JUDGMENT : S.N.P. Singh, J. 1. These two writ applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India have been filed by Indian Copper Corporation Limited (hereinafter to be called "the petitioner Company"). In C.W.J.C. No. 1 of 1969 the validity of the ORDER :of the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, dated the 31st of August, 1968 (Annexure 10) in Reference No. 8 of 1967 has been challenged and a prayer has been made for quashing that ORDER :. In C.W.J.C. No. 2 of 1969 the validity of the ORDER :dated the 30th of November, 1968 (Annexure 12A) in the same reference, which was communicated to the petitioner Company by the ORDER :dated the 4th December, 1968 (Annexure 12) has been challenged and a prayer has been made for quashing both Annexure 12A and the communicating ORDER :(Annexure 12). The material facts which are not in dispute may be briefly stated as follows. The petitioner Company carries on the business of mining copper ore in India and has a factory at Moubhandar, Ghatsila, for smelting and refining copper. The petitioner Company for the purpose of carrying on its business engaged a number of workmen on permanent basis and their service conditions are governed by a set of rules called the certified Standing ORDER :s of the petitioner Company. The workmen of the petitioner Company formed themselves into a Trade Union known as "Moubhandar Mazdoor Union". Besides the permanent workmen, the petitioner Company requires some temporary workmen also for some works of casual and fluctuating nature and for that purpose the petitioner Company takes the requisite supply of labour force from its labour contractors. Messrs A.T. Adhikari & Sons is one of such labour contractors. As stated in the applications, the workmen of the contractors also formed themselves into a Trade Union which is called "I.C.C. Contractors' Labour Union". It appears that in the year 1966 the I.C.C. Contractors' Labour Union raised a dispute before the Labour Directorate of the Government of Bihar over the retrenchment of about 145 workmen by M/s. A.T. Adhikari & Sons and in their representation the Union alleged that the petitioner Company was the principal employer of the said workmen through the agency of M/s. A.T. Adhikari and Sons. Before the Superintendent of Labour the petitioner Company took the stand that the workmen were contractors' employees and petitioner Company, had nothing to do with them and that the I.C.C. Contractors' Labour Union had no locus standi to raise dispute so far as the petitioner Company was concerned. The Labour Department of the Government of Bihar accepted the point of view of the petitioner Company and made a reference of the said dispute between M/s. A.T. Adhikari and Sons and their workmen to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, for adjudication (Annexure 4). The notification by which the reference was made and Annexure 'A' to the notification read as under: No. III/DI-1502/67-L & E 1679-Whereas the Governor of Bihar is of opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended between the management of M/s. A.T. Adhikari & Sons, Contractor of Indian Copper Corporation Ltd., Moubhandar, P.O. Ghatsila (Singhbhum) and their workmen represented by I.C.C. Contractors' Labour Union, Moubhandar, P.O. Ghatsila (Singhbhum) regarding the matters specified in Annexure 'A' annexed hereto: And whereas the Governor considers it desirable to refer the said disputes to adjudication; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (d) of Sub-section (i) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), the Governor of Bihar is pleased to refer the said dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, constituted in the State Government Notification No. IV/E3-1107/61-L & E 8938 dated the 4th December, 1961, read with notification no. 7646 dated the 17th August, 1964. Annexure 'A' (i) Whether the retrenched workmen listed in Annexure 'B' are entitled to compensation and/or any other relief? If so, what should be the quantum of such compensation/relief? (ii) And whether they are entitled to reinstatement? If so from what date? According to the terms of the reference the petitioner Company was not a party. It appears that before the Industrial Tribunal the I.C.C. Contractors' Labour Union filed a petition praying for making the petitioner Company a party to the said reference upon the assertion that the petitioner Company was their principal employer. The Tribunal thereupon issued a letter to the petitioner Company to show cause as to why it should not be made a party to the said reference. The petitioner Company thereupon filed a petition raising objection to its being added as a party to the reference. The Tribunal thereupon issued a letter to the petitioner Company to show cause as to why it should not be made a party to the said reference. The petitioner Company thereupon filed a petition raising objection to its being added as a party to the reference. The Tribunal, however, overruled the objection and by ORDER :no. 12 dated the 12th of July, 1967, directed that the petitioner Company be made a party to the reference. Being aggrieved by the said ORDER :of the Industrial Tribunal, the petitioner Company filed an application before this Court which was numbered as C.W.J.C. 445 of 1967. It appears that in that application a supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioner Company. When the application came up for final hearing on the 7th of February, 1968, learned counsel appearing for the labourers made a statement to the effect that in view of the statement made in the supplementary affidavit of the petitioner Company dated the 22nd of August, 1967, he would not oppose the application. As M/s. A.T. Adhikari & Sons had not entered appearance, the application was not opposed. A Bench of this Court thereupon allowed the petition and quashed the ORDER :of the Industrial Tribunal dated the 12th of July, 1967, making the petitioner Company a party in the reference. It appears that thereafter written statements were filed on behalf of the Union and the Contractors. In the written statement which M/s. A.T. Adhikari & Sons filed on the 6th of June, 1967, it was alleged that no relationship of master and servant existed between them and the workmen concerned in the case and that the claim of the workmen was against the Company and not against them. An objection was taken on behalf of M/s. A.T. Adhikari & Sons that the case should be decided in limine against the Union because the Union in its earlier written statement had stated that the workmen were the employees of the petitioner Company and not of the Contractors and it was not open to them to resile from that position and file a written statement subsequently taking the position that they were the employees of the Contractors. It was argued on behalf of the Union that it was not open to the Contractors now to take up that position because they did not appear before the High Court and the High Court quashed the ORDER :of the Tribunal making the petitioner Company a party to the reference. It was further urged on behalf of the Union that the point cannot be decided without taking evidence on the question as to whether in fact the Contractors were the real employers or the petitioner Company was the employer of the workmen. The Industrial Tribunal thereupon passed the impugned ORDER :dated the 31st of August, 1968 (Annexure 10 to both the writ applications). In the said ORDER :the Tribunal directed that the parties would adduce evidence on the point as to whether the workmen were the employees of the Contractors or of the Corporation (petitioner Company). The Tribunal observed that in case it was found that the workmen were the employees of the petitioner Company, the Tribunal would again consider the question of making the petitioner Company a party to the reference. A notice was sent to the petitioner Company with a direction that it could participate in the proceeding when the Tribunal would take up the question as to who was the employer of the workmen concerned in the dispute. It appears that the petitioner Company did not appear before the Tribunal but filed a petition of protest. On behalf of the workmen two witnesses were examined and one witness was examined on behalf of the Contractors. Certain documents were also produced by the parties. The said Tribunal after hearing the parties ultimately by ORDER :No. 32 dated the 30th of November, 1968 (Annexure 12/A to C.W.J.C. No. 2 of 1969) held that the petitioner Company was also the employer of the workmen and as such for effective and enforceable award it was essential to make it a party to the reference. The Tribunal further directed the petitioner Company to file written statement, if any, by the 2nd of January, 1969. It appears that the ORDER :that the petitioner Company was made a party to the reference was communicated to the petitioner Company by Annexure 12 to C.W.J.C. No. 2 of 1969. 2. Mr. The Tribunal further directed the petitioner Company to file written statement, if any, by the 2nd of January, 1969. It appears that the ORDER :that the petitioner Company was made a party to the reference was communicated to the petitioner Company by Annexure 12 to C.W.J.C. No. 2 of 1969. 2. Mr. B.C. Ghose, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Company raised three contentions in support of the applications in the first place, he contended that it was not open to the Tribunal to agitate the question regarding the addition of the petitioner Company as a party to the reference when the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 445 of 1967 have quashed the ORDER :of the Tribunal dated the 12th of July, 1967, making the petitioner Company a party to the said reference. Secondly, he urged that it was not open to the Tribunal to go into the question as to who was the employer of the workmen when there was no specific reference to such a question. Lastly, he urged that Industrial Tribunal being not a Court of general and residuary jurisdiction but a Tribunal of specific jurisdiction circumscribed by the terms of reference has to determine specific industrial dispute. 3. In Paragraph 4 of the impugned ORDER :(Annexure 10) the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal made the following observation:-- ....In my opinion it is open to this Tribunal to make the Corporation a party to this case after deciding the above question. The ORDER :of the High Court quashing the previous ORDER :of this Tribunal in this regard will not stand in its way of doing so, if having been passed by the High Court in a matter of Certiorari in which case the inferior judicial authority, whose ORDER :is quashed, does not become functus officio. It remains open to it to consider the matter again and to pass such ORDER :as it thinks fit on matters coming before it freshly. These principles emerge from the cases of (1) Basappa V. Nagappa/1 S.C.R. 250 at page 257; (2) Northumberland Corporation Appeal Tribunal's case (1951) 1 K.B. 711, at Page 724; (3) Prasad's case A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 4, (4) Sattar's case, A.I.R. 1952 Mad 695. It appears from the above observations that the Presiding Officer did not feel happy about the ORDER :of the High Court and he somehow wanted to circumvent it. 4, (4) Sattar's case, A.I.R. 1952 Mad 695. It appears from the above observations that the Presiding Officer did not feel happy about the ORDER :of the High Court and he somehow wanted to circumvent it. To say the least, it was not open to him to go into the question of making the petitioner-Company a party to the reference again when his previous ORDER :on the same question has been quashed by this Court. None of the cases referred to by the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal supports the proposition that inferior Tribunal can ignore the ORDER :of the High Court in the matter of certiorari. There is substance in the contention raised by Mr. Ghose that it was not open to the Tribunal to agitate the question again and on that ground alone the impugned ORDER :s of the Tribunal are liable to be quashed. 4. There is another ground and, in my opinion, a stronger ground, for quashing the ORDER :s of the Tribunal. As I have already stated, before the Labour Directorate of the Government of Bihar the Union had alleged that the petitioner Company was the principal employer of the workmen but the petitioner Company took the stand that the workmen were contractor's employees and the petitioner Company had nothing to do with them. The Labour Department ultimately accepted the point of view of the petitioner Company and made a reference of the dispute only between M/s. A.T. Adhikari and Sons and their workmen to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, Mr. Ghose rightly contended that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to go into the question as to who is the employer of the workmen concerned as it is a substantial dispute and the Tribunal cannot decide that question when there is no such reference. Reference may be made to the case of (5) Hochtief Gammon V. Industrial Tribunal, Bhubneshwar, Orissa and others (A.I.R. 1964 SC 1746). In that case an industrial dispute in regard to the payment of bonus arose between Hochtief Gammon and its workmen represented by the Rourkela "Workers' Union, Rourkela. That dispute was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. were not a party to the reference but a notice was issued by the office of the Tribunal to their Deputy General Manager. That dispute was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. were not a party to the reference but a notice was issued by the office of the Tribunal to their Deputy General Manager. In pursuance of the notice the Deputy General Manager of M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. appeared before the Tribunal and urged that M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. were not concerned or interested in the dispute and should not be added as a party in the reference. Hochtief Gammon took the stand that M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. was a necessary party. One of the contentions which was raised before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was that M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. was a necessary party because it was the said company which was the employer of the workmen and not Hochtief Gammon, the agent of that company. The Supreme Court rejected that contention holding that the question as to who was the employer as between the appellant and M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. was a substantial dispute and it could not be regarded as incidental in any sense. It was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as follows: ........It would have been open to the State Government to ask the Tribunal to consider who was the employer of these workmen and in that case, the terms of reference might have been suitably framed. Where the appropriate Government desires that the question as to who the employer is should be determined, it generally makes a reference in wide enough terms and includes as parties to the reference different persons who are alleged to be the employers. Such a course has not been adopted in the present proceedings, and so, it would not be possible to hold that the question as to who is the employer as between the appellant and M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd is a question incidental to the industrial dispute which has been referred under Section 10(1)(d). This dispute is a substantial dispute between the appellant and M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and cannot be regarded as incidental in any sense, and so, we think that even this ground is not sufficient to justify the contention that M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party which can be added and summoned under the implied powers of the Tribunal under Section 18(3)(b). In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, it must be held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to go into the question as to who was the real employer of the workmen in absence of a reference in that regard. 5. It is not necessary to deal with the third contention of Mr. Ghose which is of general nature. I may, however, state that some of the observations made by the learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the case referred to above support the contention of learned counsel. In Paragraph 7 of the JUDGMENT : the learned Chief Justice observed as follows:-- ....It is necessary to bear in mind one essential fact, and that is that the Industrial Tribunal is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is to try an industrial dispute referred to it for its adjudication by the appropriate Government by an ORDER :of reference passed under Section 10. It is not open to the Tribunal to travel materially beyond the terms of reference, for it is well settled that the terms of reference determine the scope of its power and jurisdiction from case to case... For the reasons stated above, the two applications are allowed and the ORDER :s as contained in Annexure 10 of both the applications and Annexures 12 and 12A in C.W.J.C. No. 2 of 1969 are quashed. There will be no ORDER :as to costs. I agree. Application allowed