Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is a Deputy Superintendent of Police and he was functioning as an Assistant Commissioner (Crimes) on 4-2-1971. Certain incidents took place in and around the University College, Trivandrum, on that day. From the materials available in these proceedings it appears that the agitation carried on by some students of the Sanskrit College in which the other students of the Ayurveda College, and a large number of students from the University College joined, took a turn towards violence, resulting in damage to public property and injury to Police Constables who were deputed for duty on the spot on that day, as well as to others. The petitioner too was deputed for duty on that day in relation to the above incidents and the petitioner was the senior-most Police Officer present at the scene. When the violence increased the petitioner ordered the unlawful assembly to disperse and on failure to disperse, action was taken to disperse it by use of force in the course of which the Police entered the compound of the University College and building and even went upstairs and entered certain rooms in the first floor of the building and used force. These occurrences are referred to in detail in the affidavit in support of the petition. But in the counter affidavit that has been filed, with commendable restraint, the State Government has refrained from joining the issue on the correctness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the affidavit, in view of an enquiry that was ordered by the State Government by Ex. P6 order in exercise of their powers conferred by S.3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 and in view, it is alleged in the counter-affidavit, of a contemplated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner relating to his conduct on 4-2-1971, though it is hinted that there are other versions of the incidents of the 4th February 1971. 2. On the same day the order Ext. P6 was passed which directed an enquiry relating to the following matters: (i) whether the entry of the Police into the College campus and buildings was justified. (ii) whether the use of force by the Police was justified. Another order was passed by the Government, Ext. P7 suspending the petitioner "with immediate effect" "pending enquiry". It is this order that is impugned in this petition. 3. The petitioner has challenged Ext. (ii) whether the use of force by the Police was justified. Another order was passed by the Government, Ext. P7 suspending the petitioner "with immediate effect" "pending enquiry". It is this order that is impugned in this petition. 3. The petitioner has challenged Ext. P7 on numerous grounds and elaborate arguments have been advanced before us on various aspects, some of which related to the questions whether Ext. P7 has imposed any substantive punishment, whether it has the effect of suspending the contract of service. whether it is only a direction to an employee by his employer not to discharge his functions and therefore not involving any break in the contract of service; and whether such an order can be passed under the statutory rules alone or whether Government have also the inherent power as employer to direct, in given circumstances, that an employee should not discharge his functions as an employee. 4. A consideration of all these questions is unnecessary for the disposal of this petition because the matter can be dealt with on the main ground of attack levelled against the order Ext. P7. Briefly stated this contention is that the Government had been influenced by extraneous considerations in passim the order Ext. P7, that they have not applied their mind to the questions involved and that the order was passed merely because of political pressure. Such an order, it is contended, is malafide in law and cannot stand. 5. We shall presently refer to the averments in support of this contention and the replies thereto. Before doing so, we must deal with one aspect, whether the order Ext. P7 is one passed in contemplation of any disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner or is merely an order passed in exercise of the alleged inherent power directing the petitioner not to discharge his functions because such exercise would embarass the conduct of the enquiry ordered by Ext. P6. We shall read the relevant part of the order Ext. P7. "Government have instituted an enquiry into the circumstances which led to the use of force by the Police in the premises of the University College, Trivandrum on 4-2-1971. 2. Pending enquiry Shri A. K. Veeramani, Assistant Commissioner (Crimes) who was the senior most Police Officer, present at the spot is placed under suspension with immediate effect. He will be paid subsistence allowance as provided under R.55, Part I, KSR. 2. Pending enquiry Shri A. K. Veeramani, Assistant Commissioner (Crimes) who was the senior most Police Officer, present at the spot is placed under suspension with immediate effect. He will be paid subsistence allowance as provided under R.55, Part I, KSR. with full D. A. admissible during the period of suspension. ("By order of the Governor) S. Narayanaswamy Secretary to Government." The order does not state that it has been passed in exercise of any statutory powers. A reading of the two paragraphs in the order might indicate that the order was passed pending the enquiry ordered by Ext. P6. There are averments in the counter affidavit that the order is supportable on the basis of the inherent power of the State to pass an order of suspension. But in view of the specific averments in the counter affidavit that an enquiry into the conduct of the petitioner is contemplated (vide Para.3) and the averment in Para.13 of the counter affidavit that the Government contemplated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, as well as the categorical statement in Para.14 of the counter affidavit that the order was issued by virtue of the powers vested in the Government under R.7 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958 (for short Rules), we do not consider that in this case we must deal with the matter on any basis other than that the order Ext. P7 is one passed under R.7 of the rules. We shall extract in full Para.14 of the counter affidavit: "The averments in grounds 2 and 3 are incorrect. Order Ext. P7 is not arbitrary nor does it violate any principles of natural justice. The order was issued by virtue of the Powers vested in the Government under R.7 of the Kerala Police Departmental Enquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules and the failure to recite the said rule in Ext. P7 order does Win any way affect its validity. It was not felt necessary to give the petitioner on opportunity to explain his case before Ext. P7 order was passed." 6. R.7 (1) of the Rules is in these terms: 7. P7 order does Win any way affect its validity. It was not felt necessary to give the petitioner on opportunity to explain his case before Ext. P7 order was passed." 6. R.7 (1) of the Rules is in these terms: 7. (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Government in this behalf, may place a member of a mice under suspension, where (a) an inquiry into his conduct is contemplated, or is pending, or (b) a complaint against him of any criminal offence is under investigation or 7. All that R.7 (1) (a) states is that a member of. a service can be placed under suspension if any enquiry into his conduct is contemplated or is pending, Notwithstanding this rather general and in a sense vague statement in the rule, it has been accepted on all hands at the time of the argument of the case that before an order is passed under R.7 of the Rules, placing a member of a service under suspension, the nature of the charges levelled against a servant and the circumstances of the case and the necessity or desirability of placing the member of the service under suspension, should be considered by the State Government or the authority competent to place the servant under suspension. We may refer to R.7 (1) (a) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 which is in these terms: "If, having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances in any case, the Government which initiates any disciplinary proceedings is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension the member of the Service against whom such proceedings are started, that Government may (a) ...pass an order placing him under suspension". 8. We will certainly not be justified in interpreting R.7 of the Rules by importing the words of other rules though framed under the dilution in exercise of identical or similar powers. But R.7 of the Rules has to be interpreted. 8. We will certainly not be justified in interpreting R.7 of the Rules by importing the words of other rules though framed under the dilution in exercise of identical or similar powers. But R.7 of the Rules has to be interpreted. We consider that if the Rule is interpreted with reference to its wording and read with R.6 (1) and the general principles that should govern the matter the conclusion is obvious that before a Government servant is placed under suspension there must be serious allegations of misconduct against the servant and there should be a prima facie satisfaction that the allegations are true. R.6 (1) of the Rules provides that: "Whenever on a complaint or otherwise, it is found necessary to inquire into the conduct of a member of the service the departmental superior under whom such member is employed shall make a preliminary inquiry and determine whether there are grounds for further action". There is a proviso to this sub-rule which has been added to the original rule and the proviso is in these terms: "Provided that no such preliminary inquiry shall be necessary if prima facie grounds for action against the member of the service have already been established to the satisfaction of the departmental superior, or any authority to whom such superior is subordinate." From the above, it is clear that either there should be a preliminary enquiry and a prima facie satisfaction or there must be material available which would indicate prima facie grounds for action against the member and those grounds should be established to the satisfaction of the departmental superior or any authority to whom such superior is subordinate. When R.7 (1) (a) is read with R.6, it is clear that an enquiry can be said to be contemplated against a member of a Service only when a prima facie case for enquiry is established. It is further obvious that in all cases when an enquiry is to be conducted there need not be an order of suspension. There should be some guide-lines then in determining when an order of suspension could and should be passed. An order of suspension should be passed only if it is necessary or desirable. It is further obvious that in all cases when an enquiry is to be conducted there need not be an order of suspension. There should be some guide-lines then in determining when an order of suspension could and should be passed. An order of suspension should be passed only if it is necessary or desirable. Such necessity or desirability will arise when the charges against a servant are of a serious nature and keeping him in service will not be conducive to discipline or the maintaining of the efficiency or the honesty of the administration. So it follows that there must be serious allegations of misconduct and having regard to the allegations and the attendant circumstances the authority must be satisfied that it is necessary or at least desirable to keep a member of a service under suspension. 9. In dealing with the question as to whether before an order of suspension is passed under R.7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 formal charges should be levelled against a member of a service and communicated to the member in view of the wording in that rule that regard must be had to the nature of the charges the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2338 of 1968 decided on 12-2-1971 (AIR. 1971 SC 823) held that charges mentioned in R.7 (1) does I not mean formal charges to be framed under the rules but only allegations of misconduct. In that judgment there are certain observations which we consider are very pertinent for deciding the circumstances under which the power of suspension pending enquiry can be exercised. We shall extract that part of the judgment: "When serious allegations of a misconduct are imputed against a member of a service normally it would not be desirable to allow him to continue in the post where he was functioning. We shall extract that part of the judgment: "When serious allegations of a misconduct are imputed against a member of a service normally it would not be desirable to allow him to continue in the post where he was functioning. If the disciplinary authority takes note of such allegations and is of opinion after some preliminary enquiries that the circumstances of the case justify further investigation to be made before definite charges can be framed, it would not be improper to remove the officer concerned from the sphere of his activity inasmuch as it may be necessary to find out facts from persons working under him or look into papers which are in his custody and it would be embarrassing and in opportune both for the officer concerned as well as to those whose duty it was to make the enquiry to do so while the officer was present at the spot." The above passage clearly indicates that there must be allegations of a serious nature of misconduct imputed to a member of a service and the disciplinary authority must form an opinion after some preliminary enquiry that the circumstances of the case justify further investigation. This means that there must be prima facie satisfaction of serious misconduct. We consider the same considerations must apply in exercising the power under R.7 of the Rules. 10. The question then is whether the order Ext. P7 has been passed after satisfying the above requirements honestly, bona fide and reasonably as explained by the Supreme Court in the decision in S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR. 1964 SC. 72. 11. We have read the order Ext. P7. It is dated 5th February, 1971. But the decision regarding the suspension had admittedly been taken by the Chief Minister on the evening of the 4th February, 1971. The file relating to the matter has been placed before us by the Government Pleader who appeared on behalf of the respondent and this indicates that the Chief Minister passed an order on the 4th February 1971 on the Note File directing that the petitioner be kept under suspension pending enquiry. The point to be decided in the case is whether any extraneous consideration weighed with the Chief Minister in passing this order on the 4th February, 1971. 12. We may now refer to the averments in the affidavit in support of the petition. The point to be decided in the case is whether any extraneous consideration weighed with the Chief Minister in passing this order on the 4th February, 1971. 12. We may now refer to the averments in the affidavit in support of the petition. Specific averments have been made in the petition that soon after the incidents or even while the incidents were in progress, demand was made by a student leader that the Police Officers should be kept under suspension. He also resorted to an indefinite hunger strike to have this demand conceded. Reports regarding this appeared in the newspapers. The Indian Express and the Malayala Manorama of the 5th February, 1971 have been produced by the petitioner along with the petition marked as Exts. P4 and P5. Ext. P4 is the report the Indian Express carried on its front page under date 4 21971. We shall extract it: "Meanwhile, Mr. Pratapachandran, President of the District Unit of the pro-New Congress Kerala Student's Union, who has been hospitalised for injuries has announced that he would go on fast until the police officers involved in today's incidents were suspended." And Ext. P5 is a news item in the Malayala Manorama under date 4 21971. A part of it reads as follows: 13. It is alleged in Para.5 of the affidavit in support of the petition that several important and influential political leaders of the ruling coalition who are mentioned by name in the paragraph exerted pressure on the Government for getting the Police Officers suspended. It is further alleged that several student leaders also threatened that they would not attend classes if the Police Officers were not suspended forthwith. The further averments are that the Chief Minister yielded to the political pressure and to the threat of indefinite strike by the students and issued orders constituting a commission to hold an enquiry into the incidents in question and at the same time suspended the petitioner without applying his mind to the true facts and without stating any. reasons. The further averments are that the Chief Minister yielded to the political pressure and to the threat of indefinite strike by the students and issued orders constituting a commission to hold an enquiry into the incidents in question and at the same time suspended the petitioner without applying his mind to the true facts and without stating any. reasons. As soon as orders were passed on 4 31971 by the Chief Minister, an important and influential political leader as well as the Personal Assistant to the Chief Minister have allegedly met the student leader above-mentioned and some other students who had also resorted to hunger strike and informed them about the order of suspension and pleaded that they should give up the fast and to this it is said, they acceded. This is the averment in Para.6 of the affidavit. There was a news item to this effect in the Kerala Kaumudi dated 5th February 1971 which has been marked as Ext. P8. The affidavit in support of the petition proceeds to state that the students were not satisfied with the suspension of the petitioner alone though they welcomed it and demanded the suspension of the other police officers too. The averments in this regard are contained in Para.7 of the affidavit. The paper report in the Indian Express dated 6th February 1971 which has been marked as Ext. 9 has also been relied on and it is in these terms: "There is no question of the students of the University College going back to classes until the Government took action against two more police officials, it was stated by their leader today. Mr. M. M. Hassan, President of the Kerala University Union and Speaker of the College Union, in a statement welcomed the suspension of the Assistant Commissioner, but demanded action against two Sub-Inspectors whom he named and who, he said, were the real culprits. He also demanded action against the writer in the Cantonment police station" Apparently further political pressure was exerted on the Chief Minister and he finally put his foot down and lashed out at those who were making the demand that there should be further orders of suspension. His statement to the press has been produced as Ext. P12. 14. He also demanded action against the writer in the Cantonment police station" Apparently further political pressure was exerted on the Chief Minister and he finally put his foot down and lashed out at those who were making the demand that there should be further orders of suspension. His statement to the press has been produced as Ext. P12. 14. Though in one part of the counter affidavit (paragraph 5) it is stated that no one had exerted any pressure on the Government for getting the Police Officers suspended as alleged, and no outside pressure influenced the Government in passing Ext. P7 order, in Para.8 of the same counter affidavit it is admitted that there has been public pressure to suspend all the Police Officers involved in the use of force. We shall extract Para.8 of the counter affidavit: "The political and agitational pressures for action against the police officers did not in any way influence the Government in issuing Ext. P7 order. It is a fact that there has been public pressure to suspend all the police officers involved in the use of force on 4 21971 but the Government at no time were swayed by such pressures and its decisions were solely based upon objective determination on the basis of facts brought to its notice by its officers." 15. In the order passed by the Chief Minister on the Note File on the 4th February, 1971, the fact that a deputation of the representatives of the political parties and employees of the University College met the Chief Minister on the 4th February 1971 and gave their version of the incidents, is mentioned. The case in the counter affidavit is that the decision to suspend the petitioner was taken on the basis of the reports of the District Collector, Trivandrum as well as on the information orally conveyed to the Chief Minister by the Inspector General of Police on the 4th February 1971. The District Collector's report it appears that the District Collector bad been directed to make an on the spot enquiry has been produced by the respondent and marked as Ext. R1. In Para.7 of the counter affidavit there is the following averment: "The Inspector General of Police met the Chief Minister on 4 2 71 itself and orally placed before him the facts relating to the incident as disclosed by his independent enquiry. R1. In Para.7 of the counter affidavit there is the following averment: "The Inspector General of Police met the Chief Minister on 4 2 71 itself and orally placed before him the facts relating to the incident as disclosed by his independent enquiry. The Inspector General of Police also reduced his report to writing on 5 21971 and submitted the same to Government. But the Inspector General had already on 4 2 71 placed before the Government the contents of his report which he submitted in writing on 5 21971." The report of the Inspector General of Police as well as the report of the Commissioner of Police, Trivandrum which was forwarded by the Inspector General of Police to the Home Secretary who has sworn the counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent, State of Kerala, are in the file and we have perused them. 16. Stated briefly, what is contained in the report of the District Collector, Trivandrum is that the Police had entered the college building without proper authority and had assaulted some people who were in the building. That they entered the college without proper authority is mentioned in two places in his report. The only additional statement which has got any relevance contained in his report Ext. RI is that the police entered without grave provocation. The report further cautions that the facts stated in the report can be ascertained only after a detailed enquiry. And towards the end of the report it is stated that these are only tentative conclusions which have to be verified on the basis of an enquiry. 17. We find that there is some notion in some quarters that when the Police exercise their power to disperse an unlawful assembly, which they are enabled to do and we conceive they are enjoined to do in the discharge of their duties, they must get prior permission of some authority such as the head of an Institution like the Principal of a College or the Headmaster of a School. This is a very erroneous notion. The police have not only the right, but have the duty to maintain law and order in given circumstances. S.128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enables to use civil force in the discharge of their duties. If circumstances warrant the use of force the Police have the right to use it. This is a very erroneous notion. The police have not only the right, but have the duty to maintain law and order in given circumstances. S.128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enables to use civil force in the discharge of their duties. If circumstances warrant the use of force the Police have the right to use it. Nay, we would say, it is the duty of the Police to use force and that power does not stem from the permission to be granted by any private person or authority. We do not think that the Principal of a College or the Head of an Institution has a higher right in this regard than a house owner. Even a private house can be entered by the police in given circumstances and the house owner has no right to resist. S.149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enjoins that every Police Officer shall, to the best of his ability, prevent the commission of any cognizable offence. S.29 of the Kerala Police Act, 1960 has imposed a large number of duties on Police Officers. The discharge of these duties imposed by law on the Police Officers cannot be made to depend on the permission of any private person or authority. This proposition has not been contested before us. We refer to this only because the District Collector in his report Ext. RI in more places than one, has used the expression "without proper authority" and we are inclined to think that the reference is to the lack of permission given by the Principal and the entrance of the Police notwithstanding the protest made by the Principal. If the statement that the entrance was without proper authority because the Principal had not granted permission is eschewed from Ext. RI report there is very little left in that report on the basis of which it can be said there has been allegations of any nature regarding the conduct of the petitioner on that day. There being not even allegations against him, no question of any prima facie satisfaction that he has been guilty, can arise. We do not know whether the Inspector General of Police, when he met the Chief Minister, apprised the Chief Minister regarding the report of the Commissioner of Police which he forwarded along with his own report oh the 5th February 1971. We do not know whether the Inspector General of Police, when he met the Chief Minister, apprised the Chief Minister regarding the report of the Commissioner of Police which he forwarded along with his own report oh the 5th February 1971. The Inspector General of Police, we find has been in touch as disclosed by the District Collector's report, from time to time about the incidents that had taken place on the 4th February 1971 and we are inclined to think that he had a full version of the Commissioner's views before he met the Chief Minister on the 4th February 1971. The Commissioner's report is very categorical and details the circumstances under which the Police entered the premises of the University College and the circumstances under which the Police had to enter the building and go upstairs and even enter the office room. It is stated therein that two Police Constables were forcibly carried away upstairs into the office room in the College and they were being assaulted by the students. It is even stated that their lives were in danger. So the Police party entered the building to rescue them. If these are the circumstances we do not wish to express any opinion on these matters because the public enquiry ordered to be conducted is now pending it is idle to suggest that the police have acted in excess of their powers or have misused their powers. Be that as it may what we wish to emphasise is that if the version of the Commissioner had also been placed orally before the Chief Minister on the 4th February 1971; that would have clearly indicated that prima facie the Police had not been guilty of any misconduct. The Inspector General's report on the 5th February 1971 only states that there has been an error of judgment on the part of the petitioner. It is not for us to comment on the report because as the Head of the Police Department who had been in touch with the incidents of the day he must be regarded as a better judge of the situation. But we cannot help remarking that the decision to take any particular action when confronted with an unlawful assembly resorting to indiscriminate violence must be left to the officers on the spot. But we cannot help remarking that the decision to take any particular action when confronted with an unlawful assembly resorting to indiscriminate violence must be left to the officers on the spot. They cannot be expected to measure in a golden balance the pros and cons of their action nor can they be expected to use only such measure of force as may be determined upon in the calm atmosphere of an office room. The decision to use force and the quantum of force to be used in such circumstances cannot be weighed with the sense of detachment and objectivity which may be available in other circumstances such as when one has time to reflect and act. The use of force in such circumstances, we think, is something akin to the use of force in the exercise of the right of private defence of person or property. The Supreme Court had to consider this question of the right of private defence and an observation from the judgment in Jai Dey and another v. State of Punjab reported in AIR. 1963 SC. 612 is pertinent. This is the observation: "But in dealing with the question as to whether more force is used than is necessary or than was justified by the prevailing circumstances, it would be inappropriate to adopt tests of detached objectivity which would be so natural in a court room, for instance long after the incident has taken place" 18. We think the same principle must apply. But this again is not very important for the purpose of answering the questions with which we are confronted. We have referred to this matter only for the purpose of showing that the report of the Inspector General of Police also did not attribute any misconduct, much less a serious misconduct, on the part of the petitioner. The Chief Minister was therefore left only with the solitary statement of the District Collector that the Police entered without grave provocation. He had however cautioned in his report that his was only a tentative opinion and that details will have to be determined later at a proper enquiry. And in Ext. RI report itself the District Collector had stated that there was violence on a large scale by the students. He had however cautioned in his report that his was only a tentative opinion and that details will have to be determined later at a proper enquiry. And in Ext. RI report itself the District Collector had stated that there was violence on a large scale by the students. He has mentioned that he saw evidence of profuse stone throwing on the road and on the lawns in front of the College and the corridors of the College and the staircase. There is the further statement that the situation was serious and that he directed the Revenue Divisional Officer to go to the spot immediately. This was before noon, and the major incidents appear to have taken place in the after-noon. The conclusion is irresistible that there was no material before the Chief Minister of any misconduct by the petitioner or for that matter by the Police force deputed for maintaining law and order on that day. Why then has the Chief Minister passed this order of suspension Ext. P7? This can also be only a matter of inference. That the incidents were of a serious nature, certainly important, and of public importance, cannot be denied: An enquiry under S.3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 is desirable, perhaps necessary, and Ext. P6 order was passed directing the enquiry apparently because the true nature of the incidents and the exact manner in which the Police and others acted on that day must, in the public interest be ascertained. It does not however follow that before these are determined and in the absence of any material to indicate that the Police have been guilty of misconduct any member of the Police force should be kept under suspension. If there was no material pointing to any misconduct on the part of the petitioner, the order could have been passed only on the basis of the pressure that had been brought to bear on the Chief Minister by important and influential political figures and student leaders. The fact that there was pressure, as we indicated already, is admitted. The averments in the affidavit in support of the petition point, notwithstanding the argument to the contrary by the Government Pleader, that the pressure was on the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister has not filed any affidavit in answer to the averments denying that there has been any such pressure. The averments in the affidavit in support of the petition point, notwithstanding the argument to the contrary by the Government Pleader, that the pressure was on the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister has not filed any affidavit in answer to the averments denying that there has been any such pressure. The Home Secretary who has filed the counter affidavit in this case cannot possibly have any personal knowledge about such pressure. His affidavit commences by stating that "I am aware of the facts of the case as disclosed from the relevant files." It calls therefore for no comment. There is no answer to the averment that pressure has been brought to bear on the Chief Minister. 19. We are not suggesting that the order passed by the Chief Minister is not an honest order in the sense that it was passed with good intentions. Perhaps it was felt that such an order was necessary in the circumstances of tension that prevailed then. But none the less it would be an improper order if it had been passed due to political pressure. It is clear from what we have stated that the pressure played a dominant part in inducing the order Ext. P7. The rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision in S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR. 1964 SC. 72, must apply. That was of course, a case which was of a very clear nature, mala fides being writ large and the intention to wreak vengeance on the Government servant being spelt out in clear terms. But the principle must apply here also and the principle has been so stated: "The second ground of attack on the orders might be viewed from two related aspects of ultra vires pure and simple and secondly as an infraction of the rule that every power vested in a public body or authority has to be used honestly, bona fide and reasonably, though the two often slide into each other. When a power is exercised for a purpose or with an intention beyond the scope of or not justified by the instrument creating the power, in legal parlance it would be a case of a fraud on a power, though no corrupt motive or bargain is imputed. When a power is exercised for a purpose or with an intention beyond the scope of or not justified by the instrument creating the power, in legal parlance it would be a case of a fraud on a power, though no corrupt motive or bargain is imputed. In this sense, if it could be shown that an authority exercising a power has taken into account - it may even be bona fide and with the best of intentions as a relevant factor something which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should be exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad. Sometimes courts are confronted with cases where the purposes sought to be achieved are mixed, some relevant and some alien to the purpose. The Courts have, on occasions, resolved the difficulty by finding out the dominant purpose which impelled the action and where the power itself is conditioned by a purpose, have proceeded to invalidate the exercise of the power when any irrelevant purpose is proved to have entered the mind of the authority. This is on the principle that if in such a situation the dominant purpose is unlawful then the act itself is unlawful and it is not cured by saying that they had another purpose which was lawful." 20. The petitioner has 23 years of service in the Police Department. He has a distinguished career. He was the recipient of the President's Police Medal in 1970 for meritorious service. This decoration was conferred on him because he had discharged his duties "with commendable efficiency, honesty, tact and considerable success." In the citation read out by the Inspector General of Police on the occasion of the presentation of the Police Medal, the Inspector General of Police referred to his service as distinguished by integrity, outstanding ability and steadfast devotion to duty. There can be no doubt that the order suspending him from service has affected him adversely. 21. The passing of an order of suspension of any public servant is a matter of important consequences not only so far as the public servant is concerned but as regards the satisfactory discharge of the duties by the members of a service and therefore so far as the public interest is concerned. 21. The passing of an order of suspension of any public servant is a matter of important consequences not only so far as the public servant is concerned but as regards the satisfactory discharge of the duties by the members of a service and therefore so far as the public interest is concerned. It affects the reputation of the public servant and if unjustifiably passed, it affects his morale apart from the fact that it deprives him of his full emoluments and the right to work. It affects the efficiency of the service as well as security of service. As far as the Police force is concerned, demoralising it and making it ineffective and inefficient has the result of rendering the rule of law envisaged by the Constitution a mockery. This being so it is necessary that such power is exercised with caution and only for valid reasons and not for extraneous considerations. We are satisfied that the order passed in this case has been dominated by extraneous considerations. The order Ext. P7 is therefore set aside and, this Original Petition allowed. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in these proceedings.