J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner member society and its manager challenge in this petition the order passed by respondent No. 2 District Registrar under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act referring the dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 federal society as per the order at Annexure A dated June 9 1969 to the nominee respondent No. 3 for resolution of that dispute. The petitioner has challenged this order on three grounds:- (1) That sec. 96 of the Act providing for the statutory arbitration is ultra vires (2) That in any event the District Registrar having not given a reasoned order the impugned order is void order and (3) that as respondent No. 2 was an ex-officio director of the federal society he could not have remained indifferent and situated as he was there was a conflict of interest and duty and therefore such a biased person was disqualified from deciding this preliminary question under sec. 96 (2) of the Act. ( 2 ) AS regards the first question the point is now concluded by the decision of the Division Bench consisting of the learned Chief Justice and D. A. Desai J. in Rasiklal v. Kailasgavri XII G. L. R. 355. The learned Chief Justice speaking for the Division Bench in terms held that the provision of the special machinery of adjudication of their disputes by a domestic forum was justified having regard to the object of the impugned provisions in sections 96 and 98 of the Act. So also the said procedure was justified in its application to other class namely non-members who unlike members officers and servants are outsiders qua the society but the classification made by the Legislature in regard to non-members suffered from a serious infirmity and that infirmity invalidated the classification. Therefore only qua non-members the impugned sec. 96 was held to be ultra vires and void as offending Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore so far as the petitioner society is concerned and the respondent No. 1 federal society the aforesaid section was clearly intra vires as it provided an adjudication machinery for disputes between the society and its members by domestic forum. That is why the first question was completely concluded so far as this Court is concerned. Therefore so far as the petitioner society is concerned and the respondent No. 1 federal society the aforesaid section was clearly intra vires as it provided an adjudication machinery for disputes between the society and its members by domestic forum. That is why the first question was completely concluded so far as this Court is concerned. ( 3 ) AS regards the other two questions the argument has been advanced on the ground that the aforesaid order of the District Registrar was a quasi-judicial order and therefore it must be a speaking order and must be passed by the authority who is not disqualified being a biased authority. ( 4 ) WE need not go into the earlier decision because at one stage it was thought that there was a difference between a duty to act fairly and a duty to act judicially because of the decision in Nakkuda Alis case and therefore where an administrative authority had a mere duty to act fairly as distinguished from a duty to act judicially the order was not reviewed by the process of judicial review in a writ of certiorari. Nakkuda Alis decision got shattered by the observations of Lord Reid in his classic decision in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 0 AC 40) where the learned Judge pointed out the wrong gloss which was put on Hemart C. J. s observations by requiring the characteristic of a duty to decide judicially being shown to be superadded and by pointing out the error which was committed by their Lordships of the Privy Council. That is why our Supreme Court in Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co. v. Company Law Board A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1789 at page 1794 in terms pointed out that Nakkuda Alis case (1951 AC 66) was in their Lordships view erroneously decided where it laid down that a duty to act judicially arose only from an express provision to that effect. Their Lordships in terms followed the view taken by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 0 AC 40) and also in the later decision in Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food 1968 1 A. E. R. 694 which is another land-mark in the modern administrative law. Therefore once Nakkuda Alis decision no longer holds the field this distinction between the administrative decision and quasi-judicial decision get almost obliterated. Therefore once Nakkuda Alis decision no longer holds the field this distinction between the administrative decision and quasi-judicial decision get almost obliterated. That is why in another classic decision in A. K Kripak v. Union of India A. I. R. 1970 S C. 150 at page 154 their Lordships in terms pointed out that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power was quite thin and was being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred the person or persons whom it is conferred the frame work of the law conferring that power the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power. At page 155 their Lordships pointed out that to prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. At pages 156-157 their Lordships pointed out that arriving at a just decision was the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry might have more far reaching effect than a quasi-judicial enquiry. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. In the past it was thought only two rules were contemplated: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable opportunity of heating. Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi- judicial enquiries must be held in good faith without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi- judicial enquiries must be held in good faith without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. That is why their Lordships in terms held that what particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case the frame work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. The court must decide the question by finding out whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case. Even in the context of what was assumed to be an administrative power of promotion on a recommendation by the selection committee even at the stage of making the report containing the recommendation such a statutory authority was held duty bound to act fairly and justly and that is why the doctrine of bias was in terms invoked. Their Lordships held that if there was a conflict between duty and interest such a person could not sit as a judge in his own cause. In view of this settled legal position whether the decision is administrative or a quasi- judicial one if the authority which is functioning under the statute has arrived at a decision determining the rights of the parties there would be clearly a duty to act justly as contemplated in Kripaks case and these principles of natural justice would apply which would be required for arriving at a just decision in the matter. ( 5 ) NOW the expression decision is always a natural expression as pointed out by his Lordship Shah J. in Sadhu Singh v. Delhi Administration A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 91 at page 97 because it can be used with reference to purely executive acts as well as judicial orders. His Lordship also pointed out that the mere fact that an executive authority had to decide something did not make the decision judicial. It was the manner in which the decision had to be arrived at which made the difference and the real test was: is there any duty to decide judicially ?. His Lordship also pointed out that the mere fact that an executive authority had to decide something did not make the decision judicial. It was the manner in which the decision had to be arrived at which made the difference and the real test was: is there any duty to decide judicially ?. At page 96 his Lordship pointed out that there is undoubtedly a clear distinction between cases in which the authority is invested with power to determine the rights of a person and cases in which the authority is invested with the power to act in a certain matter and the exercise of that power affects the rights of a person. In the former the duty to act judicially may readily be inferred. But whether a public authority invested with powers to pass a specified order is required to act judicially must depend upon the scheme of the statute which invests him with that power. The nature of the authority conferred the procedure prescribed and the nature of the power exercised will determine the question whether the public authority is required to act judicially. In P. L. Lakhanpal v. The Union of India A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1507 while considering this question their Lordships pointed out at page 1507 that where there was a lis there was prima facie in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority was a quasi-judicial act. Their Lordships also pointed out even if there was no lis inter partes and the contest was between the party proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it the final determination of the authority would yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority was required by the statute to act judicially At page 1511 Their Lordships pointed out five factors which should be considered when the statute is silent as to the duty to act judicially. Such an inference whether the authority acting under the statute where it is silent has duty to act judicially would depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected the manner of the disposal provided the objective criterion if any to be adopted the effect of the decision on the person affected and other indicia afforded by the statute. Further proceeding at page 1512 their Lordships pointed out that it was well recognised that a function or power which in its inception was purely ministerial might sometimes become quasi-judicial at a latter or some intermediate stage during the course of its exercise. At the stage the authority had to comply with the rules of natural justice and give an opportunity to the party concerned of representing his case. Their Lordships pointed out that it started as an administrative function but at the second stage it may be quasi judicial when it is characterised as a quasi lis between the parties. Again in State of Assam v. Bharat Kala Bhandar A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1766 at page 1773 their Lordships pointed out how such a question whether the power is to be exercised on subjective satisfaction or on objective tests has to be resolved. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used and where the language used is plain and unambiguous effect must be given to it. But where the language is not clear the following factors must be considered. The language of the provision the nature of the power conferred and the purpose for which it has been conferred the circumstances and the manner of the exercise of the power what things are affected by such exercise and how and other relevant factors in the context of the particular provision may have to be considered in determining whether the power envisaged can be exercised on subjective satisfaction or on other objective tests before the power could be exercised. It is on these settled principles that we will have to resolve the present controversy. ( 6 ) WHEN we turn to the statute in the present case to be construed sec. 96 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force any dispute touching the constitution management or business of a society shall be referred in the prescribed form either by any of the parties to the dispute or by a federal society to which the society is affiliated or by a creditor of the society to the Registrar if the parties thereto are from amongst the following:- (A) a society. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) a member. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) a member. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sub-sec. (2) which is material enacts as under:- when any question arises whether for the purposes of sub-sec. (1) a matter referred to for decision is a dispute or not the question shall be considered by the Registrar whose decision shall be final. EXPLANATION 1 explains what is a dispute. Sec. 97 deals with limitation and in clause (1) provides for a limitation period for various kinds of dispute. Sec. 97 (2) then provides that the period of limitation in the case of any dispute other than those mentioned in sub-sec. (1) which are required to be referred to the Registrar under sec. 96 shall be regulated by the provisions of Indian Limitation Act 1908 as if the dispute were a suit and the Registrar a Civil Court. Sec. 96 (3) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-secs. (1) and (2) the Registrar may admit a dispute after the expiry of the period of limitation if the applicant satisfies him that he had sufficient cause for not referring the dispute within such period and the dispute 50 admitted shall be a dispute which shall not be barred on the ground that the period of limitation had expired. Sec. 98 provides as under:- (1) If the Registrar is satisfied that any matter referred to him is a dispute within the meaning of sec. 96 the Registrar shall subject to the rules. decide the dispute himself or refer it for disposal to a nominee are a board of nominees appointed by the Registrar:provided that no person who is connected with a dispute or with the society at any stage or has previously inspected the society or audited its accounts shall be appointed as a nominee or as member of the board of nominees to settle the dispute. Sec. 98 (2) provides for power in the Registrar to withdraw a dispute from the nominee for reasons to be recorded in writing and decide it himself or refer it to another nominee or the Board. ( 7 ) SEC. 98 (3) provides as under:-NOTWITHSTANDING anything contained in sec. Sec. 98 (2) provides for power in the Registrar to withdraw a dispute from the nominee for reasons to be recorded in writing and decide it himself or refer it to another nominee or the Board. ( 7 ) SEC. 98 (3) provides as under:-NOTWITHSTANDING anything contained in sec. 96 the Registrar may if he thinks fit suspend proceedings in regard to any dispute if the question at issue between a society and a claimant or between different claimants is one involving complicated question of law or facts until the question has been tried by a regular suit-instituted by one of the parties or by the society. If any such suit is not instituted within two months from the Registrars order suspending proceedings the Registrar shall take action as is provided in sub-sec. (1 ). ( 8 ) SEC. 99 (1) provides as under : the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees hearing a dispute under sec. 98 shall hear the dispute in the manner prescribed and shall have power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses including the parties interested or any of them and to compel them to give evidence and to compel the production of documents by the same means and as far as possible in the same manner as provided in the case of a civil Court by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 sec. 101 provides when a dispute is referred to the Registrar for decision he or his nominee or board of nominees after giving a reasonable opportunity to the parties to the dispute to be heard make an award on the dispute. Under sec. 102 any party aggrieved by any decision of the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees under sec. 101 or an order passed under sec. 100 may within two months from the date of the decision or order appeal to the Tribunal. Under sec. 150 the Co-operative Tribunal has even a revisional jurisdiction besides its appellate jurisdiction under sec. 150 (9) as it can call for and examine record of any proceeding in which appeal lies to it for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed. Sec. 153 is the provision for appeal to the Co-operative Tribunal under which there is no appeal provided for an order passed under sec. 96 (2 ). Sec. 153 is the provision for appeal to the Co-operative Tribunal under which there is no appeal provided for an order passed under sec. 96 (2 ). Sec. 155 confers revisional jurisdiction both on the State Government and the Registrar by enabling them to call for and examine record of any enquiry or the proceeding of any other matter of any officer subordinate to them except those referred to in sub-sec. 150 (9) for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. ( 9 ) FROM the aforesaid scheme it is obvious that the domestic forum which is constituted under sec. 96 (1) enables the parties mentioned therein to refer their dispute touching the constitution management or business of the society in the prescribed form to the Registrar if the parties are as specified therein. Therefore under this clause this federal society could refer its dispute with the petitioner member society to the Registrar. Sec. 96 (2) requires the Registrar to consider the question when it arises for the purposes of sec. 96 (1) whether the dispute sought to be referred to is a dispute or not and this decision is made final. Under sec. 97 when limitation provision is for the first time provided for such reference sec. 97 (2) has provided Limitation Act being applied by treating the dispute as a suit and the Registrar as a civil Court even if there is no specific limitation provided under sec. 97 (1 ). Under sec. 97 (3) the Registrar has the power to condone the delay and admit this dispute even after the expiry of the period of limitation if the applicant satisfied him that he had sufficient cause for not referring the dispute within such period. The section further provides that the dispute so admitted shall not be barred on the ground that the period of limitation had expired and therefore makes that admission order condoning the delay final and conclusive order on that question of limitation. It should be noted that sec. 98 (1) in terms provides that if the Registrar is satisfied that any matter referred to him is a dispute within the meaning of sec. It should be noted that sec. 98 (1) in terms provides that if the Registrar is satisfied that any matter referred to him is a dispute within the meaning of sec. 96 he shall subject to the rules decide the dispute himself or refer it for disposal to a nominee or a board of nominees appointed by him. The proviso enacts that such a nominee should not be a person connected with the dispute or with the society at any stage or who had inspected it or audited its accounts. Therefore sec. 98 contemplates the stage of final settlement of dispute after the Registrar is satisfied that a dispute exists within the meaning of sec. 96. The resolution of the dispute after being satisfied on the preliminary question of the existence of dispute is left either to the Registrar himself or by referring it to a nominee or a board appointed by him. It is only at that stage that the proviso makes a specific provision that a nominee shall not be a person who is connected with the dispute or with the society so that impartial adjudication can be had. The detailed procedure is provided for resolution of the dispute under sec. 99 and in that connection powers are conferred as of the civil Court for compelling the attendance of witnesses and production of documents. It is only this final award completely resolving the dispute under sec. 101 after giving opportunity to the parties to be heard either by the Registrar or by the nominee or the board that is made appealable under sec. 102 to the Co-operative Tribunal. The Co-operative Tribunal as we have earlier pointed out has no revisional jurisdiction under sec. 150 (9) against the preliminary decision under sec. 96 (2) or the Registrars order that the dispute shall be referred to the nominee. Even the procedural rules in Rule 41 provide procedure for hearing and decision after the dispute had reached that stage of resolution of dispute. The decision is to be given in accordance with justice equity and good conscience and has to be recorded in writing. Rule 42 provides for the reference under sec. 96 in form F which is almost that of a plaint. There is no procedure prescribed for the stage prior to actual settlement of dispute under sec. The decision is to be given in accordance with justice equity and good conscience and has to be recorded in writing. Rule 42 provides for the reference under sec. 96 in form F which is almost that of a plaint. There is no procedure prescribed for the stage prior to actual settlement of dispute under sec. 98 either by the Registrar or by the nominee after the dispute is referred to him or to the board. ( 10 ) IT is in the light of such a scheme that we have to answer the present question. At the outset we must mention that the expression decision in sec. 96 (2) is a neutral expression. The legislature itself has explained that expression in the subsequent provisions and has therefore clearly expressed its intention as to what that decision means. Under sec. 97 (3) it is in terms stated that the Registrar may admit a dispute after the period of limitation by condoning the delay and the dispute so admitted shall be a dispute which shall not be barred on the ground of limitation. Even under sec. 98 (1) the Legislature has clarified its meaning by providing that the stage of a settlement of dispute by the Registrar himself or by the nominee to whom he refers the dispute will arise only if he is first satisfied that any dispute referred to him is a dispute within the meaning of sec. 96. Therefore the Legislature has by these three expressions explained the meaning of the term decision by referring to the same as the admission or as being satisfied as to whether the dispute is a dispute within the meaning of sec. 96. As pointed out in Bharat Kala Mandir case if the provision was plain and unambiguous we would be bound to give effect to it. In the present case the expression decision is not a plain expression but is one which is a neutral expression capable of taking different meaning in different context. Here the Legislature itself clarified that the context of the decision is the context of admission of dispute after the Registrar is satisfied that the dispute is one falling under sec. 96. Therefore the whole context of this decisive function of the Registrar is the context of the admission stage. At that stage the Registrar does not purport to exercise any power under sec. 96. Therefore the whole context of this decisive function of the Registrar is the context of the admission stage. At that stage the Registrar does not purport to exercise any power under sec. 98 of deciding a dispute or any part thereof. The stage of deciding lies between the parties by settling the dispute would only arise after the preliminary admission stage is over and the Registrar goes to the second stage to decide the dispute himself or by referring it to the nominee or the board. That is why the Legislature has contemplated full hearing procedure in accordance with the principles of natural justice only after the dispute reaches the second stage and has not provided any such procedure at the initial stage where the Registrar is only admitting the dispute. Even the rules also make it clear that the) contemplate full enquiry as a quasi-judicial inquiry at the stage of hearing of the dispute while at the initial stage there is no express provision either in the Act or in the rules as to how this function is to be exercised Where therefore the statute is silent as to the procedure which has to be followed we would have to apply those five factors for determining this question. If the power of the Registrar at the admission stage is to decide the rights of the rival parties by disposing of a lis as a third party it would be surely a quasi-judicial power. Mr. Kaji in this context relied upon the decision in Wiseman v. Borneman 1969 (3) A. E. R. 275. In that decision three of the learned Lords in terms held that even if a statutory Tribunal has to arrive at a preliminary decision on a preliminary question such a decision has to be arrived at on principles of natural justice and there is no difference in principles so far as observance of the rules of natural justice is concerned between the decisions which are final and which are not. It should however be noted that their Lordships have in terms proceeded on the footing that as pointed out by Lord Guest at page 279 that rules of natural justice are always implied when the statute is silent on the question in cases where a statutory machinery has been set up to decide final questions affecting parties rights and duties. It should however be noted that their Lordships have in terms proceeded on the footing that as pointed out by Lord Guest at page 279 that rules of natural justice are always implied when the statute is silent on the question in cases where a statutory machinery has been set up to decide final questions affecting parties rights and duties. Therefore even if a preliminary point or a jurisdictional question is sought to be finally decided between the parties statutory Tribunals would have to follow ordinary principles of natural justice. Therefore this decision by itself cannot help Mr. Kazi because we will have to find out whether in the present context at the admission stage the Registrar finally concludes this question against the other party or not. ( 11 ) MR. Kaji next pointed out that in sec. 97 (3) even on the question of condonation of delay final by it terms enacting that a dispute admitted after condoning the delay shall be a dispute which shall not be barred on the ground that the period of limitation had expired. That is because of the express provision made in that behalf. Therefore if the Registrar wants to condone the delay and admit the dispute he would have to bear in mind that he is finally concluding the question of limitation and when he exercises such a function even at the admission stage he would be required to follow all the principles of natural justice and he can condone the delay only if sufficient cause is made out. Therefore merely because some final orders at that stage would require a quasi-judicial approach the same position could not be assumed to be true for order of admission of the Registrar which does not finally conclude the rights of the parties. ( 12 ) MR. Kaji next relied upon sec. 98 (3) which enables the Registrar to suspend the proceedings if the question at issue between the society and the claimant involved any complicated question of law and facts until such a question is tried by a regular suit filed by one of the parties or by the society. ( 12 ) MR. Kaji next relied upon sec. 98 (3) which enables the Registrar to suspend the proceedings if the question at issue between the society and the claimant involved any complicated question of law and facts until such a question is tried by a regular suit filed by one of the parties or by the society. It may be that while disposing of the question whether he should suspend the proceedings the Registrar in order to arrive at a just decision for exercising his power of suspension and referring the parties to a regular suit may have to follow the principles of natural justice. But that would not suffice to show that in all orders of admission the power sought to be exercised is the same power. If the stage of settlement of dispute arises only subsequently after this preliminary question is disposed of at the admission stage it is obvious that the Legislature advisedly contemplates these two distinct stages. ( 13 ) IN this context when the language or the statute is not plain but ambiguous the previous history also would be relevant. Under the earlier enactment of 1925 the corresponding sec. 54 providing for a statutory reference to a domestic forum did not contemplate any such admission stage. Even the appellate provision in sec. 56 was wide enough to provide for an appeal against every order of the Registrar. The Legislature was conscious of the delay involved if such preliminary order of the Registrar was to be appealed against. That is why the Legislature while enacting the new provision abolished any appeals at the stage of admission. The whole purpose of this statutory arbitration is one of expedition by providing a domestic forum to the concerned parties which would save the parties from the huge litigation cost and the delay involved in court trial. When expedition is the main purpose of the Legislature to enact this special machinery the Legislature took care to enact sec. 166 which bars the jurisdiction of Courts under clause (1) (b) in regard to any dispute to be referred to the Registrar or his nominee for his decision. Under sec. When expedition is the main purpose of the Legislature to enact this special machinery the Legislature took care to enact sec. 166 which bars the jurisdiction of Courts under clause (1) (b) in regard to any dispute to be referred to the Registrar or his nominee for his decision. Under sec. 166 (3) all orders decisions or awards passed under the Act or the rules are made final subject to the appeal or revision and no such order decision or award is liable to be challenged set aside revised or declared void in any court upon the merits or upon any other ground whatsoever except for want of jurisdiction. If the Legislature wanted to retain the old scheme under which as soon as a reference was made by a party the Registrar would straight away enter the stage of settlement of dispute the Legislature would have enacted in vain this admission stage and the whole purpose of the admission stage would be self-defeating if it is held that even at admission stage when only the dispute is admitted by the Registrar the decision is final. In case of such a decision as pointed out by the Division Bench in the aforesaid decision in XII G. L. R. 355 at page 367 the revisional jurisdiction of the State Government under sec. 155 would be attracted. The finality would exclude only the ordinary appeal or revision. Therefore the whole purpose of this admission stage will be frustrated if it is held to be a final decision even when it amounted only to an admission of the dispute for the order would be revisable under sec. 155 as a final order. That would entail great delay. Another difficulty which would arise would be that even though the Legislature has contemplated only one full-fledged inquiry at the second stage of actual settlement of dispute on merits even at the preliminary stage the Registrar would have to hold a full-fledged inquiry if the admission stage is held to be a quasi-judicial stage involving the final decision. If the Registrar wants to conclude the rights of the other parties even at the admission stage such a preliminary decision which finally concludes rights of the other parties must be arrived at after a full-fledged inquiry. Therefore this construction of the term decision and the term final would be self-defeating. If the Registrar wants to conclude the rights of the other parties even at the admission stage such a preliminary decision which finally concludes rights of the other parties must be arrived at after a full-fledged inquiry. Therefore this construction of the term decision and the term final would be self-defeating. ( 14 ) THE entire purpose of creating this admission stage has been pithily expressed by our learned brother D. A. Desai J. in Popatlal v. Dasha Porvad Jain Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. XI G. L. R. 147 at page 153. Our learned brother in terms pointed out that it was only with a view to avoid any frivolous dispute being litigated involving the cooperative society in avoidable expense that the intervention of the Registrar is retained before any dispute can be referred for adjudication. It is only when the Registrar is satisfied that a dispute exists that the claim is allowed to cross the first hurdle at the admission stage. When the Registrar is so satisfied he creates a Tribunal for settlement of the dispute on merits by either himself acting as a Tribunal or by referring the dispute for adjudication to a nominee or a board. Therefore the Registrar is only to interpose for this salutary purpose at that stage. When the Registrars power is thus looked at as one of interposing himself as required by the statute for considering the question whether a dispute exists within the meaning of sec. 96 his satisfaction is clearly for the purpose of that limited stage. viz. admission stage. He has to exercise important administrative power. Our learned brother rightly pointed out that the creation of Tribunal and asking it to adjudicate upon the dispute would not be a function of a quasi-judicial authority. Therefore the Registrar at that stage where he interposed himself as required by the statute exercises this important administrative power. If the Registrar is not satisfied of the claimants claim being a dispute under sec. 96 the Registrar would reject the reference. Inasmuch as the Registrar the admission stage finally concludes the claimants right of statutory reference under sec. 96 such an order quashing the claimant would of course operate as a final decision even at the admission stage. When the order so operates as a final order qua the claimant. 96 the Registrar would reject the reference. Inasmuch as the Registrar the admission stage finally concludes the claimants right of statutory reference under sec. 96 such an order quashing the claimant would of course operate as a final decision even at the admission stage. When the order so operates as a final order qua the claimant. The claimant is given a special remedy although the ordinary appeal or revision is excluded by the finality at this stage that remedy is one under sec. 155 for the revisional jurisdiction by the State Government can be exercised only against the order which finally disposes of the lis. At that stage there would be a quasi-lis between the claimant on the one hand and the Registrar on the other. The Registrar was under the statute required to see if the admitted dispute crosses the first hurdle whether it was a dispute within the meaning of the Act. Therefore at that stage of admission the lis or a quasi-lis would be only between the claimant proposing the reference and the Registrar and he would have to decide at the admission stage whether to admit the dispute or not. Therefore even though objective test may have to be taken into account as to whether the dispute is one falling under sec. 96 the Registrars admission order finally concludes the right only of the claimant. The other side at that stage is not in the picture at all. The procedure is fair as the claimant has set out the claim in all its details in Form F and by considering that claim the Registrar decides the admission question. In order to make this process fairer the Registrar has evolved the procedure of even giving a notice at the initial stage even to the other side. That is however only to enable him to discharge his important function as a statutory authority. The notice is not for determining any lis between the parties. The notice was only for collecting the material so that be would be properly satisfied The Legislature has left the entire procedure to be evolved in this connection to him looking to the power which he exercised at the admission stage when the dispute is only between the claimant and this authority. The notice was only for collecting the material so that be would be properly satisfied The Legislature has left the entire procedure to be evolved in this connection to him looking to the power which he exercised at the admission stage when the dispute is only between the claimant and this authority. If the Registrar comes to the conclusion that he is satisfied of the existence of the dispute he would admit the dispute subject to the provision of limitation. There is no question of limitation in the present case and therefore he has on being satisfied of the dispute straightaway referred the matter to respondent No. 3 nominee. ( 15 ) IT is this decision of admission which is said to be a quasi-judicial decision by Mr. Kaji. If we keep in mind the entire context of this provision the only effect of the Registrars satisfaction on consideration of the claim of the claimant is that he is further empowered to put the matter for final adjudication either at his hands or by the reference to the nominee under sec. 98 (1 ). At that stage the claimants rights only are sought to be affected and he alone would have the right to be heard so far as this quasi lis is concerned. Even though the other party may be given notice at the admission stage the admission stage does not conclude the other partys rights finally. The only effect of the finality given to this Registrars admission order is that this order of reference could not be challenged by appeal or revision or even under the special revision under sec. 155 and the matter would have to go for the second stage for final settlement of the dispute. In the context of such domestic forum where expedition is the sole test any other view would be self defeating. the respondent does not suffer by this view because at the admission stage there is a lis only as between the claimant and the authority. Therefore the respondents rights are not finally affected by the admission order. The dispute whether it falls under sec. 96 (1) is a mixed question of law and facts because it has to be a dispute touching the constitution management or business of the society. Such a complicated question would have at times to be decided after taking evidence. Therefore the respondents rights are not finally affected by the admission order. The dispute whether it falls under sec. 96 (1) is a mixed question of law and facts because it has to be a dispute touching the constitution management or business of the society. Such a complicated question would have at times to be decided after taking evidence. What the Legislature intended was that there should not be two full-fledged inquiries in such a domestic forum one at the admission stage and the other at the stage of resolution of the dispute. Therefore the Legislature gave finality to this admission decision by the Registrar which has decisive effect so far as the claimant is concerned. The order is however only an exparte order of reference so far as the other party is concerned and his rights could never be concluded because the dispute was once admitted. The only effect of the Registrars order would be that the other side can raise this issue only at the time of final hearing before the Registrar or the nominee and that would entail utmost expedition. ( 16 ) MR. Kaji in this context had referred to the decision of the Maharashtra High Court in I. R. Hingorani v. Pravinchandra 67 Bom. L. R. 307. That decision proceeds on a concession. Their Lordships have not examined this vital question that the order at that stage is only admission order. Therefore even though this function may have been assumed to be completely quasi-judicial this decision could not support Mr. Kajis contention that at the admission stage the Registrar was conclusively deciding the rights of the respondents in this connection. Once it is kept in mind that there is lis only so far as the claimant is concerned only an order of rejection amounts to concluded order. So far as the other side is concerned even where a notice of admission is given the admission order even of a quasi-judicial authority would not be a final order determining the lis conclusively so far as the other party is concerned. In this context Miss Shah had relied upon the analogy of the Industrial Disputes Act where the reference is made by the Government on being satisfied of the dispute. In this context Miss Shah had relied upon the analogy of the Industrial Disputes Act where the reference is made by the Government on being satisfied of the dispute. In Madras State v. C. P. Sarathy A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 53 it was pointed out that the Government had a discretion to refer the dispute on its being satisfied that it was an industrial dispute. In the present case the Registrar had not the same administrative discretion but he has a power which is coupled with duty and he has to make reference for revolving the dispute on merits if he is satisfied that a dispute exists within the meaning of sec. 96. Even then as at the initial stage he is only deciding the question of prima facie admission of the dispute he is not concluding in any manner the right of the other party. Therefore just as before the Industrial Tribunal it can be urged that the reference is ultra vires the question can be raised by the respondent at the time of final resolution of the dispute before the Registrar or the nominee. The finality is only of the admission stage but the order of the Registrar at the admission stage cannot in any manner conclude the right of the respondent to raise this contention. We have already made a distinction so far as sec. 97 (3) was concerned where because of the express language by which the right of the respondent in the question of limitation was concluded. There is no such effect of an admission order by the Registrar. Therefore if sec. 96 (2) is so interpreted that the Registrar has to admit the dispute if he is satisfied that the claimants claim is one falling under sec. 96 his order of admission does not conclude the right of the respondent. But it has the only effect that it cannot be challenged in appeal revision or special revision. This construction would completely carry out the purpose of the Act of utmost expedition and at the same time would not effect in any manner the right of the respondent because he can canvass this ground at the stage of final hearing. This construction would really carry out the purpose of the Legislature when it has created this admission stage in terms. This construction would really carry out the purpose of the Legislature when it has created this admission stage in terms. In that view of the matter if the order of the Registrar is only one of admission it does not conclude this contention of the respondent at this stage and it is open to him to raise this contention only at the time of final hearing. In such an order there would be no question of any speaking order. Similarly the question of bias would hardly arise. The doctrine of bias could only apply where the administrative or quasi-judicial authority purports to decide the final rights of the parties. That is why the Legislature has even enacted this proviso to sec. 98 (1) that a person interested in the dispute could not become a nominee. That would arise only at the second stage that the Registrar has clearly avoided by refusing to decide this dispute himself and by referring it to a nominee. Therefore in the present case none of these two grounds could ever be urged and therefore it is not necessary to go into the wider question whether such an order without reasons would vitiate the entire order or whether so called bias objection had been waived. ( 17 ) IN the result this petition fails and the rule is discharged with no order as to costs. The Nominee shall now expeditiously dispose of this dispute as sufficient time has now elapsed by giving it a top priority. .