Judgment :- 1. The decree-holder is the appellant. Under a compromise decree the defendant agreed to pay in instalments and failing the payment of instalments, it was agreed that the amount could be realised by the sale of the attached property (the property was already attached before judgment). The defendant defaulted, whereupon the property which was subjected to the attachment was brought to sale. The defendant then raised the objection that the property is not liable to be sold as he did not possess a saleable interest in it. The right he has in the property is a kuthakapattom right which under the Kuthakapattom Rules is not alienable by him. The objection was ruled out by the learned Munsiff as untenable; but in appeal the learned Subordinate Judge quashing that order has held that the kuthakapattom right is not alienable and as the judgment-debtor does not have disposing power or possess saleable interest in the property the sale cannot be had. It is against this finding of the learned appellate judge that the decree holder has come up in second appeal. 2. It is true that the property is not liable to sale in execution unless the judgment-debtor has a disposing power over it for his own benefit. R.26 (b) (i) of the Kuthakapattom Rules provides that: "the lessee shall not alienate the lease without obtaining the previous sanction of the authority who granted the lease." The alienation by the lessee, it is important to note, is not totally prohibited under the above rule. Alienations are made conditional on previous sanction being accorded by the government. With the sanction of the government, there fore, the lessee can transfer the right. Even if the above rule is construed as imposing an absolute prohibition, the prohibition can apply, only as against the sale by tenant; it does not prevent a sale by the court. Under similar circumstances a Full Bench of the erstwhile Travancore High Court had to consider the question in Kesavan Narayanan Empran v. Krishnan Govindan (22 TLJ. 968). There the property involved was kandukrishi land wherein also the tenant was prohibited from alienating the right without previous sanction of the government. Under similar circumstances a Full Bench of the erstwhile Travancore High Court had to consider the question in Kesavan Narayanan Empran v. Krishnan Govindan (22 TLJ. 968). There the property involved was kandukrishi land wherein also the tenant was prohibited from alienating the right without previous sanction of the government. On the question of the nature of the interest held by the kandukrishi tenant, the learned judges held in that case that though the tenant is only a tenant at will under the crown, the right possesed by such tenant was always regarded as valuable property. The learned judges held: "It cannot be held that the interest of a tenant-at-will is an estate not known to the law or that it creates no right which cannot be attached and sold. Such a tenant has a right which is recognised by the law and is available against all the world except the landlord and even as against him his position is not like that of a mere tenant by sufference. A tenaney-at-will clearly gives rise to reciprocal rights and liabilities." Held further that: "Ia the case of kandukrishi lands in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary it must be held that the kandukrishi tenant has an interest in the lands which is saleable within the meaning of the first part of S.52 (corresponding to S.60 of the present Code). This view would be quite correct and proper even under the latter part of S.52 (1) in as much as the kandukrishi tenant is not one without any right of disposal over such lands. Under the present Civil Procedure Code the only restriction regaining the enforcement of rights arising under leases, mortgage of kandukrishi pattom lands have been removed and there is at present nothing to prevent such transferees from enforcing deeds executed in their favour by the holder of such lands. It is, therefore, impossible to hold that he holds these lands as a mere tenant-at-will with no powers of disposal at all over them." Kandukrishi lands are homefarm lands of the sovereign. The holders of these lands are only tenants-at-will, and have no right to alienate the property by sale, gift or mortgage, or in any other way without the previous consent of the sirkar, just like kuthakappattom land which is the subject matter of the present case. In 33 TLR. The holders of these lands are only tenants-at-will, and have no right to alienate the property by sale, gift or mortgage, or in any other way without the previous consent of the sirkar, just like kuthakappattom land which is the subject matter of the present case. In 33 TLR. 240, the question was whether the rights of a tenant of kandukrishi lands over the improvements effected by him in such lands could be attached end brought to sale in execution of a civil court's decree. Viraraghava Aiyangar J., who wrote the order of reference, referred to the rulings in 1 TLJ. 334 and 358 and 7 TLJ. 24 and observed as follows: "The point whether the improvements effected on kandukrishi lands by a kandukrishi tenant were attachable and saleable under a decree, does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the court or considered by the court in that case. The question arising in this case being an important one and liable to arise often before the courts, we think it cecsssary to have it decided authoritatively by a Full Bench." The Full Bench considered the effect of S.1 (a) of the old Civil Procedure Code and held that it did not apply to improvements effected by the kandukrishi tenant. 3. In Rajanagam Aiyer v. Ayisha Veevi (43 TLR. 466), Venkatarama Iyer, J., (Subramania Iyer, J., concurring) held that a vesting order under S.16 of the Insolvency Regulation could be passed in respect of Kandukrishi lands in the occupation of the insolvent. An examination of this decision shows that the view of the learned judge was based on the following grounds: (i) There are no statutory prohibitions against the alienation of such lands by kandukrishi tenants. (ii) The provisions of S.7 (a) cannot be regarded as prohibiting alienation. (iii) If the tenant has a disposing power over these lands it will be 'property' which under the order of adjudication passed under S.16 of the Regulation rests in the official receiver. In the subsequent case Chandy v. Ouseph (19 TLJ.113), the same point again arose for consideration. Chatfield, C.J., adopted the view taken in 43 TLR. 466, and held that the rights of the tenant over kandukrishi lands would vest in the Official Receiver under an order of adjudication passed under S.16 of the Insolvency Regulation. In the subsequent case Chandy v. Ouseph (19 TLJ.113), the same point again arose for consideration. Chatfield, C.J., adopted the view taken in 43 TLR. 466, and held that the rights of the tenant over kandukrishi lands would vest in the Official Receiver under an order of adjudication passed under S.16 of the Insolvency Regulation. It was contended in that case that the defendant had no 'interest' properly so called in the properties such as could be attached and sold in execution. It was urged that title to property implies rights in rem which must be enforceable against the whole world and if therefore, the right of occupancy was terminable at the will of the sirkar it cannot be deemed to be 'property' within the meaning of S.52 of the CPC. Kandukrishi tenant is no doubt a tenant-at-will under the crown. But even so it cannot be held that it is not an estate known to the law or - that it creates any right or interest at all. Under S.60 CPC., "the following property is liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree, namely, lands, houses or other buildings, goods, money, bank-notes, cheques, bills of exchange, hundis, promissory notes, government securities, bends or other securities for money, debts, shares in a corporation and, save as hereinafter mentioned, all other 'saleable property', movable or immovable, belonging to the judgment debtor, or over which, or the profits of which, he has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit whether the same be held in the name of the judgment debtor or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf." In considering the scope of the above provision, courts have consistently held that the expression 'saleable interest' should be taken to refer to interest which could be sold at a compulsory sale, as is execution of a decree and not denoting alienation (Golak Nath Roy Chodwhury v. Nathura Nath Roy Chodhury 1LR.. 20 Cal. 273; Pramanik v. Biswas 281C. 837). A general prohibition against private alienations could not bar involuntary alienations such as sales is execution of decrees (vide Satish Chandra de v. Gagam Chandra Rudra 78 IC. 802; Kastur v. Baliram 791C.117). 20 Cal. 273; Pramanik v. Biswas 281C. 837). A general prohibition against private alienations could not bar involuntary alienations such as sales is execution of decrees (vide Satish Chandra de v. Gagam Chandra Rudra 78 IC. 802; Kastur v. Baliram 791C.117). The above view is is in consonance with the rule that provisions of this kind virtually deprive litigants of their rights to enforce their claims against the properties of their debtors, and therefore, of an expropriatary nature. In the opinion of Venkitarama Iyer, J., (43 ILR. 466), "the judgment-debtor may have no right to alienate the property; but the property may nevertheless be saleable within the meaning of the section, unless there is legislative provision to the contrary. The wording of the section recognised two classes of property liable to attachment, viz., that which comprised property in which the judgment-debtor has a saleable interest, which evidently means an interest capable of being sold in court sale, and another class comprising property over which he has a power of disposal. It would follow from this that though the debtor cannot alienate the property he may nevertheless have such interest as may be sold by the court. If it be established that a debtor has some right over a property it roust be presumably saleable unless the law declares otherwise. Chatfield, C. J., observed in 19 TL1.113 (cited supra) at p. 118 as follows: "The policy of the law, is that anything belonging to a debtor which is valuable in the sense that he can obtain money by selling it should be liable to satisfy the demands of the creditor whether by attachment or through the working of the Insolvency laws, unless for reasons of public policy the legislature has expressly declared otherwise. In the case of Kandukrishi lands there is no express prohibition in the Civil Procedure Code against their being taken in execution." The learned judges of the Full Bench in 22 TLJ.968 (cited Supra), basing on the aforesaid authorities held that: "this view would be quite correct and proper even under the latter part of S.52(1) in as much as the kandukrishi tenant is not one without any right of disposal over such lands. It is worthy of note that the section requires only that he should have the power to alienate it for his own benefit. As pointed out in 43 TLR. It is worthy of note that the section requires only that he should have the power to alienate it for his own benefit. As pointed out in 43 TLR. 466 there is no prohibition statutory or otherwise regarding the alienation of such lands, though it is undeniable that the tenancy being one at the will of the lessor, any alienation could take effect only if accepted by the latter. Accordingly S.7 (a) of the old CPC. recognised this right and provided that all suits in respect of kandukrishi lands required the sanction of government and it followed that the alienee of such lands could not without such sanction sue to enforce such rights. By this means the rights of the sirkar were conserved, but this legislative provision cannot be regarded as tantamount to a declaration that such alienations would give rise to no legal rights and obligations as between the parties." The above observations of the Full Bench apply with equal force in the present case also. Here also there is no absolute prohibition by statute against alienation of kuthakapattom lands by the lessee. All that the Kuthakapattom Rules require is that such alienations should be preceded by a sanction by the government. Improvements standing in the property are to be enjoyed by the tenant and they form property in the strict sense of the term, and such property is saleable by court in execution of a decree. Objection of the judgment-debtor, therefore, is of no avail. Moreover, be had agreed in the compromise decree to the right being sold in execution in case he fails to pay the instalments and it was on that basis that the suit itself was compromised. In the face of such an agreement, it is not up to the tenant to turn round and say that the right is not saleable and as such it is not available for sale in execution of the decree. The proprietory right vests in the government and it is for the government to come forward and object to the sale. The judgment-debtor is not competent to put forward such objections. 4. The judgment of the learned appellate judge is, therefore, set aside and the order of the learned Munsiff rejecting the objection is restored. The second appeal is thus allowed. A. N. K. Allowed.