B. K. MEHTA, J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THESE four petitions raise common questions of law as they challenge the vires of sec. 73a regarding employers special contribution and sec. 73d as to the mode of its recovery of the Employees State Insurance Act 1948 The vires of these provisions is challenged on the grounds (1) of want of legislative competence on the ground that the special contribution was a fee or a tax which was a tax on the trade or calling or employment falling in entry No. 60 of the State List List II; (2) that they violate articles 14 and 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution of India; and (3) that sec. 73a violates also article 31 of the Constitution. ( 2 ) THIS is an Act which provides an all India scheme providing insurance benefits to the employees. Under sec. 1 (2) it extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Under sec. 1 (4) in the first instance it applies to all factories including Government factories other than seasonal factories. Under sec. 1 (5) the appropriate Government may in consultation with the Corporation and where the appropriate Government is a State Government with the approval of the Central Government after giving six months notice of its intention of so doing by notification in the Official Gazette extend the provisions of the Act or any of them to any other establishment or class of establishments industrial commercial agricultural or otherwise. The Act contemplates a Corporation being created under sec. 3 known as the Employees State Insurance Corporation for the purpose of administration of the scheme under the Act. Chapter Ill deals with the provisions of finance and audit and it provides in sec. 26 (1) that all contributions paid under the Act and all other moneys received on behalf of the Corporation shall be paid into a fund called the Employees State Insurance Fund which shall be paid and administered by the Corporation for the purposes of this Act. Sec. 26 (2) provides that the Corporation may accept grants) donations and gifts from the Central or any State Government local authority or any individual or body whether incorporated or not for all or any of the purposes of the Act. Sec. 26 (2) provides that the Corporation may accept grants) donations and gifts from the Central or any State Government local authority or any individual or body whether incorporated or not for all or any of the purposes of the Act. Sec. 28 lays down the mode of appropriation of this fund by setting out the purposes to which this fund could be expended namely payment of benefits under the Act provision of medical treatment and for defraying the cost of the implementation of the scheme etc. Chapter IV deals with the subject of contributions because the Act has envisaged a contributory scheme where both the employers and the employees contribute. Sec. 38 provides that subject to the provisions of the Act all employees in factories or establishments to which the Act applies shall be insured as provided in the Act. Sec. 39 (1) provides that the contribution payable under the Act in respect of an employee shall comprise contributions payable both by the employer and the employee and shall be paid to the Corporation. Sec. 39 (2) provides that the contributions shall be paid at the ordinary rates which are specified in the First Schedule. Under sec. 40 the principal employer is made liable to pay the contributions in the first instance both the employers contribution and the employees contribution in respect of every employee whether directly employed by him or by or through an immediate employer. Under sec. 40 (2) he is given a right to recover from the employee the employees contribution by deduction from his wages and not otherwise. Sec. 41 provides that the principal employer can recover the amount of contribution from the immediate employer. The mode of payment of contribution is laid down in secs. 42 and 43. Sec. 44 provides that the employer shall furnish returns and maintain registers as provided therein. Sec. 45 deals with the inspector. whose duty is to implement the Act. Secs. 45a and 45b are added by Act 44 of 1966. Sec. 45a (2) provides for determination of contributions by the Corporation by a written order. It enacts that where in respect of a factory or establishment no returns particulars registers or records are submitted furnished or maintained in accordance with the provisions of sec. 44 or any inspector or other official of the Corporation referred to in sub-sec. (2) of sec. It enacts that where in respect of a factory or establishment no returns particulars registers or records are submitted furnished or maintained in accordance with the provisions of sec. 44 or any inspector or other official of the Corporation referred to in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 45 is obstructed by the principal or immediate employer or any other person in exercising his functions or discharging his duties under sec. 45 the Corporation may on the basis of the information available to it by order determine the amount of contributions payable in respect of the employees of that factory or establishment. Under sec. 45a (2) the order of the Corporation so determining the contribution is made sufficient proof of the claim of the Corporation under sec. 75 or for the recovery of the amount determined by such order as an arrear of land revenue under sec. 45b. Sec. 45b enacts that any contribution payable under the Act may be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. Chapter V is the important Chapter. It deals with the benefits which are provided by this Act. Sec. 46 enumerates those six benefits which are as under:- (1) sickness benefit (2) maternity benefit (3) disablement benefit (4) dependants benefit (5) medical benefit by way of medical treatment for and attendance on insured persons; and (6) funeral benefit for recovering the actual expenditure incurred on the deceased insured person. THE rest of the Chapter makes elaborate provision for these various benefits. Secs. 53 and 61 may be kept in mind because they provide that an insured person or his dependants shall not be entitled to receive or recover whether from the employer of the insured person or from any other person any compensation or damages under the Workmens Compensation Act 1923 or any other law for the time being in force or otherwise in respect of an employment injury sustained by the insured person as an employee under the Act. Similarly sec. 61 enacts that when a person is entitled to any of the benefits provided by the Act he shall not be entitled to receive any similar benefit admissible under the provisions of any other enactment. Under sec. Similarly sec. 61 enacts that when a person is entitled to any of the benefits provided by the Act he shall not be entitled to receive any similar benefit admissible under the provisions of any other enactment. Under sec. 72 the employer is prohibited from reducing the wages of the employee by reason only of his liability for any contributions payable under the Act whether directly or indirectly or to discontinue or reduce benefits payable to him under the existing conditions of his service which are similar to the benefits conferred by the Act. Chapter VA is a self contained Chapter which is newly added by the amending Act 53 of 1951 which is material for our purpose as it deals with the subject of special contribution. It has been enacted as a money bill falling under Article 110 of the Constitution and was enacted as such. The Statement of Objects and Reasons at the time of introduction of this Chapter VA discloses that as the Act permitted the implementation of the scheme by stages the scheme was first introduced in Delhi and Kanpur. There were practical difficulties in the regional implementation of the scheme. The principal difficulties were the rise in the cost of production and the diminution of the competitive capacity of industries located in those regions. The employers main objections centered round the former difficulty and those of the Utter Pradesh Government emphasised the latter. After considering these objections as the Central Government was anxious to avoid any competitive handicap to any region it was considered this could be best achieved by an equitable distribution of the employers contribution even where implementation is effected only in certain areas among the employers in the whole country employers in regions where the scheme is implemented paying slightly higher contributions It was believed that this would minimise the contribution leviable from the employers and spread the incidence of the cost of the scheme equitably and for that purpose primarily this money bill was introduced for enacting the self contained Chapter. Sec. 73a (1) provides that for so long as the provisions of this Chapter are in force every principal employer shall not with standing anything contained in the Act pay to the Corporation a special contribution. Sec. 73a (1) provides that for so long as the provisions of this Chapter are in force every principal employer shall not with standing anything contained in the Act pay to the Corporation a special contribution. Under clause (3) it would consist of such percentage not exceeding five per cent of the total wage bill of the employer as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify from time to time. Sub-clause (2) enacts that the employers special contribution shall in the case of a factory or establishment situate in any area in which the provisions of both Chapters IV and V are in force be in lieu of the employers contribution payable under Chapter IV. The first proviso enacts that before fixing or varying any such percentage the Central Government shall give by like notification not less than two months notice of its intention so to do and shall in such notification specify the percentage which it proposes to fix or as the case may be the extent to which the percentage already fixed is to be varied. The second proviso enacts that the employers special contribution in the case of factories or establishment situate in any area in which the provisions of both Chapters IV and V are in force shall be fixed at a higher rate than that in the case of factories or establishments situate in any area in which the provisions of both Chapters IV and V are not being enforced. Sub-clause (4) enacts that the special contribution shall fall due as soon as the liability of the employer to pay wages accrues but may be paid to the Corporation at such intervals within such times and in such manner as the Central Government may by notification in that connection specify. The Explanation enacts that the total wage bill means the total wages which have accrued due to employees in a factory or establishment in respect of such wage periods as may be specified by the Central Government in the notification. The Explanation enacts that the total wage bill means the total wages which have accrued due to employees in a factory or establishment in respect of such wage periods as may be specified by the Central Government in the notification. Sec. 73b provides a machinery for adjudication by enacting in clause (1) that if any question or dispute arises in respect of the employers special contribution payable or recoverable under this Chapter and there is no Employees Insurance Court with jurisdiction to try such question or dispute it shall be decided by such authority as the Central Government may specify in this behalf. In that proceeding the provisions of secs. 76 (1) 77 to 79 and 81 are made applicable as they apply in relation to a proceeding before an Employees Insurance Court. Sec. 73d provides the mode of recovery of this special contribution as under:-THE employers special contribution payable under this Chapter may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue. SEC. 73e provides that the Corporation may for the purpose of determining whether the employers special contribution is payable under this Chapter for determining the amount thereof by general or special order require any principal or immediate employer or any other person to furnish such information or returns to such authority in such form and within such time 3s may be specified in the order. Sec. 73f enables the Central Government to give exemption even in respect of such special contributions. It enacts that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act the Central Government may having regard to the size or location of or the nature of industries carried on in any factory or establishment or class of factories or establishments exempt the factory or establishment or class of factories or establishments from the payment of the employers special contribution under this Chapter and nothing contained in secs. 87 to 91 inclusive shall be deemed to authorise any State Government to grant any such exemption. Sec. 73g provides that save as otherwise expressly provided in this Chapter the provisions of Chapter IV sec. 87 to 91 inclusive shall be deemed to authorise any State Government to grant any such exemption. Sec. 73g provides that save as otherwise expressly provided in this Chapter the provisions of Chapter IV sec. 72 and Chapter VII and any rule and regulations made under the Act shall so far as may be apply in relation to the payment or recovery of employers special contribution the penalties specified in connection therewith and all other matters incidental thereto as they would have applied in relation to an employers contribution if this Chapter were not in force and the employers contribution had been payable under the Act. Sec. 73 I enacts that the Central Government may by notification in the Gazette direct that the provisions of this Chapter shall cease to have effect Oil such date as may be specified in the notification not being a date earlier than three months from the date of the notification. Chapter VI provides for adjudication of disputes and claims. Under sec. 74 Employees Insurance Court is to be constituted. Sec. 75 deals with matters to be decided by Employees Insurance Court. Under sec. 75 (3) no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question or dispute as aforesaid or to adjudicate on any liability which by or under the Act is to be decided by a medical board or by a medical appeal tribunal or by the Employees Insurance Court. Secs. 76 and 77 deal with the institution of proceedings and commencement of the proceedings of the Court. Sec. 78 confers powers on the employees Insurance Court which are same as the powers of a Civil Court for the purposes of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects administering oath and recording evidence and such Court is to be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of sec. 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 The Insurance Court has to follow the procedure prescribed by the Government. Under sec. 78 (4) the order of the Employees Insurance Court is to be enforced as a decree passed by a Civil Court. Sec. 82 provides for an appeal to the High Court. Chapter VII is of penalties. Chapter VIII deals with miscellaneous provisions. Sec. 87 to 91 deal with various exemptions. Under sec. 78 (4) the order of the Employees Insurance Court is to be enforced as a decree passed by a Civil Court. Sec. 82 provides for an appeal to the High Court. Chapter VII is of penalties. Chapter VIII deals with miscellaneous provisions. Sec. 87 to 91 deal with various exemptions. Sec. 91a enacts that exemptions may be prospective or retrospective. Sec. 92 gives the Central Government powers to give directions to a State Government as to the carrying into execution of the Act in the State. Sec. 94 gives a priority of the Corporation dues in respect of contributions. etc. over other debts in case of insolvency or winding up. Sec. 95 empowers the Central Government to make rules. Under sec. 96 the State Government is empowered to make rules. Under sec. 97 the Corporation is empowered to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the rules made thereunder for the administration of the affairs of the Corporation and for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. Under sec. 97 (2) in particular and without prejudice to the generality of power under clause (1) the regulations empower the Corporation to determine the various benefits and for laying down penalties for breach of regulations and for granting relaxation. Under clause (3) the regulations made by the Corporation are to be published and thereupon shall have effect as if enacted in the Act. The First Schedule lays down how the various benefits shall be worked out. ( 3 ) FROM the aforesaid scheme of the Act it is obvious that this is a far reaching labour welfare scheme which introduces an insurance benefit for the employees working in factories and establishments covered by the Act. This statutory insurance is a comprehensive scheme under which at least six benefits are envisaged as mentioned in sec. 46. The employee on his own could never provide for these hazards that is why such a contributory scheme is envisaged. The employees self respect is maintained by seeing that he does not live on charity. That is why he is also made to contribute under the scheme his own mite. The employer is also made to contribute because it is the employer who will ultimately benefit. The employees self respect is maintained by seeing that he does not live on charity. That is why he is also made to contribute under the scheme his own mite. The employer is also made to contribute because it is the employer who will ultimately benefit. The employer will save the cost of some of the benefits which are given to his employees under the Maternity Benefit Act under the Workmens Compensation Act or in the benefit of sick leave or other corresponding benefits under the existing statutes. Besides these direct benefits that he will derive the employer will have substantial indirect benefit from the implementation of the scheme by the increased efficiency of the workers when their health is properly attended to by the medical benefits and by increase in the production on account of the labour being more contented. As such a scheme could never be worked out by individuals on their own the Act envisages the pooling of the resources and a contributory scheme both of the employers and the employees of course supplemented by the grants and donations not only from the Union and States and local authorities but also from the individuals. That is why a common fund is created and a Corporation is established for administering this labour welfare measure. It being an all India scheme which is to be in force throughout the country its implementation had to be in stages. The validity of this conditional legislation was considered in. Their Lordships pointed out that in the very nature of things it would have been impossible for the legislature to decide in what areas and in respect of which factories the Employees State insurance Corporation should be established. It was obvious that a scheme of this kind though very beneficent could not be introduced in the whole of the country all at once. Such beneficial measures which need careful experimentation had some times to be adopted by stages and in different phases and so inevitably the question of extending the statutory benefits contemplated by the Act had to be left to the discretion of the appropriate Government. The course adopted by modern legislatures in dealing with welfare scheme had uniformly conformed to the same pattern. The course adopted by modern legislatures in dealing with welfare scheme had uniformly conformed to the same pattern. Their Lordships therefore held that the legislature evolves a scheme of socio economic welfare makes elaborate provisions in respect of it and leaves it to the Government concerned to decide when how and in what manner the scheme should be introduced. That cannot amount to excessive delegation. ( 4 ) DUE to the enormous administrative difficulties of such an all India scheme comprising such a comprehensive scheme of benefits which had to be brought into force throughout the country the amendment had to be made by enacting Chapter V-A which is a self contained Chapter during the transitional period when the benefits of Chapter V could not be made available to the employees and therefore the ordinary normal contributions under Chapter IV could not be recovered either from the employers or the employees. Where therefore these two Chapters were not in force in lieu of the employers contribution this special contribution was provided of course at a lesser rate under sec. 73a on the basis of a percentage not exceeding five per cent of the total wage bill of the employers in the country who were covered by the Act. As the scheme of the amendment pointed out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons this Chapter only ensured an equitable distribution of the burden of the entire scheme. Such an insurance scheme requires a fund to be built up. The downpour has to first begin until in the course of years it became a strong stream which could reach every nook and corner of the country. Therefore for the actual benefits envisaged under Chapter V the normal contributions would be collected from the concerned employers under Chapter IV. But even during the transitional period the employers had to make a token contribution so that the steady flow of these benefits could be maintained as and when the Act was extended even to other areas after Its successful implementation in the areas in which Chapters IV and V were first introduced. This being an insurance premium which is first collected from the employers they are made to contribute token amounts which are at present 3/4 per cent of the total wage bills which would come to 2 or 3 days wages so that the insurance fund would be built up. This being an insurance premium which is first collected from the employers they are made to contribute token amounts which are at present 3/4 per cent of the total wage bills which would come to 2 or 3 days wages so that the insurance fund would be built up. The amendment would serve the very important purpose besides building up the insurance fund of equitable distribution of burden under the Act so that there would be no competitive handicap because the scheme was implemented first in one region and was from time to time extended to other regions. Therefore Chapter V-A is only a transitional provision which only defers the benefits while it collects the premium from the employers who are liable to contribute towards their share of this statutory insurance contract. Chapter V-A which is a self contained Chapter not only provides for the levy of this special contribution laying down its guidelines but it provides an adjudication machinery when any question or dispute arises in respect of this special contribution and when there is no Employees Insurance Court with jurisdiction to decide such a dispute as the Central Government has to appoint an authority in this behalf. That authority follows similar provisions which are applicable to proceeding before an Employees Insurance Court in adjudication of such a dispute. Sec. 73d lays down the mode of recovery of this special contribution as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Sec. 73e provides for the initial determination of the amount of special contribution by the Corporation and for that purpose it can require information and returns in such form and within such time as may be specified in the order. Sec. 73g makes even the provisions of Chapter IV applicable to the recovery of special contribution along with penalties provisions and other incidental provisions as if they apply to the case of normal contribution after Chapter IV was brought in force. That would make secs. 45a and 45b applicable even to a case of special contribution in which the Corporation can determine the amount of contribution by an order which would be sufficient proof of the claim of the Corporation for recovery of that amount as an arrear of land revenue under sec. 73d. Besides sec. 73f is a valuable provision which provides for appropriate exemption even from recovery of the special contribution. Under sec. 73d. Besides sec. 73f is a valuable provision which provides for appropriate exemption even from recovery of the special contribution. Under sec. 73-I the duration of Chapter VA is made dependent on the notification being issued by the Central Government on which date it shall cease to have effect. ( 5 ) WHEN this Chapter VA is therefore analysed in its true context it is not an independent provision but a part of an integrated scheme of this insurance measure. The administrative difficulties require implementation of this gigantic living scheme only in stages. Therefore the consequent problems like that of competitive handicap had also to be solved so that the burden of the scheme was equitably distributed. That is why the new Chapter VA provided for a lesser rate of contribution in the initial stages by the employers when special contribution was levied from the employers. The downpour had to continue till it emerged into a gigantic stream which could flow to every nook and corner in the country as envisaged in the scheme. Therefore even this impost which provides for the employers liability even in the initial stages is a part of the whole integrated scheme and could never be read as an independent taxation measure. The charge under this contributory welfare scheme is an integrated part thereof. The measure as a whole is nothing but a labour welfare measure and the charge which is collected under this contributory scheme which at the initial stages is only from the employers alone is only a charge of this regulatory measure. The employees get benefits under this scheme and they contribute even their mite their employers who ultimately will derive benefits from this labour welfare measure have also to contribute their own mite in a manner which is equitable in the context of such an all India scheme which can be implemented only in stages. Unless such welfare schemes are made contributory schemes even by the employers they would cease to be just. The employers would reap an unearned increment if such schemes were to be financed only by public finance. The employers would derive all the benefits of the scheme by the increased efficiency of their employees and would even be able to effect savings in various ways and therefore it is but just and reasonable that such a scheme should provide that the employers shall also contribute. The employers would derive all the benefits of the scheme by the increased efficiency of their employees and would even be able to effect savings in various ways and therefore it is but just and reasonable that such a scheme should provide that the employers shall also contribute. Such an employers liability in the good old days under the common law had its origin in the employers fault and the employers liability was based on a fault or as is known as a tortuous liability. Once the welfare concept got entrenched in all industrial Legislations the base of the employers liability is changed from the fault base to an absolute base. That is why under the factory Legislation the employer today has become an insurer of his workers by providing safe machinery equipment and tools. The worker may be foolish negligent and still the employers liability in case of employment injury is always made absolute. Therefore in the modern concept the employers liability concept is a wider concept not only of fault based liability but also an absolute liability by which the employer becomes an insurer. It is in the context of such a welfare measure that it provides for this charge being collected at the initial stages only from the employers which is of course at a lower rate in this contributory scheme so that ultimately the benefits of this scheme would be available to all the insured employees under the scheme and by whose contented and efficient production ultimately their employers would derive corresponding profit. Therefore at the outset we should note that the whole concept of the scheme is a regulatory welfare measure providing for the employers liability to make a contribution towards the cost of this statutory insurance contract for the benefit of the employees. The contributions which are collected whether at the initial stage or at the final stage have their appropriations made in advance by the very words of this statute. The Corporation holds this fund under the Act only to be spent for the purposes of the Act so that these benefits would flow to the employees resulting in the corresponding benefits to the employers concerned. The Corporation holds this fund under the Act only to be spent for the purposes of the Act so that these benefits would flow to the employees resulting in the corresponding benefits to the employers concerned. It is true that the implementation of the scheme in the various stages is left to the discretion of such a high authority like the Central Government but the discretion is not arbitrary but one which is to be exercised in the light of the scheme of the Act and for advancing the purposes of the Act. Therefore the charge levied in this context whether for direct services rendered or for indirect benefits to the employers by imposing a liability on them to contribute could never be considered as a taxation measure pure and simple nor as a levy of fee which is to be co related on consideration of quid pro quo. It is in the light of such a scheme that we have to consider the question of legislative competence which is urged by Mr. K. S. Nanavati in his first ground. After the decision of ; it would be quite an erroneous approach to the question to view such a statute not as an organic whole but as a mere collection of sections then disintegrate it into parts examine under what heads of legislation those parts would severally fall and by that process determine what portions thereof are ultra vires and what are not. Therefore while judging the legislative competence of this statute we must examine the statute as an organic whole whose benefits are ultimately to reach every nook and corner of the country as soon as it acquires sufficient momentum. In such a scheme it would be against all settled principles of construction to serve the scheme into parts while examining the legislative competence of the statute. The statute fairly and squarely falls under entries 23 and 24 of List III Concurrent List as it deals with the topic of social insurance as well as the general topic of welfare of labour. That general item welfare of labour includes in item No. 24 employers liability workmens compensation invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits. Both these items could surely provide a labour welfare measure which introduces an insurance scheme for the workers so that they are able to insure themselves against the various hazards. That general item welfare of labour includes in item No. 24 employers liability workmens compensation invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits. Both these items could surely provide a labour welfare measure which introduces an insurance scheme for the workers so that they are able to insure themselves against the various hazards. Under this wide topic of legislation both the Parliament and the State Legislatures have concurrent powers to enact any such labour welfare measure providing for a statutory contract of insurance. In substance such an insurance contract merely provides that on payment of the premium as envisaged therein by the employers and by the employees the employees will be insured against all the specified hazards for which a provision is made in the Act. It may be that the benefits may be deferred till the scheme gets sufficient momentum and such a gigantic scheme may be implemented in stages. That however would not change the nature of this labour welfare measure under which what the employer pays is only the insurance premium to which he is made liable under this statutory contract of insurance. In all labour laws it is now a settled principle that the law regulates the contractual relations between the employees and the employers by introducing new terms and if this labour welfare measure introduces this new term providing for the employer paying the premium so that the worker gets insurance under a comprehensive insurance policy for the various hazards mentioned in the Act it would only be the regulatory labour welfare measure in its pith and substance. The payment is to be recovered from the employer by the authority of law which in the wider sense only falls in the concept of taxation. The provision is made even for such a charge in the very entry No. 24. Therefore this entry No. 24 read with entry No. 23 is a complete topic of legislation by itself which covers not only such a welfare labour measure of insurance for the employees but which carries with it in express terms the power to fix the charge payable by the employers. In this connection the employers liability as we have already mentioned need not be only a fault based liability in the modern statute. In this connection the employers liability as we have already mentioned need not be only a fault based liability in the modern statute. Moreover the employers liability need not be an individual liability under this modern statute but may be a pooled liability so that the resources of all the employers who are liable to pay the charge under the Act are pooled together for providing such a comprehensive insurance scheme for the employees. Mr. K. S. Nanavati however vehemently relied upon the decision in the Second Gift Tax Officer Mangalore at p. 1001 where it is held that our Constitution divides the topics of legislation into three broad categories: (a) entries enabling laws to be made (b) entries enabling taxes to be imposed and (c) entries enabling fees and stamp duties to be collected. Their Lordships there. fore held that it was not intended that every entry gave a right to levy a tax. The taxes were separately mentioned and in fact contained the whole of the power of taxation. Unless a tax was specifically mentioned it could not be imposed except by Parliament which is conferred the residuary power of taxation by reason of Article 248 read with entry No. 97 of the Union List I. These observations were made by Their Lordships in the context of Gift Tax Act which was challenged on the ground that the specific State List List II-entries Nos. 18 and 49 covered this topic. Entry No. 18 was land that is to say rights in or over land tenures etc. and entry No. 49 was taxes on lands and buildings. In that context Their Lordships held that entry 18 of the State List did not confer additional power of taxation. At the most fees could be levied in respect of the items mentioned in that entry when read with entry No. 66 of the State List. Therefore it was considered whether the pith and substance of the Gift Tax Act fell within entry 49 of the State List or under the residuary powers of the Parliament under entry 97 of the Union List. The pith and substance of the Gift Tax Act was not to tax lands and buildings as such but it was a tax levied upon a particular use which was transmission of title by gift. The pith and substance of the Gift Tax Act was not to tax lands and buildings as such but it was a tax levied upon a particular use which was transmission of title by gift. The value of the lands and buildings was only the measure of the value of the gift. A gift tax was thus not a tax on lands and buildings as such resting upon general ownership of lands and buildings but was a levy upon a particular use. Therefore entry 49 which contemplated a tax directly levied by reason of the general ownership of lands and buildings could not include the gift tax as levied by Parliament. In this context the observations in the State of Mysore v. M/s. D. Cawasji 1970 (2) Supreme Court Cases 710 at p. 714 were relied upon where it was held that Legislative power normally included all incidental and subsidiary power but the power to tax was neither incidental nor subsidiary to the power to legislate on a matter or topic. Their Lordships followed their earlier decision in M. P. V. Sundaramier and Co. v. The State of A. P.-A. I. R. 1958 S C 468 and further observed that entries in Lists I and It in Schedule VII dealing with certain specific topics did not grant power to levy tax on transactions relating to those topics. Their Lordships observed that power to tax must be derived from a specific taxing entry. It should be noted that both these decisions deal with the topic of taxing power pure and simple. In the first case it was the power to levy gift tax while in the second it was the power to levy education cess on intoxicating liquors. Therefore both the cases were where Their Lordships were concerned with the power of taxing and it was held that taxing powers should be derived under our Constitution from a specified taxing entry. If the legislation in its true pith and substance is a regulatory labour measure which merely provides for the charge to be recovered from the employer the legislation fairly and squarely falls only under entries 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List. Such a legislation can never be treated as being in pith and substance a taxing measure pure and simple. Such a legislation can never be treated as being in pith and substance a taxing measure pure and simple. ( 6 ) IF we put an interpretation that even such a labour welfare measure involves a tax in the wider sense such taxation is only incidental and subsidiary to the power to legislate on the matter or topics specified in entries 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List and even so far as these entries are concerned for the incidental power there is an express enumeration under the head employers liability. Therefore the Employers Liability Act which is enacted as a labour welfare measure and which provides either for a provident fund workmens compensation invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits such an insurance scheme or other welfare measures by creating a charge on the employers in that connection would be wholly falling within this specific entry. To accept any other interpretation would be to ignore the plain words of this wide entry employers liability and to make them redundant. In fact to look upon such a welfare measure as a taxation measure would be to render these salutary entries 23 and 24 devoid of all utility. It is true that the residuary powers of taxation are with the Parliament because of entry 97 in the Union List List I-but by recourse to that entry alone the Parliament even cannot enact such a labour welfare measure. The taxing entry would enable the Parliament to levy tax but the amount could be spent only if there is a power to enact such a scheme. Therefore even the Parliament would have to resort to entries 23 and 24 in the Concurrent List. When the framers of the Constitution introduced this topic in the Concurrent List they really intended that labour welfare measures could be enacted both by Parliament and by the State Legislatures. If therefore the specified entries 23 and 24 which deal with such labour welfare schemes are interpreted on the assumption that the charge for such welfare scheme could be collected only by resorting to such a tax entry it is obvious that the State Legislatures would have no power to enact any such labour welfare measure because it has no such residuary power of taxation. The State Legislature therefore in its concurrent powers could not enact this measure. The State Legislature therefore in its concurrent powers could not enact this measure. Therefore such an interpretation makes not only the words employers liability in entry 24 redundant; but renders such a concurrent topic devoid of all content and utility. Therefore in the context of such schemes of labour welfare measures which are in substance and effect regulatory measures which provide for a charge to be collected from the employers are in that connection regulatory measures enacted under those entries 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List List III and they could never be considered as an exercise of taxation power so long as the charge is collected from the employers in respect of the cost of such a scheme. ( 7 ) EVEN there is abundant authority for this conclusion which we have arrived at on the first principle alone. In the Division Bench consisting of Their Lordships Bhagwati and N. G. Shelat JJ. in the context of Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act 1953 under which a labour welfare fund was constituted for the financing of activities to promote welfare of labour in the Bombay State and where the employers were required to contribute by making payment of unpaid accumulations the legislative competence was upheld as a labour welfare measure falling under entry 24 of List III. Bhagwati J. (as he then was) in terms held that this legislation could not fall within the residuary taxing power of the Union under entry 97 of the Union List. The Legislature has enacted the legislation for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment of employer by unpaid accumulations standing to the credit of the workers and this Legislation was clearly justified by the doctrine of incidental or ancillary legislation and must be held to be within the legislative competency of the State Legislature under entry 24 of List III. Therefore even the doctrine of incidental or ancillary legislation was invoked under which a charge was collected from the employers by making them pay up the unpaid accumulations which were lying with them. Even without recourse to the express words or entry 24 employers liability His Lordship had held that this was a regulatory welfare measure and not an exercise of taxing power pure and simple which would fall under the residuary entry 97 of the Union List List III. Even without recourse to the express words or entry 24 employers liability His Lordship had held that this was a regulatory welfare measure and not an exercise of taxing power pure and simple which would fall under the residuary entry 97 of the Union List List III. In Viscount Haldane speaking for Their Lordships of the Privy Council in terms pointed out that the primary purpose of the Act was to confer on workmen compensation for personal in jury in course of their employment. Such a statutory condition was introduced by this insurance measure in the contract of employment for the benefit of the workers and the members of his family dependant on him. The compensation was payable by the Board and not by an individual employer and still such a statute where the employer was taxed with an object of establishing an institution to provide insurance benefits for the employees was held to be a regulatory measure falling under sec. 92 under the Provincial List as it regulated the civil duties of the employers who carried on business within the Province. In The the question had arisen in the context of the Employment and Social Insurance Act 1935 which in substance provided for a system of compulsory unemployment insurance throughout Canada. Lord Atkin speaking for the entire Board held that in pith and substance the Act was an insurance Act affecting the civil rights of employers and employed in each Province and was accordingly within the exclusive competence of the Provincial Legislature under sec. 92 entry 13 of the British North America Act 1867 where entry 13 was Property and civil rights in the Province and therefore the Dominion in its taxing power under sec. 91 1 and 3 where it could raise moneys by any form of taxation could not enact this measure as it was falling within the exclusive competence of the Provincial Legislature. At p. 366 Their Lordships did not finally decide whether the levy of such a contribution was in fact taxation. Their Lordships only observed :- It might seem difficult to discern how it differs from a from of compulsory insurance or what the difference is between a statutory obligation to pay insurance premiums to the State or to an insurance company. Their Lordships only observed :- It might seem difficult to discern how it differs from a from of compulsory insurance or what the difference is between a statutory obligation to pay insurance premiums to the State or to an insurance company. Their Lordships also observed that But assuming that the Dominion has collected by means of taxation a fund it by no means follows that any legislation which disposes of it is necessarily within Dominion competence. Therefore. this high authority makes it clear that such an insurance measure under which a charge is collected from the employers for the insurance premium is not a taxation measure pure and simple but entirely a labour welfare measure regulating the relation between the employers and the employees which wholly falls within such a topic of legislation of labour welfare including employers liability. In Edvev 28 Law. Ed. 798 at p. 803 Justice Miller had examined this problem in the context of immigration measure whose title was An Act to Regulate immigration (p. 803) as that was its purpose and effect and all its provisions from the beginning to end related to the subject of immigration and they were aptly designed to mitigate the evils inherent in the business of bringing foreigners to that country as those evils affected both the immigrant and the people among whom he was suddenly brought and left to his own resources. Under that Act of the Congress in order to regulate immigration a duty of fifty cents for every such passenger who was not citizen of the U. S. A. was imposed on the owners of steam ships or sailing vessels who brought such passengers from a foreign port into a port of the United States. The validity of this duty was challenged on the ground whether it was a valid exercise of the regulatory power or was a taxing power which must be uniformly exercised under sec. 8 of Article 1 of the American Constitution. At p. 803 of the Lawyers Edition Their Lordships observed that. it was true that not much was said about protecting the ship owner. But he was the man who reaped the profit from the transaction who had the means to protect himself and knew well how to do it and whose obligations in the premises need the aid of the statute for their enforcement. it was true that not much was said about protecting the ship owner. But he was the man who reaped the profit from the transaction who had the means to protect himself and knew well how to do it and whose obligations in the premises need the aid of the statute for their enforcement. In that context the sum demanded of him was not therefore strictly speaking a tax or duty within the meaning of the Constitution. The money thus raised though paid into the Treasury was appropriated in advance to the uses of the statute and did not go to the general support of the Government. It constituted a fund raised from those who were engaged in the transportation of these passengers and who made profit out of it for the temporary care of the passengers whom they bring among us and for the protection of the citizens among whom they were landed. Their Lordships further observed that if this was an expedient regulation of commerce by Congress and the end to be attained was one falling within that power the Act was not void because within a loose and more extended sense than was used in the Constitution it was called a tax. Their Lordships gave various illustrations from other decisions where such levies were not held to be an exercise of ordinary taxation power pure and simple. It was therefore held that in the exercise of its power to regulate immigration and in the very act of exercising that power it was competent for Congress to impose this contribution on the ship owner engaged in that business. Even our Supreme Court had taken the same view on a similar legislation in the context of the land development scheme. In the vires of Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 was challenged on the ground of want of legislative competence. At p. 1381 Their Lordships pointed out that entry 18 in List II which dealt with land in its various aspects could be relied upon to support this measure. Their Lordships also relied upon entry 20 of List III which was as follows :20 Economic and social planning. At p. 1381 Their Lordships pointed out that entry 18 in List II which dealt with land in its various aspects could be relied upon to support this measure. Their Lordships also relied upon entry 20 of List III which was as follows :20 Economic and social planning. AT p. 1384 Their Lordships answered the question raised by the petitioner as to whether the amount collected or demanded by way of contribution to such a planning scheme of land development was really a tax or fee at any rate which also the local authority had no right to ask for. Their Lordships answer was that the matter would have to be approached in an entirely different manner. The amount that the petitioners had been asked to contribute was only towards the cost of the scheme which had to be incurred by the local authority. As to how exactly that contribution was to be worked out and the proportion in which the plots were to bear that burden had all been indicated in the Act. Therefore the liability of the petitioners to pay contribution had to be upheld once Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the Act as a whole would have to be sustained under those two entries 18 and 20. Therefore it is well settled by all these authorities that where a planning scheme makes a provision for a contributory charge from persons who ultimately profit from the scheme by depriving them of any unearned increment such measures are not being looked upon as a taxation measure pure and simple. The scheme is an integrated scheme should not be dissected into parts to judge the legislative competence. If the scheme as a whole or in its pith and substance falls under the legislative competence merely because it provides for contributions being levied it could never be tested in the light of taxation power or whether it was a service charge which was a fee pure and simple which would require co-relation being established in the form of quid pro quo. ( 8 ) MR. K. S. Nanavati had in this context vehemently relied upon the case of the Indian Mica and Micanite Industries v. State of Bihar A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1182 where Their Lordships distinguished the various features of a tax and a fee. ( 8 ) MR. K. S. Nanavati had in this context vehemently relied upon the case of the Indian Mica and Micanite Industries v. State of Bihar A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1182 where Their Lordships distinguished the various features of a tax and a fee. At p. 1184 Their Lordships reiterated their approval to the characteristic of tax as laid down by the High Court of Australia in Matthews where the learned Chief Justice observed:-A tax is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment for services rendered. REITERATING the observations of Mukherjea J. in the earlier decision in the Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 282 Their Lordships pointed out that the essence of taxation was compulsion that is to say it was imposed under statutory power without the tax payers consent and the payment was enforced by law. The second characteristic of tax was that it was an imposition made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. This was expressed by saying that the levy of tax was for the purposes of general revenue which when collected formed part of the public revenues of the State. As the object of a tax was not to confer any special benefit upon any particular individual there was as it was said no element of quid pro quo between the tax payer and the public authority. Another feature of taxation was that as it was a part of the common burden the quantum of imposition upon the tax payer depended generally upon his capacity to pay. Their Lordships then observed that a fee was generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some Governmental agency. The amount of fee levied was supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service though in many cases the costs were arbitrarily assessed. A fee was regarded as a sort of return or consideration for services rendered it was absolutely necessary that the levy of fees should on the face of the legislative pro vision be co-related to the expenses incurred by Government in rendering the service. A fee was regarded as a sort of return or consideration for services rendered it was absolutely necessary that the levy of fees should on the face of the legislative pro vision be co-related to the expenses incurred by Government in rendering the service. From the decision in Ma/want Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 400 and other decisions Their Lordships called out the distinction between a tax and a fee as under:-ALTHOUGH there can be no generic difference between a tax and a fee since both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorities there is this distinction between them that where as a tax is imposed for public purposes and requires no consideration to support it a fee is levied essentially for services rend red and there must be an element of quid pro quo between the person who pays it and the public authority that imposes it. While a tax invariably goes into the consolidated fund a fee is earmarked for the specified services in a fund created for the purpose. Whether a cess is one or the other would naturally depend on the facts of each case. THEIR Lordships ultimately held that the Court would have to determine on a scrutiny of the scheme of the levy if a tax was imposed in the guise of a fee and these were the various tests to determine whether a levy was a fee or a tax. In determining whether a levy was a fee the true test must be whether its primary and essential purpose was to render specific services to a specified area or class it being of no consequence that the State might ultimately and indirectly be benefited by it. Mr. K. S. Nanavati therefore argued that if these tests were to be adopted it was obvious that this charge was a fee pure and simple being a service charge. There fore even in the case of employers who would be ultimately benefited by reasons of savings being made co-relation must be established and unless quid pro quo test was fulfilled this was not a valid levy more so when by a money bill this tax was collected from the employers whose employees were to derive no benefits. While relying on this decision Mr. While relying on this decision Mr. K. S. Nanavati ignores the fact that this is not a case of fee pure and simple which has to satisfy the test of quid pro quo. Even an alternative contention that this was a tax could not have helped him in view of the fact that the residuary taxing power was in any event with the Parliament under entry 97 of the Union List. Besides even if Latham C. J. s test definition had to be applied in the wider sense as a levy consisting of compulsory exaction of money which is imposed by any public authority for public purposes and which is enforceable by law this levy even though it does not go to the consolidated fund would satisfy that test. The States taxing power may be delegated and any delegate like a local authority or public authority which exercised the Governmental functions and for whose revenue the taxing power is delegated when it levies a compulsory exaction of money for its public purpose and when its demand is enforceable as a public debt even by recovery as arrears of land revenue 8 or by other coercive processes it would be taxation in that sense. Latham C. J. however added one more qualification in that definition that a taxing measure pure and simple is not one where the imposition is for payment of services rendered. Therefore the taxation measure as Their Lordships have interpreted is one where not only the other tests of Latham C. J. would be fulfilled but it should not be a payment for services rendered. When the taxation power is exercised there is no question of services being rendered. It is only in a case of a fee that a sort of return for services rendered becomes necessary. This approach of examining the question whether this particular levy from the employers was a tax or Z fee would not be proper as Their Lordships observed in Maneklals care (supra) when the legislative competence of the Act as a whole for such a labour welfare scheme including the employers contribution could be wholly supported under the specific entries 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List List III. We have also indicated that in substance and effect even this levy in this regulatory measure is not a taxation pure and simple but a service charge from persons who ultimately benefit by this scheme and where co-relation is not to be established as it is not a fee pure and simple. In fact there is no exercise of taxing power at all in this statute and what is sought to be exercised is a purely regulatory power to regulate the relations of employers and employees in a comprehensive labour welfare measure. Mr. K. S. Nanavati in this connection relied upon Dutta J. s observations in K. C. Sharma v. Regional Director E. S. I. Corp. A. I. R. 1962 Assam 120. We may point out that Mehrotra C. J. had in terms held at p. 124 with which view we are in complete agreement that it was not material whether the imposition was a tax or a fee. If the provisions of Chapter V-A had been validly enacted in as much as the Legislature had competence to enact the said law and if the provisions are not hit by any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution whether the imposition was in the nature of a fee or tax it could be realised from the employers. The learned Chief Justice also held that the provisions of sec. 73a did not violate article 14 or 19 of the Constitution as these were not unreasonable restriction. The whole object of the Act was to provide for benefits to employees in case of sickness maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto. In order to work out the scheme it was essential to have a fund and in a welfare State the employers who get profits as a result of the labour of the employees had to contribute towards the maintenance of the health of their employees. It could not therefore be said that the imposition constituted unreasonable restriction on the right of the employers. Dutta J. however went into the question whether it was a tax or a fee and he held that the provisions of the scheme as a whole under which the employers contribution was in the nature of a premium which was paid in a contract of insurance to cover some risk the levy thereof was a service charge. Dutta J. however went into the question whether it was a tax or a fee and he held that the provisions of the scheme as a whole under which the employers contribution was in the nature of a premium which was paid in a contract of insurance to cover some risk the levy thereof was a service charge. The Government could not go on levying employers contribution under sec. 73a of the Act without giving a service in return. But from this it did not follow that the service must be given as soon as the contribution was made. The object of the Act was that the benefits which it provided should become available to the employees in all factories throughout India (except Jammu and Kashmir) as soon as circumstances made it practicable. There were various steps that the Government had to take before such benefits could be given to the employees. All these required time and money and in some areas the time required might be more than in other areas. Chapter V-A was for meeting the needs of the transitory period. In his view therefore the contribution constituted a fee and not a tax as it was clearly a service charge. We would agree with the said observations of Dutta J. only to the extent that even though this is a service charge which is not a taxation measure pure and simple it is not a fee which is to be co-related by establishing quid pro quo. It is a statutory charge which the employers have to pay under an employers liability statute which is validly enacted and which does not involve any exercise of taxing power of the State. In this context we may finally add that it is wholly immaterial that when sec. 73a was introduced the procedure of money bill was adopted to fulfill the requirements of Article 110 of the Constitution. The definition of taxation in Article 366 (28) which includes the imposition of any tax or impost whether general or local or special and under which tax is accordingly to be construed is also subject to the context as the opening words of the definitions in the article indicate. This wide meaning of taxation may be appropriate in the context of Article 110 for treating this as a money bill. This wide meaning of taxation may be appropriate in the context of Article 110 for treating this as a money bill. It may be also appropriate in the context of Article 265 which in our Constitution imposes a bar that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. What we are concerned is whether taxing power pure and simple is exercised or other legislative regulatory power while enacting a particular enactment is exercised. Each constitutional entry will have to be interpreted in the light of the settled principles of interpretation by looking upon the enactment in question as one organic whole without severing its parts. In that view of the matter this particular legislation would be treated as a labour welfare measure and it could never be said to be in exercise of the taxing power which consideration would be wholly inappropriate in the context of such a regulatory welfare measure which regulates the relations of employees and employers under the express legislative head in that connection as laid down in the aforesaid Maneklals case. Mr. K. S. Nanavati had challenged the vires even on the aspect of tax only on the ground that this was a tax on trades professions callings and employments falling under entry 60 of the State List List II. Once it is held that this is not in exercise of taxing power at all this contention is wholly misconceived. Besides entry 60 in List II is a tax on trades professions callings and employments as such. Merely because a charge of a regulatory measure is collected from the employers and employees it could never be said to be a tax on professions trades callings and employments as such. The scope of that entry is very narrow where the tax is levied for carrying on that particular trade or employment and that is why there are constitutional limits for that levy under Article 276 under which it was not to exceed Rs. 250. 00 per annum. Therefore that entry would be wholly inappropriate in the context of such a welfare scheme which requires such a huge fund to defray the cost of its implementation. Therefore there is no substance at all in the first contention raised by Mr. K. S. Nanavati that there was no legislative competence for enacting this labour welfare measure including the provisions of sec. 73a of the Act. Therefore there is no substance at all in the first contention raised by Mr. K. S. Nanavati that there was no legislative competence for enacting this labour welfare measure including the provisions of sec. 73a of the Act. ( 9 ) THE next attack on the ground of violation of fundamental rights would hardly be appropriate once it is realised that this is a reasonable charge which is collected from the employers only to defray the insurance premium so that the employees get ultimately insured when the scheme will get full momentum and will be able to meet the various hazards against which they are to be protected. We are not in those old days when the employers liability was envisaged as a fault based liability arising from tort. We are in the days of labour legislation where all exploitation of the employees is sought to be ended and our country is taking rapid stride to implement the directive principles under the Constitution. In C. B. Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 2042-at p. 2048 Their Lordships pointed out in the context of minimum wages legislation that minimum wage did not mean wage just sufficient for bare substance. At present the conception of a minimum wage is a wage which is somewhat intermediate to a wage which is just sufficient for bare substance and a fair wage. That concept includes not only the wage sufficient to meet the bare substance of an employee and his family. It also includes expenses necessary for his other primary needs such as medical expenses to meet some education for his children and in some cases transport charges etc. Their Lordships pointed out that the concept of minimum wage was likely to undergo a change with the growth of our economy and with the change in the standard of living. It was not a static concept. Its concomitants must necessarily increase with the progress of the society. At p. 2050 Their Lordships gave an answer to the contention that the concern which could not pay the minimum wages would be crippled and the smaller units in the industry would be driven out of the trade. Prima facie the minimum wages fixed did not appear to Their Lordships unreasonable which would adversely affect the industry or even a small unit therein. Prima facie the minimum wages fixed did not appear to Their Lordships unreasonable which would adversely affect the industry or even a small unit therein. Their Lordships gave the pithy answer that if they did then the industry or the unit as the case may bee had no right to exist. Freedom of trade did not mean freedom to exploit. The provisions of the Constitution were not erected as the barriers to progress. They provided a plan for orderly progress towards the social order contemplated by the preamble to the Constitution. They did not permit any kind of slavery social economic or political. It was a fallacy to think that under our Constitution there were only rights and no duties. While rights conferred under Part III were fundamental the directives given under Part IV were fundamental in the governance of the country. Their Lordship pointed out that we see no conflict on the whole between the provisions contained in Part III and Part IV. They are complimentary and supplementary to each other. The provisions of Part IV enable the Legislature and the Government to impose various duties on the citizens. The provisions therein are deliberately made elastic because the duties be imposed on the citizens depend on the extent to which the directive principles are implemented. In that context Their Lordships pointed out that the mandate of the Constitution was to build a welfare society in which justice social economic and political should inform all institutions of our national life. The hop es and aspirations aroused by the Constitution would be belied if the minimum needs of the lowest of our citizens were not met. Just as the minimum wage legislation has become a must in a welfare society similar minimum condition legislations are also a must in a welfare society. That is how we have progressed by enacting labour laws which now secure minimum conditions to protect health safety and welfare of the employees by enacting adequate safeguards in such factory and other establishment legislation like the Mines Act Plantations Act Shops Act etc. It should be kept in mind that it was along with the Factories Act 1948 that this legislation introducing this social insurance for the benefit of the labour was introduced in the same year. It should be kept in mind that it was along with the Factories Act 1948 that this legislation introducing this social insurance for the benefit of the labour was introduced in the same year. Merely because this welfare measure is not introduced in the Factories Act itself it can never be urged that this is not one of those minimum conditions which has got to be fulfilled for running factories and establishments in this country. In the context of the Factories Act 1948 when it was sought to be extended even to smaller institutions which did not come within the scope of that Act by a notification issued under sec. 85 of the Factories Act where even the concept of deemed workers was created by the Legislature the said provision was upheld by Their Lordships in B. Y. Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 1591. At p. 1597. Their Lordships was at one time regarded as a matter of contract between the employer and the employee and the State was not concerned to impose any duties upon the employers. It was however now recognised that the State had a vital concern in preventing exploitation of labour and in insisting upon proper safeguards for the health and safety of the workers. The Factories Act undoubtedly imposed numerous restrictions upon the employers to secure to the workers adequate safeguards for their health and physical well being. But imposition of such restrictions was not and could not be regarded in the context of the modern outlook on industrial relations as unreasonable. Extension of the benefits of the Factories Act to premises and workers not falling strictly within the purview of the Act was intended to serve the same purpose. By authorising imposition of restrictions for the benefit of workers who in the view of the State stand in need of some or all the protections afforded by the Factories Act but who were not governed by the Act the Legislature was merely seeking to effectuate the object of the Act i. e. it authorised extension of the benefit of the Act to persons to whom the Act to fully effectuate the object should have been but had on account of administrative or other difficulties not been extended. Therefore the vires of this extension was in terms upheld as not violating Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. It should be noted that in the same decision Their Lordships have upheld the extension of the provisions of sec. 79 to such smaller institutions to which the Factories Act did not apply but was extended by a notification under sec. 83 of the Act. Their Lordships observed Therefore by imposing liability to the same extent as is afforded to workers strictly so called under sec. 2 (1) of the Factories Act no unreasonable restriction has been imposed upon the occupier or the owner of the factory. If such a burden which was cast on even such smaller employers irrespective of their paying capacity only because it was necessary for the health safety and welfare of the factory employees it is obvious that this welfare measure which provides this statutory insurance for the employees at such a token cost by the employers must be equally upheld as a reasonable restriction. If the employers liability concept is no longer a fault based but has become more and more absolute he is not the insurer of the workers only so far as the safety in the premises or as regards the machinery and tools is concerned. It would be reasonable in this context and really just to safeguard the worker even against other hazards by reason of which his efficiency is affected and he looses wages. Whatever wages are fixed would be on the basis of his putting in all the working days of the month. When he falls sick or she has to avail of the maternity leave the worker cannot work and there is a real loss of wage. Similarly there is employment injury hazard. Besides attending to his health would go a long way to add to his efficiency. The only other benefit is the dependents benefit and to some extent a funeral benefit which is to be given only in case of death. Therefore all these provisions are the bare minimum which are envisaged and have been enacted at the same time as the Factories Act 1948 Whatever Mr. The only other benefit is the dependents benefit and to some extent a funeral benefit which is to be given only in case of death. Therefore all these provisions are the bare minimum which are envisaged and have been enacted at the same time as the Factories Act 1948 Whatever Mr. K. S. Nanavati says the burden of this 3/4 per cent contribution of the total wage bill really comes to only 2 or 3 days wages which an employer can hardly complain as ultimately he has to reap the benefits of this salutary measure. Therefore prima facie there is nothing unreasonable in this impost so as to invoke the guarantee of Article 14 or Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution especially in the context of such a labour welfare measure which is enacted under the directive principles of State policy under Articles 39 (e) 41 42 and 43. As we have already pointed out in a welfare State where justice prevails it would be an unjust principle to enable an employer to keep to himself an unearned increment to which he has not contributed which would have been the case if the insurance scheme were to be financed by the State from the public finance. The underlying feature of the welfare State is that individual interest would be sublimated to serve the organic whole and if the employer view from that perspective they could never challenge the measure as in any manner arbitrary unjust and unreasonable. ( 10 ) BESIDES the Legislature has laid down the various guidelines so that the burden is made reasonable. Even in this transitory provision under sec. 73a the Legislature has provided that the rate of special contribution shall not exceed five per cent of the total wage bill of the employer as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify from time to time. Before this percentage is fixed or varied the Central Government has to issue a notification of its intention so to do by giving two months period so that the employers can send their objections which would be considered by this high authority which is the Central Government itself. The second proviso to sec. Before this percentage is fixed or varied the Central Government has to issue a notification of its intention so to do by giving two months period so that the employers can send their objections which would be considered by this high authority which is the Central Government itself. The second proviso to sec. 73a also provides that the rate of special contribution where both the Chapters are in force shall be fixed at a rate higher than that in the case of factories or establishments situate in 3 area in which the provisions of the said Chapters are not in force. This is also a temporary provision as stated in sec. 73-I. Besides sec. 73f enables the Central Government to give exemption even in respect of the employers special contribution It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act the Central Government may having regard to the size or location of or the nature of industries carried on in any factory or establishment or class of factories or establishments exempt the factory or establishment or class of factories or establishments from the payment of the employers special contribution under this Chapter and nothing contained in secs. 87 to 91 inclusive shall be deemed to authorise any State Government to grant any such exemption. In fact there are such exemptions granted as is the case of these three petitioners themselves. Therefore there is no arbitrary power but a properly canalised power with proper safeguards and the scheme provides a token rate for giving insurance benefits to the employees. The charge in this connection is statutorily fixed and even the maximum is laid down. Therefore in that context the entire attack on this Chapter of legislation under Articles 14 and 19 is wholly misconceived. ( 11 ) MR. K. S. Nanavati no doubt vehemently relied upon the decision in Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 578. The question there was regarding fair wage which was a mean between the living wage and the minimum wage. ( 11 ) MR. K. S. Nanavati no doubt vehemently relied upon the decision in Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 578. The question there was regarding fair wage which was a mean between the living wage and the minimum wage. In that context Their Lordships had observed at p. 603 that whereas the bare minimum or subsistence wage would have to be fixed irrespective of the capacity of the industry to pay the minimum wage thus contemplated postulated the capacity of the industry to pay and no fixation of wages which ignored this essential factor of the capacity of the industry to pay could ever be supported. It should be noted that the concept of our present legislation unlike the Minimum Wages Act is that of a minimum establishment condition for the purpose of safeguarding the health and welfare of the employees. In such matters the employers liability is becoming absolute in the modern context and therefore so long as the charge imposed on him under such an employers liability statute is a reasonable charge and which really is a service charge because of the fact that ultimately the employer himself would derive the corresponding benefit from the scheme the question cannot be examined from the aspect of each individual employers paying capacity. The Implementation of the Act is left to the nigh authority like the Central Government or the State Government where it is the appropriate Government. The question of exemption is also left only to the discretion of the high authority like the Central Government under sec. 73f where appropriate exemption can be given looking to the size or location of or the nature of industries carried on in any factory or establishment or class of factories or establishments. The exemption is not only to a class but can be availed of by a single factory. Looking to all these safeguards it is impossible to uphold the attack in this case on the ground of Articles 14 and 19 in any event. Therefore the second question raised in this context by Mr. K. S. Nanavati must also fail. lt. ( 12 ) COMING to the last question as to the vires of sec. 73d which makes the employers special contribution recoverable as an arrear of land revenue the attack on the score of Article 14 is wholly misconceived. Therefore the second question raised in this context by Mr. K. S. Nanavati must also fail. lt. ( 12 ) COMING to the last question as to the vires of sec. 73d which makes the employers special contribution recoverable as an arrear of land revenue the attack on the score of Article 14 is wholly misconceived. As pointed out in the minority decision in N I. Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1581 at p. 1589 it was settled by the previous decisions that the Revenue Recovery Acts and other Acts creating special tribunals and procedure for the expeditious recovery of revenue and State dues were in the public interest and did not violate Article 14. His Lordship Bachawat J. referred to a formidable list of authorities in this connection. Even in the aforesaid Express Newspapers case A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 578 at p. 632 Their Lordships had upheld the attack on sec. 17 on the score of Article 14 where it provided recovery as an arrear of land revenue. Mr. K. S. Nanavati however vehemently argued relying on the ratio of majority decision that the authority having two remedies under which it can pick and choose there has been a violation of the guarantee envisaged under Article 14. It is welt settled by the majority decision that the guarantee of Article 14 is violated where a public authority has an arbitrary and unguarded power to pick and choose which of the powers should be resorted to. It is equally well settled in the decision in State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 634-where there are no two competing powers in the field the authority has only one single power or where his discretion is not an arbitrary unguarded discretion but a canalised discretion as per the norms of the statute the said guarantee of Article 14 is not violated. In the decision Their Lordships have referred to the salutary principles in (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426 that when power is given under a statute to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. In the present case it is this later decision which would be clearly applicable. In the decision Their Lordships have referred to the salutary principles in (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426 that when power is given under a statute to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. In the present case it is this later decision which would be clearly applicable. So far as the Corporation which is of course a public authority would be the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution in view of the fact that it is a revenue producing public authority performing the governmental functions and which has a power of recovery under sec. 73d as a public debt has only one power under the Act. Chapter V-A is a self-contained Chapter which not only created a liability for special contribution under sec. 73a but it enacts its own remedy for collection of special contribution as an arrear of land revenue under sec. 73d of that very Chapter. What Mr. K. S. Nanavati relied on is the provision enacted in sec. 73b which is really for the benefit of the employer in that if he wants to have any adjudication even after the determination of his liability by the Corporation he can resort to the procedure therein prescribed by asking the authority appointed in that behalf to decide the dispute. That itself would show that this is not a power to be exercised by the Corporation The Corporation itself would be a litigant if it wants to go for adjudication of the dispute. Sec. 73b is not at all a provision which empowers the Corporation to recover anything. On the contrary it provides a machinery for adjudication and the adjudicating authority instead of deciding in favour of the Corporation may equally reject its claim. Therefore instead of its being a machinery which is an empowering one this adjudicating machinery is really one which operates as a quasi judicial tribunal to adjudicate disputes between these two rival parties where the Corporation is also one of the dispute. The only power which the Corporation has under the statute to recover this special contribution is only under sec. 73d. Therefore this is a case of one power and there are no two competing powers in the field. The only power which the Corporation has under the statute to recover this special contribution is only under sec. 73d. Therefore this is a case of one power and there are no two competing powers in the field. Besides even this power of recovery as an arrear of land revenue is laid down with restrictions and is not an arbitrary uncanalised power as assumed by Mr. K. S. Nanavati. Under sec. 73a the Corporation has to determine the amount of the contribution and for that purpose it has been conferred power under sec. 73e to require the principal or immediate employer or any other person to furnish such information or returns to such authority. in such form and within such time as may be specified in the order. Such a determination would be a quasi judicial determination even though the Corporation is made a Judge in its own case. As pointed out by Their Lordships in P. L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1507 at p. 1510 The principles distinguishing a quasijudicial function from one which is ministerial were more precisely set out by Das J. (as he then was) in the Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani 1950 S. C. R. 621 at p. 725 (A. I. R. 1950 S. C. 222 at p. 260 ). He observed (1) where there is a lis there is prima facie in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasijudicial act; and (2) even if there is no lis inter parties and the contest between the party proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. Further proceeding Their Lordships observed The inference whether the authority acting under a statute where it is silent has the duty to act judicially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected the manner of the disposal provided the objective criterion if any to be adopted the effect on the decision on the person affected and other indicia afforded by the statute. At p. 1511 Their Lordships laid down the aforesaid 5 factors which must be taken into account to judge whether such an authority acting in its own cause and which under a statute is made a Judge would have a duty to act judicially or not. When a third party decides a lis between two contending rival parties it has obviously to act judicially. It is only when a person is made a Judge in his own cause that something however would have to be bound into the statute by applying these five factors to see whether it has a duty to act judicially. In the present case the very fact that the authority is made a judge in its own cause and is conferred the wide powers to decide the liability of the opposing party which involves civil consequences and as a result of which liability being determined he would be subjected both to penal consequences and to recovery as arrear of land revenue would clearly imply a duty to make a quasijudicial determination. Of course it could never be a duty to act as a full Court but only after following the elementary principles of giving the person an opportunity to make a representation in that behalf before the liability is determined in this context. Therefore sec. 73a clearly provides a safeguard that the liability shall be determined by the Corporation quasijudicially as to the amount payable by the employer as a special contribution. Even if the employer is dissatisfied a further machinery is provided under sec. 73b as the employer has a right to apply to the authority appointed as a tribunal to adjudicate that dispute. Therefore the power which is conferred for recovering the special contribution as the revenue recovery as a debt under sec. 73d is the only power created to be availed of by the Corporation and which is hedged by the various safeguards under the Act. Therefore this is not a case of any arbitrary exercise of power but a case of a single power which is hedged down with so many restrictions. Therefore the attack under Article 14 is wholly misconceived. 73d is the only power created to be availed of by the Corporation and which is hedged by the various safeguards under the Act. Therefore this is not a case of any arbitrary exercise of power but a case of a single power which is hedged down with so many restrictions. Therefore the attack under Article 14 is wholly misconceived. 12 Equally the attack under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) must fail when we keep in mind the aforesaid scheme under which the Corporation has to determine the amount acting in a quasijudicial manner and when corrective machinery is provided by getting final adjudication from the special tribunal under sec. 73b. Therefore the whole attack of Mr. K. S. Nanavati on the ground that there is no assessment machinery or that there is no corrective machinery is wholly mis conceived. Mr. K. S. Nanavati had in this connection vehemently relied upon the decision of the Division Bench consisting of our learned Chief Justice and Bakshi J. in Ramanlal Govindram v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. XI G. L. R. 1. There the impugned provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act gave an arbitrary unguided power to the Municipal Commissioner to act at his sweet will for evicting a person. There were no guidelines as to when the Municipal Commissioner could exercise this power. Therefore there being no guidelines for the exercise of this power the provision was held to violate Article 14. It is true that in that context the learned Chief Justice refused to imply any quasijudicial duty on the Municipal Commissioner who was made a judge in his own case and therefore the impugned provision was held to violate Article 19 of the Constitution. After the decision in Jagdish Pandey v. The Chancellor University of Bihar A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 353 at p. 357 it is well settled that the section should be read as far as possible consistently with the principles of natural justice. The Chancellor in that case had to pass an order on the recommendation of the Commission. It was therefore reasonable to hold that the Commission before it made its recommendation would hear the teacher concerned according to principles of natural justice. The Chancellor in that case had to pass an order on the recommendation of the Commission. It was therefore reasonable to hold that the Commission before it made its recommendation would hear the teacher concerned according to principles of natural justice. This to our mind was implicit in the section as Their Lordships observed when it provided that the Commission had to make a recommendation to the Chancellor on which the Chancellor would pass necessary orders against the teacher concerned. If the order was passed by the Chancellor even though on the recommendation of the Commission but without complying with the principles of natural justice the order would be bad and liable to be struck down. Their Lordships observed that they had no difficulty is reading sec. 4 as requiring that the Commission before it made its recommendation must hear the teacher concerned according to principles of natural justice. Reading the section therefore in this way Their Lordships emphasised and that was the only way in which it could be read it could not be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution discriminatory. Therefore it is the settled principle of construction that a statute should be read consistently with the principles of natural justice and should not be struck down if it could be read in that manner. Mr. K. S. Nanavati in this connection also relied upon the decision in Kasturi and Sons v. N. Salivateswaram 1958 S. C. 507 where even though in the earlier decision in Express Newspapers the vires of sec. 17 was upheld it was held that no dues could be recovered by process of land revenue recovery unless they were ascertained dues. There being no power in the authority to make any such determination of a disputed liability it was held that without such determination the dues could not be recovered by that summary procedure. That decision can never apply to the facts of the present case where we hold that the Corporation is conferred a power under sec. 73a to determine the amount due from the employer by way of special contribution in a quasijudicial manner. In fact the provisions of secs. 45a and 45b which are also incorporated in this Chapter V-A by sec. 73a to determine the amount due from the employer by way of special contribution in a quasijudicial manner. In fact the provisions of secs. 45a and 45b which are also incorporated in this Chapter V-A by sec. 73g make it clear that such a determination by the Corporation would be sufficient proof of the claim of the Corporation for the purpose of land revenue recovery. In the present case the Corporation has been given further power in order to enable it to determine the amount required to obtain information and returns under sec. 73e from any principal or immediate employer or any other person. Besides the employer has been given a further remedy if he is dissatisfied to have the dispute adjudicated by a special tribunal under sec. 73b. Therefore in the present case not only the provisions of sec. 73d are not discriminatory or arbitrary but the entire procedure that is laid down is a procedure of quasijudicial assessment of employers liability as the Corporation is under a duty to act judicially in such determination. There is a further safeguard for complete adjudication at the hands of the competent special tribunal who can adjudicate the dispute in this connection when it is raised before the tribunal Mr. K. S. Nanavati however relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2439 of 1966 (General Manager North East Frontier Railway and ors. v. Dinabandhu Chakraborty) where under the Railway Provident Fund Rules 1941 the Controlling Officer was empowered to deduct any amount due under a liability incurred by the subscriber to the Government. Their Lordships held that before any deduction could be made under that rule it must be established that under a liability incurred by subscriber the amount in question was due to the Government. The employee disputed the liability on the ground that he was not responsible for the loss in question. Under the Railway Provident Fund Rules no authority was constituted for deciding any dispute that might arise between the subscriber and the Government as regards any alleged incurring of liability nor as regards its quantum. In that context Their Lordships observed that the only forum in which these disputes could be decided was the Civil Court. Under the Railway Provident Fund Rules no authority was constituted for deciding any dispute that might arise between the subscriber and the Government as regards any alleged incurring of liability nor as regards its quantum. In that context Their Lordships observed that the only forum in which these disputes could be decided was the Civil Court. That is why further proceeding Their Lordships observed that the Government could not be a judge in is own cause in the absence of any statutory provision empowering it to act as such. In the present case we find a specified provision in sec. 73e under which the Corporation is made a judge in its own cause and if we read the statute properly we find that the authority has to act judicially looking go the nature of the power conferred on it. Therefore that decision cannot help Mr. K. S. Nanavati in the present context where the relevant statute empowers the Corporation to make an order determining the amount due by way of special contribution and which under sec. 45b is regarded as proof of the claim for the purpose of recovery as an arrear of hand revenue. Therefore there is no substance in the contention that the recovery procedure under sec. 73d is hit by Article 14 or Article 19. ( 13 ) WE would now mention only the last contention of Mr. K. S. Nanavati which was half heartedly pressed before us on the score of Article 31. Article 31 (1) would be entirely out of question when the aforesaid impose as we have found is levied under the authority of a valid law which is competently enacted. Article 31 (2) also can hardly have any application when there is no question of an expropriator measure so as to amount to acquisition. Besides as taxation in this context would have that wider meaning as envisaged by Articles 286 even clause (5) (b) (i) of Article 31 would be attracted to save such an impost from the challenge under Article 31 (2 ). It is in this context that a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Anand Kumar v. Employees S. I. Corpn A. I. R. 1957 All. 136 considered the question as to the validity of this Act on the score of Article 31 by holding that in that sense this was a tax. It is in this context that a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Anand Kumar v. Employees S. I. Corpn A. I. R. 1957 All. 136 considered the question as to the validity of this Act on the score of Article 31 by holding that in that sense this was a tax. The Division Bench had not considered the other question which we have elaborately considered as to whether such a regulatory measure involves exercise of a taxing power pure and simple in the context of the three legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule. In that view of the matter even the attack on the score of Article 31 must also fail as the aforesaid impost is not shown to be acquisitory or expropriatory one. Any such impost can never be challenged under any of the three Articles 14 19 and 31 so long as it is not found to be confiscatory or extortionate one (Vide Ass. Commr. v. B. and C. Mills A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 169 179 Therefore the whole challenge on the score of legislative competence must fail in all the four petitions. ( 14 ) ON merits we must discharge the rule in the three Special Civil Applications Nos. 645 of 1968 1488 of 1969 and 1489 of 1969. In the first petition of Dhrangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. the challenge completely fails even though Parts IV and V have now come into force with effect from December 28 1969 because only the special contribution has been challenged in that petition. In the other two petitions there was an exemption notification under sec. 73f which has now been cancelled with from May 31 1969 Therefore after that date the Chapter having become applicable the special contribution can be legally recovered from these two factories and their challenge must equally fail. Therefore in these three Petitions we discharge the rule. In the last petition the factory being in the very same area as the other two factories in village Bil being Special Civil Application No. 1487 of 1969 the exemption notification which was issued has through some oversight not been withdrawn at all. If it is not withdrawn it is not open to the Government while the exemption continues to enforce recovery of the special contribution. If it is not withdrawn it is not open to the Government while the exemption continues to enforce recovery of the special contribution. Therefore in that case on admitted facts the rule must be made absolute by quashing the impugned demand notice. Rule is accordingly made absolute in Special Civil Application No. 1487 of 1969. In that petition we also make the consequential order that the amount if any recovered from the petitioner shall be refunded. In all these petitions however we would make no order as to costs. ( 15 ) IN the aforesaid three petitions where the rule is discharged Mr. K. S. Nanavati made an oral request for a certificate being issued for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 (1) (c) and also under Article 132 (1) of the Constitution. As aforesaid these petitions involve the question of interpretation of the Constitution and there are questions of wide public importance and therefore we issue the certificate both under Article 133 (1) (c) and also under 132 (1) of the (Constitution in all these three cases. .