Judgment :- 1. One Kochappi Kunjukrishnan filed LA. 2154/63 in O. S.10/56 for setting aside the sale in execution under 0 21. R.90 CPC. The sale took place on the 24th of June, 1963; but the property was placed under attachment on the 28th of November, 1962. The decree was for costs in the suit which was dismissed. The decree holder was the 1st defendant; the plaintiffs were the judgment-debtors. The sale was conducted on the 24th of June, 1963 and the property was bid by the decree holder for Rs. 186-29 Ps. The petitioner's case is that the property was purchased by him from the plaintiff on 20-8-62, that is, long before the attachment. At the time of the attachment, therefore, the judgment-debtors had no interest in the property. The decree-holder knowing about the sale to the petitioner fraudulently got the property attached and sold and the proceedings were all conducted secretly; there was material irregularity in the conduct of the sale and the property was sold for a grossly inadequate price. The 1st defendant-decree holder stated that the sale in favour of the petitioner was benami for the judgment-debtors and that it is unsupported by consideration. The contention was also raised that 'the petitioner had no locus standi to challenge the sale. At the time of the sale the judgment-debtors had no saleable interest in the property. The execution court allowed the petition and set aside the sale; but in appeal the learned Addl. District Judge of Trivandrum set aside the order and dismissed the petition under O.21 R.90 CPC. 2. The main question for consideration is whether the petitioner was competent to apply under 0.21, R.90 CPC. to set aside the sale; even if it is found that the petitioner is competent whether at the time of the sale the judgment-debtors had any saleable interest in the property. On both these points, I think the view taken by the learned appellate judge must prevail. A Bench of five judges of the Calcutta High Court had to consider this question in Asmutunnissa v. Ashruff (ILR. 15 Cal. 488). In that case also, as in the present one, the objector was a person who claimed the property as her own alleging that she had bought it from the judgment-debtor prior to the attachment. The question was whether such a person is entitled to object to the sale. 15 Cal. 488). In that case also, as in the present one, the objector was a person who claimed the property as her own alleging that she had bought it from the judgment-debtor prior to the attachment. The question was whether such a person is entitled to object to the sale. The learned judges observed in that case: "In the present case, however, as in the case of Abdul Hub Mozunder v. Mohini Mohun Shaha (ILR. 14 Cal. 240), the applicant is a person who claims not through but adversely to the judgment-debtor. She says: "The property was not the property of the judgment-debtor, but belongs to me"; and the question is whether a claim of this sort can be entertained under S.300. We are of opinion that it cannot be entertained under that section. It seems to us that the object of that section is to allow objections to be preferred to the regularity of the sale proceedings by those interested in the sale on the supposition that it was a sale of the judgment-debtor's property, and that the section ought not to be used for the purposes of allowing third parties to advance claims to the property on the ground that it was not the property of the judgment-debtor." It was also held in that case that: : "the objector has no locus standi; S.311 only refers to persons whose property has been sold under Chapter XIX and it "is only the judgment-debtor's property that the chapter deals with. The words "any person" in that section are to receive the widest meaning and that any person whatever may come in and claim an interest in the property and may apply under that section to set aside the sale." Other persons than the judgment-debtor can apply, if they are injured by the irregularity of the sale. The words "any person whose immovable property has been sold" in the old Code have now been amended so as to read, "any person whose interests are affected by the sale". The section as it stood originally' any person whose immovable property has been sold' would apply and the sale was not to be set aside unless the applicant proves that he has sustained substantial injury. The section as it stood originally' any person whose immovable property has been sold' would apply and the sale was not to be set aside unless the applicant proves that he has sustained substantial injury. But under the present Code 'any person whose interests are affected by the sale' can apply to set aside any sale on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale, and that no sale shall be set aside on such ground unless the court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. "The expression "any person whose interests are affected by the sale" has been substituted for the expression "any person whose immovable property has been sold", which occurred in the old section. The latter expression was construed as meaning "any person whose interests are affected by the sale" in the Full Bench case of Asmutunnissa Begum v. Ashruff AIi ILR.15 Cal. 488 where an application, therefore, is made by a person other than a decrae holder or one emitted to share in a rateable distribution of assets, such person must be one whose interests are affected by the sale. It cannot be said of a person claiming by title paramount to the judgment-debtor that his interests would be affected by the sale, in as much as his title to the property cannot be affected by the sale, whether it were regular or irregular. Hence, a person who claims to be a purchaser of immovable property from the judgment-debtor prior to the attachment cannot apply under this rule, for the sale being prior to the attachment, his interest cannot be legally affected by the sale." (vide Mulla's Cods of Civil Procedure Vol.11, 13th Edn. p.1170). Applying the principle to the present case it is clear that the petitioner is one whose interests are not affected by the sale, he having purchased the property even before the attachment. The lower appellate court is hence right in its conclusion and in confirmation of the judgment of the learned appellate judge, this revision petition is dismissed.