C. V. RANE, J. ( 1 ) THIS judgment will govern the disposal of these six revision applications which involve the same questions of law. The revision applications arise out of the orders passed by the learned City Magistrate 8 Court Ahmedabad in six criminal cases holding that none of the complaints was barred by limitation. In each case the complaint was filed on 10 on behalf of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in respect of an offence punishable under sec. 392 (1) (a) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The facts of all the complaints are almost similar. According to the complainant the accused in each case had started using the premises constructed by him without obtaining the permit from the proper authorities as contemplated by sec. 263 of the Act. According to the complainant the accused had committed the offence as stated above on or about 16-6-1971. During the pendency of the complaints the accused in each case gave an application that the complaint was barred by limitation in view of sec. 428 of the Act. The learned City Magistrate by his order dated 4-3-1972 negatived the above contention. Being aggrieved by his order the accused have come in revision to this court. ( 2 ) IT is argued by the learned advocate for the applicants that as the Corporation had given notice to each of the accused in the year 1970 calling upon him to stop using the premises it should be presumed that the Corporation had knowledge that the offence in question was committed by the accused on the day on which the notice was served on each of the accused. Now according to sec. 428 of the Act :-NO Magistrate shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or any rule regulation or by-law unless complaint of such offence is made before him (a) within six months next after the date of the commission of such offence; or (B) if such date is not known or the offence is a continuing one within six months next after the commission or discovery of such offence. AS each of the complaints was filed more than six months after the date of the notice it is argued by him that it is tarred by limitation. AS each of the complaints was filed more than six months after the date of the notice it is argued by him that it is tarred by limitation. Sec. 263 (1) of the Act relates to the steps to be taken by a person intending to occupy a building after it is completed. Sub-sec. (2) of that section providesno person shall occupy or permit to be occupied any such building or use or permit to be used the building or part thereof affected by any work until (A) permission has been received from the Commissioner in this behalf or (b) the Commissioner has failed for twenty-one days after receipt of the notice of completion to intimate his refusal of the said permission. IN the present case according to the complainant none of the accused had obtained permission to occupy the premises as contemplated by the above section. According to sec. 392 (1) of the Act whoever (a) contravenes any provision of any of the sections sub-sections or clauses mentioned in the first column of Part I of the table in Appendix 11 or of any regulation or order made thereunder; or (b) failing to comply with any requisition lawfully made upon him under any of the said sections sub-sections or clausescontinues to contravene the said provision or to neglect to comply with the said requisition or fails to remove or rectify any work or thing done in contravention of the said provision as the case may be or fails to vacate any premises shall be punished for each day that he continues so to offend with fine which may extend to the amount mentioned in that behalf in the second column of the said Part. IN the present case as observed above the accused in each case is alleged to have committed the offence under sec. 392 (1) (a) of the Act. According to Part I of the Table in Appendix II of the Act breach of sec. 263 is punishable with a fine extending to Rs. 500/and breach of sec. 263 read with sec. 392 (2) is punishable with a fine which may extend to Rs. 100. 00. In the present case however the complaint relates to the offence under sec. 392 (1) (a) of the Act. 263 is punishable with a fine extending to Rs. 500/and breach of sec. 263 read with sec. 392 (2) is punishable with a fine which may extend to Rs. 100. 00. In the present case however the complaint relates to the offence under sec. 392 (1) (a) of the Act. ( 3 ) IT is however argued by the learned advocate for the applicants that even if it is assumed that an offence under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 392 2 the Act is a continuing offence the accused cannot be punished for any such offence in view of the fact that none of them has been first convicted of the offence of occupying the building without obtaining permission of the proper authority. Thus according to him each of the accused should have been firsts convicted of the offence which he committed on the day on which he occupied the building in question. As the prosecution for that offence is barred by sec. 428 of the Act he argues that none of the accused can now be punished for contravening any of the provisions of the Act even if such a contravention constitutes a continuing offence as contemplated by sec. 428 of the Act. In support of his above arguments he has relied on the decisions in the cases of State v. Sevamal Pevamal (2 G. L. R. 242) and Bachubhai v. Ratilal (A. I. R. 1972 Guj. 206 ). The former case related to the prosecution under sec. 152 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the Boroughs Act) and the latter case related to an offence under the Act. In each of these cases however the accused had already been convicted of a particular offence before the second prosecution was launched against him for the offence under the same section. In the case of State v. Sevamal (supra) the respondent who was twice convicted under sec. 152 for projection of a wooden plank in the front portion of his shop was again prosecuted under sec. 152 of the Boroughs Act for continuing the encroachment. The Encroachment Inspector went to the place on the 8th July 1959 and finding the encroachment he filed the complaint. 152 for projection of a wooden plank in the front portion of his shop was again prosecuted under sec. 152 of the Boroughs Act for continuing the encroachment. The Encroachment Inspector went to the place on the 8th July 1959 and finding the encroachment he filed the complaint. On the above facts it was held that in as much as the encroachment or projection was con tinued by the respondent on 8th July 1959 notwithstanding his conviction for the offence of setting up the same this offence was committed on 8thejuly 1959 and that date should be taken as the terminus a quo for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation prescribed by the proviso to sec. 200 (1) of the Boroughs Act the provisions of which are similar to sec. 428 of the Act. It has also been pointed out in the above case thatthe act which constituted the offence was the act of continuing the encroachment or projection after the date of conviction of the respondent for the offence of setting up the same under the first part of sec. 152 and since that act continued from day to day a fresh offence was committed on every day on which the act continued. In the above case as the accused had a ready been convicted twice of the offence under the first part of sec. 152 of the Boroughs Act he was tried for the offence which was a continuing offence under the second part of sec. 152 of the Boroughs Act. There is however nothing in the above case which lays down that unless the accused is first convicted of an offence the cognizance of which has been taken by the Magistrate within six months next after the date of the commission of such offence or if such date is not known within six months after the discovery of such offence he cannot be punished for the continued breach of the provisions of the Act even though it constitutes a continuing offence as in these applications before me. There is nothing even in the decision in the case of Bachubhai which supports the above submission of the learned advocate for the applicants. ( 4 ) SEC. 392 (1) of the Act relates not only to the first offence but also to what are called continuing offences; whereas sec. There is nothing even in the decision in the case of Bachubhai which supports the above submission of the learned advocate for the applicants. ( 4 ) SEC. 392 (1) of the Act relates not only to the first offence but also to what are called continuing offences; whereas sec. 392 (2) relates to punishment for continuing the contravention of the provisions of the Act for the breach of which the accused has already been convicted under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 392this shows that the question of previous conviction arises only in the case of offences falling under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 392 of the Act and that for the purpose of prosecution for an offence under sec. 392 (1) of the Act all that is necessary to be seen is whether complaint of such offence is made within the period prescribed by sec. 428 of the Act. According to the prosecution each of the accused has continued to occupy or use the premises in question without obtaining permission from the concerned authority as contemplated by sec. 263 of the Act. Now the wordings of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 263 which has been reproduced above show that to continue to occupy or use the building in question without obtaining the permission of the Commissioner is a continuing offence. According to the complainant each of the accused was found occupying or using the premises in question without obtaining permit on or about 16-6-1961. As each of the complaints has been made within six months from that date it is obvious that it is within the period of limitation as contemplated by sec. 428 of the Act. ( 5 ) THE above view is supported by the decision in the case of State v. Bhiwandiwalla (56 Bom L. R. 1172 ). For the reasons stated above I agree with the view of the learned City Magistrate that none of the complaints was barred by limitation. That being so the applications are liable to fail and they are dismissed. .