T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS reference is made by the learned Sessions Judge Bhavnagar in Criminal revision application No. 12 of 1971 of his file which was preferred against the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class at Palitana who discharged the opponents accused so far as the offence under sec. 436 I. P. C. is concerned but charged them with an offence contemplated by sec. 435 read with sec. 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate has held that charge under sec. 436 I. P. C. could not be framed against the accused because the hut to which the fire is said to have been set is not a building as contemplated by that section. The learned Sessions Judge before whom the above referred revision application No. 12/71 was preferred by the State has disagreed with this view of the learned Magistrate and held that the hut with which we are concerned in this case is a building meant for human dwelling as it was used for residential purpose of the complainant and his family and therefore the learned Magistrate ought to have framed the charge not under sec. 435 read with sec. 114 I. P. C. but under sec. 436 read with sec. 114 I. P. C. The learned Sessions Judge has therefore made this reference proposing that the charge framed by the learned Magistrate should be set aside and he should be directed to frame a charge under sec. 436 read with sec. 114 I. P. C. ( 2 ) THE prosecution is based on the allegation that on 2nd November 1970 at about 11. 00 p. m. the opponent set fire to the complainants house situated at village Nani Vavdi in his absence when his (complainants) wife and children were sleeping in that hut. The house contained household articles such as utensile bed sheets clothes etc. It is alleged that some currency notes which were kept by the complainant in this hut were also destroyed due to fire. ( 3 ) THE question to be considered is whether the hut which is said to have been gutted by the fire alleged to have been set by the opponent is a building as contemplated by sec. 436 of the Indian Penal Code. In this connection it should be noted that the main distinction between the offence contemplated by sec. ( 3 ) THE question to be considered is whether the hut which is said to have been gutted by the fire alleged to have been set by the opponent is a building as contemplated by sec. 436 of the Indian Penal Code. In this connection it should be noted that the main distinction between the offence contemplated by sec. 435 I. P. C. and the one contemplated by sec. 436 I. P. C. is that while the former envisages mischief by setting fire to any property the latter contemplates mischief by fire to any building which is ordinarily used either as a place of worship or as a human dwelling or as a place for custody of property. The offence under sec. 435 is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 7 years and the offence contemplated by sec. 436 I. P. C. is punishable with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years. The offence under the latter section is exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions. ( 4 ) IT is not in dispute that the hut to which the fire is alleged to have been set up is used by the complainant and his family members as their dwelling house and that all the household kit of the complainant and his family is stored and kept in this hut. The learned Magistrate is of the view that this hut being a thatched hut having not been constructed with bricks and mortar it is not covered within the meaning of the word building which is found used in sec 436 I. P. C. For this vies the learned Magistrate has put reliance upon an Allahabad decision in Babulal v. State A. I. R. 1952 Allahabad 146. I will advert to this decision at a subsequent stage in this judgment For the present it would be proper to note that the learned Sessions Judge before whom the State had preferred the revision application has been of the opinion that the hut which was gutted in this case is covered by the meaning of the word building which is found used in sec. 436 I. P. C. and that the Allahabad decision on which the learned Magistrate has put reliance has no application to the facts of the present case. 436 I. P. C. and that the Allahabad decision on which the learned Magistrate has put reliance has no application to the facts of the present case. ( 5 ) I find myself in agreement with the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge for the reasons which follow. ( 6 ) IT is undoubtedly true that sec. 436 I. P. C. contemplates the offence of mischief by fire with intention to cause destruction of any building which is ordinarily used as a place of worship or as a human dwelling or as a place for custody of property. Therefore question is what is the meaning of the word building. In Hamiria (1954) M. L. R. (Cr.) 337 it is observed that the word building connotes something which is exclusively used for human habitation of a person or group of persons including family. Dictionary meaning of the word building as found in Webster is anything that is built as. a house a church etc. The verb to build is given four meanings the first of which is as under:-1 to construct or erect as a house ship or wall to unite into a structure. THE other three meanings which are given in the dictionary are not useful for our purpose. But the above quoted dictionary meaning of the verb to build shows nothing to suggest that the construction or erection of a house should necessarily be made of bricks mortar cement or other such building materials which are utilised for the purpose of carrying out a pucca structure. Therefore even a thatched hut made of reeds and mud can be considered a structure and can be included within the meaning of the expression building if the same is found utilized for human dwelling or for custody of property. The word hut is defined in the same dictionary as a small house hotel or cabin a mean lodge or dwelling a temporary shelter Even in this dictionary meaning of the word hut there is nothing to suggest that a house made of thatched roof straw reeds and mud cannot be considered as a building used for human dwelling. The word hut is defined in the same dictionary as a small house hotel or cabin a mean lodge or dwelling a temporary shelter Even in this dictionary meaning of the word hut there is nothing to suggest that a house made of thatched roof straw reeds and mud cannot be considered as a building used for human dwelling. Under the circumstances the idea that a hut made of thatched roof straw reeds and mud would not be covered by the meaning of the word building simply because it is not made of bricks mortar and other building materials which are used for constructing a pucca structure appears to be totally foreign to the meaning which the Legislature intended to give to the word building used in sec. 436 of the Indian Penal Code. If the meaning of the word building is restricted only to the construction made with the help of materials generally used for constructing a pucca structure then we would be facing with an absurd situation wherein only the pucca buildings used by the richer section of the society would be protected and the kutcha structures and the huts used by the poor would be found outside the perview of the protection which sec. 436 I. P. C. intends to give. It need not be emphasised that the dominant intention of the Legislature in framing sec. 436 is to give protection to those building which are used as places of worship or as human dwellings or as places where the property is stored for safe custody. A place of worship or a human dwelling or a place for custody of property could be in a simple construction made of thatched roof and sticks reeds mud and to such construction the protection which the Legislature intended to give by enacting sec. 436 I. P. C. would be available. The Law Commissioners have pointed out this aspect of the matter in their following observations:-GRASS or mathuts of the lowest classes are placed on a level with the substantial secure and valuable dwellings of the better classes. THESE observations clearly bring about the real intention of the Legislature in making a distinction between the provisions of secs. The Law Commissioners have pointed out this aspect of the matter in their following observations:-GRASS or mathuts of the lowest classes are placed on a level with the substantial secure and valuable dwellings of the better classes. THESE observations clearly bring about the real intention of the Legislature in making a distinction between the provisions of secs. 435 and 436 I. P. C. ( 7 ) AS for the Allahabad decision of Babulal v. State (supra) on which the learned Magistrate has put reliance I find that it does not apply to the facts of the present case. The facts of that case were that the accused persons had set fire to a thatched shed which was meant for keeping horses of the complainant. The High Court considered whether keeping of a horse in a thatched shed would amount to the custody of that horse. While discussing this question Bhargava J. is found to have observed as under:-A structure made of straw and not of bricks and mortar may be considered a building if it has got the necessary furnishing needed for a buildings such as doors bars etc. An ordinary double thatched shed resting on bamboos or wooden or brick pillers having no doors etc. cannot be treated as a building within the meaning of that term used in sec. 436 of the Penal Code. The building referred to in the section is a building which can be used as a place of worship or as a human dwelling or a as a place for the custody of property. The word custody is undoubtedly different from the word keeping and st implies a sense of security which would be wanting in the case of a shed which is only meant to provide shelter from sun and rain and which has no doors etc. consequently thatched shed in the present case cannot be considered a building for custody of property. IT is obvious from these observations that what has weighed with the High Court is that in order to be covered by the meaning of the word building the structure in question must be such which could generate a sense of security either for persons dwelling therein or for the property kept therein. IT is obvious from these observations that what has weighed with the High Court is that in order to be covered by the meaning of the word building the structure in question must be such which could generate a sense of security either for persons dwelling therein or for the property kept therein. It is therefore in context of the sense of security that the High Court observed that the structure in question should have furnishing needed for a building such as doors bars etc. ( 8 ) SO far as the case under my consideration is concerned it is evident that the complainant was residing in the gutted hut along with his family members and other household equipments. At the time of the incident his family members were found sleeping in the hut. Under the circumstances all the requirements visualised by the Allahabad High Court in the above referred case are fulfilled in this case. ( 9 ) UNDER the circumstances I allow this reference quash the charge framed by the learned Magistrate under sec. 435 I. P. C. and direct him to frame a charge under sec. 436 I. P. C. read with sec. 114 of the Code and to proceed with the case accordingly. .