P. P. Appu v. Executive First Class Magistrate, Perinthalmanna
1971-11-15
K.SADASIVAN
body1971
DigiLaw.ai
Order.- The petitioners in this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition are the ‘A’ party in M.C. No. 11 of 1971 on the file of the Executive First Class Magistrate, Perintalmanna. They challenged the order of the learned Magistrate placing the property in dispute, in the hands of the Village Officer as receiver. This the learned Magistrate has done under proviso 3 to section 145(4), Criminal Procedure Code. According to the revision petitioners the Magistrate has gone in excess of the power conferred on him under the proviso. 2. The question therefore that arises for decision is whether under section 145 of the Code a receiver could be appointed by the Magistrate. On a strict view of the provisions of section 145 it must be said that the Court has no power. There are clear provisions in the Code for appointment of receiver in certain other situations, as for instance, under section 88 in respect of a proclaimed offender and under section 146(2) when the Magistrate is unable to decide as to which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute on the date of the initiation of the proceedings. When the Legislature has omitted to make such a provision under section 145 it must be taken, as observed by the Supreme Court in Nathia Agarwala v. Jahanara Begum1, under a similar situation, that such omission or departure is deliberate. Section 145, as it stands, does not provide for the appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the dispute. Learned Counsel for the respondents took me to some decisions which say that if the Magistrate has power to attach under section 145(4), it must be inferred that he is clothed with the power of appointing receiver to take charge of the attached property. In my view, when the Legislature has deliberately omitted to provide for the appointment of a receiver under section 145, such inference will not be justified. At the same time it must be conceded that the right to attach carries with it the right to take necessary steps also for the custody and management of the property attached. "Attach" means to take or apprehend by commandment or writ or precept (see Wharton’s Law Lexicon). By virtue of the attachment the property is placed in custodia legis (in the keeping of the law).
"Attach" means to take or apprehend by commandment or writ or precept (see Wharton’s Law Lexicon). By virtue of the attachment the property is placed in custodia legis (in the keeping of the law). There can, therefore, be no doubt that by the attachment the property comes under the custody of the Court. This position has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Deo Kuer v. Sheo Prasad1. Their Lordships observed: "The position in the case of an attachment under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is the same. In a suit for declaration of title to property filed when it stands attached under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is unnecessary to ask for the further relief of delivery of possession. Assuming that in the case of such an attachment, the Magistrate holds possession on behalf of the party whom he ultimately finds to have been in possession the fact is irrelevant. It is unnecessary to ask for possession when property is in custodia legis. Property under attachment under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is in custodia legis." In that case, on the date of the civil suit the property was under attachment by a Magistrate under powers conferred by section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, and was not in the possession of any party. It was conceded by the parties that in the case of an attachment under section 146 of the Code a suit for a simple declaration of title without prayer for delivery of possession is competent. But it was contended that the position in the case of attachment under section 145 of the Code is different as in such a case, the Magistrate holds possession for the party who is ultimately found by him to have been in possession. The Court held that in a suit for declaration of title to property filed when it stands attached under section 145 of the Code, it is not necessary to ask for the further relief of the delivery of possession, because possession is already with the Magistrate and the successful party can get del very from the Magistrate. It is thus clear that by attachment under section 145 the property attached, passess on to the possession of the Magistrate. The next step will therefore, be to make arrangements for the management of the property so attached.
It is thus clear that by attachment under section 145 the property attached, passess on to the possession of the Magistrate. The next step will therefore, be to make arrangements for the management of the property so attached. Courts have held that under such circumstances the Magistrate has power and the right to make suitable arrangements to maintain such possession, The authorities are Maung San U v. Maung Lu Gale2; Nandki shore v. Radhakishun3 and Jethmul Bhojraj v. Harbans Narin Singh4. In the Rangoon decision the Court observed: "Under section 145(4) a Magistrate has no power to appoint a receiver and to give in his charge the property in dispute. It can at the most attach it, but the Code does not make it clear by what method the attachment is to be effected. But if the analogy of section 88 were to be followed, the Magistrate ought to attach the land through the Collector of the District. The word "attach" merely means to bring under the control of the Court, and the Magistrate is entitled to effect that object in any way which is within his power. The appointment of a receiver with the powers of a receiver under the Civil Procedure Code, is not one of those ways because unless that power is expressly given, a Magistrate cannot exercise it. At the same time, if the Magistrate’s attachment is to be effected, Magistrate must put some person into possession of the property, who will have autbority to maintain his possession. However the word "receiver" should not be applied to such person because of possibilities of misunderstanding." In Nandkishore v. Radhakishun3, the Division Bench observed: "The effect of an attachment under the proviso to section 145(4) is to bring the property under the custody or control of the Magistrate. The parties no longer have any control or possession over the property and the Magistrate may take such steps as he thinks fit for its proper custody and management. It is, therefore, competent for the Magistrate to settle the land attached pending the disposal of the case. Such action does not militate against section 145(8)".
The parties no longer have any control or possession over the property and the Magistrate may take such steps as he thinks fit for its proper custody and management. It is, therefore, competent for the Magistrate to settle the land attached pending the disposal of the case. Such action does not militate against section 145(8)". On the same lines is the decision in Jethmul Bhojraj v. Harbans Narain Singh1, The result therefore, is that even though the Court is not empowered in so many words under section 145 to place the property attached in the hands of a receiver, it can take necessary steps to settle the property some way or other, so that the Court’s possession might be maintained. Such steps the Court is bound to take as by the attachment the property has fallen into the hands of the Court. Exactly the same thing has been done by the Magistrate in the instant case. After attachment he has placed the property in the hands of the village officer to be looked after by him on behalf of the Court. Of course, it is incorrect and inappropriate to call the village officer the receiver in respect of the property. 3. Even if the matter is looked at from the standpoint of avoidance of a breach of peace which is the primary object of the section, it is necessary for the Court to take custody of the property. The security proceeding contemplated under section 145 is initiated by the Magistrate when he is satisfied on police report or on other information that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists concerning any land, water, boundaries etc. The likelihood of a breach of peace is what confers jurisdiction on the Magistrate and in the present case also it was reported that ‘A’ party and ‘B’ party are scrambling for possession, and if that is allowed to continue like that, a breach of peace was quite likely. The correct step open to the Court in such circumstances will be to assume possession of the property and leave the parties to settle their claims in the Court. It would therefore be incorrect to say that the property cannot be taken possession of by the Court as under the section the only right conferred is to attach the property. This argument overlooks the legal consequences of an attachment under section 145.
It would therefore be incorrect to say that the property cannot be taken possession of by the Court as under the section the only right conferred is to attach the property. This argument overlooks the legal consequences of an attachment under section 145. The matter is only in the preliminary stage and I do not see any reason to interfere at this stage. The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is, therefore, dismissed and the case is sent back for disposal according to law. M.C.M. ----- Petition dismissed; matter remitted.