JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Plaintiff who succeeded in the trial Court and has lost before the learned Subordinate Judge is the Appellant. He and Bikal were two brothers. The Plaintiff sued for a declaration that the second Defendant who is the natural son of the first Defendant is not the adopted son of the Plaintiff's deceased brother Bikal. There is a registered deed of adoption dated 27-4-1960 (Ext.1). The Plaintiff wanted a declaration from the Court that this deed of adoption was not valid. 2. The question that arose for determination in the Courts below was whether the second Defendant was the adopted Bon of Bikal. The learned trial judge held against the adoption while the learned Subordinate Judge has accepted the adoption and has dismissed the suit. The evidence of giving and taking was completely discarded by the trial Court. The learned appellate judge placed reliance on the evidence of d.w. 3, the family priest and drew the presumption available u/s 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to uphold the adoption. 3. Mr. Murty, learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that the presumption u/s 16 of the Act does not extend to the factum of adoption and adoption as a fact must be proved in the same way as any other fact. According to him, Section 16 of the Act, does not prescribe any special rule of evidence to establish the fact of adoption. It becomes necessary to examine the correctness of this contention. 4. Section 16 of the Act provides: Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. There is no dispute in this case that the registered deed of adoption (Ext. 1) satisfies the requirements of the section. This statutory provision requires the Court to presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of the Act. The meaning of the term "shall presume" is found in Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is no dispute in this case that the registered deed of adoption (Ext. 1) satisfies the requirements of the section. This statutory provision requires the Court to presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of the Act. The meaning of the term "shall presume" is found in Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act. It has been provided thus: Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved and until it is disproved. In view of this meaning of the words "shall presume" it was indeed not necessary to provide in Section 16 of the Act at its end "unless and until it is disproved." The legislature has, however, added these words at the end of Section 16 to emphasise upon the extent of presumption. The use of "shall presume" thus is a presumption in Jaw as was indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Madras Vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer, . Under Section 3 of the Evidence Act "a fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist." 5. Thus, where there is a registered document evidencing adoption, the presumption has to be drawn in favour of adoption and it is then for the person disputing the adoption to disprove that no adoption has been made under the Act. Section 4 makes provision for the overriding effect of the Act and in Chapter 2, detailed provision is made about adoption indicating requisites of a valid adoption (Section 6), capacity of a male Hindu to take in adoption (Section 7); capacity of a female Hindu to take in adoption (Section 8); about persons who are capable of giving in adoption (Section 9); about persons capable of being taken in adoption (Section 10) and other general conditions for valid adoption (Section 11). The effect of adoption has been indicated in Section 12. Thus, provision has been made to cover the entire field by statute. The effect of adoption has been indicated in Section 12. Thus, provision has been made to cover the entire field by statute. In this state of the matter when Section 16 provides that the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Murty that the presumption is limited to compliance with the procedural requirements only and not relating to the factum of adoption. The true effect of Section 16 seems to be that it calls upon the Court to accept the adoption unless it is disproved. The rule in Section 16 is not one of a mere statutory presumption which can be rebutted in the ordinary manner of rebuttal but the presumption has to be dislodged by disproof of the fact. This view of mine receives direct support from a decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of Basudeo Bhardwaj v. Ram Barup and Ors. ILR 1968 (II) Punjab & Haryana 231. Tek Chand, J. negatived similar contentions as raised by Mr. Murty before me by saying: Thus, where there is a registered document relating to adoption, the presumption shall be drawn in favour of adoption and it is then for the other side to disprove that no adoption has been made under the Act ... A distinction between the factum probandum and the factum probans has to be borne in mind. The factum probandum or the fact to be proved in this case is that there was a registered document produced before the trial Court purporting to record the adoption made and was signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption. No doubt can be entertained on these facti probandi. The deed of registration records an adoption by Kishan Devi of Mukesb Kumar. Her thumb mark as the person taking the child in adoption, and the signatures of Basdev as the person giving in adoption are borne on the deed. The attesting witnesses have deposed to the execution of the deed. After such a document is produced, Section 16 requires that the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provision of the Act unless and until it is disproved ... The attesting witnesses have deposed to the execution of the deed. After such a document is produced, Section 16 requires that the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provision of the Act unless and until it is disproved ... There is no option left to the Court, and it is bound to take the fact as proved, until evidence is given to disprove it and the party interested in disproving it most produce such evidence if he can. The factum probandum was that the adoption had been made in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The presumptive proof is sought to be disproved by casting aspersions on the credibility of the oral evidence. Supposing that was successfully done, that will only prove that the witnesses are not to be relied upon but that would not suffice to disprove the presumption. It is true that the presumption is a presumption juris and it is competent to a party to show that the inference was fallacious. It most be conceded that Section 16 does not raise a presumption juris et de jure when no evidence to displace presumption is allowed to be given. 6. Mr. Murty wanted to refer to the oral evidence laid on the side of the Plaintiff. P.ws. 1, 2 and 3 ale all the witnesses examined on the side of the Plaintiff. p.w. 1 was found by the trial Court not to be a competent witness to speak about the condition of Bikal at the time of execution of Ext. 1. In fact, the comment of the trial Court gives an impression that p.w. 1 was not at an accepted. p.w. 2 who is a relation was found to be lying. The learned trial judge with reference to him stated: p.w. 2 who is the bhanoja of the Plaintiff and Bikal has fabricated the story of Bikal's removal to the Cuttack Medical Hospital about a month before death. His was only negative evidence denying adoption. p.w. 3, admittedly, is a Harijan and had no access to the house of Bikal. The learned trial judge, therefore, discarded his evidence to toto. It is not the case of the Defendant that relations of Bikal were cased to the spot when adoption ceremonies were being performed on the 27th April, 1960. His was only negative evidence denying adoption. p.w. 3, admittedly, is a Harijan and had no access to the house of Bikal. The learned trial judge, therefore, discarded his evidence to toto. It is not the case of the Defendant that relations of Bikal were cased to the spot when adoption ceremonies were being performed on the 27th April, 1960. In fact, his case is that the adoption was proposed only in the previous evening and everything was quickly finalised. It is quite possible that the relations even from the village had not been called. The evidence laid on the side of the Plaintiff can at best be said to cast a doubt about the plea of adoption. But raising of a doubt is not rebuttal. Thus the Plaintiff has not been able to disprove the presumption arising from the document u/s 16 of the Act. The evidence on the Defendants' side is commented by Mr. Murty to be worthless and even d.w. 3, he contends, should not have been accepted by the lower appellate Court. Even conceding that the entire evidence in support of the adoption is discarded, the Court is required to presume in favour of the adoption and this presumption which is drawn from the document not connected with any oral evidence has to be disproved by the Plaintiff by leading cogent and credible evidence of rebuttal in order to succeed. As I have already shown, the Plaintiff has failed to disprove the fact of adoption which the Court is bound to hold on the basis of the provisions of Section 16 of the Act. 7. On the aforesaid analysis, the learned appellate is right when he reversed the decree of the trial Court and held in favour of the adoption. I would accordingly dismiss this appeal. The Defendants shall have their costs throughout. Final Result : Dismissed