JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS second appeal arises from a suit for injunction instituted by the respondent against the appellant Municipal Board, Bhopal, for restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs fencing or possession of the suit land which is situated in Mohalla Talaiya within municipal ward No. 7, Bhopal. ( 2. ) A notice under section 176 of the Bhopal State Municipalities Act, 1953 (No. III of 1956), was issued on December 29, 1956, to the respondent alleging that the respondent had put up a fencing without obtaining sanction from the Municipal Committee. In this notice, it was also said that the land in question belonged to the Municipal Committee, Bhopal. ( 3. ) THE respondent brought the suit on November 28, 1957, alleging that the land belonged to him as it had been purchased by his grandfather who was succeeded by him and that the fencing had been put several years before the suit. ( 4. ) THE suit was resisted by the appellant Municipal Board contending that the suit land never belonged to the plaintiff or his grandfather, and that the fencing was new. ( 5. ) THE trial Court found the plaintiff to be the owner of the land in suit by virtue of a purchase by his grandfather. It held that the land was not nazul land as alleged by the defendant-Board. It further held that the fencing on the land had been put about 9 years prior to the suit. It, however, held that fencing was put without obtaining permission of the Municipal board, but the fencing being not a building, no sanction was necessary. Thus the trial Court held that there was no encroachment on Nazul land and sanction of the Municipal Board was not necessary for putting a fencing. The trial Court, however, dismissed the suit holding that a notice, as required by section 335 of the Bhopal State Municipalities Act, had not been given by the plaintiff before the institution of the suit. ( 6. ) THE plaintiff appealed and succeeded. The first appellate Court held that the case was within the purview of the proviso to section 335 of the Act, as the suit was one for injunction. ( 6. ) THE plaintiff appealed and succeeded. The first appellate Court held that the case was within the purview of the proviso to section 335 of the Act, as the suit was one for injunction. It further held that fencing is not a structure within the meaning of section 173 of the Act, so that the Municipal board was not entitled to give notice to the plaintiff. In the result, it allowed the appeal and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. ( 7. ) IT is first contended that the land in suit belonged to the Municipality. In my opinion, this contention has no substance. There is a concurrent finding of fact that the plaintiffs grandfather purchased the land in suit and that he is the owner of it. On the other hand, the Municipal Board was not able to prove that it is a Nazul land. Since it has not been shown to me that any material evidence was overlooked by either Court below, or that the conclusion reached by them is perverse, there can be no interference in second appeal on that question of fact. ( 8. ) IT is then contended that the plaintiff could not avail himself of the proviso to section 335 of the Act without showing that he would have suffered substantial injury, if he had given notice to the Municipal Board. In my opinion, this contention must be rejected. ( 9. ) SECTION 335 of the Bhopal State Municipalities Act reads thus : "335. (1) No suit shall be instituted against a Board, or against a member, officer or servant of a Board, in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of a Board left at its office, and, in the case of a member, officer or servant, delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, explicitly stating the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (2) If the Board, member, officer or servant shall, before action is commenced, have tendered sufficient amends to the plaintiff the plaintiff shall not recover any sum in excess of the amount so tendered, and shall also pay all costs incurred by the defendant after such tender. (3) No action such as is described in sub-section (1) shall, unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced, otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action: provided that nothing in sub-section shall be construed to apply to a suit wherein the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceeding. " ( 10. ) THE proviso to section 335 exempts from the application of the first sub-section a suit in which the only relief claimed is an injunction, the object of which would be defeated, if a notice were given and the commencement of, the suit were consequently postponed. In a suit where an injunction is claimed to restrain the defendant from doing an act, if because of postponement of the commencement of the suit, the act to be restrained would be done, which is apprehended to be done, the object of the injunction would be defeated. ( 11. ) INJUNCTION, in a case of this nature, is a preventive relief and cannot ordinarily be employed to correct a wrong already done, or to restore to a party rights of which he has been deprived. The object of an injunction is to prevent the doing of an apprehended wrong and to protect a party against any unlawful invasion of his rights. An injunction of this character, therefore, necessarily operates upon unperformed and unexecuted acts and prevents an injury which is threatened, though non-existent at the time of the suit. The relief is available to a party who is vigilant and seeks protection from the Court before the injury is done. See 43 C. J. S. 408. ( 12. ) TO continue in possession of a property is a valuable right. The relief is available to a party who is vigilant and seeks protection from the Court before the injury is done. See 43 C. J. S. 408. ( 12. ) TO continue in possession of a property is a valuable right. When there is a threat to deprive him of that right, the party sues for an injunction but no injunction to restrain the opposite party from interfering with possession is issued when the other party has already taken possession. The party injured has then to sue for possession. In other words, the object of the injunction is defeated. ( 13. ) IN the present case, the notice (Exh. P. 5) was given by the defendant Municipal Board to the plaintiff for removing the fencing within 24 hours, otherwise action would be taken and expenses would be recovered. ( 14. ) THEREFORE, it must be said in the present case that if the plaintiff had postponed the commencement of the suit for two months and, in the meantime, the Municipal Board had removed the fencing and taken possession of the plaintiffs land, the object of the injunction would have been defeated. The proviso to section 335 of the Act thus comes to the aid of the plaintiff. The first appellate Court was right in giving its benefit to the plaintiff. ( 15. ) THE appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.