JUDGMENT E.K. Moidu, J. 1. This second appeal is by the 2nd defendant in O. S. No. 100 of 1965 of the Munsiff's Court, Ponnani. The respondent as plaintiff instituted the suit for recovery of money due under a hypothecation bond executed by the 1st defendant to him. The 1st defendant pleaded discharge of the amount due under the bond. That contention was negatived by the Munsiff and granted a decree as prayed for by the sale of the property. The defendants 2 and 3, the 2nd defendant being the husband of the 3rd defendant, were impleaded as persons in possession of the property. The 2nd defendant, however, contended that he was an unnecessary party to the suit and as such he would be entitled to his costs. The Munsiff in decreeing the suit allowed the costs of the 2nd defendant to be paid by the plaintiff respondent. The 1st defendant filed an appeal before the lower appellate court against the decree reiterating his contention that the discharge of the mortgage amount was true. The lower appellate court dismissed the appeal, but in allowing the cross objection which was filed by the respondent plaintiff the court set aside the order awarding costs to the appellant, who is the 2nd defendant. The appellant raises the contention that the cross objection as against the 1st defendant, who was the appellant in the lower appellate court, was incompetent as it was directed by one corespondent against the other, the plaintiff and the defendants 2 and 3 being respondents in the appeal filed by the 1st defendant in the lower appellate court. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that in view of the provisions of O.41 R.22 CPC., the respondent had no right to file a cross objection when the appeal in the lower appellate court related only to a question which involved a dispute between the 1st defendant on one side and the plaintiff on the other, as the 2nd defendant had absolutely no interest in the subject matter of the appeal which was pending in the lower appellate court and as such the lower appellate court was not correct in allowing the cross objection as against the appellant and the order passed in the appeal had to be set aside. 3. The provision of O.41 R.22(1) CPC. 3. The provision of O.41 R.22(1) CPC. reads as follows: "Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree on any of the grounds decided against him in the Court below, but take any cross objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow." 4. The above provision came up for consideration before the courts. The final word on this question was first struck in the judgment of the Madras High Court reported in Vadlamudi Venkateswarlu and another v. Ravipati Ramamma and another, AIR (37) 1950 Mad. 379 (Full Bench). The view expressed in the above decision is as follows: "An objection by a respondent under O.41, R.22 should, as a general rule, be primarily against the appellant. In exceptional cases, it may incidentally be also directed against other respondents. O.41. R.22 does not enable one respondent to prefer objections against another respondent when the objection sought to be taken is one in which the appellants are in no way interested." 5. The principle has been approved by the Supreme Court in Panna Lal v. State of Bombay and others, AIR 1963 SC 1516 . The principle is stated as follows: "O.41 R.22 permits, as a general rule, a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant and it is only in exceptional cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being reopened between the objecting respondent and other respondents, that an objection under O.41 R.22 can be directed against the other respondents. The use of the word ' cross objection" in O.41 R.22 expresses unmistakably the intention of the legislature that the objection has to be directed against the appellant. The use of the word ' cross objection" in O.41 R.22 expresses unmistakably the intention of the legislature that the objection has to be directed against the appellant. That the legislature also wanted to give effect to the view that in exceptional cases an objection can be preferred by a respondent against a corespondent is indicated by the substitution of the word "appellant" in the third paragraph by the words "the party who may be affected by such objection." 6. This court in Raman Pillai Gopala Pillai and others v. Madhavan Pillai and others, AIR 1959 Ker. 235 had also taken the same view. The view is expressed as follows: "As a general rule the right of a respondent to urge cross objections should be limited to his urging them only against the appellant; and it is only by way of exception to that general rule that one respondent may urge cross objections as against other respondents, the exceptions holding good in those cases in which the appeal opens up questions which cannot be disposed completely without matters being allowed to be opened up as between corespondents as in the case where the appellants' interest is inter mixed with that of the respondent." 7. In the instant case, the cost was awarded to the appellant by the Munsiff without any regard for the contentions raised by the 1st defendant against the plaintiff. The dispute was between the plaintiff on one side and the 2nd defendant on the other as regards his impleadment as a party to the suit. The 2nd defendant's contention was accepted by the Munsiff and the plaintiff was directed to pay costs to him. That was a dispute inter se between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant that is a dispute inter se among the corespondents, in appeal. It is, however, contended by the learned counsel of the respondent that the plea set up by the 1st defendant in appeal that he discharged the mortgage debt would enure ultimately to the benefit of defendants 2 and 3 as well and as such the interests of the 2nd defendant was so intermixed with the interests of the 1st defendant, so that the relief to be granted to the 2nd defendant would be the same as the relief to be granted to the appellant in the lower appellate court. This argument appears to be far fetched. This argument appears to be far fetched. The 2nd defendant contended that he was an unnecessary party to the suit. That contention would not, in any way, affect the right of the appellant (1st defendant) so far as the relief he claimed in the appeal was concerned. So, it cannot be said in the circumstances of the case that the cross objection by the respondent against the 2nd defendant is competent. I find, therefore, that the cross objection by the respondent in the lower court appeal should not have been entertained. 8. The above conclusion, however, does not, in any way, entitle the appellant herein to get the order passed in the appeal vacated. O.41 R.33 CPC. is intended to empower the appellate court to make whatever order it thinks fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondent, but also as between a respondent and a respondent. It empowers the appellate court not only to give or refuse to give to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal, but also to give such other relief to the respondent "as the case may require". If there was no impediment in law, the lower appellate court could give the proper relief even among the respondents. My attention has been drawn to the decision reported in The Digambar Parshwanath Jain Mandir v. Valubai w/o. Ravchand Mahta, AIR 1961 Bom. 221 . That arose out of a decree in an original suit in which the decree was passed on compromise between the parties. It was found that the suit was not maintainable on the original side, but only on the small cause side. However, the Trial Court gave a decree on the original side. When it came up before the High Court in appeal, the question was whether the appeal was competent. The Bombay High Court held that the point as to jurisdiction of a court which went to the root of the matter could well be taken even in the highest court of the land because it is the duty of the higher courts to see that none of the subordinate courts exercises jurisdiction which the legislature has not thought fit to confer upon it. That decision has no application to the instant case. That decision has no application to the instant case. The lower appellate court, even if there was no cross objection, could have given relief to the respondent in an appeal preferred by the 1st defendant, whatever relief he would be entitled to by virtue of the provisions of O.41 R.33 CPC. The lower appellate court having exercised its discretion in allowing the relief as required by O.41 R.33 CPC., it cannot be contended that the question as to jurisdiction would arise in this case as a point which goes to the root of the matter. The wide wording of O.41 R.33 was intended to empower the appellate court to make whatever order it thinks fit not only as between the appellant and the respondent, but also as between a respondent and a respondent. The lower appellate court having exercised a jurisdiction vested in it by virtue of O.41 R.33. in the circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that it is not competent to interfere with that order in the second appeal. The appellant stood on the fence until an order adverse to him had been passed without raising his objection in the lower appellate court. Now, having obtained an order against him, he has come up in second appeal. The point as to jurisdiction might not go to the root of the matter in the instant case, but in the circumstances of the case, no jurisdiction arises as the appellate court was competent to pass the appropriate order as required by O.41 R.33. The second appeal is, therefore, not sustainable. 9. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed, however, without costs.