Judgement ORDER :- All these cases involve the same point and as such they are dealt with together. The petitioners in all these cases are the same, though respondents in each of the cases are different. The petitioners claiming themselves to be landlords, filed applications under Section 3 (4) (a) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act for eviction of the various respondents from the lands in their respective occupation for nonpayment of the arrears of rent. It was the petitioners' case that the respondents are their tenants in respect of the various extents of their private lands in 3/4th portion of the village, Keelakanjiramkulam which was granted as Devastanam Inam by one of the ancient Rajahs of Ramnad, the grant being less than the whole village, that the separate portions of those lands have been given to the respondents on lease, but that they have refused to pay the arrears of rent taking advantage of certain proceedings initiated by the Settlement Officer under Madras Act 26 of 1963. The said petitions for eviction were resisted by the respondents on the ground that the lands in question have been notified under the Inams Abolition Act (Madras Act 26 of 1963) that the question of right of ownership has not been finally decided by the Settlement Officer, and that pending determination of the question of ownership by the Settlement Officer the petitions for eviction under Madras Act 25 of 1955 cannot be maintained. All the petitions for eviction have been dismissed by the Revenue court on two grounds : (1) that in view of the fact that the parties are agitating their claims for ryotwari patta before the Settlement Officer under Madras Act 26 of 1963, the question of ownership of the lands cannot be finally decided in the proceedings and (2) the lease deeds filed by the petitioners in the form of Exs. P.17, P.20 and P.21, to prove the tenancies cannot be considered to be tenancy agreements within the meaning of Madras Act 25 of 1955 as they were not in the prescribed form under Section 4 (B) (1) of the Act. The petitioners are aggrieved against the dismissal of their petitions by the Revenue Court. 2. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the two reasons given for the dismissal of the petitions are quite untenable and that therefore the dismissal orders cannot be sustained. The petitioners are aggrieved against the dismissal of their petitions by the Revenue Court. 2. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the two reasons given for the dismissal of the petitions are quite untenable and that therefore the dismissal orders cannot be sustained. I am in entire agreement with the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners. It has been clearly laid down by a Division Bench of this court in Srinivasa Iyengar v. Revenue Court. Tanjore, 1957-2 Mad LJ 369, that the Tribunals constituted under Madras Act 25 of 1955 have an incidental power or jurisdiction to determine the tenure of the lands as a preliminary to the investigation of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the contending parties, and that whatever finality might attach to any adjudication by the Tribunal as regards the tenure of the lands the Tribunal would certainly have jurisdiction to determine the tenure for the purpose of conducting the enquiry which the statute imposes on it. In this case the revenue court has got a statutory duty to consider and dispose of the petitions for eviction filed by the petitioners on merits, and he cannot shirk that duty by dismissing the petition on the ground that the proceedings for the issue of ryotwari patta are pending before the Settlement Officer under Madras Act 26 of 1963, and that so long as the question of issue of ryotwari patta is not decided, it is not possible to decide whether there exists the relationship of landlord and tenant. It is well established that the operation of Madras Act 25 of 1955 cannot be confined to ryotwari areas alone, and that as the Madras Act 25 of 1955 has been enacted to restrict the grounds of eviction open in cases of tenancies unregulated by statutes, if the Tribunal finds that the lands are situate in an estate it must proceed to decide the question as to whether the lands are private lands or ryoti land in accordance with the provisions contained in Ss. 183 and 185-A of the Estates Land Act. 183 and 185-A of the Estates Land Act. As for the decision of the Division Bench in the case above referred to the Court in such cases has to incidentally consider the question whether the lands are royti lands or private lands of the petitioners without waiting for the decision of the Settlement Officer in proceedings under Madras Act 26 of 1963, and dispose of the contentions of the parties before it on the question whether the petitioners are entitled to an order of eviction on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. In a recent judgment of Ismail J. in Karuppan v. Lakshminarayana Iyer 1970-2 Mad LJ 314, it has been ruled that, when the question whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsists between the petitioner and the respondents incidentally arises for determination for the purpose of discharging the statutory duty imposed on an officer or authority, that officer or authority cannot escape his obligation by stating that the jurisdiction is vested exclusively in some other Tribunal, and that such vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in some other Tribunal by other statutes will have certain other legal consequences such as finality and res judicata and those consequences may not be available to that office or authority which decides the very same question as a jurisdictional or incidental question. According to the learned Judge the officer who is entrusted with the task of fixation of fair rent under Madras Act 26 of 1963 cannot refuse to decide about the relationship of landlord and tenant merely because the lands are found to be situated in a village which was notified and taken over by the Government under Madras Act 26 of 1963, and the tenure of the lands have to be necessarily decided by the authorities constituted under Madras Act 25 of 1955 as a jurisdictional or incidental question without waiting for a decision on that question by the authority constituted under Madras Act 26 of 1963. The facts in these cases are exactly similar to the facts in the case in 1970-2 Mad LJ 314. Hence I find that the first ground given by the Revenue court for dismissing the petitions cannot at all be sustained. 3. The facts in these cases are exactly similar to the facts in the case in 1970-2 Mad LJ 314. Hence I find that the first ground given by the Revenue court for dismissing the petitions cannot at all be sustained. 3. As regards the other reasons given by the Revenue court for dismissing the petitions, that the lease deeds produced by the petitioners are not in the form prescribed under Section 4 (B) (1) of Madras Act 25 of 1955, I have to straightway say that the said reasoning overlooks the specific definition of the cultivating tenant, contained in Section 2 (aa) which refers to a tenancy agreement, express or implied. This question has been specifically decided by Kailasam, J. in Kannappa Pillai v. Venkataratnam, (1965) 78 Mad LW 363 wherein the contention that, all tenancy agreements after 1956 can only be under the particular form prescribed under Madras Act 25 of 1955 and in no other manner, was rejected on the ground that a reading of Section 4 (B) in the light of Section 2 (aa) did not support the contention that, if the tenant is to have the rights of the cultivating tenant, it can only be by executing a lease deed in the form prescribed in Section 4 (B). With respect I am in entire agreement with the said decision of Kailasam, J. Having regard to the object and policy of Madras Act 25 of 1955, it cannot be said that the tenants can have the benefit of the Act only if the tenancy agreements had been made as provided in Section 4 (B). The definition of "cultivating tenant" under Section 2 (aa) specifically refers to a person who carries on personal cultivation under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and the operation of the Act cannot, therefore, be curtailed so as to apply to tenancies entered into in the prescribed form under Section 4 (B). Thus the second reason given by the Revenue Court has also to be rejected. 4. The result is, the civil revision petitions are allowed, and the matters are remitted to the revenue court for disposal on merits, after considering the question whether the lands are private lands of the petitioners or not. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.