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1972 DIGILAW 102 (PAT)

JADU PASWAN v. STATE OF BIHAR

1972-07-07

G.N.PRASAD, N.L.UNTWALIA

body1972
JUDGMENT : Untwalia, J. Shri Jadu Paswan, the sole petitioner in this writ application, has obtained a rule from this Court against the State of Bihar and its officers in the Mines and Geology Department to show cause why the ORDER :of his discharge from service made by the Commissioner, Mines and Geology, respondent no. 2 on 9.8.69, copy of which is Annexure 6 to the writ application, be not called up and quashed by grant of an appropriate writ. A counter-affidavit sworn by Shri Mehta Nagendra Singh, Geologist, respondent no. 5, has been filed on behalf of the respondents. 2. The petitioner was appointed a Chain Man in the Department of Mines and Geology on 11.6.66 on a temporary basis. According to his case, he joined the post and worked honestly and efficiently. He worked at various places and eventually he was directed to work at the residence of the Deputy Director, Mines and Geology, at Patna. There he was asked to do various kinds of work which he did. When the Deputy Director, respondent no. 4 asked him to do work at his residence for all the 24 hours, the petitioner objected. Thereupon the Deputy Director got annoyed and directed him to go back to the office and also threatened that on his coming back from tour the petitioner would be taught a good lesson. Apprehending trouble at the hands of the Deputy Director, the petitioner intimated his Association to take suitable action in regard to his apprehended trouble. A copy of the petitioner’s letter dated 21.6.69 to his Association is Annexure 4. Thereupon the Joint Secretary of the Association wrote a letter dated 4.7.69 (Annexure 5) to the Commissioner, Mines and Geology. On his return from duties from the residence of the Deputy Director, the petitioner was attached to the office of Shri P. Shankar, Geologist at Patna. The Deputy Director, according to the petitioner's case, poisoned the ears of Shri P. Shankar for complaining against the petitioner on some ground or the other with a motive of getting the petitioner discharged from service. Only a week after the petitioner joined the duty with Shri P. Shankar, he made a complaint to the Deputy Director saying that the petitioner was not punctual in his duties as well as he was disobedient. Only a week after the petitioner joined the duty with Shri P. Shankar, he made a complaint to the Deputy Director saying that the petitioner was not punctual in his duties as well as he was disobedient. The petitioner's case is that he was not given any opportunity of explaining or showing cause in regard to any of the allegations made against him by superior officers. All on a sudden on 9.8.69 the petitioner was handed over an ORDER :signed by the Commissioner of the Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar, saying that his service had been terminated. 3. The petitioner's case further is that being aggrieved by the ORDER :of discharge he moved the Adviser of the Government. The Association also moved in the matter. The petitioner sent a second representation to the Adviser. Copies of the said letters and representations are Annexures 7, 8 and 9. After the Adviser's regime was over and ministry was formed, the petitioner again filed a representation before the Ministry, a copy of which is Annexure 10. Thereupon a letter dated 12.6.70 (Annexure 11) was issued by the Under-Secretary of the Department, respondent no. 3, to the petitioner stating that he was removed from office with effect from 8.8.69 on several charges mentioned in that letter. The petitioner was directed to show cause, if any. He submitted his show cause petition, a copy of which is Annexure 12. Thereafter the Under-Secretary informed the petitioner on 4.8.70 that the petitioner's show cause petition has been rejected. A copy of that intimation is Annexure 13. 4. Upon the allegations aforesaid made in the writ application, the petitioner challenges the ORDER :of termination of his service mainly upon two grounds. – (i) That the ORDER :was made mala-fide at the instance of the Deputy Director, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar. (ii) That the ORDER :was made by way of punishment without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to meet the alleged charges leveled against him and without holding a departmental enquiry and thus it was made in violation of the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 5. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State and which is sworn by the Geologist, Shri Mehta Nagendra Singh, respondent no. 5. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State and which is sworn by the Geologist, Shri Mehta Nagendra Singh, respondent no. 5, against whom certain allegations have been made in the petition, the facts stated by the petitioner to make out a case of mala fides have been denied. It is asserted in the counter affidavit that to forestall the action which was proposed to be taken against the petitioner as he was not found suitable for the job, letters were got written by him to his Association and false allegations were made against the Deputy Director of Geology only to deter him from taking any action against the petitioner. Shri Mehta Nagendra Singh states in paragraph 8 of counter-affidavit that when the petitioner was attached with him, he had to make several complaints against the petitioner. The petitioner used to leave the camp without necessary permission from the Geologist in charge of the camp. He was indulging in acts of indiscipline, was negligent in his duties and doing various other acts mentioned in that paragraph. The Deputy Director visited the camp on 22.6.69 and on enquiry he found that the complaints made against the petitioner were correct. He was made to return from the camp and thereafter was attached with Shri P. Shankar, Geologist. With him too, he did not work satisfactorily and complaints of non-punctuality, disobedience and arrogant behaviour were made against him by Shri P. Shankar. The stand in the counter-affidavit is that the petitioner's service was terminated without asking him to show cause, but on the persistent representation of the petitioner to recall the ORDER :of his discharge, and explanation was called for from him before taking any final decision on his representation. Consequently, by letter of the 12th June, 1970 the petitioner was asked to show cause in regard to the allegations made against him. His reply was not found satisfactory and, therefore, his representation was rejected. 6. The facts alleged by the petitioner in his writ application in support of the allegations of mala fides against the Deputy Director remain unsubstantiated. They have been controverted in the counter-affidavit. His reply was not found satisfactory and, therefore, his representation was rejected. 6. The facts alleged by the petitioner in his writ application in support of the allegations of mala fides against the Deputy Director remain unsubstantiated. They have been controverted in the counter-affidavit. And, on a consideration of the entire matter, I have come to the conclusion that the allegations of mala fides made against the Deputy Director are not correct and there is no substance in the attack on the ORDER :of discharge (Annexure 6) on the ground of mala fides. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged his second point. He submitted that the subsequent serving of the charges_ on the petitioner, as mentioned in Annexure 11, and asking him to show cause in the matter clearly show that the petitioner was discharged from service not as a matter of termination of service simpliciter but by way of punishment. The charges which were disclosed later ought to have been disclosed earlier and a regular departmental enquiry ought to have been held. Without such enquiry discharge of the petitioner from service was violative of Article 311 (2). I find no substance in this argument either and the same is rejected, for the reasons to be stated hereinafter. 8. It is well settled by now by several decisions of the Supreme Court that if a temporary Government servant or a probationer is removed from service by way of punishment, the requirement of Article 311 (2) has got to be followed. So also, it has been firmly laid down that if a Government servant officiating in a higher post is made to revert to his substantive post by way of punishment, it is tantamount to reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311 (2). But if actions like aforesaid have been taken not by way of punishment but for some other reasons then, in case of temporary Government servant, probationer or Government servant officiating in higher post, no enquiry in accordance with Article 311 (2) need be held. The services of a temporary Government servant may be terminated in accordance with rules or according to contract or under the general law of master and servant. The services of a temporary Government servant may be terminated in accordance with rules or according to contract or under the general law of master and servant. So also, a Government servant officiating in higher rank may be made to revert to his substantive post because an officiating servant does not acquire any right to the higher post by mere affiliation. The reason or motive for taking such action is not necessary to be probed into in a court of law. The reason on a motive may be that the Government servant was found unsuitable or unfit for the post he was holding. This view may be taken by the authorities concerned by a confidential enquiry or even by holding a preliminary enquiry against the delinquent Government servant. In such cases, it has been consistently held that if the ORDER :on its face or the attending circumstances do not lead to the causing of any stigma or evil consequences to the Government servant, the ORDER :is not by way of punishment. If I however, the ORDER :on its face or the attending circumstances show that the alleged guilt of the delinquent Government servant was the foundation for the ORDER :of discharge or the ORDER :of discharge was made by way of punishment then it has been held that even though the Government servant may not have any right to the post, he cannot be made to suffer without following the procedure of Article 311 (2). The principles of law have been repeatedly enunciated by the Supreme Court in several decisions and seem to be beyond the pale of dispute. But, as usual, a controversy has always arisen and is bound to arise as to on which line of the principle a particular case on its own facts would lie. I shall, therefore, now make reference to some of the Supreme Court decisions to support my conclusion that the instant case is of the first type and not of the second type. 9. I may now conveniently discuss the facts and ratio of a few decisions of the Supreme Court of the first type and then I shall refer to a few of the second type. 9. I may now conveniently discuss the facts and ratio of a few decisions of the Supreme Court of the first type and then I shall refer to a few of the second type. In (1) State of Orissa V. Ram Narayan Das (A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 177) a Sub-Inspector of Police on , probation in the Orissa Police Force was served with a notice to show cause why he should not be discharged from service “for gross neglect of duties and unsatisfactory work". He submitted his explanation which was considered by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police as unsatisfactory. The said authority passed an ORDER :discharging the respondent from service for unsatisfactory work and conduct. Such an ORDER :was challenged up to the Supreme Court, distinguishing the other line of cases, one of which is reported in (2) State of Bihar V. Gopi Kishore Prasad (A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 689) it was held by the Supreme Court- “----the fact of the holding of an enquiry is not decisive of the question. What is decisive is whether the ORDER :is by way of punishment in the light of the tests laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case, 1958 SCR 828 : (A.I.R. 1958 SC 36)". In (3) the State of Punjab V. Sukh Raj Bahadur (A.I.R. 1968 Supreme Court 1089) Mitter, J., has reviewed several reported and unreported decisions of the Supreme Court falling either on this side of the principle or on that side. One such unreported decision discussed in Paragraph 12 of the JUDGMENT : was from Bihar in regard to some incident in the service career of an Assistant Professor of Botany. The Commissioner of Patna Division was appointed to make an enquiry into the same. The report of the enquiry was against the Professor. Thereupon the Government passed an ORDER :reverting him from his officiating Class I post to his substantive post in Class II and transferred him from Patna College to Ranchi College. The Assistant Professor challenged his reversion by a suit which he lost in the lower court as also in the High Court. His argument before the Supreme Court was that the ORDER :of the Government amounted to infliction of punishment. The Assistant Professor challenged his reversion by a suit which he lost in the lower court as also in the High Court. His argument before the Supreme Court was that the ORDER :of the Government amounted to infliction of punishment. The Supreme Court repelled this argument by observing- "the enquiry which was held by the Commissioner in this case was in the nature of a preliminary enquiry to enable the Government to decide whether disciplinary action should be taken against the appellant. It is clear however that the Government did not decide to hold any enquiry for the purpose of taking disciplinary action against the appellant, for no enquiry officer was appointed, no charges were framed and no regular departmental enquiry as envisaged by the rules and Article 311(2) of the Constitution was ever held." Two cases falling on the other side, namely, (4) Madan Gopal V. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 531) and (5) Jagdish Mitter V. Union of India (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 449) were discussed by Mitter, J. Thereafter there is reference to another unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Paragraph 15. The appellant A.G. Benjamin before the Supreme Court in this case was temporarily employed as Stores Officer in the Central Tractor Organisation. His services were terminated on April 23, 1954 as he was a temporary servant. There had been certain complaints against him in respect whereof the Chairman of the Central Tractor Organisation sent him a notice asking him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him and an enquiry officer was appointed. But before the enquiry could be completed, the Chairman recommended that the services of the appellant should be terminated under the rules observing in his note to the Secretary that- “The departmental proceedings will take a much longer time and we are sure 'whether after going through all the formalities we will be able to deal with the accused in the way he deserves." Upon this the ORDER :was to the effect that the appellant was being informed that his services were no longer required in the organisation and the same were terminated with effect from the date on which the notice was served on him. In lieu of notice one month's pay and allowance were to be paid to him. In lieu of notice one month's pay and allowance were to be paid to him. (4) Madan Gopal's case (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 531) was distinguished and the ORDER :of termination was upheld by the Supreme Court in A. G. Banjamin's case also. From the facts of the case of (3) The State of Punjab V. Sukh Raj Bahadur (A.I.R. 1968 Supreme Court 1089) it would be noticed that a charge sheet had been served on the Government servant who had filed his explanation also. But the departmental enquiry which had been initiated did not proceed to conclusion, it was not proceeded• with. There were no sittings of the enquiry officer, no evidence was recorded and no conclusion was arrived at at the enquiry. Under these circumstances, it was held that the case was not governed by the principle laid down in (4) Madan Gopal's case (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 531) or (5) Jagdish Mitter's case (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 449), but it was governed by the principles laid down in (1) State of Orissa V. Ram Narayan Das (A. I. R. 1961 Supreme Court 177) and the two unreported decisions alluded to above. In Paragraph 16 of the JUDGMENT : it has been said- "On a conspectus of these cases, the following propositions are clear- 1. The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 2. The circumstances preceding or attendant on the ORDER :of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. 3. If the ORDER :visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. 4. An ORDER :of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 5. 4. An ORDER :of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 5. If there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311, i.e., an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge-sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered an ORDER :of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said Article." 10. Reference may. now usefully be made to the case of (6) Delhi Transport Undertaking V. Balbir Saran Gael (A. I. R 1971 Supreme Court 836)-a case decided by the Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of 3 learned Judges, namely, J. C. Shah, J. as he then was, and K. S. Hegde and A. N. Grover, JJ. In March, 1952 the respondent before the Supreme Court was demoted from the rank of Travelling Ticket Examiner to that of a Conductor. He filed a writ petition in the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi in April, 1953. The writ petition was dismissed and thereafter his services were terminated on November 11, 1953. The ORDER :of termination which was passed by the Manager of the Delhi Road Transport Authority was in the following term- "Your service will not be required by this organisation with effect from November 12, 1953. You will be paid one month's salary in lieu of notice." There were certain proceedings before the Conciliation Officer and in answer to a query made by that officer the General Manager wrote a letter on August 14, 1956 in which it was stated, inter alia, that the respondent had approached the High Court when he had been demoted at the previous stage without exhausting the normal official channel of redress and without putting in his representation before the appellant authority as provided in the Service Rules. The stand of the General Manager was that the services of the respondent were, therefore, terminated under Regulation 9(b) after paying one month's salary in lieu of notice. The respondent filed a suit to challenge the ORDER :of termination of his service on the ground that it was an ORDER :of dismissal and had been made as a measure of punishment without following the procedure prescribed by Regulation 15. The trial court decreed the suit. The respondent filed a suit to challenge the ORDER :of termination of his service on the ground that it was an ORDER :of dismissal and had been made as a measure of punishment without following the procedure prescribed by Regulation 15. The trial court decreed the suit. The lower appellate court affirmed the decree. Although for some slightly different reason, a learned single Judge of the High Court affirmed the decree and so did the Letters Patent Bench. The reason given by the Letters Patent Bench was that a breach of the Standing ORDER :for which the services of the servant had been dispensed with amounted to misconduct, as provided by Regulation 15(1). One of the penalties prescribed by Regulation 15(2) was dismissal. Though the ORDER :of termination of services of the respondent did not, on its face, contain the reason for the non-requirement of his service, the real reason was the misconduct of the respondent in that he had committed a breach of the Standing ORDER :. It was obligatory to follow the procedure of enquiry, etc., as prescribed in Regulation 15(2)(c). - The procedure was not followed. Therefore, the impugned ORDER :was void and illegal. The Supreme Court held that the services of the respondent were merely terminated in accordance with Regulation 9(b) which governed the conditions of his employment, and then it was said- "It may be that the motive for termination of his services was the breach of Standing ORDER :17, i.e., of filing a writ petition in the High Court against the demotion without exhausting departmental remedies but the question of motive is immaterial. No charge-sheet was preferred under Regulation 15 nor was enquiry held in accordance therewith before the ORDER :under Regulation 9(b) was made. It may be that if the respondent had successfully pleaded and proved mala fides on the part of the authority terminating his services the impugned ORDER :could be legitimately challenged but no foundation was laid in that behalf in the plaint nor was the question of mala fides investigated by the Courts below". The penultimate paragraph of the JUDGMENT : may also be usefully quoted. It runs as follows- "As regards the punishment having been inflicted for misconduct the ORDER :being a mere camouflage we are unable to endorse the view that any such question could arise in the present case. The penultimate paragraph of the JUDGMENT : may also be usefully quoted. It runs as follows- "As regards the punishment having been inflicted for misconduct the ORDER :being a mere camouflage we are unable to endorse the view that any such question could arise in the present case. Regulation 9(b) clearly empowered the authorities to terminate the services after giving one month's notice or pay in lieu of notice. The ORDER :was unequivocally made in terms of that Regulation. Even if the employers of the respondent thought that he was a cantankerous person and it was not desirable to retain him in service it was open to them to terminate his services in terms of Regulation 9(b) and it was not necessary to dismiss him by way of punishment for misconduct." 11. In (2) State of Bihar V. Gopi Kishore Prasad (A. I. R. 1960 Supreme Court 689) the public servant had been discharged from service consequent upon an enquiry into alleged misconduct and the enquiry officer had found that the public officer was unsuitable for the post. In such a situation it was held that the ORDER :of discharge was by way of punishment. In (4) Madan Gopal V. State of Punjab (A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 531) the public servant Madan Gopal was served with a charge-sheet to the effect that he had received illegal gratification and called upon to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. Madan Gopal submitted his explanation and the Settlement Officer who had sent out the charge-sheet submitted his report to the Deputy Commissioner that the charge relating to receipt of illegal gratification had been proved. Thereupon the Deputy Commissioner ORDER :ed that the services of Madan Gopal be terminated forthwith and that in lieu of notice he would receive one month's pay as required by the rules. It was held by the Supreme Court that the enquiry made by the Settlement Officer was with the object of ascertaining whether disciplinary action should be taken against the appellant for his misdemeanour and the purpose of the enquiry was to take punitive action including dismissal or removal from service if the charge was substantiated. (1) Ram Narayan Das's case (A. I. R. 1961 Supreme Court 177) was distinguished. 12. (1) Ram Narayan Das's case (A. I. R. 1961 Supreme Court 177) was distinguished. 12. In (5) Jagdish Mitter V. The Union of India (A. I. R. 1964 Supreme Court 449) the appellant before the Supreme Court was appointed as temporary Second Division Clerk in the General Post Office. He continued to be employed on a temporary basis by subsequent ORDER :s made from time to time. An observation was made by the Supreme Court that even before discharging a temporary servant the authority may have to examine the question about the suitability of the servant to be continued, and acting bona fide in that behalf, the authority may also give a chance to the servant to explain, if any complaints are made against him or his competence or suitability is disputed on some grounds arising from the discharge of his work, but such an enquiry would be held only for the purpose of deciding whether the temporary servant should be continued or not. There is no element of punitive proceedings in such an enquiry, the idea in holding such an enquiry was not to punish the temporary servant but just to decide whether he deserves to be continued in service or not. There, in that case on the face of the ORDER :, the public servant was found undesirable to be retained in Government service which cast an aspersion on him and, therefore, it was held that it was a punitive ORDER :which could not be made without following the procedure of taking action of dismissal. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (7) The State of Bihar V. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra (A. I. R. 1971 Supreme Court 1011) a decision of the same Bench which had decided the case of (6) Delhi Transport Undertaking (A.I. R. 1971 Supreme Court 836). The five principles laid down by Mitter, J., in (3) Sukh Raj Bahadur's case (A. I. R. 1968 Supreme Court 1089) were quoted with approval. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (8) Union of India V.R.S Dhaba, Income-tax Officer, Hoshiarpur (A.I.R. 1969 S. C. 21) was distinguished by quoting passage from the said decision. The five principles laid down by Mitter, J., in (3) Sukh Raj Bahadur's case (A. I. R. 1968 Supreme Court 1089) were quoted with approval. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (8) Union of India V.R.S Dhaba, Income-tax Officer, Hoshiarpur (A.I.R. 1969 S. C. 21) was distinguished by quoting passage from the said decision. The passage runs as follows- "The test for attracting Article 311 (2) of the Constitution in such a case is, whether the misconduct or negligence is a mere motive for the ORDER :of reversion or termination of service or whether it is the very foundation of the ORDER :of termination of service of the temporary employee [see the decision of this Court in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah V. The Union of India (1964) 5 S.C.R. 190 : (AI.R. 1964 SC 1854]. In the present case, however, the ORDER :of reversion does not contain any express words of stigma attributed to the conduct of the respondent and; therefore, it cannot be held that the ORDER :of reversion was made by way of punishment and the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution are consequently attracted." The bald argument that so long there• are no express words of stigma attributed to the conduct of a Government servant in the impugned ORDER :, it cannot be held to have been made by way of punishment, was rejected, and, then on the facts of that case, it was held - "....that the ORDER :of reversion was made owing to the note of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police following the report of the Commandant. The ORDER :of reversion was directly and proximately founded on what the Commandant and the Deputy Inspector General said relating to the respondent's conduct generally and in particular with reference to the incident of assault by him on his ORDER :ly. We find no reason to disagree with the view of the High Court." There is one more decision of the Supreme Court reported in (9) K. H. Phadnis V. State of Maharashtra (A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 998). On the special facts of that case, it was held that the ORDER :of reversion was in the nature of punishment. 14. We find no reason to disagree with the view of the High Court." There is one more decision of the Supreme Court reported in (9) K. H. Phadnis V. State of Maharashtra (A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 998). On the special facts of that case, it was held that the ORDER :of reversion was in the nature of punishment. 14. It would thus be seen that if in the impugned ORDER :there are express words to cast a stigma on the public servant or to show that the ORDER :has been made by way of punishment, no further proof seems to be necessary to substantiate the case of that public servant that the ORDER :has been made by way of punishment. It would be bad if it was made without following the procedure according to law. If, however, on the face of the ORDER :no such stigma is cast, the ORDER :is a piece of evidence to show that it has not been made by way of punishment. But then the ORDER :by itself is not conclusive. It is open to the aggrieved public servant to show by attending circumstances that really he has been punished by the - impugned ORDER :without following the legal procedure. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case as to on which side of the line and principle the case would fall. The mere holding of a preliminary enquiry in ORDER :to find out whether a public servant should be reverted to his substantive rank or his services being temporary should be terminated or not or that the motive of the ORDER :was to get rid of the public servant because the authorities thought him to be undesirable is not sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the ORDER :is by way of punishment. By and large some such facts must be proved, which would lead to the conclusion that the action taken was by way of punishment and the charges leveled against the public servant were the foundation of the ORDER :. By and large some such facts must be proved, which would lead to the conclusion that the action taken was by way of punishment and the charges leveled against the public servant were the foundation of the ORDER :. In this particular case, even if the charges, as mentioned in Annexure 11, would have been served on the petitioner prior to the passing of the impugned ORDER :and he would have been asked to explain them, followed by his explanation, on several decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, those facts would not have led to the conclusion that the impugned ORDER :was by way of punishment. Rather, they would have merely shown that a preliminary enquiry was held and it was found that the petitioner was unfit to be retained in service. The petitioner was apprised of the charges since by repeated representations he insisted that he has a good record of service and his services had been terminated mala fide. Then the Government was compelled to tell him the very many allegations which were against him and asked him to submit an explanation for the purpose of finding out whether the ORDER :of termination was fit to be recalled. If the petitioner's explanation would have been found to be satisfactory, in all probability the impugned ORDER :would have been recalled but since the explanation was not found satisfactory I the Government did not touch that ORDER :. It is difficult to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner that serving charges on him in Annexure 11 and asking him to explain his conduct show that the impugned ORDER :made earlier was by way of punishment. 15. For the reasons stated above, the writ application fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances there would be no ORDER :as to cost. G. N. PRASAD. J. I agree. Application dismissed.