JUDGMENT : 1. - This is a defendant-tenant's second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment. 2. The plaintiff's can was that the defendant had not paid rent for the shop leased out to him by the plaintiff for a period of more than six months. He has further alleged that the shop was required for his bona fide and reasonable personal necessity. The defendant pleaded inter alia that he was not a defaulter inasmuch as he used to remit the monthly rent by money orders but the plaintiff refused to accept the same. He also pleaded that the notice of ejectment served by the plaintiff was not valid. The Munsiff, Baran by his judgment dated 20.9.1968 dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 3. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff the plaintiff filed appeal and the learned Additional District Judge, Baran by his judgment dated 14.12.70 reversed the judgment and decree by the trial court and decreed the plaintiff's suit. Consequently, the defendant has filed this second appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the first appellate court was not correct in striking out the defence of the defendant under section 13(6) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. It is urged that the plaintiff had not taken this Plea before the trial court and will therefore be deemed to have abandoned it. He has further argued that even if this point is decided against the appellant yet it was hot open to the lower court to have decreed the suit for ejectment without giving a finding that one of the conditions laid down in section 13(l) (a to k) was satisfied. 5. So far as the first point regarding striking out the defence is concerned it is not disputed that there was failure on the part of the defendant in depositing month by month rent during the pendency of the suit It is also not disputed that on account of non-compliance with the provisions of 13(4) the defence of the defendant was liable to be struck out under section 13(6) of the Act. All that is contended in this connection is that since the defendant did not raise the objection before the trial court, he cannot rely upon it subsequently, as he will be deemed to have waived it. All that is contended in this connection is that since the defendant did not raise the objection before the trial court, he cannot rely upon it subsequently, as he will be deemed to have waived it. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Lachhomal v. Shri Radhey Shyam, 1971 R.C.J. 340. This case decided by the Supreme Court is, in my opinion, completely distinguishable. So far as the point raised in the case in hand is concerned, it is completely covered by my judgment, Judhraj v. Suleman, 1970 R.L.W. 170. and I do not see any reason for revising my decision. Consequently, I over-rule the first contention raised by the learned counsel. 6. Coming to the next contention that in spite of the defence having been struck out it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiff to have proved that the tenant had neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months it may be observed that the plaintiff has examined himself and has stated that the rent of the premises in question had not been paid to him for more than six months, and that the defendant had neither offered nor remitted by money order the arrears of rent. The evidence produced by the defendant in this connection cannot be looked into as his defence under the Act has been struck out. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that all the evidence produced by the defendant upto the stage the defence of the defendant was struck out should be taken into consideration. I find myself unable to accept this contention. The defence of the defendant having been struck out he is not entitled to ask the Court to look into the evidence examined by him. Consequently, in absence of any rebuttal the plaintiff s statement must be accepted with the result that there is no escape from the conclusion that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent as contemplated by section 13(l)(a) of the Act. 7. Apart from that I am not prepared to subscribe to the view as at present advised that inspite of the defence of the defendant having been struck out the plaintiff is yet bound to prove one of the conditions laid down for claiming ejectment under section 13(l)(a) to (k) of the Act. 7. Apart from that I am not prepared to subscribe to the view as at present advised that inspite of the defence of the defendant having been struck out the plaintiff is yet bound to prove one of the conditions laid down for claiming ejectment under section 13(l)(a) to (k) of the Act. It appears to me that when the defence of the defendant tenant has been struck out it means all the defences available to him against ejectment under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 cannot come to his rescue. This is the view, I have held in the cases decided by me. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, argued on the basis of two judgements relied by him : Krishnabai v. Laxmibai, AIR 1970 Madhya Pradesh 280. and L.T. Thadani v. Coyashwar Dayal, that even after the defence of the tenant had been struck out, the court has still to be satisfied that ground has been made out under the Act for ejecting the tenant and that striking out the defence of the tenant does not mean that an automatic order in favour of the landlord is to be passed. The Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Delhi High Court have undoubtedly taken this view on the interpretation of the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, and Delhi Rent Control Act, 1938, which are somewhat different from the relevant provisions of our Act. To be brief, I do not feel persuaded to change the view, I have taken in the matter. But at any rate, so far as this case is concerned, as already stated above, there is the statement of the plaintiff that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for more than six months and had consequently incurred the liability to be ejected from the shop in question.The result is that I do not see any force in this appeal and hereby dismiss it. But in the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.Learned counsel for the appellant prays for leave to appeal to Division Bench. Leave is refused.Learned counsel prays that some reasonable time may be granted to his client to vacate the shop. In the circumstances of the case, four months' time is granted to the appellant to hand over vacant possession of the shop in question to the respondent. *******