VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of the decree passed in OS. No. 35 of 1964 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge, Mysore. The facts of the case are these : One D. Venkatrao Kore (Deft. 1) had two sons M. V. Shivajirao and Shankara Rao. Shankara Rao, died in the year 1957 leaving behind him his widow Rukminiyamma, the plaintiff in the above suit and his mother Venkubai as his heirs. Alter the death of Shankara Rao, Rukminiyamma continued to live with the members of the family of her husband till about 1960. In 1960 she went out of the family of her husband and issued a notice to the 1st defendant calling upon him to divide the properties of the joint family by metes and bounds and to deliver possession of the share to which she was entitled on the death of her husband in the year 1957. Since the demand made in the said notice was not complied with, she instituted a suit in forma pauperis in Misc. No. 240 of 1960 on the file of the District Judge, Mysore on 29-10-1960. The said application was registered as a suit in OS. No. 2/1963 on 11-1-1963 on the file of the District Judge, Mysore. Thereafter on account of the reorganisation of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in Mysore State the suit stood transferred to the Court of the Civil Judge, Mvsore and was registered as OS. No. 35 of 1964. During the pendency of the petition Misc. . 240 of 1960, Venkat Rao the 1st defendant died on 22-3-1962. After his death shivaji Rao, the son of the 1st defendant Venku Bai, widow of the first defendant Sushilabai, Nagubai and Kamalabai the daughters of defendant no. 1 were impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased first defendant. The 2nd defendant Savitribai is the sister of Venkat Rao, the first defendant. ( 2 ) THE case of the plaintiff as disclosed in the plaint is that the family of her husband owned considerable properties, moveable and immovable, as set out in the schedule attached to the plaint at the time of death of shankara Rao, the husband of the plaintiff and that on his death by virtue of the provisions of the proviso to S. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') the plaintiff became entitled to 3/18th share in the family properties. It was also claimed that by the reason of the death of Venkat Rao the 1st defendant during the pendency of the suit the plaintiff became entitled to 1/18th share in the family properties as a heir of venkat Rao. she being the widow of a pre-deceased son of Venkat Rao. The plaintiff therefore prayed for partition and separate possession of 4/18th share of the familv properties. It may be mentioned here that as against defpndant-2 the case of the plaintiff was that a certain sum of money which had been deposited in her name belonged to the familv and that the 2nd defendant was liable to render account to the plaintiff and other members of the family with regard to the said amount. ( 3 ) IN this case number of written statements have been filed by the legal representatives of the 1st defendant. Although they took a common stand in the first written statement filed by them, some of them resiled from that stand and tried to support of the case of the plaintiff in some respects by the written statements filed by them subsequently. But by the time the case was taken up for trial the relative contentions of the parties became crystallised in the following way. The case of Shivaji Rao, the son of 1st defendant was that the plaintiff was not entitled to a share because she had ceased to be the wife of Shankara Rao by reason of the fact that Shankara Rao himself had divorced her in accordance with the custom prevailing in the community to which they belonged and so the suit was liable to be dismissed. By a memo filed by all the parties before the Court below on 19-6-67 it was agreed that Items 1 to 3, S. Nos. 12 and 12 3 in Item No. 4 and Item No. 5 in A schedule should be considered as joint family properties for the purpose of the suit. Shivaji Rao, however, maintained even after the said memo was filed that land bearing S. Nos. 14/1 and 14/2 in item No. 4 of plaint A schedule was his separate property as he had purchased the same under a registered deed in the year 1959. with the moneys belonging to him. Shivaji Rao, however, maintained even after the said memo was filed that land bearing S. Nos. 14/1 and 14/2 in item No. 4 of plaint A schedule was his separate property as he had purchased the same under a registered deed in the year 1959. with the moneys belonging to him. Defendant No. 2 pleaded in her turn that a sum of Rs. 15. 000 which was utilised by her for the purpose of purchasing certain buildings exclusively belonged to her and that she was not in any way accountable to the plaintiff or to any other member of the family in regard to it. She also pleaded that all other moneys which stood in the joint accounts standing in the name of defendant No. 1 and herself has been drawn and utilised by the members of the family and no other money was available with her regarding which she could be called upon to render account. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the pleadings the Court below framed among others three issues regarding : (1) The right of the plaintiff to maintain the suit; (2) The properties available for partition ; and (3) The liabilitv of the 2nd defendant to render account with regard to the sums utilised by her for her own benefit. ( 5 ) AFTER trial the lower Court came to the conclusion: (1) that the plaintiff was the widow of Shankara Rao and that the case of Shivaii Rao that the plaintiff had been divorced by Shankara Rao before his death was not true; (2) that all the properties described in schedule A of the plaint and a sum of Rs 1 07 949-18 and the interest accrued thereon standing in deposit in several Bonks and Co-operative Societies was divisible amongst the members of family (3) that Shivaii Rao was liable to render account to the extent of Ps 800 which was the value of a Car belonging to the familv which he has alleged to have sold, and (4) that the 2nd defendant was liable to render account to the extent of Rs. 15,000. 15,000. ( 6 ) WITH regard to the actual share to which the plaintiff was entitled, the lower Court was of the opinion that she was entitled to 4/18th share on the ground that she had become entitled to 1/18th share of the family properties on the death of the 1st defendant in addition to 3/18th share claimed earlier. ( 7 ) AGGRIEVED by the judgment and decree of the Court below Shivaji rao, one of the legal representatives of defendant No. 1 and defendant-2 have filed this appeal. ( 8 ) IN the course of the hearing of the appeal Shri K. R. D. Karanth, learned Counsel for the appellant filed a memo before the Court stating that he would not press the case of defendant-1 fa) Shivaii Rao, covered bv Issues 2 and 3 in the suit. Those issues relate to the right of the plaintiff to maintain the suit. Tn view of the above memo it is unnecessarv for us to go into the question whether Rukiminiyamma the plaintiff had been divorced by Shankara Rao or not before his death. We proceed on the basis that Rukminivamma was entitled to a share in the properties of the family. Similarly Shri P N. Nanayya, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff has filed a memo stating that he would not press his case as against 2nd defendant. All the parties other than defendant-2 in this appeal who are represented by their Counsel have stated that they would not claim any amount from defendant-2 and the decree passed against her may. therefore, be set aside. We therefore set aside the decree passed against defendant-2 and dismiss the suit as affainst her. Shri Nanavya also says that he does not press his claim against defendant-1 (a) shivaiji Rao with regard to the value of the Car regarding which a decree has been made bv the Court below. He submits that the decree to that extent may be modified. ( 9 ) WHAT, however, remains to be considered in this appeal is, about the nature of the properties bearing S. Nos. 14/1 and 14/2 in item No. 4 of plaint A schedule and the extent of the share to which the plaintiff is entitled to. It is no doubt true that the sale deed (Ext. D-4) under which S. Nos. 14/1 and 14/2 in item No. 4 of plaint A schedule and the extent of the share to which the plaintiff is entitled to. It is no doubt true that the sale deed (Ext. D-4) under which S. Nos. 14/1 and 14/2 in item 4 of plaint A schedule were purchased stands in the name of Shivaji Rao, defendant-1 (e ). Ext. D-4 is the original sale deed and Ext. D-5 is a certified copy thereof. Before the said sale deed was executed by DW. 1 there was an agreement Ext. D6 entered into on 12-2- 1958, under which a sum of Rs. 2,000 was paid as advance and the balance of the sale price had to be paid at the time of the registration of the sale deed. "the sale deed was registered on 27-2-1959. The case of Shivaji Rao was that the price paid under the agreement to sell belonged to him and no part of the monies belonging to the family was utilised in that regard. In support of his case apart from his evidence we do not have any other evidence. It is true that ordinarily when a property stands in the name of a junior member of a family who is not functioning as a manager the property would be considered as belonging to him until it is established by other persons who claim that the said property is joint family property by adducing reliable evdience showing that it is joint family property. If any evidence is forth-coming that the money utilised for buying the property belonged to the family then the said property would be treated as joint family property. In this case we have unimpeachable evidence in the form of entries made in the diaries for the years 1958 and 1959, Exts. P9 and p10 maintained by Venkat Rao, the 1st defendant who was the manager of the family. At page No. 43 in Ext. P9 relating to 12th February 1958 the 1st defendant Venkat Rao has recorded in his own hand-writing that a sum of Rs. 2,000 had been paid by way of advance under an agreement to buy certain properties. At page No. 57 in the diary of 1959 which is marked as Ext. P10 (a) relating to 26th February 1959, it is written by the 1st defendant Venkat Rao that he had advanced a sum of Rs. 2,000 had been paid by way of advance under an agreement to buy certain properties. At page No. 57 in the diary of 1959 which is marked as Ext. P10 (a) relating to 26th February 1959, it is written by the 1st defendant Venkat Rao that he had advanced a sum of Rs. 5,000 to Shivaji rao, defendant 1 (a) for the purpose of getting a document registered. Ext. D6 the agreement was entered into on 12-2-1958 and the sale deed Ext. D4 was registered on 27-2-1959. Apparently the two entries referred to above referred to the transactions covered by Ext. D6 the agreement and Ext. D4 the sale deed. It is not shown that any other transactions were entered into on those dates. Further the land in question was being managed as part of joint family property. The lower Court was therefore right in not accepting the case of Shivaji Rao, defendant-1 (a) and in holding that S. Nos. 14/1 and 14/2 in item No. 4 of plaint A schedule belonged to the joint family. We therefore reject the case of the defendant-1 (a) in this regard. ( 10 ) THE next submission made by Shri K. R D. Karanth, is one based on S. 6 of the Act. He depended upon the Explanation 2 to S. 6 of the Act in support of his contention that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim a share in the estate left by the 1st defendant Venkat Rao on his death in the year 1962. He contended that the plaintiff having instituted a suit for partition and separate possession of her share to which she became entitled on the death of Shankara Rao, incurred the disability created by Explanation 2 to S. 6 of the Act, and she being an heir of Shankara Rao, was not entitled to claim a share in the property of Venkata Rao who continued to be joint with Shivaji Rao until his death. It was urged that the estate of Venkat Rao would devolve on his heirs according to the provisions of the Act other than the plaintiff and Venkubai, defendant-1 (b) both of whom had acquired interest in the share of Shankara Rao on his death. It was urged that the estate of Venkat Rao would devolve on his heirs according to the provisions of the Act other than the plaintiff and Venkubai, defendant-1 (b) both of whom had acquired interest in the share of Shankara Rao on his death. In order to examine the correctness of the submission made by shri Karanth it is necessary to set out the provisions of S-6 of the Act, it reads as follows:"6. Devolution of Interest in coparcenary property : When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be under this act and not by survivorship. Explanation : (1) For the purpose of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation : (2) Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself \ from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. "the main part of S. 6 reproduces the law as it stood before the Act was passed and it states that the interest in a joint family property of a deceased coparcener would devolve on the surviving coparceners. The proviso to this section however introduces a departure from the law as it stood then in so far as the interest in the joint family property of a deceased coparcener who has left behind him a female relative specified in Clause (1) of the schedule to the Act or male relative specified in that clause who claims through such female relative. The proviso read with Explanation-1 to S. 6 provides that on the death of a coparcener leaving behind the female relative or the male relative specified therein his interest in the joint family property would devolve by testamentary or intestate succession as provided in the Act and not by survivorship and that for purposes of quantification of the interest of the deceased coparcener it should be assumed that a notional partition has taken place immediately before his death irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. To us it appears to be clear that neither the proviso nor Explanaton-1 states that on the death of a coparcener an actual division takes place between' the heire of such deceased coparceners and the other coparceners. They continue to be members of the joint family until such time the property is actually divided from a share claimed by them. Explanation-1 cannot be read as actually bringing about a division. As already stated it only provides for determination of the extent of the share of the deceased coparcener which would devolve by testamentary or intestate succession and not by survivorship and it follows that anv other subsequent event would not in any way affect the extent of that share. ( 11 ) EXPLANATION 2 only reproduces the law which was already in force before the Act came into force as understood by some High Courts in India. A son who is divided from a family was not entitled to claim a share in the property of the father on his death if there were undivided son or sons living with him at the time of his death. Explanation-2 does no more than incorporating the same principle of law in the Act. It states that the proviso to S. 6 would not enable a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the estate of the deceased. It declares that the disability which a divided member was suffering from continues to be operative even after the Act comes into force. It declares that the disability which a divided member was suffering from continues to be operative even after the Act comes into force. The principle underlying the said view of law is that persons who continue to remain joint with other members of the family should be preferred in the matter of intestate succession to a person who has gone out of the family by taking away his share. Probably that was considered to be in consonance with the notions cf the joint family system prevailing in India. The said disability was a consequence of a voluntary act on the part of the separated member. The proviso to S. 6 is an exception to the rule incorporated in the main part of s. 6 and Explanation-2 is an exception to the rule incorporated in the proviso to S. 6. While construing a provision of this type we have to construe it strictly and if the case of any person cannot be brought within the four corners of the exception it should be held that it would not affect the interest of such a person. In the instant case Shankar Rao did not file a suit before his death nor had he expressed his intention to separate from the family. When he died he was an undivided member of the joint family and if on account of the proviso to S. 6, certain heirs of Shankara Rao became entitled to the share of Shankara Rao in the joint family property it cannot be said that they are in the same position which Shankar Rao or his heirs would have occupied if he had filed a suit for partition or demanded partition and separate possession of their share in the joint family properties. Explanation-2 should be confined only to those cases where a coparcener has gone out of the family on account of his voluntary act and should not be extended to a case where by operation of law certain persons become entitled to a share of the joint family property of a deceased coparcener. Explanation-2 should be confined only to those cases where a coparcener has gone out of the family on account of his voluntary act and should not be extended to a case where by operation of law certain persons become entitled to a share of the joint family property of a deceased coparcener. If we accept the contention of Shri K. R. D. Karanth, not merely the plaintiff would be disentitled to claim a share on the death of Venkat rao, but defendant Venkubai, the widow of the 1st defendant also would not be entitled to claim share in the property of her husband, because both of them happen to be the heirs of Shankara Rao. Neither Venkubai nor the plaintiff is claiming any interest in the property of Venkat Rao, through Shankar Rao, but by reason of schedule 1 to the Act. The fact that the plantiff instituted the suit before the death of Venkat Rao for a share in the estate of her husband does not preclude her. from claiming a share in the estate of Venkat Rao as a widow of his predeceased son. We are of the opinion, that the contention urged on behalf of defendant 1 (a) by Shri k. R. D. Karanth has therefore to be rejected. It is not disputed that in that event the plaintiff would be entitled to 1/18th share as a heir of Venkata rao in the family properties. The Court below was therefore right in holding that plaintiff was entitled to 4/18th share in the family properties. ( 12 ) BEFORE concluding it is necessary to refer to some other aspects of the case urged before us ****** ( 13 ) SHRI P. M. Nanayya, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that certain amounts have been drawn by the parties during the pendency of this appeal and the Court below should be directed to take into account while passing a final decree that the said payments have been made to them. We accordingly do so. ( 14 ) IT was brought to our notice that in the course of the judgment and decree of the Court below there were some discrepancies with regard to the shares to which the parties were entitled to. So in order to make the matters clear we pass a fresh decree in substitution of the decree passed by the Court below. So in order to make the matters clear we pass a fresh decree in substitution of the decree passed by the Court below. There shall be a preliminary decree directing partition of the properties belonging to the family as-follows: (1) The plaintiff is entitled to 4/18th share in the properties described in plaint A schedule and in the Sum of Rs. 1,07,949-48 Ps. and the interest accrued thereon as set out in para 19 of the judgment of the lower Court. (2) Defendant 1 (a) Shivaji Rao is entitled to 7 18th share. (3) Defendant 1 (b) Venkubai is entitled to 4/18th share. It shall be distributed in accordance with the direction in the will said to have been made by her. (4) Defendants 1 (c), 1 (d) and (e) are each entitled to 1/18th share in the said properties. The Court below will pass a final decree on the above basis and in accordance with the directions given above. (5) Account shall be taken under Order 20, Rule 18 of the CPC. and appropriate consequential orders may be made after such enquiry. (6) The suit as against defendant 2 stands dismissed. ( 15 ) THE costs incurred by the plaintiff and defendants 1 (a) to 1 (e) in this Court and in the Court below shall come out of the estate. Defendant no. 2 shall bear her own cost both in this Cpurt as well as in the court below. The Court fee payable on the plaint shall be paid out of the estate. ( 16 ) THE trial Court shall proceed to dispose of the suit expeditiously. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. --- *** --- .