( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against an order dated September 8, 1969, whereby the appellant's application for a rule under Article 226 of the Constitution was dismissed in limine. ( 2 ) THE appellant was appointed an electrician by the respondent No. 1. His service commenced from September 26, 1964, and he was dismissed from service with effect from November 1, 1967. According to the appellant , he has dismissed from service on the ground that he owed allegiance to the union of the workmen of the respondent No. 1. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the respondent No. 1, on the other hand, the appellant was retrenched as his service was found redundant and the respondent wanted to effect economy in its administration. The appellant now seeks in this application to attack the award of the Industrial Tribunal by which it was held that he was not dismissed but was retrenched and also that the retrenchment was not mala fide. It was also held that, before the retrenchment, the respondent complied with the provisions of section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the termination of the appellant's service was not unjustified and he was, therefore, not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for. ( 4 ) MR. C. F. Ali, learned Advocate for the appellant, contended that this client served the respondent company for a long time and that there was enough work for full-time employment of the services of his client. He argued that the respondent was seeking to have the work done by independent contractors and, therefore, the dismissal of the appellant was mala fide. In our view, this contention on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted, because the Tribunal found that there was not enough work for full-time employment of the appellant and also that the retrenchment of the appellant by the respondent was not mala fide. The next contention of Mr. Ali was that the provision in section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was mandatory in character and, as the respondent did not comply with the provisions in this section, the retrenchment order should be held to be bad. The next contention of Mr. Ali was that the provision in section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was mandatory in character and, as the respondent did not comply with the provisions in this section, the retrenchment order should be held to be bad. Section 25f of the Act provides: (A) that the workman proposed to be retrenched should be given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and that the workman should be paid one month's wages if his services are to be terminated without notice in lieu of such notice; (b) no workman shall be retrenched unless the workman has been paid at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days' average pay; (c) no workman shall be retrenched until notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government. ( 5 ) SO far as provisions in sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 25f of the Act are concerned there is no doubt that the respondent No. 1 tendered to the appellant one month's pay in lieu of notice together with retrenchment compensation. It is evident from the letter dated December 28, 1967, which is to found at page 39 of the paper-book, that the appellant was asked to collect the arrears of wages for the months of October, November and December, 1967, and one month's wages in lieu of notice together with compensation for three completed years of service aggregating Rs. 418-75 appear to have been sent to the appellant by postal money order. The appellant, for some reason or other, did not choose to accept the wages lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation. It cannot, therefore, be said that the respondent did not tender to the appellant the amount due to him under sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 25f. Mr. Ali sought to make a point that the respondent did not pay to his client the arrears of wages for the months of October, November and December, 1967. But it is clear to us from the letter of December 28, 1967, that the appellant was requested to collect the arrears of wages from the respondent's office and we do not see why this should not be treated as sufficient readiness and willingness on the part of respondent No. 1 to pay to the appellant the arrears of wages. But it is clear to us from the letter of December 28, 1967, that the appellant was requested to collect the arrears of wages from the respondent's office and we do not see why this should not be treated as sufficient readiness and willingness on the part of respondent No. 1 to pay to the appellant the arrears of wages. Besides, it is to be noted that sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 25f are not concerned with arrears of wages at all but only require the employer to give one month's notice to the employee and in lieu of such notice one month's wags and, secondly, retrenchment compensation. As the respondent offered to pay to the appellant one month's wages in lieu of notice and also retrenchment compensation, which the respondent declined to accept, it cannot be said that there was non-compliance with sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 25f of the Act. ( 6 ) THE next contention of Mr. Ali was that there was non-compliance with sub-section (c) of section 25f of the Act. It was argued that notice in the specified form was not served by the respondent No. 1 on the State Government and, therefore, the order of retrenchment was bad and the Tribunal should accordingly have set aside the order of retrenchment and directed reinstatement of the appellant. In our view, there is no merit in this contention on behalf of the appellant. It is true that a formal notice in the prescribed form was not given by the respondent No. 1 to the respondent No. 3. But it cannot be overlooked that in a series of letter addressed by the respondent No. 1 to the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Government of West Bengal, it was made amply clear that the respondent No. 1 intended to retrench the appellant on the ground that there was no sufficient work for full-time employment of the appellant as an electrician. Secondly, what is of still greater importance for the purpose of this appeal, is that the appellant cannot be heard to complain that the notice contemplated by sub-section (c) of section 25f of the Act was not given to the respondent No. 3. The object of the notice clearly is to enable the State Government to take necessary steps in the dispute between the employer and the employee. The object of the notice clearly is to enable the State Government to take necessary steps in the dispute between the employer and the employee. If any body could complain of non-service of this notice, it is the State Government alone and not the appellant. It is well-settled that in order to maintain a writ petition under Article 226 the petitioner must be able to satisfy the Court that there has been an invasion of his rights. Failure on the part of the respondent No. 1 to give a notice under section 25f (c) of the Act to the respondent No. 3 is no invasion of the rights of the appellant. ( 7 ) IN support of his contentions the learned Advocate for the appellant relied on the decisions in (1) City of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 610 : (1960) SCA 243 and (2) Ambalal Shivlal v. D. M. Vin, AIR 1964 Guj 192 . Reliance was placed on those two decisions for the proposition that the provisions in section 25f of the Act are mandatory in character. As I have noticed earlier, there has been complete compliance by the respondent No. 1 with the requirement of sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 25f of the Act. As regards sub-section (c) of that section, failure or omission to comply with the provisions of that sub-section does not, in our view, entitle the appellant to a rule nisi under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 8 ) I now return to another question which is of considerable importance in this appeal. The appellant's application was for a rule nisi in a writ petition for a Writ interest he nature of Certiorai. In order to get such a rule the appellant as a petitioner in the writ petition must satisfy the Court that there has been an error of law apparent on the fact of record. In our view, there has been no such error of law on the face of the record in the award made by the Tribunal. The main questions raised by the appellant were questions of fact relating to continued employment of the appellant under the respondent No. 1. The Tribunal considered the evidence adduced by the parties, thereafter, came to the conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to any relief. The main questions raised by the appellant were questions of fact relating to continued employment of the appellant under the respondent No. 1. The Tribunal considered the evidence adduced by the parties, thereafter, came to the conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to any relief. It was not a case where the Tribunal had made the award without any evidence to support it, nor is it a case where it had excluded material evidence. On the contrary, we are satisfied that both parties had ample opportunity to adduce material evidence in support of their contention and the Tribunal after taking into consideration such evidence made the award. The other ground on which the award could be attacked by the petitioner was a question of jurisdiction, namely, that either the Tribunal had no jurisdiction or that it had refused to exercise a jurisdiction which it had or that it had acted in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by statute. No such question of jurisdiction has been raised by the appellant in the writ petition. On the contrary, the appellant proceeded on the basis that the Tribunal had such jurisdiction and had duly exercised it. This Court in dealing with an application for a Writ of Certiorari is not an Appellate Court and it cannot go into facts decided by the Tribunal. The decision of a Tribunal cannot be interfered with in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court merely because it has come to a wrong conclusion unless the Court is satisfied that on the materials on record the decision of the Tribunal is perverse. In our view, it can by no means be said that the conclusion of the Tribunal is perverse having regard to the materials on record. ( 9 ) FOR reasons mentions above we hold that the Court below was justified in refusing to issue a rule Nisi and rejecting the appellant's application. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Mukharji, J. : I agree. ( 10 ) THE only issue in this proceeding is retrenchment whether it was valid or invalid. This appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Mukharji, J. : I agree. ( 10 ) THE only issue in this proceeding is retrenchment whether it was valid or invalid. The retrenchment is challenged by the petitioner mainly on four grounds: (a) breach of section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act, (b) retrenchment is in violation of the conciliation proceedings on the alleged ground that retrenchment was made while conciliation proceeding was pending, (c) retrenchment cannot be made of a permanent employee, and (d) this retrenchment is bad on the ground of mala fides. ( 11 ) THE first contention of the petitioner that the retrenchment in this case violates the conditions precedent laid down in section 25f is put forward on the following grounds. It is not suggested that the retrenchment in these case violates section 25f (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. That sub-section (a) requires that the workman has to be given one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment and the period of notice must expire or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice wage for the period of notice provided, of course, that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date of termination of service. That condition relating to the sub-section (a) is fully satisfied on the facts of the case. ( 12 ) IT is not even argued by Mr. Ali for the petitioner that there has been any violation of section 25f (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. What is suggested, however, is that there should have been also arrears of pay included and offered in the notice. This sub-section (a) of section 25f does not mention arrears of pay. All that it requires is that the workman must be given one month's notice in writing giving reasons for the retrenchment and the period of notice must expire, or the workman paid in lieu of such notice, the wages for the period of the notice. Therefore, there is no reason or substance in the contention of Mr. Ali for the petitioner that only Rs. 418-75 was offered to the petitioner, as stated in the letter dated December 28, 1968, and that it should have included the arrears of pay for November and December, 1967. Therefore, there is no reason or substance in the contention of Mr. Ali for the petitioner that only Rs. 418-75 was offered to the petitioner, as stated in the letter dated December 28, 1968, and that it should have included the arrears of pay for November and December, 1967. It may be noted here that the retrenchment was to take effect on January 1, 1968. ( 13 ) THE next argument of Mr. Ali for petitioner was that no proper payment within the meaning of section 25f (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was made to the petitioner. My Lord in the judgment just now delivered has dealt with this point fully. I only wish to add in emphasis the expression 'at the time of retrenchment' appearing in sub-section (b) of section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act. The crucial point of time is that the workman must be paid at the time of retrenchment. As the retrenchment in this case was to take effect from January 1, 1968, the payment by money order on December 28/29, 1967, was in compliance with this statutory condition under section 25f (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In other words, the condition in this sub-section (b) is that the workman must be paid at the time of retrenchment and not when the notice of retrenchment is given. At one stage Mr. Ali's contention for the petitioner was that the first notice dated September 29, 1967, retrenching the petitioner was bad because actual payment was not made. But he missed the clause in the notice that the retrenchment at that time was indicated to take effect from November 1, 1967, and payment was promised at the end of October, 1967. If the retrenchment was to take effect from November 1, 1967, as according to that letter, then payment in October, 1967 would be in compliance with the statutory condition in sub-section (b) of section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act. At one stage also, Mr. Ali for the petitioner to collect the money was bad, because the statute required under sub-section (b) of the section 25f the payment to the petitioner and not request to him to collect. Having regard to the letter of December 28, 1967, it is unnecessary in such circumstances to deal with these contentions any more as they are irrelevant for the purpose of this decision. Having regard to the letter of December 28, 1967, it is unnecessary in such circumstances to deal with these contentions any more as they are irrelevant for the purpose of this decision. ( 14 ) THE third contention of Mr. Ali for the petitioner is that this retrenchment violates the condition laid down in sub-section (c) of section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act because no notice to Governments was given. This sub-section (c) requires that no workman shall be retrenched until a notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government. No notice is admittedly served on the appropriate Government in that sense in the present facts of the case. Under Rule 77 of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rule it is laid down, inter alia, that the notice of retrenchment shall be in Form P and such notice shall be served on the State Government either by personal service or by registered post not less than one month before the date of actual retrenchment if notice of retrenchment is given to a workman, or within three days of the date of retrenchment if no notice is given to a workman and he is paid one month's wages in lieu thereof, or not less than one month before the date of actual retrenchment if retrenchment is carried out under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of such service. Prima facie such a condition of giving notice to the State Government in case of retrenchment is intended to inform the State Government in appropriate time so that it can take any steps, if necessary, for that purpose. In that sense, it is a notice to help the State Government and enures for its benefit. It is therefore, for the State Government to complain of any lack of notice in any petitioner case and not for the workman who had normal notice otherwise of the retrenchment. ( 15 ) LEFT to myself, I would read that under section 25f (c) such a notice to the State Government would normally be necessary where there is no conciliation proceeding or where there has been no award after a formal reference of the industrial dispute to a Tribunal. ( 15 ) LEFT to myself, I would read that under section 25f (c) such a notice to the State Government would normally be necessary where there is no conciliation proceeding or where there has been no award after a formal reference of the industrial dispute to a Tribunal. This notice for the information of the State Government under sub-section (c) section 25f was intended for information to such Government where the Government was not otherwise informed of these proceedings as it would be in the case of conciliation proceedings or reference under the Industrial Disputes Act to a Tribunal. For, as I conceive, the requirement of notice in sub-section (c) of section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act is exactly intended for this purpose so that, by notice to the State Government, the State Government is enabled to take conciliation proceedings or make a reference to an Industrial Tribunal or take such other steps permissible under the Act and in public interest. Therefore, I am of the view that where there is such a proceeding and in this case there were both conciliation proceedings and award by the Tribunal, there is no further question of any notice to the State Government about this retrenchment. ( 16 ) I am not unaware of the fact that Form P under Rule 77 of the Industrial Disputes Rules requires the notice under sub-section (c) of section 25f to be given to the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Labour Department. But that does not make any difference in the view that I have expressed. No doubt, it was the Assistant Labour Commissioner who was then conducting the conciliation proceedings, as will be seen from the respondent's letter dated December 23, 1967, and other relevant correspondences on the subject, and it was not the Secretary, Labour Department of the Government of West Bengal. The conciliation was on this point whether the retrenchment of the petitioner was legal or illegal, or justified or unjustified. Again from the award of the Industrial Tribunal it would be plain that it is the Labour Department of Government by its Order No. 6640-GR L. R. /11l. The conciliation was on this point whether the retrenchment of the petitioner was legal or illegal, or justified or unjustified. Again from the award of the Industrial Tribunal it would be plain that it is the Labour Department of Government by its Order No. 6640-GR L. R. /11l. 313/68 dates September 6, 1968, declared that the Governor was pleased to refer the dispute of the First Industrial Tribunal with the main issue framed in the following way: -whether the termination of service of Sri C. K. Datta is justified ? To what relief, if any, is he entitled ? in other words, this was the very point which was the subject-matter of the award. ( 17 ) IN those circumstances and for these additional reasons, I agree with my Lord that the condition laid down in sub-section (c) of section 25f is also satisfied in this case. ( 18 ) IT will be necessary in this context to deal with the two decisions cited at the Bar at this point. In the (1) City of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (supra), Gajendragadkar, J. made the following observation: -on a plain reading of section 25f (b) it is clear that the requirement prescribed by its is a condition precedent for the retrenchment of the workman. The section provides that no workman shall be retrenched until the condition in question has been satisfied. It is difficult to accede to the argument that when the section imposes in mandatory terms a condition precedent, non-compliance with the said condition would not render the impugned retrenchment invalid. ( 19 ) THIS observation was made in connection with sub-section (b0 of section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act and not in connection with sub-section (c) although the learned Judge made the observation that sub-sections (a) and (c) of section 25f prescribe 'similar conditions'. But his Lordship was also careful to observe, 'but we are not concerned with that'. ( 20 ) A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in 92) Ambalal Shivlal v. D. M. Vin (supra) quoted the above observation of the Supreme Court. But his Lordship was also careful to observe, 'but we are not concerned with that'. ( 20 ) A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in 92) Ambalal Shivlal v. D. M. Vin (supra) quoted the above observation of the Supreme Court. ( 21 ) NEITHER of these two cases deals directly with the point of notice to the State Government and sub-section (c) regarding notice to the State Government and whether the lack of such notice can be availed of by the workman although the State Government does not make any complaint on that score and although the State Government is a party to this application. ( 22 ) THE next branch of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that this retrenchment was bad because it was made during the pendency of conciliation proceedings. The argument is that the conciliation proceedings in this case commenced on December 23, 1967, and continued till January 8, 1968, but this retrenchment was made on January 1, 1968. On a point of fact this does not seem to be an accurate assumption. Actually, the first notice of retrenchment was given by the employer to the employee on September 29, 1967, where clear notice was given to the petitioner that he would be relieved from November 1, 1967. What actually happened there is that this date of November 1, 1967, was extended till January 1, 1968, in the circumstances already mentioned. Therefore, the retrenchment was virtually before the conciliation proceeding started on December 23, 1967. In that view of the matter this question does not arise and it cannot be a ground of challenge to the retrenchment in this case. ( 23 ) IT may, however, be emphasized that there is no particular section directly preventing retrenchment even during a conciliation proceeding. The relevant sections in this connection are section 33 and section 33a of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 33 deals with the conditions of service etc. and provides that they should remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings. The relevant sections in this connection are section 33 and section 33a of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 33 deals with the conditions of service etc. and provides that they should remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings. It is said that during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings no employer shall, (a) in regard to any matter connected with a dispute, after to the breach of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings, or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute save with express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. Now, these proceedings obviously do not deal with retrenchment by express reference. Nor does the retrenchment in this involve any 'conditions of service' or 'misconduct' within the meaning of section 33 (a) or (b) of the Act. It must be understood in the facts of the present case that no conditions of service exist in the present context and has been so found as a fact by the Industrial Tribunal Award. I am, therefore, of opinion that there is no force in the argument of Mr. Ali for the petitioner on this point in the facts of this case. 25. The petitioner's next submission was that a permanent employee could not be retrenched. I have no hesitation in rejecting that contention. Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act says: retrenchment means termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include (i) voluntary retirement of the workman or (ii) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf or (iii) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health. It is clear that retrenchment means the termination by an employer of the service of a workman 'for any reason whatsoever' with the specific exceptions mentioned there and the present case does not come within such exceptions. From this definition there does not appear to be any statutory bar under the Industrial Disputes Act for an employer to retrench a permanent employee. From this definition there does not appear to be any statutory bar under the Industrial Disputes Act for an employer to retrench a permanent employee. In this connection it would be appropriate to refer to the two decisions of the Supreme Court enunciating the principle that it is for the management to decide the strength of its labour force to carry out efficiently the working of its undertaking. These decisions are (3) In re : Workmen of Subong Tea Estate, AIR 1967 SC 420 : (1964) 5 SCR 602 and (4) Parry and Co. Ltd. v. P. C. Pal and Ors. , (1970) 2 L. L. J 429 (439 ). In the last case Shelat, J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed: as laid down in the Workmen of Subong TGea Estate, (1964) 5 SCR 602 : AIR 1967 SC 420 ,it is for the management to decide the strength of its labour force to carry out efficiently the working of its undertaking. If as a result of reorganization the number of its existing employees exceeded the reasonable and legitimate needs of the undertaking, the management, subject to its obligation to pay compensation, can effect the retrenchment. So long as retrenchment carried out is bona fide and not vitiated by any consideration for victimization or unfair labour practice and the employer comes to the confusion that he can carry on his undertaking with reasonable efficiency with the number of employees retained by him after retrenchment, the Tribunal ought not ordinarily to interfere with such decision. ( 24 ) THE last ground that the retrenchment was bad because of mala fides failed as a fact before the Industrial Tribunal and the award records that finding of fact. Northing has been shown before us to establish that the retrenchment in this case was in any way mala fide. ( 25 ) WITH these observations I agree with the order proposed by my learned brother that the appeal should be dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Northing has been shown before us to establish that the retrenchment in this case was in any way mala fide. ( 25 ) WITH these observations I agree with the order proposed by my learned brother that the appeal should be dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. ( 26 ) IN this case, it has been held by the Industrial Tribunal and it is also the case of the employer that a whole-time job for a whole-time electrician was not necessary, and in that policy the Court will not normally interfere with the employer unless it is shown that the retrenchment was mala fide or otherwise hit by any statutory provision. Lastly, I agree with the observations made by my Lord on the question of mala fides. The fact has been found against the petitioner by the Industrial Tribunal in its award. It has been held on the facts after a consideration of evidence that the retrenchment in this case was not mala fide. In such circumstances it will be inappropriate and improper for this Court to interfere on a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution. Mukharji, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed.