JUDGMENT : Untwalia, J. Shri Kedar Nath Lal, the sole petitioner in this writ application, has obtained a Rule against the Life Insurance Corporation of India, respondent 1, its Zonal Manager and Senior Divisional Manager, respectively respondents 2 and 3 to show cause why the final ORDER :of the Chairman of the Corporation communicated in the letter dated 9-12-1971, a copy of which is Annexure 15 to the writ application, written by respondent 3 to the petitioner, be not called up and quashed and why the respondents be not directed to continue to accept the date of birth of the petitioner as 1-4-1914. Cause has been shown on behalf of the respondents by filing a counter-affidavit as also at the time of the hearing of the rule. 2. Facts do not seem to be much in dispute in this case. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant in the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Company Ltd. on 1-9-1943. The said Insurer, according to the petitioner's case, at the time of confirmation of the petitioner accepted his date of birth as 1-4-1914 on the basis of the horoscope, and some affidavits, as, his date of birth was wrongly recorded as 1-4-1912 in the school records and consequently in the university certificate. The petitioner was confirmed with effect from 1-12-1943. 3. The Life Insurance Corporation was created in the year 1956 and the insurance business of the Insurer was taken over by the Corporation with effect from 1-9-1956. Under the Corporation the petitioner was fixed up as Section Head and was later promoted in the rank of Superintendent with effect from 19-2-1962. Since then he had been working in the said capacity. By Annexure 1-a letter dated 28-5-1965 -the petitioner was informed by respondent 3 that his date of birth as per his horoscope was 1-4-1914 and that had been noted in the records. In the counter affidavit of the respondents it is stated that the fact mentioned in Annexure 1 was on the basis of the routine entry made before the Corporation took up the matter of verification of entries in the staff records. 4. In the counter affidavit of the respondents it is stated that the fact mentioned in Annexure 1 was on the basis of the routine entry made before the Corporation took up the matter of verification of entries in the staff records. 4. The petitioner's case is that he was surprised to receive the letter dated 6-2-1968 from respondent 3 reopening the question of date of birth of the petitioner on the basis of a certified copy of the certificate of the Patna University, according to which his date of birth came to be 1-4-1912. By this letter the petitioner was asked to submit his original university certificate. Another letter dated 14-12-1968 (Annexure 3) by way of reminder was written by the Divisional Manager where it was also stated that the Patna Divisional Office had admitted his date of birth as 1st April, ] 912 in its record as per instructions of the Zonal Office, Calcutta. The petitioner gave his reply dated 17-5-1969, a copy of which is Annexure 4, expressing his inability to produce the original Matriculation Certificate. The Divisional Manager by his letter dated 27-5-1969 (Annexure 5), communicated to the petitioner that the Central Officer, Bombay, had decided that even in cases of members of the Oriental Pension Fund, verification of the date of birth should be done afresh with reference to Matriculation/School Certificate only. The final decision taken by the Patna Divisional Office in pursuance of the said instructions was communicated to the petitioner that his date of birth had been taken as 1-4-1912. The petitioner filed representation dated 12-5-1970 (Annexure 6) to challenge the decision contained in Annexure 5. This was treated as an appeal to Zonal Manager. And, from the Zonal Office, Calcutta, certain document were asked for by letter dated 21-8-1970 (Annexure 7). The petitioner gave his reply dated 3-12-1970 (Annexure 8), expressing his inability to produce the documents. The petitioner's representation was forwarded by the Zonal Office to the Central Office. The latter advised the former to draw the petitioner's attention to the Chairman's "Instruction's (LIC of India, verification of date of birth of employees) (sic) Instructions 1970 requiring all Employees to produce documentary proof for the purpose of verifying their date of birth.” Original Matriculation Certificate, original horoscope and copy of the birth certificate were asked for by the letter (Annexure 9). The petitioner gave his reply (Annexure 10). The petitioner gave his reply (Annexure 10). Some more correspondence followed, and then by letter dated 10-8-1971 (Annexure 13) written by respondent 3 the petitioner was intimated that the Central Office has accepted his date of birth as 1-4-1912 on the strength of the certificate from the Registrar, Patna University, dated the 6th May, 1971. A copy of the said certificate is Annexure A to the counter-affidavit. Accordingly, by Annexure 13, the petitioner was informed that his date of retirement fell due on 1st April, 1972. Then followed the letter dated 17-8-1971 (Annexure 14) informing the petitioner that he would be attaining superannuation age and retiring from service with effect from 1-1-1972 and giving him option to apply for leave preparatory to retirement. The petitioner states in Paragraph 27 of the writ application that on 21st of September, 1971 he preferred an appeal against the ORDER :of alteration of his date of birth in his service record under Staff Regulation of 1960 to the Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Central Office, Bombay. The said appeal was finally rejected by the ORDER :of the Chairman communicated in the Patna Divisional Office letter dated 9-12-1971 (Annexure 15). Shortly put, the Corporation accepted the petitioner's date of birth as 1-4-1912 on the basis of the Matriculation Certificate while the petitioner wanted the previous acceptance of his date of birth, i. e. 1-4-1914 to continue. 5. Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned counsel of the petitioner, asked us to quash the final ORDER :of the Chairman of the Life Insurance fixing the date of birth of the petitioner as 1-4-1912 on the following grounds- (i) That the ORDER :was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. (ii) That the impugned ORDER :is arbitrary, as the Corporation had no power to go behind the date of birth accepted by the Insurer, namely, the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Company Ltd. and it did so in violation of the statutory provision of Section 11 (1) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Act). (iii) That the impugned ORDER :is unreasonable and discriminatory and should be struck down as being violative of equal protection of law guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (iii) That the impugned ORDER :is unreasonable and discriminatory and should be struck down as being violative of equal protection of law guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Counsel, therefore, prayed that the impugned ORDER :should be quashed by grant of a writ of certiorari and a writ of mandamus should issue commanding the respondents to make the petitioner retire on the basis of his date of birth as 1-4-1914. 6. In reply Mr. Radha Raman, learned counsel for 6e respondents submitted that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice nor was the ORDER :arbitrary or made in violation of any statutory provision of the Act. Counsel further submitted that the Life Insurance Corporation is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution nor is it amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 or 227, and no relief can be granted to the petitioner, as, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, it would be tantamount to granting specific performance of contract of service allegedly broken illegally by the master. 7. In determination of the rival contentions of the parties are involved some important and difficult questions of law. I may, however, briefly indicate my view first on the questions of facts. 8. There was no violation of any principle of natural justice in this case. While stating the facts, I have briefly referred to the correspondence between the parties. On discovery of the certified copy of the University Certificate in the file of the petitioner showing his date of birth as 1-4-1912, letter dated 6.2.1968 (Annexure 2) was written to the petitioner. The long correspondence which followed thereafter and the opportunity which was given to the petitioner to substantiate his case would clearly show that there was no violation of any principle of natural justice. The petitioner had his full say in the matter. Not only that, he, on two occasions, filed representations or appeals before the higher authorities, which were dealt with by them in the manner they thought it fit and proper to deal. I do not propose to decide in this writ case whether the Corporation had a right or was justified to reopen the question of determination of the date of birth of the petitioner. I do not propose to decide in this writ case whether the Corporation had a right or was justified to reopen the question of determination of the date of birth of the petitioner. I shall assume in his favour that the Corporation had no such right or justification, and in that sense its ORDER :determining the date of birth of the petitioner as 1.4.1912 was arbitrary. But the question is: is the petitioner entitled to any relief in this case? 9. Section 11 of the Act deals with the transfer of service of existing employees of insurers to the Corporation. Sub-section (1) says that such employees "shall, on and from the appointed day, become an employee of the Corporation and shall hold his office therein by the same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions and with the same rights and privileges as to pension and gratuity and other matters as he would have held the same on the appointed day if this Act had not been passed, and shall continue to do so unless and until his employment in the Corporation is terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions are duly altered by the Corporation." Sub-section (2) empowers the Central Government to alter the remuneration and other terms and conditions of service to such extent and in such manner as it thinks fit. Section 48 of the Act confers power in the Central Government to make rules to carry out its purposes. The Corporation derives its power to make regulations under Section 49. Clause (bb) was added in Sub-section (2) of Section 49 of the Act with retrospective effect by Act 17 of 1957. The regulations framed by the Corporation, under the said clause, may provide for “the terms and conditions of service of persons who have become employees of the Corporation under Sub-section (1) of Section 11". The Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 were framed by the Corporation in exercise of its power under Section 49. Regulation 19 deals with superannuation and retirement, and Sub-regulations (1) to (2A) read as follows :" (1) A transferred employee shall retire on completion of age 60; but the appointing authority may direct such employee to retire on completion of 55 years of age or at any time thereafter, if his efficiency is found to have been impaired. Regulation 19 deals with superannuation and retirement, and Sub-regulations (1) to (2A) read as follows :" (1) A transferred employee shall retire on completion of age 60; but the appointing authority may direct such employee to retire on completion of 55 years of age or at any time thereafter, if his efficiency is found to have been impaired. (2) An employee appointed to the service of the Corporation on or after 1st September, 1956 shall retire on completion of 58 years of age; but the appointing authority may direct such employee to retire on completion of 55 years of age or at any time thereafter, if his efficiency is found to have been impaired. (2A) Notwithstanding what is stated in Sub-regulations (1) and (2) above, an employee may be permitted to retire at any time after he has completed age 55." 10. It's not the petitioner's case that Regulation 19(1) violated Section 11 (1) of the Act or that any change of conditions of service was brought about by changing the age of superannuation of the transferred employee without following the procedure of Section 11(2), It is not his case that other transferred employees placed in a similar and equal situation as the petitioner's were allowed to continue on the basis of date of birth recorded in the records of the insurers, but the petitioner only, without any rhyme or reason, was discriminated and picked out for making him retire on the basis of the age recorded in his Matriculation Certificate. Rather, the letter dated 30.1.1971 (Annexure 9) shows that under the Chairman's instructions all employees were asked to produce documentary proof for purposes of verifying their date of birth. Annexure 5- letter dated 27-5-1969-further shows that a uniform policy was adopted for verification of the date of birth on the basis of Matriculation/School Certificate only. It is, therefore, clear that no discrimination was made in the case of the petitioner nor there was any violation of the statutory requirement of Section 11 (1) of the Act, as was argued on his behalf. It is, therefore, clear that no discrimination was made in the case of the petitioner nor there was any violation of the statutory requirement of Section 11 (1) of the Act, as was argued on his behalf. To my mind, the effect of the impugned ORDER :, assuming in favour of the petitioner that it is arbitrary and unjustified, is to ask the petitioner to superannuate and retire 2 years earlier than the date on which, according to him, he ought to have been so asked to do, In other words, the Corporation by the allegedly arbitrary and illegal ORDER :has wrongfully terminated the contract of service of the petitioner and has asked him to go out of employment at a time which was premature by 2 years. The question of difficulty then is : is the petitioner entitled to any relief in this writ case? 11. The position of law which emerges on a consideration of the various authorities which will be presently alluded to is as follows : (i) The Life Insurance Corporation is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and cannot make any regulation or take any action so as to violate the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III. (ii) Although it is an authority amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, no writ can issue to quash the impugned ORDER :if it has the effect of enforcing the contract of service unless the ORDER :is held to have been made in infraction of the fundamental right or the requirement of the Act or the Rules framed under Section 48. 12. In (1) Rajasthan State Electricity Board V. Mohan Lal (A. I. R. 1957 Supreme Court 1857) Bhargava, J, delivering the majority JUDGMENT : hid d.Jwn the tests for determining whether an authority comes within the expression "other authorities" in Article 12 of the Constitution. His Lordship was pleased to say at page 1863 (Column 1): "These decisions of the Court support our view that the expression 'other authorities' in Article 12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. Under the Constitution, the State is itself envisaged as having the right to carry on trade or business as mentioned in Article 19 (1)(g). In Part IV, the State has been given the same meaning as in Article 12 and one of Directive Principles laid down in Article 46 is that the State shall promote with special cue the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. The State, as defined in Article 12, is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people. The State, as constituted by our Constitution, is further specifically empowered under Article 298 to carryon any trade or business. The circumstance that the Board under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word 'State' as used in Article 12. On the other hand, there are provisions in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly show that the powers conferred on the Board include power to give directions, the disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence." Shah, J., as he then was, while striking out a note of dissent apropos the general and wide meaning of the term 'authority' given in the majority JUDGMENT :, agreed with it that the Electricity Board is a State., Applying the tests given in the majority JUDGMENT :, I have come to the conclusion that the Life Insurance Corporation is also a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Under Section 13 (3) of the Act it has been made lawful for the Corporation to take all necessary steps for securing possession of all properties which have been transferred and vested in it under the Act. Section 40 makes the failure to deliver property under Section 13 punishable. Section 47 gives protection to action taken under the Act and says- “No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any member or employee of the Corporation for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act." Under Section 49 the Corporation is empowered to make regulations. Section 47 gives protection to action taken under the Act and says- “No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any member or employee of the Corporation for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act." Under Section 49 the Corporation is empowered to make regulations. It would thus be seen that under the scheme of the Act the Government have taken over the insurance business and decided to run it through the statutory Corporation, namely, the Life Insurance Corporation, clothing it with certain powers which may be called quasi-governmenta1. I think, therefore, that the Life Insurance Corporation is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 13. In (2) Shyam Lal Sharma V. Life Insurance Corporation of India [(1970) Labour Law Journal 393] a Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that the Life Insurance Corporation is a State. Our attention was drawn to an un certified copy of the decision of the Kerala High Court in (3) O. P. No. 463/1972 (S. R. S. Mony V. Life Insurance Corporation of India) decided on the 13th April, 1972 taking the same view. A Bench of the Bombay High Court in (4) Pramodrai Shamaldas Bhavsar V. Life Insurance Corporation of India (A. I. R. 1969 Bombay 337) has expressed the view that the Life Insurance Corporation is not a State. The Calcutta High Court in (5 ) Life Insurance Corporation of India V. Nilratan Banerjee (1971) I Labour Law Journal 1] has not agreed with this view as would appear from the discussion in Paragraph 14 at page 13. With very great respect, I also do not accept the Bombay view as correct. 14. In (6) Ham Babu Rathaur V. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India (A.I R. 1961 Allahabad 502) Jagdish Sahai, J., refused to issuea writ against the Life Insurance Corporation and its authorities. With very great respect, I also do not accept the Bombay view as correct. 14. In (6) Ham Babu Rathaur V. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India (A.I R. 1961 Allahabad 502) Jagdish Sahai, J., refused to issuea writ against the Life Insurance Corporation and its authorities. Dealing with this case, Shah, J. as he then was, in (7) S. R. Tewari V. The District Board (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 1680) has said at page 1683 (column 1)- "In (6) Ram Babu Rathaur's case AIR 1961 All 502 the Court had to consider the question whether an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation whose employment was terminated could claim a writ of mandamus restoring him to the service of the Corporation, or a writ of certiorari quashing the proceeding of the Corporation. The Corporation is an autonomous body and is not a department of the State, and the relation between the Corporation and its employee is governed by contract, and no statutory obligation is imposed upon the Corporation in that behalf. The Court was therefore right in holding that the relationship between the employee and the Corporation had to be determined, in the absence of any statutory provision or a special contract, by the general law of master and servant." In regard to the case of dismissal of an employee of the District Board, the Board's argument put forward on its behalf was rejected but in the following words- “The contention raised by counsel for the Baud that a petition for a declaration that the employment of the appellant was not lawfully terminated and on that account the Board be commanded to treat the appellant as lawfully in service cannot be maintained, must be rejected. The jurisdiction to declare the decision of the Board as ultra vires exists, though it may be exercised only when the Court is satisfied that departure is called for from the rule that a contract of service will not ordinarily be specifically enforced." The decision i (7) Tewari's case although reported later in the A.I R. volume was given on 15-4•1963. The decision in (8) Life Insurance Corporation of India V. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 847) although reported earlier seems to have been given later on 22-11-1963. In this decision the re is no reference to Tewari's case. The decision in (8) Life Insurance Corporation of India V. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 847) although reported earlier seems to have been given later on 22-11-1963. In this decision the re is no reference to Tewari's case. Later it has been considered and distinguished in several decisions of the Supreme Court The interference with He termination of service of the Corporation employees in the case of (8) A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 847 made by the High Court was maintained on the ground that the termination was in violation of the ORDER :of the Central Government made under Section 11 (2) of the Act and hence it was a violation of the statutory requirement of the law. 15. In (9) Executive Committee of U. P. State Warehousing Corpn. V. Chandra Kiran Tyagi (AI.R. 1970 Supreme Court 1244) it has been said by Vaidialingam, J., in Paragraph 20- “From a review of the English decisions, referred to above, the position emerges as follows: The law relating to master and servant is c1ear. A contract for personal service will not be enforced by an ORDER :for specific performance nor will it be open for a servant to refuse to accept the repudiation of a contract of service by his master and say that the contract has never been terminated. The remedy of the employee is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or for breach of contract. This is the normal rule and that was applied in Barbar's case, 1958-I All ER 322 and Francis' case, 1962-3 All ER 633. But when a statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of the provisions of the statute while terminating the services of such an employee, the latter will be eligible to get the relief of a declaration that the ORDER :is null and void and that he continues to be in service, as it will not then be a mere case of a master terminating the service of a servant. This was the position in Vine's case, 1956-3 All ER 930." After considering some decisions of the Supreme Court, the law laid down in Paragraph 23 is as follows :-- "From the two decisions of this Court, referred to above, the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. This was the position in Vine's case, 1956-3 All ER 930." After considering some decisions of the Supreme Court, the law laid down in Paragraph 23 is as follows :-- "From the two decisions of this Court, referred to above, the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there are certain well recognised exceptions to this rule and they are: To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute." The (8) Life Insurance Corporation's case of A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 847 was distinguished as it was a case of violation of statutory requirement. 16. In (10) Indian Airlines Corporation V. Sukhdeo Rai (A.I. R. 1971 Supreme Court 1828) the entire law has been reviewed, I may say so with respect, by Shelat, J., with reference to the ORDER :of dismissal of an employee of the Indian Airlines Corporation. The Corporation was established by Act XXVII of 1953. Many provisions of said Act are parallel to those of the Act. Section 20 of the Air Corporation Act is equivalent to Section 11 of the Act. It has been said in paragraph 6 at page 1830 (column 2)- "The fact, therefore, that the appellant-Corporation was once set up under and was regulated by Act XXVlI of 1953 would not take away, without anything more, the relationship between it and its employees from the category of purely master and servant relationship. Are there then in the Act any provisions which imposed upon the Corporation any statutory restriction or obligation which limits its power of terminating that relationship ?" It was held that employment of the respondent in that case was not to an office or status and there being no obligation and restriction in the Act or the Rules subject to which only the power to terminate the respondent's employment could be exercised, the respondent was not entitled to a declaration that the termination of his employment was null and void, as in effect it would be granting a specific performance of contract of service. The Allahabad view in (6) Ram Babu Rathaur's case (A I. R. 1961 Allahabad 502) as also the view of the Calcutta High Court in the case of (5) Life Insurance Corporation [(1971)-I Labour Law Journal 1] was referred to with approval in paragraph 10. It was further pointed out that all rules and regulations made by authorities in pursuance of a power under a statute do not necessarily have the force of law. Then finally it was said at page 1834 (column 1)- "The regulations contain the terms and conditions which govern the relationship between the Corporation and its employees. Though made under the power conferred by the statute, they merely embody the terms and conditions of service in the Corporation but do not constitute a statutory restriction as to the kind contracts which the Corporation can make with its servants or the grounds on which it can terminate them. That being so, and the Corporation hiving undoubtedly the power to dismiss its employees, the dismissal of the respondent was with jurisdiction, and although it was wrongful in the sense of its being in breach of the terms and conditions which governed the relationship between the Corporation and the respondent it did subsist. The present case, therefore, did not fall under any of the three well recognised exceptions, and therefore, the respondent was only entitled to damages and not to the declaration that his dismissal was null and void." 17. In (11) Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. V. Additional Industrial Tribunal (A. I. R. 1970 Supreme Court 245)it has been pointed out in paragraph 10 that bye-laws framed by a Co-operative Society which is empowered by the Co-operative Societies Act to make them have not the force of a statutory rule. 18. Coming to the facts of this case, it would be noticed that the petitioner was asked by the Corporation to superannuate and retire on 1-4-1972. He did not actually retire on that date. If otherwise his contention is correct then it was a wrongful termination of his service and he has been debarred by this wrongful termination from his two years' emoluments. The determination of his date of birth as 1-4-1912 could not be shown to be in violation of any provision of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. If otherwise his contention is correct then it was a wrongful termination of his service and he has been debarred by this wrongful termination from his two years' emoluments. The determination of his date of birth as 1-4-1912 could not be shown to be in violation of any provision of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. The petitioner has been asked to superannuate and retire in accordance with Regulation 19 (1) which regulation by itself has not been shown to be contrary to Section 11 or any other statutory law. The master, namely, the Corporation had a right to determine the date of superannuation of the petitioner and if it determined it wrongly or wrongfully the petitioner could pursue his remedy to claim damages only. No writ can be issued against the Corporation, as it will have the effect of bringing into existence the contract of service already determined by the employer, albeit it nay have been wrongfully. 19. If I could have persuaded myself to hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case Equal opportunity was denied to the petitioner in the matter of his employment and the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 were violated, I would have no difficulty in striking down the ORDER :on the view taken by me that the Life Insurance Corporation is a State within the meaning of Part III of the Constitution. But in that regard the petitioner fails on facts. The Allahabad case of (2) (1970) II Labour Law Journal 393 was a case of striking down the regulation framed by the Corporation on the ground of violation of the fundamental light of the petitioner. 20. In passing, I may make reference to Bench decisions of this Court one in (12) P. C. Goyle V. Divisional Manager Life Insurance Corporation of India (A. I. R. 1958 Patna 223) and another in (13) Shri S. K. Bhattacharya V. The State of Bihar (1970 P. L J. R 369) and the decision of the Supreme Court in (14) State of Orissa V. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei (A. I. R. 1967 Supreme Ccurt 1269). (Miss) Binapani Dei (A. I. R. 1967 Supreme Ccurt 1269). In (12) P.C. Goyle's case although there is no discussion whether the Life Insurance Corporation is a State within the meaning of Article 12 or an authority within Article 226 of the Constitution, the writ application seems to have succeeded upon the footing of violation of the statutory requirement of Section 11. The case of (13) Shree S. K. Bhattacharya was one of a Government servant which stands on a different footing. So is the Orissa case decided by the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1967 Supreme Court 1269. The facts of that case, however, being similar to those of the instant one, it would be pertinent to note that Dr. Binapani Dei was treated to have been compulsorily retired by the illegal change of her date of birth. I have also more or less taken the same view that the petitioner by the allegedly wrongful ORDER :of changing his date of birth was made to superannuate and retire prematurely. It had the effect of illegal, compulsory retirement or a wrongful termination of the contract of service. In either view of the matter, there being no violation of any fundamental right enshrined in Part III of the Constitution or the requirement of the statutory law, I hold that the impugned Older of the respondents cannot be interfered with in exercise of the power of this Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution nor any writ of mandamus can be issued, as it will have the effect of enforcing the contract of service. 21. For the reasons stated above, I hold that the petitioner must fail in this case. His application accordingly fails and is dismissed bat in the circumstances there would be no ORDER :as to costs. S. N. P. SINGH, J., I agree. Application dismissed.