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1972 DIGILAW 104 (PAT)

EMPLOYERS IN RELATION TOJAMADOBA 6 AND 7 PITS COLLIERY OF MIS TATA IRON & STEEL CO. LTD. v. PRESIDING OFFICER, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LABOUR COURT AT DHANBAD

1972-07-10

G.N.PRASAD, N.L.UNTWALIA

body1972
JUDGMENT : Untwalia, J. The petitioner has challenged in this writ application the ORDER :of the Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court at Dhanbad (respondent no. 1) made on the 24th January, 1970, a copy of which is Annexure "4" to the writ application, under Section 33C(2) ()f the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, holding that the workman concerned (respondent no. 2) is entitled to receive a sum of Rs.3,294-15 from the petitioner, who is the employer in relation to Jamadoba Colliery of Messrs Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited. The second respondent appeared, filed counter-affidavit and opposed the application at the time of the hearing. 2. Respondent no. 2 while working in Pits 6 and 7 of Jamadoba Colliery as a miner met with an accident on the 29th of March, 1966. A slab or coal fell on him which fractured his ribs. He was examined by the Medical Board on the 30th June, 1966 as also on the 29th September, 1966 and on both the occasions the Medical Board was of the opinion that he was not fit to work and may be able to work in a few months' time. The Medical Board certified on re-examination of respondent no. 2 on the 30th of March, 1967 that he had become fit to join the job. Thereupon on two dates, that is on the 5th of April and 14th of April, 1967, the petitioner asked him to join the work, but he did not. Thereafter in accordance with Clause 19(16) of the certified Standing ORDER :s, charges were framed on 18/20th of April, 1967, domestic inquiry was held and eventually respondent no. 2 was dismissed by an ORDER :dated the 30th of December, 1967. Since at the time of taking action of dismissal of respondent no. 2 a reference case was pending before the Central Government, Industrial Tribunal No.2 at Dhanbad, in Reference Case No. 132 of 1967, the employer applied for approval of the ORDER :of dismissal to the Tribunal under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal by its ORDER :dated the 31st October, 1968 (Annexure "1") refused to accord approval to the ORDER :of dismissal. In short, the charge against respondent no. 2 framed by the petitioner was that the former had absented himself without reasonable cause. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal by its ORDER :dated the 31st October, 1968 (Annexure "1") refused to accord approval to the ORDER :of dismissal. In short, the charge against respondent no. 2 framed by the petitioner was that the former had absented himself without reasonable cause. The defence was that since he was not fit to work, he could not join his job and, therefore, there was a reasonable cause for not joining his work. The Tribunal seems to have accepted the workman's case and as against the opinion of the Medical Board given on the 30th of March, 1967, came to hold that there was justification for the workman not to join his work. In that view of the matter, the ORDER :of dismissal was not approved. Thereafter respondent no. 2 offered to join his job on the 22nd of November, 1 968 and actually he resumed his work on the 6th of December, 1968. Sometime later he filed an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Central Government Labour Court at Dhanbad claiming wages and other benefits for the period from 30.12.1967 to 5.12.1968. It appears that the workman concerned was paid his wages up to the date of the ORDER :of dismissal, but was not paid his wages between the period which expired from the date of making of the ORDER :of dismissal up to his joining duty on 6.12.1968. And that necessitated the filing of the application, resulting in the impugned ORDER :(Annexure (“4"). 3. Respondent no. 2 filed an application on 23.1.1967 under Section 4 of the Workmen's Compensation Act before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Dhanbad, claiming compensation of Rs.9800/- on account of the injury sustained by him which, according to him, permanently and totally disabled him. A copy of this application is Annexure "5" to the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the petitioner. That application was numbered as W.C. Case No.2 of 1967. The petitioner resisted that case. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, by his ORDER :dated the 23rd of September, 1968 (Annexure "2") allowed a compensation of Rs. 3,920/-. The finding recorded by the Presiding Officer is that there was a partial disablement to the extent of 40 per cent and the earning capacity of the respondent no. 2 was reduced to that. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, by his ORDER :dated the 23rd of September, 1968 (Annexure "2") allowed a compensation of Rs. 3,920/-. The finding recorded by the Presiding Officer is that there was a partial disablement to the extent of 40 per cent and the earning capacity of the respondent no. 2 was reduced to that. It seems that the ORDER :of the Tribunal dated the 31st of October, 1968 (Annexure "1") refusing to accord approval to the dismissal ORDER :and the ORDER :of compensation made by Presiding Officer, Labour Court, are final. The petitioner has challenged the ORDER :made by the Labour Court under Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act in this writ application on the following grounds: (i) that the second respondent having got compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act was not entitled to full wages, if at all he was entitled to 60 per cent of wages, as the compensation given to him was on the basis of reduction in his earning capacity to the extent of 40 per cent; and, (ii) that wages are payable for the work done, and if the workman concerned did not do any work, either out of his volition or because of disability, he is not entitled to wages for the period during which no work was done by him. 4. I have no difficulty in rejecting the first submission made on behalf of the petitioner. The scheme of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not to compensate the workman in lieu of wages. The compensation is for the injury caused. Obviously in a case of award of compensation under the said Act on account of death of a workman, one cannot say that the compensation is in lieu of wages. So also when a workman is injured, certain amount of compensation, which may not be at par with the quantum of damages, if an action in tort is commenced, is paid for injury caused to the workman for the partial or total disablement caused to him, which may be temporary or permanent. No case was brought to our notice, as there could be none, to say that merely because a workman gets compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, he is not entitled ., to his wages. The first point, therefore, urged on behalf of the petitioner is rejected as being without any substance. 5. No case was brought to our notice, as there could be none, to say that merely because a workman gets compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, he is not entitled ., to his wages. The first point, therefore, urged on behalf of the petitioner is rejected as being without any substance. 5. In my JUDGMENT :, the second ground of attack on the impugned ORDER :(Annexure “4") was attractive and required some careful consideration. The service conditions of the workman concerned (respondent no. 2) was governed by the Certified Standing ORDER :s of the Company. Under the general law of master and servant, I am inclined to think that if the servant does not do any work out of his own volition, the master can never be liable to pay wages. The contract of service may not come to an end, but the servant under the contract of service is bound to do work for the master and reciprocity of the promise of the master to pay wages is to be honored when the servant does work. If he docs not do the work without any rhyme or reasen and out of his own volition, the master is not bound to pay his wages. If, however, the servant concerned is unable to do work for the master, what will be the position of the liability of the latter? Undoubtedly, the master cannot be made liable to pay wages for an indefinite period. He may by his action put a stop to the running of his liability to pay wages either by giving notice to the servant or by putting him on leave without pay, if the servant has no leave due on full pay or half pay. But surely for the inability of the servant, even though it may be for no fault of his, the master cannot be made to pay him indefinitely. Ordinarily and generally, the service• conditions of the work in an industry are governed by the Certified Standing ORDER :s. The employer, therefore, has got to take action in accordance with them. The action taken by the employer in this case was one of dismissal of the workman concerned. As I said above, before the ORDER :of dismissal was made, the workman seems to have been paid his full wages. The action taken by the employer in this case was one of dismissal of the workman concerned. As I said above, before the ORDER :of dismissal was made, the workman seems to have been paid his full wages. That action of the employer was not approved by the Tribunal and so the workman continued in service of the employer and the employer could not deny him his wages. No other action, either according to the Certified Standing ORDER :s of the Company, or if permissible even under the general law of master and servant, seems to or is claimed to have been taken by the employer. That being so, on a careful consideration of the matter, I have come to the conclusion that the workman continued in service of the master and there was no stopping to the running of his liability to pay the wages. It would bear repetition to say that the liability was sought to be stopped by the dismissal ORDER :which became non-est on the refusal of the Tribunal to accord approval to it. The workman concerned, therefore, was entitled, as held by the Labour Court, to his wages etc. for the period 30.12.1967 to 5.12.1968. The second point urged on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, also fails. 6. For the reasons stated above, the writ application is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 64/- G. N. Prasad, J. I agree Applications dismissed.