Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioners are accused 2 to 5. They along with the 1st accused, were prosecuted for offences falling under S.332, 342, & 426 read with S.34 IPC. and also under S.46 (2) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, pw. 4 the Intelligence Officer of the Sales Tax Department with pws.1 and 2 the Intelligence Inspectors and pw. 3 the peon, on 512 69 entered the medical shop known by the trade name "Zaas Agencies", Kottayam for inspecting the accounts of the shop. In the absence of the proprietor of the shop, the 5th accused was in temporary management. The 1st accused the accountant, the 2nd accused the compounder and accused 3 and 4 the salesmen were then present in the shop It is stated that the accused refused to place the account books before them for inspection. pw. 4 thereupon proceeded to the West Police Station, Kottayam to seek police help. He had instructed pws.1 to 3 to keep watch over the place and see that the account books were not removed from the shop. It is alleged that on pw. 4 leaving the place, the 1st accused attempted to remove the account books and on being resisted by pws,1 to 3, a scuffle ensued resulting in minor injuries on the person of pws.1 and 2. It is also the case of the prosecution that accused 2 and 4 prevented pw.1 from proceeding further, and actually kept him in wrongful confinement. pw. 2 was kept in wrongful confinement by the 5th accused and pw. 3 was similarly confined by the 3rd accused. The charge was denied by the accused. The learned District Magistrate convicted the accused under S.332 and 342 IPC. and sentenced them each to R. I. for 3months. They were also convicted under S.426 IPC., and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 100/-each. A further conviction was entered under S.46 (2) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act; but no separate sentence was passed thereunder. On appeal the learned Sessions Judge of Kottayam acquitted the accused of the charge under S.332 and 426 IPC., and confirmed the conviction and sentence of accused Nos. 2 to 5 under S.342 IPC. The 1st accused was acquitted of the charge under S.342 IPC. On appeal the learned Sessions Judge of Kottayam acquitted the accused of the charge under S.332 and 426 IPC., and confirmed the conviction and sentence of accused Nos. 2 to 5 under S.342 IPC. The 1st accused was acquitted of the charge under S.342 IPC. The conviction of accused 1 to 5 under S.46 (2) of the General Sales Tax Act was confirmed and a sentence of a fine of Rs. 250/-each was imposed on the accused. 2. The first point argued before me by the learned counsel was that the learned appellate judge has acted without jurisdiction in, imposing a sentence under S.56 (2) of the General Sales Tax Act, when no sentence thereunder was passed by the trial Magistrate. S.423 Cr. PC. deals with the powers of the appellate court, in disposing of appeals. Sub-section (1) (b) of S.423, which is the relevant for the present purpose reads: "may (b) in an appeal from a conviction (1) reverse the finding and sentence, and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be retired by a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such appellate court or committed for trial, or (2) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or, with or without altering the finding reduce the sentence, or, (3) with or without such reduction and with or without altering the finding, alter the nature of the sentence, but subject to the provisions of S.106, sub section (3), not so as to enhance the same." Thus the appellate court can after the conviction maintaining the sentence, or with or without altering the conviction reduce the sentence, or alter the nature of the sentence, with or without reduction and with or without altering the conviction; but not so as to enhance the sentence. The question in the present case is whether the imposition of the sentence under S.46 (2) of the General Sales Tax Act by the appellate court would amount to enhancement of the sentence No sentence was imposed by trial court under S.46 (2) of the General Sales Tax Act, but conviction was entered by the trial court on all the accused under that section. When a person is tried for an offence and convicted, it is the duty of the court to impose on him the sentence prescribed therefor by the law. As observed by the Supreme Court in Jayaram Vithoba v. State (AIR. When a person is tried for an offence and convicted, it is the duty of the court to impose on him the sentence prescribed therefor by the law. As observed by the Supreme Court in Jayaram Vithoba v. State (AIR. 1956 SC 146): "The law does not envisage a person being convicted for an offence without a sentence being imposed therefor. The power to pass a sentence under those circumstances is derived from the law which enacts that on conviction a sentence shall be imposed on the accused, and that is a power which can and ought to be exercised by all the courts which, having jurisdiction to decide whether the accused is guilty or not; find that he is. We are of opinion that this power is preserved to the appellate court expressly by S.423 (1) (d) which enacts that it can' make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper.' When a conviction is affirmed in appeal but no sentence had been awarded by the trial Magistrate, the award of a sentence is consequential on and incidental to the affirmance of the conviction, and it is a just and proper order to be passed under the law. We are unable to agree with the view expressed in AIR. 1940 Bom.129 that such an order would be an enhancement of the sentence." Thus the imposition of the sentence by the appellate court in respect of an offence of which the accused has been convicted by the trial court, but no sentence was imposed thereon by the said court is justified under S.423(1)(d) of the Code. In the aforesaid Supreme Court case the facts are that the accused was in possession of a room in Bombay city, which he was using as a gaming house. The police on getting information raided it and found the accused and four others in possession of gaming instruments. They were all prosecuted under S.5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act for being present in a gaming house for the purpose of gaming and the 1st accused was in addition charged under S.4(a) of the Act for keeping a gaming house. The Presidency Magistrate, who tried the case found the 1st accused guilty under S.4(a) of the Act and sentenced him to R. I. for 3 months. The Presidency Magistrate, who tried the case found the 1st accused guilty under S.4(a) of the Act and sentenced him to R. I. for 3 months. He also found him guilty under S.5 of the Act; but no separate sentence was awarded thereunder. The 2nd accused was found guilty under S.5 and sentenced to R. I. for 3 months. They took up the matter in revision to the High Court which set aside the conviction of the 1st accused under S.4(a) but confirmed that under S.5, and awarded a sentence of R. I. for 3 months under that section. As regards the 2nd accused, both the conviction and sentence were confirmed. It was against that that the appeal by special leave was filed in the Supreme Court. The argument was advanced that the High Court had no power under the Code of Criminal Procedure to impose a sentence under S.5, when none such had been passed by the Magistrate. It is on repelling this contention that the above observations were made by the Supreme Court touching on the duty of the court to pass a sentence when it convicts a person. When an appellate court finds that a person has rightly been convicted of an offence it must not let him go scot-free, merely because the trial court had not imposed a sentence on him. Whenever the sentence is imposed under such circumstances such sentence should not amount to an enhancement. In other words, when under clause (d) the court makes any amendment or any consequential or incidental order it has to bear in mind the direction in clause (b) that the sentence it imposes should not amount to an enhancement. The sentence awarded by the trial court under S.342 IPC., which alone was confirmed by the appellate court was R.1. for 3 months. The sentence awarded by the appellate court under S.46(2) of the General Sales Tax Act is only a fine of Rs. 250/-. So this cannot be said to be an enhancement of the sentence already imposed; but here also the matter is not free from difficulty. The conviction under S.342 IPC., cannot be sustained, in view of the facts proved in the case. The conviction ought to have been under S.341, because the offence proved against the accused is only wrongful restraint and not wrongful confinement. The conviction under S.342 IPC., cannot be sustained, in view of the facts proved in the case. The conviction ought to have been under S.341, because the offence proved against the accused is only wrongful restraint and not wrongful confinement. The Sales Tax Officers were obstructed or prevented from proceeding in the direction in which they had the right to proceed and they were not prevented from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits which is the requirement for wrongful confinement. The maximum punishment under S.342 is imprisonment for one year; whereas under S.341 the maximum punishment is imprisonment for one month. 3. I would, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence under S.342 IPC. and convict the accused under S.341 IPC. and reduce the sentence to a fine of Rs. 100/- each, in default to undergo S. I. for one week. The sentence of fine passed by the learned appellate judge under S.46(2) of the General Sales Tax Act is Rs. 250/-, which also will have necessarily to be reduced to Rs. 100/-, so that it may not amount to an enhancement. Thus the sentence passed under S.46(2) of the General Sales Tax Act will stand reduced to a fine of Rs. 100/-, each in default to undergo S. I. for one week. Subject to the above modifications, the revision petition is dismissed.