JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, J. - The Appellant has been convicted u/s 302, Indian Penal Code., for having committed murder, by intentionally causing death of his brother, Bada Matal. Majhi of village Joka on 9-1-1967, at 2.30 P.M. and sentenced to R.I. for life. He has been further convicted u/s 307 for attempt to commit murder of another brother of his Kanka. Majhi (p.w. 12), on the same day and at about the same time, at village Digasul, in front of the cowshed of p.w. 3, and sentenced to R.I. for six years, Both these sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. The deceased was killed in front of the house of p.w. 2 in village Joka, while the attempt to commit murder was made in front of the cowshed of p.w. 3 of village Digasul. These two places are separated by about 25 cubits, even though they lie in two different villages, Digasul and Joka, which are adjoining villages intervened only by a road. 3. The prosecution case is this: The Appellant, the deceased, and p.w. 12, are three brothers. They are residents of village Khadipahadi. On the day previous to the date of occurrence, the Appellant drove away his wife from his house. She left the house with her youngest, daughter and went to live with Gurva, leaving two of her children, both sons, with her husband. The reason for this action of the Appellant is not known. On 9.1-1967 the Appellant also left his village with his two sons, and went to village Joka and took shelter in the cowshed of p.w. 3, while leaving the village he also carried his axe with him, which is the murder-weapon (M. O. I) in this case. Hearing that the Appellant had left the village with his two children and axe, and that he was behaving abnormally the deceased, p.w. 12, along with p.w. 8 proceeded to village Joka to get the children back. At -about the time of occurrence, viz., 2.30 P.M. they reached the village Joka, and found the Appellant in the cowshed of p. w 3 and one of his sons on the Pinda of p.w. 3's house. Without any preliminary, p.w. 2 picked up the child from the Pinda to take him home. At -about the time of occurrence, viz., 2.30 P.M. they reached the village Joka, and found the Appellant in the cowshed of p. w 3 and one of his sons on the Pinda of p.w. 3's house. Without any preliminary, p.w. 2 picked up the child from the Pinda to take him home. The Appellant immediately came from behind and gave him a stroke with the Tangi, M.O.I. on the back of his neck, as a result of which he fell down. "Seeing this, the deceased, p.w. 7, p.w. 8, and a few others, who were there, fled away out of fear. The Appellant chased the deceased who, while running, stumbled over a stone and fell down before the house of p.w. 3 of Digasul. The Appellant gave two strokes with the Tangi, M.O.I. on the back of the neck of the deceased causing latter's instantaneous death. Thereafter he retraced to the place where p w. 12 was lying injured, and dealt two more blows on the back of his neck. P. ws. 4 and 5 chased the accused to a distance of 20 to 25 cubits and apprehended him. p.w. 4 snatched away the Tangi from his hands, and the Appellant was tied with ropes as a measure of security and was kept on the Pinda of p.w. 2. P.w.1, the Sarpanch of Joka Grama Panchayat, had on that day came to the Sarpanoh office at village Joka. Coming to learn of this incident, he proceeded to the place of occurrence and found the deceased died in front of the house of p.w. 2, and p.w. 12 lying injured in front of the cowshed of p.w. 3. He took charge of the Tangi ... M.O.I. produced before him by p.w. 4. He sent a written report to the officer-in-charge of Bangirposhi police station. The A.S. 1., p.w. 13, in the absence of the officer in charge, recorded the first information report on the basis of the written report and proceeded to the village of occurrence which he reached at 11.30 A.M. on 10-1-1967. He immediately arrested the accused, seized a blood-stained Dhoti from his person, and also the murder weapon, M.O.I., on production by p.w. 1. He did other pieces of routine investigation, and sent the injured, p.w. 12, to Bangirposhi hospital for treatment. p.w. 14. took over charge of investigation from p.w. 1. He immediately arrested the accused, seized a blood-stained Dhoti from his person, and also the murder weapon, M.O.I., on production by p.w. 1. He did other pieces of routine investigation, and sent the injured, p.w. 12, to Bangirposhi hospital for treatment. p.w. 14. took over charge of investigation from p.w. 1. He held inquest over the deadbody and sent it for postmortem examination which was conducted by p.w. 15 at 11.30 A.M. on 11-1-1967. p.w. 13 made over charge of investigation to the S.I. p.w. 14, who despatched the blood stained articles through the S.D.O. for chemical analysis and serological test. Ultimately, on completion of investigation charge-sheet was submitted against the Appellant. 4. p.w. 9 is the doctor who examined p.w. 12 on 10-1-1967 at 2 P.M. and found, one out injury about 7" ? 1" ? i" extending obliquely from the right angle of Mandible upto left mastoid region) and another out-injury over the back of the neck more deep towards left side. Besides these, he also found two out injuries 2" ? 1" ? ?" over the scapular region. Two of these cut-injuries were grievous in nature, and the other two were simple. The doctor was of the opinion that all the injuries could be caused by a sharp-cutting weapon like, M.O.I. P.w. 15 is conducted the postmortem examination over the dead body of the deceased. He found three out-injuries on the deceased: (1) A cut injury behind the neck 6" ? 2 " ? 2 "; (2) A out injury on the forehead I " ? If', and (3) A out injury on the forehead 1" ? i". On dissection, he found that the vertebrae behind the neck was out and also the spinal chord along with its membranes was out. According to him, all these injuries were possible with M.O.I. 5 The defence plea is one of denial. The Appellant also denies recovery of any bloodstained Dhoti from his person. 6. The entire occurrence took place in broad day light. P.ws. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 12 are the eye-witnesses. Of them, p.ws. 8 and 12 had proceeded from Mouza Khadipada in company of the deceased to fetch the children of the Appellant p.w. 2 is the brother of the Appellant. The group of other eye-witnesses, comprising four persons are from village Digasul which adjoins Joka. They are p.ws. 4, 5, 6 and 7. Of them, p.ws. 8 and 12 had proceeded from Mouza Khadipada in company of the deceased to fetch the children of the Appellant p.w. 2 is the brother of the Appellant. The group of other eye-witnesses, comprising four persons are from village Digasul which adjoins Joka. They are p.ws. 4, 5, 6 and 7. There is no evidence of any enmity between the Appellant or p.w. 12 or the deceased, or with any 'one of the other eye-witnesses to the occurrence. In fact, as the evidence stands, p.w. 12 and the deceased had gone fetch the children of the Appellant being solicitous of their well being. It is also clear from the prosecution evidence that no sort of provocation had been given to the Appellant so as to incite him to violence. It is the evidence of p.ws. 8 and 12 that when they reached the house of p.w. 3, they found the Appellant in the cowshed and one of his sons on the Pinda of p.w. 3's house. p.w. 12 immediately picked up the child intending to take him home. It is then that the Appellant came from his behind and suddenly gave a Tangi blow on his back. The deceased ran away towards the other adjoining village Digasul. He stumbled over a stone before the house of p.w. 3, which is at a distance of 25 cubits from the place where p.w. 12 was assaulted and fell down. Before the deceased could pick himself up, he was dealt two successive blows and died on the spot. Retracing steps, the Appellant came to p.w. 12, and dealt two more blows on him. All the prosecution witnesses have consistently deposed to this prosecution story. Their testimony also finds corroboration from the medical evidence. There is practically no cross-examination of these eye-witnesses on this point to impeach their veracity. No facts or circumstances have been elicited from them to affect their trustworthiness. Barring p.w. 12 who is the brother of the Appellant, and with whom there might be an undisclosed dispute which might have resulted in the Appellant's driving away his wife, and himself leaving his house and thereby breaking up his home, there could be no conceivable refraction between the Appellant and the other eye-witnesses who belong to a different village, Digasul. Even if p.w. 12's testimony is discarded on a Hypothetical ground of having a feud or dispute, there is no ostensible reason for treating the evidence of other eye-witnesses on the same footing. In so far as p.ws. 4 to 7 corroborate p.w. 12, the latter's evidence becomes acceptable. On the basis of the evidence of these eye-witnesses, the conviction for the offences can be sustained. 7. There are also other corroborative circumstances in the case. The first is the Appellant's conduct in fleeing away after assaulting the deceased and p.w. 12. The evidence of p.w. 5 is that the Appellant was chased before he was apprehended and his axe was snatched away from him. The other circumstance is that the Tangi, M.O.I, with which the deceased and p.w. 12 were both assaulted, were found to be stained with human blood. So also the wearing apparel seized from the person of the Appellant has been found to be stained with human blood. The Appellant has offered no explanation for those blood-stains even though confronted with those pieces of circumstantial evidence. He has merely denied such seizures and the findings of the chemical analyst and the serologist. There seizures cannot be disbelieved. A duty, therefore, was cast on the Appellant to give some reasonable explanation for the existence of human blood on the seized articles. These circumstances have, therefore, a great incriminating significance and lend considerable corroboration to the testimony of the eye-witnesses. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has very rightly refrained from concentrating his attack on the oral testimony of the eye-witnesses and these circumstantial evidence on any ground of infirmity. 8. It is clear from a reading of Sections 229 and 300, Indian Penal Code, that what distinguishes these two offences is the presence of a special mens rea which consists of four mental attitudes in the presence of any of which the lesser offence of culpable homicide becomes the greater offence of murder. These four mental attitudes are inherent in Section 300 as distinguishable from murder and culpable homicide, and have been discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala 1966 S.C.D. 959 : AIR 1966 S.C. 1 874 , as follows: The first clause applies if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. An intention to kill or person brings the matter so clearly within the general principle of mens rea as to kill is proved, the offence is murder unless one of the exceptions applies, in which case the offence is reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The second clause applies if there is first the intention to cause bodily harm, and next there is the subjective knowledge that death will be the likely consequence of the intended injury. English Common Law made no clear distinction between intention and recklessness but in our law the foresight of the death must be present. The mental attitude is thus made of two claimants : (a) causing an intentional injury, and (b) which injury the offender has the foresight to know would cause death. For the application of clause three it must first be established that an injury is caused, next, it must be established objectively what the nature of that injury in the ordinary course of nature is. If the injury is found to be sufficient to cause death one test is satisfied. Then it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that very injury and not some other injury and that it was not accidental or unintentional. If this is also held against the offender theoffence of murder is established. The last clause is ordinarily applicable to causes in which there is no intention to kill any one in particular. It comprehends,generally, the commission of imminently dangerous acts which must, in all probability, cause death. In the present case in view of the oral testimony regarding the nature and location of the injuries on vital parts of the body of the deceased, it can safely be held that the Appellant inflicted all the injuries on the deceased intentionally with the clear foresight that such injuries would cause death. Thus, the offence of murder can be said to have been well-established in the case. 9. With regard to the assault on p.w. 12, it can similarly be said as well established from the oral testimony and the medical evidence that the Appellant caused all the injuries on p.w. 12 intentionally with the knowledge that they were likely to cause death. 9. With regard to the assault on p.w. 12, it can similarly be said as well established from the oral testimony and the medical evidence that the Appellant caused all the injuries on p.w. 12 intentionally with the knowledge that they were likely to cause death. The act which was done by the Appellant, in regard to p.w. 12, with the aforesaid intention, and in aforementioned circumstances, if death had been caused to p.w. 12, would have amounted to an offence of murder. Thus, an offence u/s 307 can be said to have been established. 10. The only point which has been seriously urged is a plea of insanity. This plea is founded upon a statement of p.w. 14 that p.w. 12 had told him that: On the next day in the morning the accused was learnt to have left for Joka with his daughter and sons being armed with a Tangi and became semi-mad" and that "since the accused was armed with Tangi and behaving like a madman, I, Gurva Majhi, Naran Majhi, Gaja Majhi, Bad Matal Majhi decided to get back the children. In dealing with insanity a number of principles in this connection have to be borne in mind. They are : (a) Every type of insanity recognised in no legal insanity unless the cognitive faculty of mind is destroyed as a result of unsoundness to such an extent as to render one incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he is doing is wrong or contrary to law. (b) The Court shall presume absence of insanity. (c) The burden of proof of insanity is on the accused though it is not as heavy as it is on the prosecution to prove an offence. (d) Every minor mental aberration is not insanity, and circumstances indicating a mere possibility of legal insanity cannot, however, be sufficient to discharge the onus resting on the accused; (e) To attract the immunity provided in Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, the Court has to consider whether the accused suffered from legal insanity at the time when the offence was committed. In reaching this conclusion the circumstances which proceeded, attended, and followed the crime are relevant considerations; and (f) When a plea of insanity is raised, it is not the duty of the prosecution to establish, affirmatively, that the accused was capable of knowing the nature of the act or of knowing that what he was doing, was either wrong or contrary to law. Every person is presumed to know the law, and the natural consequences of his act. The prosecution in discharging its burden in the face of the plea of insanity has merely to prove the basic fact and rely upon the normal presumptions aforesaid. It is then that the accused is called upon to rebut those presumptions and the inferences in such manner as would go to establish his plea : Vide Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker Vs. State of Gujarat Bhikari v. State of U.P. AIR 1966 S.C. 1 and Jai Lal Vs. Delhi Administration, . 11. In the instant case there is no evidence of any conduct of the Appellant or any other circumstances on record pertaining to the time preceding the occurrence, the time of occurrence, and the time subsequent to the occurrence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the cognitive faculty of the mind of the Appellant had been destroyed to such an extent as to render him incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. Whatever evidence is there, it shows that when he left his village with his children, he was behaving normally with them, and was taking good care of them, and that a few hours before the occurrence he had some conversation with p.w. 3 from which the indication is that the Appellant was talking in a very normal manner and that no aberration of mind was indicated, far less any legal insanity. In our opinion, the plea of insanity urged by learned Counsel for the Appellant cannot be countenanced in view of the evidence on record, and in the context of the legal principles quoted above. There is, thus, no merit in this appeal whioh is, accordingly, dismissed. S. Acharya, J. 12. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed