JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - Defendants are the Appellants against a confirming judgment. 2. Plaintiffs, owners of plot No. 768 filed the suit for a declaration of their prescriptive right of way over 1 decimal and 4 kadis out of 42 decimals in the adjacent plot No. 769. The, passage claimed is described as being 20 kadis in width extending over 80 kadis on the northern side and O kadis on the southern side from east to west. The defence is a denial of the Plaintiffs possessing any such right of way. 3. There is no dispute that plot No. 768 belongs to the Plaintiffs and that the ownership? of plot no 769 rests in the Defendants by virtue of their purchase. It is also not disputed that plot No. 769 intervenes between the Plaintiffs plot No. 768 and the road on the western side. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit declaring that Plaintiffs have acquired a preservative right of passage over plot No. 769 as claimed. The lower appellate Court confirmed the judgment of the trial Court. 5. The main ground of attack levelled by Mr. R.C. Patnaik, learned Counsel for Appellants is that the lower appellate Court?s judgment is not one in accordance with law as it has not applied its mind to the evidence on record, recorded any findings on the points that arise for decision or given any reasons for its agreeing with the trial Court?s judgment. 6. The only material issue framed by the trial Court and which arose for decision was whether Plaintiffs? have acquired a right of way as claimed either by prescription or as an easement of necessity. The lower appellate Court has confirmed the judgment of the trial Court giving the following two reasons: Firstly, it has observed that in The sale deed (Ex. 2), The northern boundary of the land sold by Maguni to Iswar, the latter being the vendor of the Defendants, is described as rasta and this description is ample proof that the passage as claimed by the? Plaintiffs I exists at that spot. Secondly, it has rejected the defence case on the evidence simply observing that ?the learned Munsif has clearly discussed the evidence so as to reject the defence version?. 7. Order XLI Rule 31 CPC provides as to what the judgment of an appellate Court is to contain. Plaintiffs I exists at that spot. Secondly, it has rejected the defence case on the evidence simply observing that ?the learned Munsif has clearly discussed the evidence so as to reject the defence version?. 7. Order XLI Rule 31 CPC provides as to what the judgment of an appellate Court is to contain. Among other things, the judgment of the appellate Court is to contain the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. Normally therefore, an appellate Court in writing out its judgment should set forth the evidence relied upon and must come to its own independent conclusion on a consideration of such evidence. A mere statement in the appellate Court?s judgment? that it is in agreement with the trial Court without referring to or discussing the evidence to come to its own independent finding is not a proper judgment. In the decision reported in Ram Lal v. Dhirendra Nath AIR 1943 P.C. 24 , it was observed: Since findings of fact by the lower appellate Court are to be treated as final they should at least be clear and specific not ambiguous or inferential. A general approval given to the views of the trial Court will not necessarily incorporate an its findings in detail. In the present case, the judgment of the lower appellate Court apart from other infirmities is perfunctory and not in accordance with The requirements of Order XII Rule 31 Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Apart from the perfunctory nature of the judgment written by the lower appellate Court, there are other infirmities in its findings. One of the main reasons why the lower appellate Court found in favour of the Plaintiffs is the description of the northern boundary in Ext. 2 as rasta. It has relied on this fact, to such an extent that it has observed: As already said, even if an the evidence on record is excluded, the only conclusion shall be and that from the recitals in Ex. 2 that the disputed site has been used by the Plaintiffs for over the statutory period, so as to have acquired right of easement there over. In placing so much reliance on the description of the northern boundary given in Ex. 2, the lower appellate Court has failed to consider the recitals in Ex. 2 about the plot which was purported to have been sold thereunder. In placing so much reliance on the description of the northern boundary given in Ex. 2, the lower appellate Court has failed to consider the recitals in Ex. 2 about the plot which was purported to have been sold thereunder. Admittedly, the plot purported to be Bold under Ext. 2 is plot No. 775 and not 769. The point for decision in the present appeal is whether the Plaintiffs have a right of way on a part of plot No. 769. The lower appellate Court for reasons difficult to divine from its judgment seems to be of the view that plot No. 769 has been wrongly noted as 775. Why such an assumption is made is nowhere discussed or mentioned. Learned Counsel for Respondents contend that in view of the averment in paragraph 12 of the written statement, it came to such a conclusion. The averments in paragraph 12 of the written statement do not amount to an unequivocal admission by the Defendants of such an error. Farther, the lower appellate, Court has not also purported to rely on paragraph 12 of the written statement for coming to the aforesaid conclusion. It ought to have considered the averments in paragraph 12 of the written statement and other material, if any, to determine whether the description of plot No. 775 in Ex. 2 is a mistake for plot No. 769. Having not done so, the arbitrary manner in which such assumption has been made cannot be supported. 9. Another serious infirmity in the lower appellate Court?s judgment is that it has not discussed the oral and other documentary evidence to come to a finding whether the necessary elements or acquisition of a prescriptive right of way by the Plaintiffs have been established. In a suit of the present nature it goes without saying that the burden is on the Plaintiffs to prove not only user of the land as a path but such user for a continuous period of twenty years or more openly and as of right. Even if the northern boundary in Ex. 2 is held to refer to the land over which a prescriptive right of way is now claimed, that itself is not sufficient to decree the suit in favour of the Plaintiffs. In addition, the lower appellate Court has to decide about user for the requisite period, continuity of user and the manner of user. 2 is held to refer to the land over which a prescriptive right of way is now claimed, that itself is not sufficient to decree the suit in favour of the Plaintiffs. In addition, the lower appellate Court has to decide about user for the requisite period, continuity of user and the manner of user. None of these aspects has been considered. 10. Lastly, the issue framed by the trial Court seems to suggest that Plaintiffs also made an alternative claim of the right of way as an easement of necessity. The lower appellate Court has not touched this aspect at all. Thus considered from any point of view, the judgment of the lower appellate Court is most superficial and perfunctory and is not in accordance with law. It does not contain consideration of the evidence and determination of the points that arose for decision, and as such, it cannot be maintained. In these circumstances the appeal has to be remanded to the lower appellate Court to come to clear findings on the different points that arise, on a consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, including the description of the northern boundary in Ex. 2 and find out whether the Plaintiffs have proved to have acquired a prescriptive right of way or a right of way as an easement of necessity over a portion of plot No. 769 belonging to the Defendants. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of The lower appellate Court are set aside and the appeal remanded to the lower appellate Court for fresh disposal according to law in the light of the observations made above. Costs of this appeal will abide the final result. Final Result : Allowed