Judgment S.Sarwar Ali, J. 1. Bhagirath Agarwal of Maharashtra obtained a decree against opposite parties 1 to 4 to this application. The decree was transferred to Begusarai and was numbered as M. Execution Case 67 of 1963. In this execution case certain property of judgment-debtor was sold on 23-8-1965. The sale was confirmed on 2-12-1965 and the execution case was dismissed on satisfaction. After obtaining the sale-certificate the decree-holder tried to obtain delivery of possession. There was obstruction to the delivery of possession. Presumably, because of that the decree-holder Bhagirath Agarwal Is said to have sold the property purchased by him in the execution case to the petitioners by a sale-deed dated 28-12-1967. On 10-1-1968 a petition was filed by the petitioners praying for substitution, of the petitioners in place of the original decree-holder. By order dated 8-2-1968 the Court ordered the petitioners to be substituted, subject to affidavit being filed by the Original Decree-Holder. Notices were issued to the original decree-holder in respect of the matter of substitution which was served on 5-7-1968. The petitioners filed a petition praying for delivery of possession against the judgment-debtor. The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the application on the ground that the requirements of the Patna amendment to the proviso of Order 21, Rule 16 have not been fulfilled, inasmuch as affidavit admitting the transfer has not been filed by the transferor decree-holder and as such the application for permission to execute the decree has to be rejected. The court also referred to two Orders 145 and 146 whereby it had directed the petitioners to establish their "locus standi" to the satisfaction of the court. Civil Revision 602 of 1969 and miscellaneous appeal No. 147 of 1969 are directed against this order. On the same day, a later order was passed by which all interim steps taken on behalf of the petitioners as also the petitions filed on their behalf have been rejected. This order was challenged in civil revision 604 of 1969. By order dated 20-3-1969 the Court dismissed the execution case itself in view of the fact that no steps were taken by the original decree-holder. Civil Revision 603 of 1969, is directed against this order. 2. This order was challenged in civil revision 604 of 1969. By order dated 20-3-1969 the Court dismissed the execution case itself in view of the fact that no steps were taken by the original decree-holder. Civil Revision 603 of 1969, is directed against this order. 2. The learned Advocate General appearing for the petitioners raised the following points: (1) The petitioners having purchased the property from the decree-holder-auction-purchaser were not transferees of the decrees and as such the court below had erred in law in requiring the petitioners to file an affidavit as contemplated under Order 21, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Patna Amendment thereof. (2) Sec.146 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable even to cases where Order 21. Rule 16. Code of Civil Procedure applied, specially where it is the property purchased by the decree-holder which is subject-matter of transfer, and as an incidence of the transfer the transferee has a right to possession in respect of the transferred property. (3) The Patna Amendment to the first proviso of Order 21. Rule 16, In so far as it requires an affidavit of the transferor admitting the transfer to be filed, is ultra vires of Sec.146 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. (3) The Patna Amendment to the first proviso of Order 21. Rule 16, In so far as it requires an affidavit of the transferor admitting the transfer to be filed, is ultra vires of Sec.146 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Order 21, Rule 16 as amended by the Patna High Court may first be quoted : "Where a decree or, if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons, the interest of any decree-holder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it or the Court to which the decree has been sent for execution as the case may be; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree-holder: Provided that, where the decree, or such interest as aforesaid, has been transferred by assignment, notice of such application shall be given to the transferor and unless an affidavit of the transferor admitting the transfer is filed with the application the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard his objection (if any) to its execution: Provided also that, where a decree for the payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one, of them it shall not be executed against the others." For the purpose of the present case the Important words in the Rule are "where a decree or, if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons, the interest of any decree-holder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law ........." It would, therefore, be necessary to see whether the instant case is a case where there was a transfer of the decree by the original decree-holder in favour of the petitioners. If it was Rule 16 would be squarely applicable. But in my opinion on the facts already stated it cannot be said that there was a transfer of the decree in this case. If it was Rule 16 would be squarely applicable. But in my opinion on the facts already stated it cannot be said that there was a transfer of the decree in this case. The undisputed facts show that the decree was executed and satisfied by the sale of the property of the judgment-debtor and the transfer in favour of the petitioners was not that of the decree but was of the property purchased by the original decree-holder at the auction sale. In such a situation Order 21. Rule 16 cannot have application to the transfer in question. The next question for consideration is whether a party who purchases from the original decree-holder the property which has been purchased by him (original decree-holder) at the auction sale, can avail of the summary remedy of obtaining possession as contemplated in Order 21. Rules 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Reference In this connection may be made to three cases relied upon by the learned Advocate General. They have Tribeni Fd. Singh V/s. Ramasray Pd. Chaudharl, AIR 1931 Pat 241; Ramnath Modi V/s. Anardei Devi, AIR 1964 Pat 311 and Jugal Kishore Saraf V/s. Rao Cotton Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 376 . But before dealing with these cases and finally answering the question posed. Sec.146 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be quoted : "Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claim-tog under him." In Jugal Kishores case, S. B. Das. J. observed: "Either the respondent company are transferee of the decree by an assignment in writing or by operation of law, in which case they fall within Order 21, Rule 16, or they are not such transferees, in which event they may avail themselves of the provisions of Sec.146 if the other condition is fulfilled. J. observed: "Either the respondent company are transferee of the decree by an assignment in writing or by operation of law, in which case they fall within Order 21, Rule 16, or they are not such transferees, in which event they may avail themselves of the provisions of Sec.146 if the other condition is fulfilled. There is nothing in Order 21, Rule 16 which expressly or by necessary implication, precludes a person, who claims to be entitled to the benefit of a decree under the decree-holder but does not answer the description of being the transferee of that decree by assignment in writing or by operation of law, from making an application which the person from whom he claims could have made." These observations are clear authority for the proposition that where a person is not a transferee covered by Order 21, Rule 16 he will be entitled to avail of the provision of Sec.146, if other conditions of the section are fulfilled by him. In Ramnaths case, Ramratna Singh, J. held that when a person becomes entitled to the benefit of a decree not by virtue of a transfer of a decree for assignment in writing but by virtue of transfer of the property which is subject-matter of the decree in his favour he is entitled to execute the decree by virtue of Sec.146 of the Code. In Tribeni Pd. Singhs case this Court held :- - "Thus the right of the purchaser arises only after decree Ss satisfied. In asking for possession he does not ask for or raise any question relating to the satisfaction of the decree. His success or failure in obtaining possession does not affect in the least degree the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. So long as the sale remains good the decree will be deemed to have been satisfied whether the purchaser gets possession of the property or not or whether the decree-holder withdraws the sale proceeds from the Court or obtains a set off or not." It was further observed in the case: "Now, Rules 95 and 96, Order 21 provide a summary remedy for the purchaser to obtain possession from the Court that sold the property to him, and the subsequent Rules 97 to 103 deal with resistance offered to the delivery of possession to him. A private vendor is bound to give possession after the transaction of the sale is completed. Recognizing this principle the rules give to the Court that seized the property and sold it power to deliver possession of the property to the purchaser after the sale is completed and confirmed and a sale certificate is granted. Consequently these rules have been placed in the chapter relating to execution of decrees and orders "for the sake of convenience and it by no means shows that delivery of possession should be regarded as raising a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree under Sec. 47 of the Code, so as to bar a separate suit for possession. It is noticeable that in order to obtain possession by means of a summary procedure under the aforesaid rules, an application has to be made and an order obtained for delivery of possession. It is in pursuance of this fresh order that possession is delivered, and not in the course or continuation of the execution of the decree which terminated with the sale of the property; whereas, under Rule 35 possession is delivered in the course of execution of the decree which directs the delivery of a specific property." In view of these authorities there can be no doubt that in the circumstances of the present case the petitioners, if they can establish that they are purchasers of the property sold in the auction sale, can avail themselves of the provision of Sec.146 of the Code and also avail of the summary remedy provided in Order 21, Rule 95 or 96 (as the case may be). 5 Mr. Jugal Kishore Pd. when confronted with the authorities mentioned above could not assail the first proposition of law urged by the learned Advocate General as discussed above. He, however, contended that he would support the order under revision on the ground that the court was entitled to require the petitioners to file affidavit of the alleged transferor in view of the special circumstances of the case. He referred to Orders 145 and 146 of the Court below. He submitted that in this case the deed of transfer was not executed by the original decree-holder himself but by some one holding power of attorney on his behalf. He referred to Orders 145 and 146 of the Court below. He submitted that in this case the deed of transfer was not executed by the original decree-holder himself but by some one holding power of attorney on his behalf. In this situation, he submitted, the court was entitled to ask the petitioners to establish their right to the property by requiring the original decree-holder to file an affidavit. In my opinion the order dated 7-3-1969 which is the impugned order in civil revision 602 of 1969 and miscellaneous appeal No. 147 of 1969 is not on the basis suggested by the learned counsel for the opposite party. Although there is reference to Orders 145 and 146 in the order dated 7-3-1969, but reading the order as a whole it is clear that the learned Subordinate Judge was requiring the affidavit on the basis of the applicability of Order 21, Rule 16. I have already held that Order 21, Rule 16 is not applicable to the instant case. The learned Subordinate Judge was, therefore, not right in Insisting on the filing of the affidavit on the basis of the applicability of Order 21, Rule 16 of the Code. I would observe that although the learned Subordinate Judge was perfectly entitled to require the petitioners to establish what he termed as their "locus standi" he was not entitled to require a specified or defined mode of proof in respect thereof. In other words it would not be right for learned Subordinate Judge to hold that the only way in which he would be satisfied about the "locus standi" of the petitioners would be if the petitioners file the affidavit of the original decree-holder. Examined from this point of view also the order of the learned Subordinate Judge suffers from, material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. 6. I would, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 7-3-1969, which is under challenge in civil revision 602 of 1969 and miscellaneous appeal No. 147 of 1969 and allow the application and the appeal, without determining whether a revision or an appeal lies against the impugned order. 6. I would, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 7-3-1969, which is under challenge in civil revision 602 of 1969 and miscellaneous appeal No. 147 of 1969 and allow the application and the appeal, without determining whether a revision or an appeal lies against the impugned order. I would, however, make it clear that the learned Subordinate Judge would be entitled to require the petitioners to prove that they have a right to take further steps for the delivery of possession of the auction sold property in accordance with law, making this, however, further clear that he cannot restrict the mode of proof in a particular way. 7. There cannot be any doubt that if the order dated 7-3-1969 is set aside by subsequent orders which are dependent on the aforesaid order or follow as the natural corollary to the order aforesaid must automatically fall and need not be set aside specifically. Since, however, the order dated 20-3-1969 is also under-challenge this order also automatically falls and civil revision 603 of 1969 will have to be allowed, 8. So far as civil revision 604 of 1969 is concerned it was dismissed for non-compliance of certain orders of this Court. An application for restoration has been filed in this application. The learned Advocate General submits that it is not necessary to proceed with this matter if his contentions regarding Civil Revision 602 of 1969 are accepted. In my view he is right in his submission. The Advocate General, therefore, does not propose to proceed with the restoration matter in civil revision 604 of 1969. 9. In the result civil revision 602 of 1969, miscellaneous appeal 147 of 1969 and civil revision 603 of 1969 are allowed subject to the observations made above, but there will be no order as to costs.