Judgment :- 1. Can a woman and her children born to her by more than one husband and governed by Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1933 take property obtained by gift as a tavazhi is the question that is raised in this Second Appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that if the children are born to the woman by several husbands, property obtained by the wife and all the children together cannot be taken as property of a tavazhi; further, even if this is possible such property must be divided on a stirpital basis between the wife and children and by the several husbands. The sustainability of this contention is the matter for consideration here. 2. One Narayanan Nambiyar, son of Lekshmi Amma, the common ancestress of plaintiffs and defendants bequeathed plaint B schedule properties by a will dated 2 5-1959 to his mother, his brothers and sisters and the descendants of his sisters. Based on this bequest, plaintiffs have filed the suit for partition claiming 8/33 shares This is resisted by the first defendant who is one of those whose names are mentioned as legatees in the will. According to him the will must be construed as having provided for a bequest in favour of the persons named therein. If so, according to him he will be entitled to 1/0 and the property will have to be divided into 10 shares. Though that was the stand taken earlier, the stand now taken is different. Narayanan Nambiyar was born to Lakshmi Amma by a husband through whom only one other child was born. Some of the others were born to another husband of Lakshmi Amma and yet others by the 3rd husband of Lakshmi Amma. It is therefore said that Narayanan Nambiar's bequest must be construed as a'puthravakasam' bequest and if so construed the children of Lakshmi Amma through the father of Narayanan Nambiar must get one share and the children of Lakshmi Amma through the two other husbands must get one share each. That is how the plea of stirpital division is urged. 3. Ext. Al is the will, the construction of which is called for. If it is possible for bequest to be made in favour of tavazhi consisting of a woman and all her children born through more than one husband, then it cannot be said on the terms of Ext. That is how the plea of stirpital division is urged. 3. Ext. Al is the will, the construction of which is called for. If it is possible for bequest to be made in favour of tavazhi consisting of a woman and all her children born through more than one husband, then it cannot be said on the terms of Ext. Al, that it was not a bequest to such a tavazhi. The terms of the document are clear. It mentions all the brothers and sisters of Narayanan Nambiar and the sisters' children then living. It directs them to enjoy properties on bis death as a tavazhi. It provides that the subsequently born children of the members of the tavazhi will also he in the group. It refers to the brothers and sisters as very clearly indicates that by the bequest all the lineal descendants in the female line of Lakshmi Amma are to be benefited and they are to hold and enjoy the property as a tavazhi. Therefore there would be no difficulty in construing Ext. Al as a bequest to a tavazhi and if that be the construction plaintiff's claim for partition would be sustainable. 4. But the contention raised by learned counsel for the first defendant-appellant is that in spite of the terms in Ext. Al this Court should hold that the property is not acquired by bequest by a tavazhi of Lakshmi Amma because, according to learned counsel, it is impossible in law to conceive of a tavazhi of a woman and all her children by different husbands. This contention appears to be strange. A tavazhi as the name indicates consists of the mother and others in her line hgn . In fact there was considerable doubt on the question earlier whether a woman and some only of her children, that being children by one of her husbands, can constitute a tavazhi. This doubt was expressed apparently because of the difficulty of conceiving a tavazhi without all the descendants of a female being members thereof and for that reason the view was held earlier that a gift or bequest to a wife or children by a husband or father as the case may be, would only be a gift which would enure to the donees as tenants-in-common. But of course that view is no longer held and it is well settled that properties taken by a group constituted by a mother and children by one of her husbands, as puthravakasam property, would also have the incidents of tarwad property and would be held by that group as property of a Marumakkathayam tavazhi. But I do not think that the view that a mother and all her children do constitute a tavazhi has ever been doubted. That is the fundamental basis of the concept of the tavazhi itself. If any authority is necessary for this proposition, I need only extract a passage from the judgment of Sadasiva Ayyar J. in Chakkara Kannan v. Kunhi Pokker (ILR. 39 Mad. 317). At page 335 the learned judge said thus: "The objection based on the woman (whose husband makes a gift to his children by her) marrying another husband and begetting other children to the latter and on these children also belonging to her tavazhi along with her children by the first husband is not. in my opinion, insuperable. The result, of that state of facts will only be that there will be two separate groups in the same tavazhi holding separate tavazhi property, the senior male in each tavazhi group being the karanavan of that tavazhi group. For instance, take the case of a woman and her children who form a tavazhi within a tarwad. Two of her daughters might form two different groups in the same tavazhi and their respective husbands might give properties to their respective children. Then, all these children would belong to the tarwad of their great grand-mother, would again belong to their grandmother's tavazhi and would also belong to the groups or sub-tavazhis of their respective mothers and hold those respective group properties separately- Just as there can be tavazhis within a tavazhi, there can be group tavazhis and sub-tavazhis in the same tavazhi. If two groups or sub-tavazhis springing from two daughters who form a tavazhi can have separate sub tavazhi properties, there is nothing startling in two branch tavazhis springing from the same lady (through her marrying to successive husbands) and holding separately their respective branch tavazhi properties. If two groups or sub-tavazhis springing from two daughters who form a tavazhi can have separate sub tavazhi properties, there is nothing startling in two branch tavazhis springing from the same lady (through her marrying to successive husbands) and holding separately their respective branch tavazhi properties. tavazhi consists, no doubt, of the descendants of a single woman (I do not think that it includes the woman herself etymologically), but there is nothing to prevent the existence in that same tavazhi of two groups each of which groups might form a separate unit for the purpose of holding particular properties as if it was a separate tarwad and with the includes of tarwad property. It cannot be said to be an unnatural separation between the two groups, unnatural in the sense of repugnance to the habits, parties, and sentiments of the community." The learned judge was answering the contention that there could be no group within a group by way of Marumakkatyam puthravakasam group. The decision assumes, and naturally, that the wife and all the children to whomsoever born constitute a tavazhi. 5. Counsel for the appellant has raised another strange argument. Apparently learned counsel seeks to draw inspiration for this from the decision in Moithiyankutty v. Puthiyapurayil Mammali and others (1928 Mad. 870). According to counsel when a woman who has children by a husband marries another and begets children by such other, there cannot be a puthravakasam tavazhi at all and all the children then take the property as tenants-in-common. I fail to see how this principle has any application to this case. That apart, since the decision in Kaliani v. Anandan (1962 KLT 234) it cannot be said that what was held in the Madras decision to which I have referred to is the law. This Court has decided that a puthravakasam tavazhi conceived of in S.48 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act 1933, was not a creature of the statute brought into existence for the first time but was known to the Marumakkathayam law even in the pre-statute period. 6. As I said earlier the terms of Ext. Al are very clear and it very definitely indicates a bequest to the tavazhi of Lakshmi Amma consisting of her lineal descendants. If so, the suit by the plaintiff is competent. The Second Appeal is without merits and the same is dismissed with costs.