had nothing to put him on enquiry, might find at the expiration of the terms of his lease that a considerable portion, it may be, of his property had passed out of his hands by a trespasser taking possession of it without his knowledge." Therefore, what this case lays down is that a lessor who had no knowledge of the trespass and who had no reason to make an enquiry must be protected because he is not likely to know before the expiration of the lease that a part or a portion of the property has been taken into possession by a trespasser. In this view of the matter, it was laid down in a number of cases that the time against the lessor starts running after the termination of the lease but in the instant case as shown above, the appellant filed the suit in the revenue court in 1936 making the lessor and the lessee both as parties and in that plaint he made a clear allegation that he was in possession over the house and the land in front of the house as his Sahan in his own right and adverse to the Thekedar and the lessee. 10. The other ruling relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is in the case of Katyayani Devi (defendant) v. Udov Kumar (plaintiff), I.L.R. LII Cal. 417. The same view which was held in I.L.R. XIII Cal. 101 was accepted in this case as well. 10. The other ruling relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is in the case of Katyayani Devi (defendant) v. Udov Kumar (plaintiff), I.L.R. LII Cal. 417. The same view which was held in I.L.R. XIII Cal. 101 was accepted in this case as well. In this case, the following observations can be read with advantage :- "It has also been pointed out in the other judgments that the landlord cannot in the ordinary case know whether the possession of a particular area of land is adverse to the tenant or has taken place with his consent. He could not therefore safely sue an action at his own hand for ejectment of a trespasser, as he might always be met with the objection that the apparent trespass was acquiesced in by the tenant, who can deal with the land as he pleases." This observations, therefore, left no room for doubt that the principle laid down in this case applied to the cases in which lessors had no knowledge of the trespass or who could be under the impression that the trespass might be with the consent of the tenant. In the instant case, the pleading by the defendant-appellant in his plaint could have very well repelled this impression of the lessor and Shrimati Ushangini Devi could very well know that the defendant-appellant was laying claim to the house and the Sahan in front of it adverse to the Thekedar as well as herself. 11. Now it has to be seen as to whether a landlord lessor has a right, if any, to bring a suit against a tres-passer if he gets knowledge of the tres-pass specially in the manner in which Shrimati Ushangini Devi got in the suit. In my opinion when a lessor gets knowledge or information of the tres-pass he has a number of remedies open to him. If the lessor cannot sue for possession, he can very well file a suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act for a declaration against the tres-passer. The second course open to the lessor would be to file a suit and to pray for symbolical possession against the tres-passer alleging that under the Theka the lessor was not put to actual possession till the termination of the lease. The second course open to the lessor would be to file a suit and to pray for symbolical possession against the tres-passer alleging that under the Theka the lessor was not put to actual possession till the termination of the lease. The third remedy open to the lessor would be to ask the Thekedar or the lessee to join him in the suit in ejecting the tres-passer and if the lessee does not join him in the suit, he can implead him as defendant and pray for a relief for possession in his favour. In the Full Bench of this Court in Sita Ram (defendants) v. Ram Lal (plaintiff) I.L.R. XVIII All 440, Sir John Edge, C. J. observed as below : "That right to possession he has parted with by the creation of the tenancy. It is no new proposition of law, and the application of that proposition of law, which I believe to be correct, does not introduce into India any new system either of law or of procedure. A landlord whose title is denied by his tenant has got right to have the tenancy determined. A landlord whose title is questioned by anyone else than the tenant, has got a right to a declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act; and if any one enters on the receipt of the rents and profits of the land and takes from his tenants the rents which were due to him, he is entitled as against such person, not only to a declaratory decree declaring his title that the other person has no title, but to a decree putting him into possession, that is, what is known as formal possession, as contradistinguished from actual or khas possession, of the lands as against the person wrongfully taking the rents and profits to which he, the landlord, is entitled. It is an error to consider that any new system of procedure is required. Sec. 262 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the delivery of Khas possession when the plaintiff is entitled to be put into actual possession as against the defendant..........." The view which I have taken is also supported by the Madras High Court in Prayag Doss, Ji Varu Mahant (defendant) v. Tirumala Srirangacharlavary (plaintiffs), I.L.R. XXVIII Mad. 319, Tiruvengada Konan-Plaintiff-appellant v. Vankatachala Konan-Defendants-Respondents, I.L.R. XXXIX Mad. 319, Tiruvengada Konan-Plaintiff-appellant v. Vankatachala Konan-Defendants-Respondents, I.L.R. XXXIX Mad. 1042 and Daved Mohideen Ravuthar (2nd defendant) v. Jayarama Aiyar (plaintiff-first defendant) I.L.R. XIV Mad. 937. The view taken in Sita Ram v. Ram Lal, I.L.R. XVIII All 440 of this High Court was followed and it was held that a lessor could file a suit either in the nature of a declaratory suit or a suit for symbolical possession if the property was in the possession of lessee and if the trespass made by the third person came to the knowledge of the lessor. This ruling is based on the principle that a lessor too has a right to protect his property even though the lessee does not inform him of his property as provided under Section 108 (n) of the Transfer of Property Act provided the lessor gets a notice of the tres-pass. In such eventuality it is not expected that a lessor would sit till the termination of the lease and let his property to be trespassed by an unauthorised person. The corpus of the property always remained with the lessor. In view of the above, I am, therefore, of the opinion that the plaintiffs did not try to eject the defendant-appellant in spite of notices in the revenue suit which the defendant appellant filed in 1936 when the defendant was claiming a title in himself and adverse to the plaintiffs' predecessor and his Thekedar. 12. The next question which would arise for determination in this case would be as to whether the order of demolition of the new construction should be maintained. According to the defendant-appellant, the constructions were old whereas according to the plaintiffs, the construction were made in 1948. The learned lower appellate court relied on the inspection note which the revenue court made in the case under Section 123 of the Agra Tenancy Act. In that case Plot No. 70 and the constructions on the plot were in dispute. There was no dispute in that case about these plots. There was, therefore, no need for the court to show in the inspection note that these constructions stood at the place where they are new. Besides this, there was no mention of any construction in that inspection note from which the defendant was ordered to be ejected by the lower appellate court. This house opens towards north. There was, therefore, no need for the court to show in the inspection note that these constructions stood at the place where they are new. Besides this, there was no mention of any construction in that inspection note from which the defendant was ordered to be ejected by the lower appellate court. This house opens towards north. Immediate south of this land was the Sahan appertaining to that house. A perusal of the report prepared by the Commissioner will show that the disputed construction which had been ordered to be demolished was adjacent to the house and in the land which was being used by the defendant as his Sahan land. Plot No. 60 is said to be a rasta. Part of the construction lies on the rasta land and part in plot No. 68. The plaintiffs brought the suit for demolition of the construction claiming plot No. 69. They, therefore, cannot get that part of the construction which fell on the rasta land because the plaintiffs did not bring any suit on the allegation that the constructions were made in the rasta land and that some special damage was caused to the plaintiffs. So far as the other construction which is situated in Plot No. 68 is concerned, it is certainly in the Sahan Land of the house over which the defendant-appellant had been laying his claim of ownership and not of licensee since the year 1936. As no suit was brought to eject the defendant-appellant within the period of limitation, therefore, the defendant-appellant cannot be ejected from the aforesaid house. In view of the above discussion, the other dispute construction about which the lower courts have ordered demolition too cannot be demolished. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the trial court and the lower appellate court are set aside. The plaintiffs' suit stands dismissed with costs throughout.