JUDGMENT CHANDURKAR J.- The defendants-appellants who are the transferees from the original defendants Nos. 1 to 4 have filed this appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the civil Judge, Senior Division, Amravati, decreeing the suit for possession and mesne profits filed by the plaintiffs-respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The plaintiffs claimed the suit property as mutawallis appointed by a wakf deed dated 4-7-1946 alleged to have been executed by deceased Sheikh Mehatab who died on 15-11-1946. By this wakf deed Sheikh Mehatab purported to create a wakf in respect of the properties Specified therein, and according to the recitals in the wakf deed Sheikh Mehatab was himself to be the mutawalli during his life time. The plaintiffs alleged that after Sheikh Mehatab died on 15-11-1946 defendant No. I Sheikh Gulab forcibly took possession of the suit property and alienated a large part of it. Sheikh Mehatab was the son of Sheikh Bawru and he had a brother by name Sheikh Chandu. Sheikh Chandu had a son called Sheikh Wazir. Both these persons died before Sheikh Mehatab. Sheikh Wazir left behind a son, Sheikh Gulab, defendant No.1 and two daughters, Batulbi and Bismillabi, defendants Nos. 2 and 3. Khatunbi, defendant No.4, is the wife of Sheikh Gulab. Now, according to the plaintiffs, these defendants had no right whatsoever to the property left behind by Sheikh Mehatab which was the subject of the wakf and the defendant No.1, along with the defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4, had sold properties to the various defendants. The details of the alienations made by these defendants are as follows: [Description of the property is not material for the Report-Editor.] The plaintiffs have also alleged that in addition to these alienations, defendant No. 1 was in possession of three open plots and one house mentioned in Schedule B of the plaint and possession of this property was also claimed in the suit. 2. Before the trial Court, the defendants Nos. 3, 4, 15 to 18 and 24 were ex parte. The other defendants filed their written statements in which the pleas raised by them were almost identical. The suit of the plaintiffs was contested firstly on the ground of denial of the execution of the wakf deed because the transferees-defendants claimed to have no knowledge of the said wakf. 3, 4, 15 to 18 and 24 were ex parte. The other defendants filed their written statements in which the pleas raised by them were almost identical. The suit of the plaintiffs was contested firstly on the ground of denial of the execution of the wakf deed because the transferees-defendants claimed to have no knowledge of the said wakf. The case of the defendants was that the entire field property with regard to which the wakf was purported to be created was joint property of Sheikh Mehatab and Sheikh Gulab and did not belong exclusively to deceased Sheikh Mehatab. According to them, defendant No.1 Sheikh Gulab and deceased Sheikh Mehatab were staying jointly and the properties were treated as joint properties by both of them. Another defence to the suit was that the wakf was illegal and void as it was obtained by undue influence by the plaintiffs taking advantage of the old age of Sheikh Mehtab and his failing health. It was also alleged that the alleged wakf, if there be any, was created during the death-illness (Marz-ul-maut) of Sheikh Mehatab and it could, therefore be valid only to the extent of 1/3rd of the property of the deceased, i.e. his share in the joint property after payment of funeral expenses according to Mohammedan Law. The defendants contended that Sheikh Mehatab had never acted upon the wakf during his lifetime and the suit properties were in joint possession of Sheikh Gulab and Sheikh Mehatab at the time of the death of Sheikh Mehatab and it was, therefore, denied that he (Sheikh Gulab) took forcible possession of the properties after Sheikh Mehatabs death. It was alleged that Sheikh Gulab had himself half share in the suit properties and the remaining half share of Sheikh Mehatab devolved on Sheikh Gulab by succession. According to the defendants, they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the wakf deed and hence the transfers in their favour could not be set aside. It was also alleged that the plaintiffs could not claim any specific land as no particular part of any of the fields in dispute belonged to deceased Sheikh Mehatab because there was no partition made during his lifetime. An alternative claim made in respect of Survey Nos. 71/1-A and 72/2 was that defendant No.1 Sheikh Gulab had become the owner by adverse possession. An alternative claim made in respect of Survey Nos. 71/1-A and 72/2 was that defendant No.1 Sheikh Gulab had become the owner by adverse possession. At the trial on behalf of the plaintiffs four witnesses were examined and it is not now disputed that the only material evidence so far as the execution of the wakf is concerned was the evidence of Kazi Rahimuddin. Five witnesses were examined on behalf of the defendants. 3. The trial Court held that there was no evidence to show that the lands and the house property in the suit were exclusively properties of deceased Sheikh Mehatab and it gave a finding that those properties were the joint properties of Sheikh Mehatab and Sheikh Gulab at the time of the death of Sheikh Mehatab. The trial Court then came to a finding that the wakf deed (Ex. P-29) was sufficiently proved and that deceased Sheikh Mehatab had created a wakf of his properties mentioned in the wakf deed (Ex. P-29) dated 4-7-1946. It may be stated at this stage that while coming to the conclusion that the execution of the wakf deed was proved the trial Court took into account three circumstances. The first circumstance was the statement of Kazi Rahimuddin (P.W. 3) that he had seen deceased Sheikh Mehtab sign the wakf deed. The second circumstance was that on comparison the signature of Sheikh Mehatab on the wakf deed (Ex. P. 29) appeared to be his when compared with the authentic signature of Sheikh Mehatab made before the Sub-Registrar on the same wakf deed at the time of registration. The third circumstance was that there was a certificate of the Sub-Registrar on the wakf deed as prescribed under section 3 of the Indian Registration Act, and according to the learned Judge, in view of the provisions of section 60 (2) of the said Act such an endorsement made by the Sub-Registrar could be some evidence of execution. On the contention of the defendants that the wakf was one which was made during his death-illness by Sheikh Mehtab, the trial Court held that there was no question of any apprehension of death by Sheikh Mehatab, nor was there any immediate danger of death of Sheikh Mehatab on 4-7-1946 when he executed the wakfdeed. On the contention of the defendants that the wakf was one which was made during his death-illness by Sheikh Mehtab, the trial Court held that there was no question of any apprehension of death by Sheikh Mehatab, nor was there any immediate danger of death of Sheikh Mehatab on 4-7-1946 when he executed the wakfdeed. The trial Court negatived the contention of the defendants that there were bona fide purchasers for value without notice and that their purchases were protected. On the issue of adverse possession in respect of Survey Nos. 71/1-A and 72/2 the trial Court held against the defendants. Having held the wakf deed to be proved, the plaintiffs were held entitled as mutawallis to recover possession of the wakf property. Having regard to the earlier finding that the properties were joint properties of Sheikh Mehatab and Sheikh Gulab, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the wakf could operate only in respect of half share of Sheikh Mehatab in the suit properties. The trial Court found that the plaintiffs could not claim land from any particular part of each field. This applied only where the entire fields were not made the subject-matter of the wakf. These were fields Survey Nos. 127 and 131/1 of Shendurjana, Survey Nos. 15 and 65 of Khedi and Survey No. 33 of Mol Wihir, because in respect of these fields a particular part of the field was stated to be the subject of the wakf in the wakf deed. On the issue of mesne profits, the trial Court rejected the evidence tendered on behalf of both the plaintiffs and the defendants and came to the conclusion that there was total absence of any evidence with regard to mesne profits and, therefore, only nominal past mesne profits could be awarded to the plaintiffs. Consequently the trial Court awarded mesne profits at Rs. 50 per year in respect of pieces of lands from Survey No. 127 of Shendurjana and Survey No. 65 of Khedi, at Rs. 100 per year in respect of pieces of lands from Survey No. 15 of Khedi and No. 131/1 of Shendurjana and Survey Nos. 71/1-A and 72/2 of Malkapur, and at Rs. 200 per year in respect of piece of land from Survey No. 33 of Mol Wihir. The total mesne profits which were thus awarded to the plaintiffs came to Rs. 71/1-A and 72/2 of Malkapur, and at Rs. 200 per year in respect of piece of land from Survey No. 33 of Mol Wihir. The total mesne profits which were thus awarded to the plaintiffs came to Rs. 1900 as against the claim for Rs. 7350 made by the plaintiffs initially. With regard to the house property also the trial Court found that the plaintiffs will get possession of one-half portion of the two houses and three open sites mentioned in the plaint after its division, though the actual work of division of land will have to be done by the Collector, Amravati, under section 54 read with Order 20, rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So far as Survey No. 33 of Mol Wihir was concerned, the trial Court found that the plaintiffs claim could be allowed only to the extent of 13 acres 24 guntha!l subject to the maximum to the extent of one-half share of deceased Sheikh Mehatab in that land. The plaintiffs who had claimed future mesne profits were also held entitled to them. Accordingly, a decree directing delivery of possession of the areas specified in the respective fields in the wakf deed was passed subject, however, to a rider that in case of Survey Nos. 131/1, 15, 65 and 33 the land of which possession would be given to the plaintiffs would not exceed half the area of the fields. Survey Nos. 71/1-A and 72 /2 of Malkapur were, however, directed to be given possession of to the plaintiffs wholly. Being aggrieved by this judgment and decree of the trial Court the defendants transferees have filed this appeal. 4. Now, the first contention which is raised on behalf of the appellants in this appeal is that the appellants had specifically denied the execution of the wakf deed and the plaintiffs have failed to examine either the scribe of or any of the attesting witnesses to the wakf deed. According to the learned counsel, there is no evidence on record which can be said to prove the signature of deceased Sheikh Mehatab on the wakf deed and, therefore, the deed was not proved, with the result that the very basis on which the plaintiffs laid a claim to the disputed properties had not been established by them. According to the learned counsel, there is no evidence on record which can be said to prove the signature of deceased Sheikh Mehatab on the wakf deed and, therefore, the deed was not proved, with the result that the very basis on which the plaintiffs laid a claim to the disputed properties had not been established by them. Now, so far as the execution of the wakf deed is concerned, as we have already pointed out above, the trial Court has mainly relied on the evidence of Kazi Rahimuddin (P. W. 3). Having carefully gone through the evidence of Kazi Rahimuddin, however, we are not inclined to agree with the view which is taken by the learned Judge of the trial Court that Kazi Rahimuddin was present at the time of the execution of the wakf deed. The wakf deed (Ex. P-29) is no doubt a registered document, but that does not absolve the parties relying on the document from independently proving the execution of the document before any claim can be laid on the basis of that document. It is a document which shows that it was executed on 4-7·1946. It was scribe by one Anand Waman Muley, resident of Warud. The signature of Sheikh Mehatab on the document is in Modi script and the signatures of the two attesting witnesses, Sheikh Banoo Sheikh Gafoor and Nararan Sakharamji Patil, are also in Mody script. Now, admittedly neither Anand Waman Muley, who was the scribe, nor any of the attesting witnesses has been examined on behalf of the plaintiff. It is true that the wakf deed is not by law required to be attested, and the examination of an attesting witness would not be necessary before the document can be said to have been proved. But if neither the scribe nor the executants of the document was available, then the only other witnesses who could have validly proved or deposed to the execution of the document by Sheikh Mehatab would be the attesting witnesses or persons who knew the signature of Sheikh Mehatab. Kazi Rahimuddin is not one of the attesting witnesses, nor was there anything in the document itself to show that he was present at the time of its execution. Before we refer to the evidence of Kazi Rahimuddin, it is necessary to refer to another document which is on record, i.e. the will Ex. Kazi Rahimuddin is not one of the attesting witnesses, nor was there anything in the document itself to show that he was present at the time of its execution. Before we refer to the evidence of Kazi Rahimuddin, it is necessary to refer to another document which is on record, i.e. the will Ex. P-28, which also is executed by deceased Sheikh Mehatab on 27-11-1944. That document purports to have been signed by Sheikh Mehatab himself and there are six attesting witnesses. Sheikh Banoo Sheikh Gafoor is a person who has attested both the will dated 27-11-1944 and the wakf deed dated 4-7-1946. Kazi Rahimuddin is an attesting witness to the will. A reference to one more attesting witness is necessary, that is, Vasant Ramchandra Kukde. The name of Vas ant Ramchandra Kukde becomes relevant when we consider the evidence of Kazi Rahimuddin. The execution of the will by deceased Sheikh Mehatab does not in any way affect the plaintiffs claim if it is otherwise proved though it appears that by will dated 27-11-44 Sheikh Mehatab had also dedicated certain properties for religious and charitable purposes, and a part of the property was according to the will, to go to Sheikh Gulab. But as found rightly by the learned Judge, the will has beep superseded, and in view of the wakf deed the will does not become operative. It is not necessary to refer to the evidence of Kazi Rahimuddin who, as it appears from the judgment of the learned Judge, was assume ed to be present at the time when the wakf deed was executed. The will date 27-11-1944 was shown to Kazi Rahimuddin and he deposed that he was present when Sheikh Mehatab signed it. Then he deposes that Sheikh Mehatab executed a wakf deed in 1946 and he was present at that time. When the wakf deed was shown to him, he stated that Sheikh Mehatab had signed it in his presence and that Sheikh Mehatab was keeping good health when he executed the wakf deed. His evidence in cross-examination, however, shows that his statement that he was present at the time when Sheikh Mehatab executed the wakf deed cannot be accepted as true. His evidence in cross-examination, however, shows that his statement that he was present at the time when Sheikh Mehatab executed the wakf deed cannot be accepted as true. When he was asked about the details of the time when the wakf deed was written, he expressed his inability to say whether the wakf deed was executed in the morning or in the evening. He also could not give the names of the other persons who were present on that day and whether those persons were from Shendurjana or some other villages. Shendurjana was the place where Sheikh Mehatab resided and where the document was written, He further says that Vasant Kukde, Gangaram Bhuraji and Shankarrao Mukhlaji were among the persons present when the wakf deed was written, and Vasant Kukde wrote the wakf deed. According to him, Vasant Kukde was specially called from Warud for writing the document. Now, the document itself shows that Vasant Kukde had not written the document and he was only an attesting witness to the will executed two years earlier. Neither Gangaram Bhuraji, nor Shankarrao Mukhlaji nor Vasant Kukde are examined as witnesses. There is no other means of ascertaining whether they were really present. These are the persons who are the attesting witnesses to the will, and in all probability, when the witness was referring to these names, he was obviously referring to these witnesses as those who had signed as attesting witnesses on the will. The witness went to the extent of deposing that he had attested the wakf deed. As already pointed out, there were only two attesting witnesses to the wakf deed and Kazi Rahimuddin is not one of them. When the witness was deposing to the fact of his having attested the document, it appears to us that he was all the time deposing to the will and not to the wakf deed because he is a witness to the will. The witness further stated that the wakf deed was handed over to the ponchos plaintiffs after it was written. Mohammad Kasam (P.W. 1) who is examined as P. W. 1, however, does not depose that the wakf deed was given to him after it was written. Mohammad Kasams statement in examination-in-chief was that the wakf deed was given to him two or three days prior to his death by Sheikh Mehatab himself. Mohammad Kasam (P.W. 1) who is examined as P. W. 1, however, does not depose that the wakf deed was given to him after it was written. Mohammad Kasams statement in examination-in-chief was that the wakf deed was given to him two or three days prior to his death by Sheikh Mehatab himself. According to the witness, the plaintiffs were called there, but he prevaricated later and said that the wakf deed was handed over to the plaintiffs two or three days after its registration. The witness further claims to have gone to Morshi two days after the document was written for the purpose of registration of the wakf deed, and the deed was, according to him, registered on the third day. This statement again is not borne out by the endorsement of registration on the document. The document was written on 4-7-1946 and it was registered about 20 days later i.e. on 24-7-1946. When the witness was further cross-examined as to when the wakf deed was executed. He stated that it was executed in the month of April while the wakf deed was actually executed in the month of July 1946. All these statements which are made by witness Kazi Rahimuddin clearly show, in our view, that the witness knew nothing about the wakf deed nor was he present at the time when it was either executed or registered. Now, the learned Judge, while noticing these discrepancies in the evidence of Kazi Rahimuddin has tried to explain away the discrepancies by observing that the confusion was very likely when the witness was coming forth to say about the execution of two documents in his presence. While making these observations, the learned Judge seems to have assumed that the witness was present at the time of the execution of the wakf deed when that was the very fact which had to be ascertained after going through his evidence. It is not disputed that no other witness speaks of having seen Sheikh Mehatab sign this document, and if Kazi Rahimuddins evidence is rejected, there is no other oral evidence on which it could be held that it is proved that the signature on the wakfdeed (Ex. P-29) is that of Sheikh Mehatab. 5. It is not disputed that no other witness speaks of having seen Sheikh Mehatab sign this document, and if Kazi Rahimuddins evidence is rejected, there is no other oral evidence on which it could be held that it is proved that the signature on the wakfdeed (Ex. P-29) is that of Sheikh Mehatab. 5. Miss De, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, however, contends that even on the other two grounds, namely, the comparison of the handwriting and the endorsement made by Sub-Registrar, the finding that the execution has been duly proved can be sustained. Now, it is no doubt true that the learned Judge has tried to compare the signature of the executant on the wakf deed with the signature made by him on the will. We are not in a position to ascertain whether the learned Judge who decided the suit was familiar with the Modi script. But that apart, in our view, though it is permissible for a Court under section 73 of the Evidence Act to compare signatures, a comparison of handwriting as a mode of proof is very hazardous and inconclusive, specially when it is made by one not conversant with the subject and without such guidance as might be derived from the evidence of experts. A Judge should not, therefore, decide the question whether the disputed signature agreed with the other signatures of a certain person merely on his own inspection without the assistance of expert evidence: [See also Azmat Ullah Khan v. Shiam Lal1]. By such a comparison of signatures, the document cannot be said to have been proved as required by section 67 of the Evidence Act. 6. The learned Judge then relied on the provisions of section 60 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, and held that the certificate of registration under section 60 of that Act was "somewhat" evidence of execution. Sub-section (1) of section 60 provides that after such of the provisions of sections 34, 35, 58 and 59 as apply to any document presented for registration have been complied with, the registering officer shall endorse thereon a certificate containing the word "registered", together with the number and page of the book in which the document has been copied. Sub-section (1) of section 60 provides that after such of the provisions of sections 34, 35, 58 and 59 as apply to any document presented for registration have been complied with, the registering officer shall endorse thereon a certificate containing the word "registered", together with the number and page of the book in which the document has been copied. Then sub-section (2) provides that such certificate shall be signed, sealed and dated by the registering officer, and shall then be admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in manner provided by this Act, and that the facts mentioned in the endorsements referred to in section 59 have occurred as therein. Section 59 requires the registering Officer to affix the date and his signature to all endorsements made under sections 52 and 58, relating to the same document and made in his presence on the same day. Now, it is difficult for us to appreciate the argument which is advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs that even though the evidence of Kazi Rahimuddin is rejected, the endorsements made under section 60 (2) would be sufficient to prove the execution of the document (Ex. 29). In our view, there is nothing in section 60(2) by which these endorsements made by the registering officer could be treated as substitute for the evidence which is contemplated by section 67 of the Evidence Act when a document which has been executed by a person is required to be proved. Section 67 of the Evidence Act provides that if a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the writing of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that persons handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. It has been held by this Court as far back as in Maruti v. Dattu2 that from the endorsement made by the registering officer that a certain person admitted the execution, it may be presumed that the person who admitted execution was the person who signed the deed but that does not of itself prove who signed the deed. That was a case in which the plaintiffs title to the suit property depended on a document which was a sale deed which purported to have been executed by the defendant No.1. That was a case in which the plaintiffs title to the suit property depended on a document which was a sale deed which purported to have been executed by the defendant No.1. The defendant No. 1 was not examined, nor was the writer of the document, nor was any witness who purported to have attested it examined, and the question was whether the document could be said to be proved on the basis of the endorsement made under section 60 of the Registration Act. Reliance was placed on an earlier decision of this Court in Thama v. Govind3. In that case the learned Judges had observed: "On the document here are endorsements made in accordance with the provisions of section 118 and in those endorsements it is stated that the executants admit execution of the document and receipt of money. We are unable sitting here in second appeal to say that these endorsements prove the execution and the receipt of consideration money, but we are able to say that the endorsements may be admissible for that purpose. We must, therefore, reverse the decree of the lower appellate Court and send back the case for re-determination in the light of these remarks. At the same time we desire to make it clear that though the certificate is admissible for the purpose of proving that the facts mentioned in the endorsement occurred as therein mentioned, we do not wish to letter the discretion of the Court, or to suggest that by reason of those endorsements the Judge is bound to hold that there has been such execution and payment as the endorsements suggest." The Division Bench, after referring to these observations held: "The only effect of that decision is that the certificate can be considered as proving certain facts within the meaning of section 60 of the Indian Registration Act. These facts might go so for in this case as to show that the person purporting to sign Ex. 29·A admitted his signature before the Registrar. In the absence of any further evidence and no evidence was led in the court below. that would not be evidence. of the necessary link in the chain that the person who admitted execution before the Registrar was the person who could give title to the plaintiff. 29·A admitted his signature before the Registrar. In the absence of any further evidence and no evidence was led in the court below. that would not be evidence. of the necessary link in the chain that the person who admitted execution before the Registrar was the person who could give title to the plaintiff. The only facts which are mentioned in the endorsement are that a certain person admitted execution, and one is entitled to presume that the person who admitted execution was the person who signed the deed. But that, as I have tried to point out, does not of itself prove who signed the deed. It is useless, therefore, in my opinion to send down the case for further examination by the Court below. It is unfortunate for the plaintiff that he was unable to prove his document, but as the evidence stands he was bound to fail". The case before us is almost identical to the case which was being decided by the Division Bench in Maruti v. Dattu (cit. supra). In Indernath Modi v. Nandram4 Wanchoo C. J. (as he then was) observed:· "Among the endorsements referred to in section 59, is the endorsement under section 58. The endorsement under section 58 Includes the signature and admission of every person admitting the execution of the document. It is from this admission of execution made under section 58 that the Courts have held that the registration of documents is some proof of its execution. At the same time, it may be remembered that this mode of proof cannot take the place of proof as provided by section 67 of the Evidence Act which lays down that if a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that persons handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting”(Italics is ours) 7. A similar view of the effect of the endorsement made under section 60 of the Registration Act has been taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ramanna v. Sambamoorthy5. A similar view of the effect of the endorsement made under section 60 of the Registration Act has been taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ramanna v. Sambamoorthy5. The Division Bench observed in paragraph 19 of the judgment: "The effect of registration is not to prove execution as provided by section 67 of the Evidence Act but only to prove an admission by the executant to the registration in solemn circumstances. The certificate of the registering Officer is admissible not to prove the execution of the deed but merely to prove the admission of execution the effect of such admission being in each case a separate question. " We may also refer to the view taken by the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Bhutkani Nath v. Kamaleswari6. With reference to section 60 of the Registration Act, the Division Bench observed: "It is, however, well-settled that when execution of a document is being challenged the certificate of registration alone will not be sufficient proof of the due execution of the document. Registration does not dispense with the necessity of proof of execution when the same is denied. It is true that a sale deed is not required by law to be attested. Even then proof of execution of a sale deed, when it is denied, will have to be furnished as in the case of any other document under section 67 of the Evidence Act." 8. In our view a certificate of registration given under section 60 of the Registration Act is not sufficient to prove due execution of a document and when the execution of a document is denied proof as required by section 67 of the Evidence Act must be furnished. In the absence of any other evidence on record adduced by the plaintiffs, it is clear that it is not possible to hold merely on the basis of the endorsement of the registering officer that the execution of the wakf deed by deceased Sheikh Mehatab has been proved as required by section 67 of the Evidence Act. 9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, however, referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji7. 9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, however, referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji7. In that case their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that when the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular or insufficient, it is essential that the objections should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record and the party cannot lie by until the case comes before a Court of appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof. It is difficult for us to see how these observations could be of any assistance to the plaintiffs. If Kazi Rahimuddins evidence was accepted, there could be no objection to the mode of proof of the document because if he had seen the document being executed, he was the best witness who could have proved Sheikh Mehatabs signature. The objection of the defendants in the instant case is not to the mode of proof but their contention is that the evidence of Kazi Rahimuddin must be rejected because he was not present when the document was executed. This objection to reading the evidence of Kazi Rahimuddin as of a witness who could legally prove Ex. P-29 could be taken only at the stage of arguments and the defendants contention that Kazi Rahimuddin must not be believed as a witness cannot be ruled out, and indeed, as we have found, there is substance in that objection. Even the Privy Council decision in Gopal Dass (cit. supra) cannot be read as laying down that where a stranger to a document denies the execution of the document, the document must be taken to have been proved merely on the endorsement of the registering officer. Even the Privy Council decision in Gopal Dass (cit. supra) cannot be read as laying down that where a stranger to a document denies the execution of the document, the document must be taken to have been proved merely on the endorsement of the registering officer. That was a case in which the document concerned was a registered receipt of the year 1881 and the suit in which the question with regard to that receipt arose was filed sometime about forty years later and it was in that context that the Privy Council observed: "It seems clear that any objection to the sufficiency of the proof upon this point would have been idle, the circumstances being such that the evidence of due registration is itself some evidence of execution as against the plaintiffs." Even there, the words used are "some evidence" and we are not, therefore, inclined to read the decision of the Privy Council in Gopal Dass case as laying down that proof as contemplated by section 67 of the Evidence Act can be dispensed with in the case of a registered document. It is not, therefore, possible for us to sustain the finding of the learned Judge that Ex. P-29 was proved as a wakf deed duly executed by deceased Sheikh Mehatab. 10. Probably anticipating their difficulty the learned counsel for the plaintiffs has filed an application under Order 41, rule 27 (b), of the Code of Civil Procedure, stating that one of the attesting witnesses, Sheikh Banu, died long back; the other attesting witness Narayan Sakharam Patil could not be traced; and that the scribe Anand Waman Muley is available, who should now be allowed to be examined. Now, it may be stated at this stage that before the trial Court the plaintiff had already cited one of the attesting witnesses, Sheikh Banu son of Sheikh Gafoor, resident of Morshi, as their witness. No reason is disclosed as to why he was not examined before the trial Court. No reason is also disclosed as to why the scribe could not be examined in the trial Court. No reason is disclosed as to why he was not examined before the trial Court. No reason is also disclosed as to why the scribe could not be examined in the trial Court. Clause (b) of rule 27 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure as applicable in this Court gives a discretion to the appellate Court to allow a party to adduce additional evidence if the party seeking to adduce that evidence satisfies the appellate Court that such evidence, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree or order under appeal was passed or made. The application discloses no reasons, as already stated, as to why the scribe could not be produced or summoned in the trial Court. The plaintiffs basis of the title was the wakf deed and the names of the scribe and the attesting witnesses appear on this deed itself. Our attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs to their averment in the application that the plaintiffs were poor persons and could not afford to summon the said witnesses. This reason is not borne out by the record. The record discloses that the plaintiffs had already paid the process fee for issuing a process to Sheikh Banu and the process parcha to that effect is found in the D file of the trial Court. The application purported to have been made under Order 41, rule 27 (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure must, therefore, be rejected. The prayer cannot even be permitted to be made under clause (c), because having heard the appeal at length, we cannot say that we are unable to pronounce any judgment in this case without the evidence of the scribe. As a matter of fact, any further opportunity to the plaintiffs to examine the scribe will result in almost reopening the whole case because one of the defences to the suit is that Sheikh Mehatab when he made the wakf was not in sound health and that fraud was practiced upon him. If the evidence of the scribe is allowed to be recorded, the cross-examination by the defendants could not be restricted and any opportunity to bring on record additional evidence will be in contravention of the provisions of Order 41, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the evidence of the scribe is allowed to be recorded, the cross-examination by the defendants could not be restricted and any opportunity to bring on record additional evidence will be in contravention of the provisions of Order 41, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application must, therefore, be rejected. 11. In the view which we have taken, namely, that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the wakf deed (Ex. P-29) was executed by Sheikh Mehatab, the plaintiffs must fail in their suit. It is wholly unnecessary for us, therefore, to go into the further questions which were argued on behalf of the appellants. We might, however, observe that on behalf of the appellants it was contended before us that the wakf deed was vitiated by fraud and that it was made during death-il1nees and, therefore, even if it was proved it could operate only in respect of one-third of half share of deceased Sheikh Mehatab. The finding that the suit properties were joint properties of Sheikh Mehatab and defendant No.1 was not challenged before us on behalf of the plaintiffs. The learned counsel for the defendants had also challenged before us the finding on the quantum of mesne profits, because, according to him, since the learned Judge has come to the conclusion that there was no evidence on either side about the quantum of mesne profits, the award of Rs. 1900 as nominal mesne profits was excessive. A contention was also raised that the decree, in so far as it directs a particular portion of some lands in dispute to be delivered possession of to the plaintiffs, was erroneous because deceased Sheikh Mehatab could not lay a claim to any particular part of the fields, and if there was a partition, according to the learned counsel, the properties which were sold by the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 could as far as possible have been allotted to the share of the defendants as a result of partition and equities could have been so adjusted that the possession of the appellants was not required to disturbed. However, in view of the finding on the basic issue of the title of the plaintiffs, we do not feel called upon to give any findings on these contentions raised by the defendants-appellants. 12. However, in view of the finding on the basic issue of the title of the plaintiffs, we do not feel called upon to give any findings on these contentions raised by the defendants-appellants. 12. The result, therefore, is that the judgment and decree of the trial Court decreeing the plaintiffs suit are set aside and the plaintiffs suit shall stand dismissed with costs throughout. The court-fees on the claim in the trial Court will be recovered from the plaintiffs by the State. Appeal allowed.