JUDGMENT : - P.C. Borooah, J :- This appeal under S. 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 (hereinafter the Code) has been preferred against an order dated December 8, 1976 passed by Sri G.C. De. Metropolitan Magistrate, 6th Court, Calcutta in Case No. C/214 of 1976 dropping the proceedings against the respondents. 2. On January 7,1976 the appellant, viz. the Provident Fund Inspector, West Bengal filed a petition of complaint against the respondents in the court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Calcutta alleging commission of offence under S. 14(1A), 14(2) and 14A(1) of tile Employees Provident Fund and Family Pension Fund Act, 1952 read with paragraph 76(b) of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate after taking cognizance transferred the case to Sri G.C. De, Metropolitan Magistrate, 6th Court for disposal. Before the transferee Magistrate a petition was filed on behalf of the defence that in view of S. 468 of the Code the proceedings wife barred by limitation the complaint having been filed more than one year after the date of default. The transferee Magistrate by an order dated December 8, 1976 dropped the proceedings against the respondents. This order is the subject matter of this appeal. 3 The appeal initially came up for hearing before Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J and the learned Judge by an order dated February 19, 1979 directed that this appeal and 2 other connected appeals be placed before a Division Bench in view of a decision of a single Bench of this Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 120-22 of 1977 with which he was unable to agree. As such this appeal and the other 2 connected appeals have come up before us for hearing. 4. Mr. J.N. Ghosh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Provident Fund Inspector, submitted that the procedure which had to be followed by the learned transferee Magistrate was the procedure for the trial of Summons Cases as laid down in Chapter XX of the Code and as such after the Case had been transferred to him, the learned transferee Magistrate could have passed only an order of conviction or acquittal, Chapter XX of the Code according to Mr. Ghosh does not contemplate any order '"dropping the proceedings" and these words must be taken to mean that the respondents were acquitted by the learned Magistrate, and as such the Provident Fund inspector has rightly come up before this Court on appeal under S 378(4) of the Code. 5. Mr. B.N. Mitra, learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Slate, has submitted before us that in as much as the learned transferee Magistrate held that the complaint were barred by limitation he rightly dropped the proceeding and the "dropping of the proceedings" cannot tantamount to an order of acquittal. Mr. Mitra in support of his argument his drawn our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nagraj v State of Mysore reported in AIR 1964 SC 269 . 6. In the instant case the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance without going into the question of limitation. When the question of limitation was raised before the transferee Magistrate and he was of the opinion that the complaint was barred by limitation in view of S. 468(2)(b) of the Code, the appropriate course for him would have been to make a reference to this Court. However, the learned Magistrate himself went into the question of limitation and dropped the proceedings. The question which now arises for determination is whether the words "dropping the proceedings" tantamount to an order of acquittal and if the answer be in the positive, then only an appeal will lie under S. 378(4) of the Code. 7. In the case of Nagray v. State of Mysore (supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with the case of a Police Officer who had been committed to the Court of Sessions without the necessary sanction as required under S. 132 of the Code. The Sessions Judge made a reference to the High Court, at Mysore recommending that the commitment should be quashed. The High Court sent the case back to the Sessions Judge suggesting, inter alia, that after the Sessions Judge was satisfied that the complaint the against accused was barred under S. 132 of the Code it would be appropriate for him to reject the complaint on that ground alone. The High Court sent the case back to the Sessions Judge suggesting, inter alia, that after the Sessions Judge was satisfied that the complaint the against accused was barred under S. 132 of the Code it would be appropriate for him to reject the complaint on that ground alone. When this point was challenged in the Supreme Court the Court held as follows : - The last question to consider is that if the Court comes at any stage to the conclusion that the prosecution could not have been instituted without the sanction of the Government, what should be the procedure to be followed by it i.e. whether the Court should discharge the accused or acquit him of the charge if framed against him or just drop the proceedings and pass no formal order of discharge or acquittal as contemplated in the case of a prosecution under the Code. The High Court has said that when the Sessions Judge be satisfied that the facts proved bring the case within the mischief of S. 132 of the Code then he is at liberty to reject the complaint holding that it is barred by that section We consider this to be the right order to be passed in those circumstances. It is not essential that the Court must pass a formal order discharging or acquitting the accused. In fact no such order can be passed. If S. 132 applies, the complaint could not have been instituted without the sanction of the Government and the proceedings on a complaint so instituted would be void the court having no jurisdiction to take those proceedings. When the proceedings be void, the Court is not competent to pass any order except an order that the proceedings be dropped and the complaint is rejected. 8. Chapter XVIII of the Code deals with trials before a Court of Sessions. Although there is no provision in the said Chapter whereby any proceedings can be dropped against an accused after he had been committed to the Court of Sessions the Supreme Court accepted the position that where a proceeding was void ab initio due to lack of sanction the proceeding could be dropped. Although there is no provision in the said Chapter whereby any proceedings can be dropped against an accused after he had been committed to the Court of Sessions the Supreme Court accepted the position that where a proceeding was void ab initio due to lack of sanction the proceeding could be dropped. Similarly in Chapter XX of the Code there is no express provision for the dropping of any proceeding but where a proceeding is void ab initio or it does not lie, having been filed beyond the period of limitation, It would be open to a Court to drop the proceedings Dropping of the proceedings however cannot tantamount to an order of acquittal. An order of acquittal contemplates that an accused who has been charged with a particular offence is exonerated and given a clean slate, and only where an order of acquittal is passed an appeal under S. 378(4) of the Code would lie. The particular order appealed against in the instant case, not being an order of acquittal, the present appeal is misconceived and will therefore notice. 9. In view of what has been stated above we must hold that this appeal is not maintainable and is therefore dismissed. Appeal dismissed. B.N. Maitra, J: I agree.