JUDGMENT DWIVEDI, J. - M/s. Hari Chand Rattan Chand and Co., the petitioner, was assessed to sales tax for 1956-57 on 25th July, 1958; and for 1957-58 on 4th February, 1959. Notices of demand were served but the taxes were not paid; instead, appeals were filed. Those appeals were decided on 10th December, 1969. The amount of tax was reduced for each year. Thereafter no fresh notices of demand have ever been issued to the petitioner. But on 23rd February, 1970, the Sales Tax Officer has demanded from the petitioner a sum of Rs. 13,904.97 as interest on the reduced amount of taxes with effect from 1st February, 1964. This demand is questioned before us. 2. The grounds of challenge are two : (1) recovery of tax having been stayed pending appeals, there was no default in payment of tax; (2) there was no fresh notice of demand after the appellate order. 3. We, do not entertain the first ground. It appears from the petition that after filing appeals the petitioner obtained from the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, an order staying realisation of fifty per cent. of the disputed tax till the disposal of appeals. But a copy of the order has not been filed with the petition. It is not proper to hazard any opinion in ignorance of the actual terms of the stay order. 4. The second challenge is put forward in two ways. According to Sri Khare, interest is a tax and accordingly there should be a notice of demand for interest. According to Sri Raja Ram Agarwal, the assessment order of the Sales Tax Officer is merged in the assessment order of the appellate authority and accordingly there should be a fresh notice of demand after the appellate order asking for payment of the tax assessed by the appellate authority. 5. The second challenge demands an understanding of certain provisions of section 8 of the Sales Tax Act. Section 8 deals with the mode of recovery of tax. It comprises several sub-sections. Of them, sub-sections (1) and (1-A) are relevant here. Sub-section (1) reads : "The tax assessed under this Act shall be paid ...... within such time, not being less than fifteen days from the date of service of the notice of assessment and demand, as may be specified in the notice. It comprises several sub-sections. Of them, sub-sections (1) and (1-A) are relevant here. Sub-section (1) reads : "The tax assessed under this Act shall be paid ...... within such time, not being less than fifteen days from the date of service of the notice of assessment and demand, as may be specified in the notice. In default of such payment, the whole of the amount then remaining due shall become recoverable in accordance with sub-section (8)." Sub-section (1-A) reads : "If the tax payable under sub-section (1) remains unpaid for six months after the expiry of the time specified in the notice of assessment and demand, or the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Bikri Kar (Dwitiya Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1963, whichever is later, then ......... simple interest at the rate of eighteen per cent. per annum shall run on the amount then remaining due from the date of expiry of the time specified in the said notice, or from the commencement of the said Adhiniyam, as the case may be, and shall be added to the amount of tax and be deemed for all purposes to be part of the tax : Provided that where as a result of appeal, revision or reference, or of any other order of a competent court or authority, the amount of tax is varied, the interest shall be recalculated accordingly : Provided further that the interest on the excess amount of tax payable under an order of enhancement shall run from the date of such order if such excess remains unpaid for six months after the order." 6. Sri Khare says that as according to the main enactment in sub-section (1-A) interest is a part of the tax, there should issue a notice of demand in respect of the interest in the same manner as it issues in respect of the tax. A similar argument has already been rejected by a majority of the Full Bench in M/s. Haji Lal Mohammad Biri Works v. The State of U.P. ([1970] 25 S.T.C. 383). So the argument fails. 7. Turning to the argument of Sri Raja Ram Agarwal, the principle of merger of orders "is not a doctrine of rigid universal application" : State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. ([1967] 19 S.T.C. 144 (S.C.)). So the argument fails. 7. Turning to the argument of Sri Raja Ram Agarwal, the principle of merger of orders "is not a doctrine of rigid universal application" : State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. ([1967] 19 S.T.C. 144 (S.C.)). The language of a particular enactment is determinative of the extent of its operation as well as of the concomitant consequences of merger. 8. The expression "the tax assessed under this Act" in sub-section (1) may perhaps include the order passed by the appellate authority. Similarly, the expression "if the tax payable under sub-section (1)" may perhaps include a case where a notice of demand is issued after the order in appeal. But these expressions neither clinch the issue in favour of the petitioner nor offset the contrary weight of the provisos. 9. According to the first proviso, where as a result of appeal the amount of tax is either enhanced or reduced, the interest shall be "recalculated" accordingly. The word "recalculated" is, we think, significant. According to the proviso the interest will not be calculated but recalculated. If the issue of a fresh notice of demand were envisaged, the proviso should have used the word "calculated". Again, the proviso requires recalculation of interest even when the tax is varied by the order of a competent court. It is conceded that the order of the assessing authority will not merge in the court's order. Accordingly the doctrine of merger, if applied to section 8, will create an anomaly. An anomalous interpretation should not ordinarily be accepted. 10. The second proviso clearly excludes the application of the doctrine of merger. It is a proviso to the first proviso. It provides that where on appeal the assessment is enhanced, then interest on the difference between the amount assessed originally and the amount assessed on appeal will run from the date of the appellate order if such excess remains unpaid for six months after the order. If the Legislature had intended that a fresh notice of demand should issue after the appellate order of variance, this proviso could not have been enacted. This proviso unequivocally shows that in spite of reduction of the amount assessed on appeal no fresh notice of demand is to issue. 11. The interpretation suggested by Sri Raja Ram Agarwal devitalises these two provisos. So we cannot accept his interpretation. 12. This proviso unequivocally shows that in spite of reduction of the amount assessed on appeal no fresh notice of demand is to issue. 11. The interpretation suggested by Sri Raja Ram Agarwal devitalises these two provisos. So we cannot accept his interpretation. 12. Sri Raja Ram Agarwal has referred us to Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality (A.I.R. 1944 P.C. 71), Hindustan Ideal Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1083) and Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Ajax Products Ltd. ([1965] 55 I.T.R. 741 (S.C.)) for the construction of a proviso. They do not appear to us to be helpful to him. Indeed, in the last case the Supreme Court has observed that the proviso "must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment." 13. M. Chockalingam v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras ([1963] 48 I.T.R. 34 (S.C.)), and Income-tax Officer v. Seghu Buchiah Setty ([1964] 52 I.T.R. 538 (S.C.)) are decisions under the Income-tax Act. The language of the material provisions of that Act is materially different from the language of section 8 of the Sales Tax Act. Again, in the second case there was no such issue as before us. These cases do not afford any help to the petitioner. 14. Durga Dutt Chunni Lal v. State of U.P. ([1969] 23 S.T.C. 432) is a decision of our court under the Sales Tax Act. Following Seghu Buchiah's case ([1964] 52 I.T.R. 538 (S.C.)), it was held that sales tax is not payable until a fresh notice of demand has been issued after the appellate order. The case of interest was not at all in issue in that case and so the language of section 8 did not receive any consideration. Our attention has also been drawn to three unreported decisions of our court. Those cases are : Masitullah Khan v. Collector, Shahjahanpur ([1969] 23 S.T.C. 106) (Writ No. 1417 of 1968 dated 23rd July, 1968), Sri Ram Autar Agarwal v. Sales Tax Officer, Bareilly (Writ No. 1659 of 1967 dated 13th September, 1968) and Ram Kishan Das Brij Mohan Lal v. State of U.P. ([1971] 27 S.T.C. 312) (Writ No. 143 of 1969, dated 6th January, 1970). 15. In the first case the assessee had died, and the tax and interest were sought to be recovered from his legal representative. 15. In the first case the assessee had died, and the tax and interest were sought to be recovered from his legal representative. It was held that as no notice of demand was issued to the legal representative, tax and interest could not be validly recovered from him. We are however concerned with the assessee in the present case. 16. The second case also does not help the petitioner. There the tax was being recovered without the issue of a fresh notice of demand after reduction of tax in appeal. That is not the case before us. 17. The third case no doubt fully helps the petitioner. In circumstances similar to the present case, it was held that interest could not be charged in the absence of a fresh notice of demand after reduction of tax in appeal. The Division Bench simply followed Seghu Buchiah's case ([1964] 52 I.T.R. 538 (S.C.)) and did not notice at all the provisions of section 8(1-A), particularly the two provisos. With respect, the decision is not correct. 18. The Standing Counsel has relied on the U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 20 of 1970). Section 3 of the Ordinance has inserted sub-section (9) in section 8. This amendment shall "be deemed always to have been so inserted". So the amendment will be deemed always to have been in force and will affect the present case. 19. The new sub-section (9) reads : "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (1-A) ......... where any notice of assessment and demand in respect of any tax ...... is served upon a dealer by an assessing authority and an appeal ........ is filed in respect of such tax ..........., then - (a) where as a result of such appeal ......... the amount of such tax ......... is enhanced, the assessing authority shall serve upon the dealer a fresh notice only in respect of the amount by which such tax ...... (is) enhanced, and any proceeding in relation to the amount specified in the notice already served upon him before the disposal of such appeal, ..... may be continued from the stage at which it stood immediately before such disposal; (b) where as a result of such appeal ........ the amount of such tax ......... (is) enhanced, and any proceeding in relation to the amount specified in the notice already served upon him before the disposal of such appeal, ..... may be continued from the stage at which it stood immediately before such disposal; (b) where as a result of such appeal ........ the amount of such tax ......... is reduced, - (i) it shall not be necessary for the assessing authority to serve upon the dealer a fresh notice; (ii) if any recovery proceedings are pending, the assessing authority shall give intimation of the fact of such reduction to the Collector who shall thereupon take steps for the recovery of only the reduced amount; and (iii) any proceedings initiated on the basis of the notice or notices served upon the dealer before the disposal of such appeal ...... including any recovery proceedings, may be continued in relation to the amount so reduced from the stage at which it stood immediately before such disposal; ..........." This amendment is a legislative overruling of the court's decision in M/s. Ram Kishan Das Brij Mohn Lal ([1971] 27 S.T.C. 312) and completely dooms the petitioner's arguments. 20. The petition is accordingly dismissed. As it was filed after the court's decision in M/s. Ram Kishan Das Brij Mohan Lal ([1971] 27 S.T.C. 312), there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.