JUDGMENT B.N. Lokur, J. - Baheri in district Bareilly was formerly a Notified Area and the State Government, in exercise of its powers under section 338 (1) (b) of the Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") imposed in Baheri the Circumstances and Property Tax, which is described in section 128 (1)(ix) as "a tax on inhabitants assessed according to their circumstances and property." Rules for the assessment and collection of the tax were also made under section 153 (a) of the Act as extended to Baheri. A copy of the rules is produced as Annexure `D' to this petition. Rules 2 and 3 read :- "(2) The income of the year ending on the 31st March previous to the date of assessment shall when possible be taken as a basis of assessment. Income shall include salary, wages, emoluments, profits from trade, bonus, dividends and interest from investments. (3) When one person carries on more than one trade, calling or vocation within the limits of the Notified Area, whether under the same name or different names, the tax shall be calculated on his total annual income or profit from all such sources." These rules indicate that the levy of Circumstances and Property Tax was to be relatable to the income of the previous year. The rate of assessment was according to a graduated scale and the maximum annual tax to be levied on a single assessee was prescribed to be not more than Rs. 3500/-. 2. The petitioner is a public limited company having a sugar factory and a distillery within the limits of Baheri. It appears that an agreement was made between the petitioner company and the Notified Area Committee of Baheri in 1952 that the petitioner company would pay Rs. 3500/- annually as Circumstances and Property Tax in respect of the sugar factory. In the same year, however, the ceiling of Circumstances and Property Tax was raised from Rs. 3500/- to Rs. 10,000/- by an amendment of the rules. 3. Baheri was declared as a Municipality in 1957 and the circumstances and Property Tax continued to be levied in the municipal area of Baheri according to the Rules and the rates in force when Baheri was a Notified Area. 4. The petitioner company received two notices from the Municipal Board of Baheri demanding a sum of Rs. 3. Baheri was declared as a Municipality in 1957 and the circumstances and Property Tax continued to be levied in the municipal area of Baheri according to the Rules and the rates in force when Baheri was a Notified Area. 4. The petitioner company received two notices from the Municipal Board of Baheri demanding a sum of Rs. 28,707.50 in respect of the year 1966-67 and a sum of Rs. 78,470/- in respect of the year 1967-68 as Circumstances and Property Tax; the notices mentioned that the tax was assessed on the basis of an income of Rs. 5,74,144/- for the year 1966-67 and an income of Rs. 15,69, 387/- for the year 1967-68. The petitioner company raised objections to the demands but they were turned down by the Municipal Board; it directed that Rs. 10,000/- for each year, which is the maximum amount that can be levied, should be recovered from the petitioner company. The petitioner has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality of the order of the Municipal Board. 5. The first objection taken by the petitioner company is that the maximum limit of the Circumstances and Property Tax to be recovered from an assessee could not be raised from Rs. 3500/- to Rs. 10,000/- as being done in 1954. The learned counsel for the petitioner company argued that after the commencement of the Constitution, the Municipal Board could levy the tax only in virtue of article 277 of the Constitution, which provides, interalia, that any taxes which were lawfully levied by any municipality or other local authority or body may, notwithstanding that those taxes are mentioned in the Union List, continue to be levied and to be applied for the same purpose until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law. It was contended that the provisions of article 277 precluded any enhancement of the rate of the Circumstances and Property Tax after the commencement of the Constitution. 6. This argument raises the fundamental question whether the Circumstances and Property Tax is a tax that could be levied exclusively by the Union under any entry in the Union List. It was contended that the provisions of article 277 precluded any enhancement of the rate of the Circumstances and Property Tax after the commencement of the Constitution. 6. This argument raises the fundamental question whether the Circumstances and Property Tax is a tax that could be levied exclusively by the Union under any entry in the Union List. In Ram Narain v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 18 the Supreme Court described the Circumstances and Property Tax in the following words : "A tax on `circumstances and property' is a composite tax and the word `circumstances' means a man's financial position, his status as a whole depending, among other things, on his income from trade or business." In the case of Zila Parishad v. Jugal Kishore, 1968 A.L.J. 665, it was argued before a Full Bench of three judges of this Court that the Circumstances and Property Tax was in effect a tax on income, covered by entry 22 in the Union List. Relying upon the above observations of the Supreme Court, the Full Bench repelled this contention with the following observation :- "Circumstances and Property Tax, therefore, is essentially a tax on status or financial position combined with a tax on property and is fundamentally distinct from Income-tax. It is true that in the majority of cases assessment of this tax depends on the amount of income earned by the assessee from various sources (e.g. his profession, business or property) ; but that will not make it an income tax. It is not essential that there should be incomes before such a tax is levied and it is purely as a matter of convenience that the income is adopted as the yard-stick for the assessment of the tax.' Another Full Bench of three judges of this Court had occasion to consider in R.R. Engineering Company v. Zila Parishad, 1969, A.L.J. 829, the question whether the Circumstances and Property Tax fell within the Union List. R.S. Pathak, J. observed that the Circumstances and Property Tax was a composite tax but none-the-less a single tax and was of the opinion that the tax would be relatable to the residuary entry 97 of the Union List. M.H. Beg, J. substantially concurred with this view, but Tripathi, J. did not express any opinion on the question. R.S. Pathak, J. observed that the Circumstances and Property Tax was a composite tax but none-the-less a single tax and was of the opinion that the tax would be relatable to the residuary entry 97 of the Union List. M.H. Beg, J. substantially concurred with this view, but Tripathi, J. did not express any opinion on the question. A contrary conclusion, however, has been reached by a Full Bench of five judges in Notified Area Committee v. Ram Singhasan Prasad, 1970 A.L.J. 656. After examining the history of the tax, the learned judges summed up the position as follows :- "To sum up, the history of the tax on circumstances and property after 1935 definitely shows that it was not a distinct and separate import. The Government of India Act 1935 and the Constitution treated it was a composite tax as its name suggested. As its constituents are already covered by one or the other entry in the legislative Lists. It is not enumerated as a category in the Lists ...................." This Full Bench cited with approval the views held by another Full Bench of three judges in District Board of Farrukhabad v. Prag Dutt, 1948 A.L.J. 338 and stated that the Circumstances and Property Tax was split up into a tax on trades, professions callings and employment and a tax on lands and buildings and perhaps the tax fell under other entries of the State List also. 7. In view of the decision of the Full Bench in Ram Singhasan Prasad's case, 1970 A.L.J. 656 it is no more open for the petitioner company to contend that the Circumstances and Property -Tax falls within the Union List. That being so, the argument that the levy of the tax is continued by reason of article 277 of the Constitution can have no force. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner next argued that if one of the elements of the tax is a tax on professions, trades, calling, and employments, the proviso to article 276 (2) having fixed the maximum of the tax on professions, trades, callings and employments at Rs. 250/- per annum, the tax levied by the Baheri Notified Area could not be changed from Rs. 3500/- to Rs. 10000/-. However, we do not know and no attempt is made to show what sum in the original amount of Rs. 3500 or in the increased amount of Rs. 250/- per annum, the tax levied by the Baheri Notified Area could not be changed from Rs. 3500/- to Rs. 10000/-. However, we do not know and no attempt is made to show what sum in the original amount of Rs. 3500 or in the increased amount of Rs. 10,000 constitutes tax on professions, trades etc. That being so, the increase cannot be disturbed now on the ground that the increase operates to exceed the maximum limit placed by the proviso to article 276 (2) of the Constitution on the tax on professions, trades, callings and employments. 9. The next argument was that the petitioner company actually suffered loss in the year 1967-68 and hence the Circumstances and Property Tax cannot be levied on the petitioner at least for that year. As already observed, the petitioner company runs a sugar factory and a distillery. It has been stated in the petition that for the year 1967-68 the sugar factory incurred a loss of Rs. 4,21,888/- although the distillery made profit of Rs. 98,661/-, the resultant position being a net loss of Rs. 3,29,227/-. As the Rules mention income as the basis of assessment, it was contended that it was not permissible for the Municipal Board to levy the tax for the year 1967-68 since the petitioner company has suffered a considerable loss during that year. It was pointed out that the Notion of Demand appears to relate to the assets held by the petitioner company and such an equation is not in contemplation of the nature of the tax as well as the Rules for assessment of the tax. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Municipal Board, the allegation regarding the loss incurred by the petitioner company during the year 1967-68 has not been controverted but it has been contended that the income for the year 1967-68 is irrelevant for the assessment made during the year 1967-68, the argument being that the accounting year for 1967-68 would be 1966-67 and the assessment year for 1967-68 would be 1968-69. The learned Counsel for the petitioner company, however, suggested that, for the purpose of levy of the Circumstances and Property Tax, the accounting year as well as the assessment year would be the same. I am unable to accept such a proposition. The learned Counsel for the petitioner company, however, suggested that, for the purpose of levy of the Circumstances and Property Tax, the accounting year as well as the assessment year would be the same. I am unable to accept such a proposition. It is inconceivable that the Circumstances and Property Tax would be assessed during the accounting year itself; the amount of income for a year can be determined only at the end of the year. In the view I take, the allegation of loss suffered by the petitioner during 1967-68 is not relevant for the assessment of tax made for 1967-68. Admittedly, in 1966-67, which is the accounting year for 1967-68, the petitioner company has carried a huge profit and hence the assessment year 1967-68 cannot be questioned. 10. On the facts appearing in this petition it is not necessary to consider the further question whether the Circumstances and Property Tax could be levied even though the assessee has suffered loss during the accounting year or whether the tax can properly be related to the assets held by the assessee, the income or loss not being relevant. It may, however, be mentioned that in Ganesh Sugar Mills Ltd v. Commissioner, Gorakhpur, Civil Misc. Writ No. 2987 of 1965 decided on 19th May, 1970, it has been held that it is the net income which has to be taken into consideration for levying the Circumstances and Property Tax. That was a case under the Kshetra Samiti and Zila Parishad Act and income was adopted as the basis for assessment of the Circumstances and Property Tax. 11. Another argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner company was that the order of the Municipal Board is not a speaking order. It appears from the minutes of the meeting of the Municipal Board produced along with the letter of the Municipal Board to the Sugar Factory at Annexure K to the petition, that a representative of the Sugar Factory was present at the meeting of the Municipal Board when it considered the objections. It is not alleged that the objections were not considered or discussed in the meeting. It is also not alleged that the representative of the petitioner company was not heard on the objections. The decision taken by the Municipal Board appears to be a considered decision. It is not alleged that the objections were not considered or discussed in the meeting. It is also not alleged that the representative of the petitioner company was not heard on the objections. The decision taken by the Municipal Board appears to be a considered decision. No appeal is provided by the Act or the Rules against the assessment made by the Municipal Board and the decision of the Municipal Board is final. That being so, there was no need for the Municipal Board to record detailed reasons for the decision taken by it. The Municipal Board cannot be regarded as functioning in a quasi-judicial capacity when disposing of the objections to assessments made by it. The argument has thus no force. 12. The last submission on behalf of the petitioner company was that the tax is to be levied, as is clear from the language of Section 128 (1) (ix) of the Act, or "inhabitants" and the petitioner company cannot be regarded as an inhabitant of the Municipality. The expression "inhabitant" is defined in section 2 (7) of the Act as meaning "any person ordinarily residing or carrying on business or occupying immovable property" within the area with reference to which the expression is used. My attention was drawn to the decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Zila Parishad v. Baboo Ram, 1970 A.L.J. 1224, in which it has been held that the scheme of the District Boards Act and the Rules leave no room for doubt that the word "person" in Section 114 of that Act means a natural person and does not include a corporate body. Section 114 of the District Boards Act, it may be mentioned, deals with the power of the District Board to impose a tax on Circumstances and Property and provides, inter alia, that the tax may be imposed on any person residing or carrying on business in the rural area. Section 3 (42) of the U.P. General Clauses Act defines "persons" as including any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporate or not. Unless the scheme of the Municipalities Act, Particularly the provision relating to the levy of the Circumstances and Property Tax, excludes the application of this definition, it is difficult to hold that a company is not an inhabitant of. the municipal area. Unless the scheme of the Municipalities Act, Particularly the provision relating to the levy of the Circumstances and Property Tax, excludes the application of this definition, it is difficult to hold that a company is not an inhabitant of. the municipal area. It would be sufficient to point out that in the case of every tax leviable by a municipality, a bill is to be presented under section 166 of the Act, to a "person" who becomes liable for the payment and if a corporate body is not to be held to be a person, the astounding consequences would be that not a single tax envisaged by Section 128 (i) can be levied on a corporate body and a bill served on it under section 166. By way of illustration, the corporate body would not be liable to pay tax on its vehicles or conveyances, to pay actroi duties on the goods imported within the municipal area, to pay water taxes or drainage tax etc. It is difficult to imagine that the Act contemplates that the corporate bodies are to be exempted from all these taxes. The decision is in Baboo Ram's case, 1970 A.L.J. 1224 which was under the District Board Act, is distinguishable from a case under the Municipalities Act, the scheme of which discloses, in my opinion, that every corporate body is liable to pay the various tax envisaged by Section 128 (1) including the Circumstances and Property Tax. It may be mentioned that Websters' Dictionary, relying upon a decision of a U. S Court, has in giving the meaning of "inhabitant", stated : "A corporation is legally an inhabitant of the place where its principal office is in the State of its organisation." The argument that the petitioner is not a "person" and hence regarded as as "inhabitant" within the meaning of Section 128 (i) (ix) is thus untenable. It may be mentioned that this ground has not been taken in the petition itself but was urged at the hearing and as counsel for both the parties were able to place their respective arguments on the question, the petitioner was allowed to raise it. 13. The result is that the petition deserves to be end is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to costs.