JUDGMENT - This is a revision application filed by accused No. 1 against the order passed by Mr. S.V. Gokarn, Presidency Magistrate, 23rd Court, Bombay, on June 30, 1972 dismissing the application filed by accused No. Ion May 5, 1972 whereby it was contended that the Court was precluded from taking cognizance of the offences in respect of which process was issued against him without obtaining the previous sanction of the Central Government under section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the complaint filed by the present respondent No.1 was, therefore, not maintainable and should be dismissed and accused No. I discharged. 2. The facts necessary for the purpose of disposing of this revision application are that, on September 3, 1954-, the petitioner was appointed as Estate Manager by the Central Government as the head of the Estate Department of the Bombay Port Trust on a starting salary of Rs. 1,300 per month, pursuant to the provisions of section 23 (3) of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). It may be mentioned that by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 24 the petitioner would be removable by the Board of Trustees constituted under section 4 of the Act, as a body corporate, subject to the sanction of the Central Government. Respondent No. I (original complainant) was, at the material time, employed on a salary of Rs. 214 per month, as a clerk in the Estate Department of the Bombay Port Trust of which the petitioner was, as already stated above, the head. Under sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Act, the Chairman of the Board, on June 18, 1970 delegated his powers of appointment, removal etc. of employees of the Estate Department whose salary did not exceed Rs. 350 per month to the petitioner. 3. The petitioners case is that respondent No.1 handed over to him personally, on the evening of March 20, 1972, a letter of resignation dated March 17,1972 bearing respondent No. 1s own signature, and the same was accepted by the petitioners letter dated March 21, 1972, with effect from March 20, 1972 after office hours. 3. The petitioners case is that respondent No.1 handed over to him personally, on the evening of March 20, 1972, a letter of resignation dated March 17,1972 bearing respondent No. 1s own signature, and the same was accepted by the petitioners letter dated March 21, 1972, with effect from March 20, 1972 after office hours. Respondent No.1s case, on the other hand, is that no such letter of resignation was written or signed or handed over by him to the petitioner, and that the alleged letter of resignation dated March 17, 1972 is a forged letter to the knowledge of the petitioner. Respondent No 1, therefore, filed a complaint dated April 18, 1972 in a Presidency Magistrates Court in which he stated that, on the morning of March 21, 1972, he had gone to his office to sign the muster roll, as usual, but was prevented from doing so by the office superintendent under orders of the petitioner, and that when he thereafter went to his own table to work, he was stopped from doing so by the head clerk, also under orders 01 the petitioner. It is further stated in the said complaint that respondent No I was called by the petitioner into his chamber and was asked to go out with the peon to whom the petitioner delivered a letter for being entered by the outward clerk and delivered to respondent No 1. Respondent No.1 has stated in his complaint that when he received that letter and read its contents he found that the petitioner had purported to accept, with effect from March 20. 1972, the letter of resignation dated March-17, 1972 alleged to have been handed over by him personally to the petitioner. According to respondent No. 1, he thereupon addressed a letter the same afternoon to the petitioner setting out that no letter of resignation dated March 17, 1972 had ever been given by him It is further stated in the said complaint that when respondent No.1 met the petitioner again that afternoon, the petitioner shouted at him and told him that the letter of resignation had been handed over by him personally to the petitioner and had been accepted by the petitioner, and respondent No.1 should, therefore, get out of the office. Paragraph 24 of the complaint is important for the purpose of this judgment and must be set out verbatim. Paragraph 24 of the complaint is important for the purpose of this judgment and must be set out verbatim. It is as follows: - "24. I say that no steps appear to have been taken by the Police so far and therefore I am forced to move this Honourable Court with my complaint. I submit the Accused No.1 had hatched the plan with Accused No.2 and some other unknown persons to throw me out of the office by getting some got up resignation letter dated 17th March 1972 with intention to throw me out of my service. The Accused Nos. 1 and 2 have tried to achieve from round about what they could not achieve from the swings. I say that Accused No. 1 had fraudulently and dishonestly used as genuine the resignation letter dated 17-3-1972, got forged by him with full knowledge that it was forged document. Hence I charge the accused as above. I submit that the Accused No.2 and other unknown accused have aided and abetted the accused No.1, in his above acts." Accused No.2, it may be stated, was one of the clerks in the petitioners department. On the said complaint, the learned Magistrate issued, on April 22, 1972, a bailable warrant of arrest against the petitioner under sections 465, 471 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code. On May 5, 1972 the present petitioner (accused No.1), filed an application in the Court of the trial Magistrate praying that the complaint should be dismissed and the petitioner discharged, as already stated in the beginning of this judgment. That application was dismissed by the learned Magistrate on June 30, 1972, and it is from that order of dismissal that the petitioner has approached this Court in Revision. That application was dismissed by the learned Magistrate on June 30, 1972, and it is from that order of dismissal that the petitioner has approached this Court in Revision. The learned Magistrate took the view that the facts set out in the complaint filed by respondent No.1 spell out the offence of forgery against the petitioner, that the affairs "carried out" by the Board of Trustees of the Bombay Port Trust were not affairs of the Central Government, but were affairs of a trust created by the Act, and that for the offence of forgery as well as for the offence of using a forged document as genuine knowing it to be forged the sanction of the Central Government under section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not required as, on the facts stated in the complaint, it could not be said that the petitioner was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his duties. 4. In my opinion, the learned Magistrate was absolutely wrong in taking the view that the complaint filed by respondent No.1 charged the petitioner with the substantive offence of forgery under section 465 of the Indian Penal Code. There is not a single word in the complaint to the effect that it was the petitioner himself who had forged the said letter of resignation. All that has been stated in para. 24 of the complaint which has been quoted in extenso above is that the petitioner had hatched a plan with accused No.2 and some other unknown persons to throw respondent No. 1 out of the office by "getting some got-up resignation letter dated March 17, 1972" and that the petitioner had fraudulently and dishonestly used as genuine the resignation letter dated 17-3-1972 got forged by him with full knowledge that it was forged document". In my opinion, the words "getting" and "got" leave no room for doubt that respondent No. 1s charge in the complaint against the petitioner is, not that the petitioner had himself forged the said letter of resignation, but that he had planned to get it forged by some other person. It has not been contended before me that the said complaint makes out the independent offence of Conspiracy under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, but what Mr. It has not been contended before me that the said complaint makes out the independent offence of Conspiracy under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, but what Mr. Kotval urged before me was, (a) that it did spell out the substantive offence of forgery under section 465; and (b) that, at any rate, it did make out against the petitioner the charge of abetment, by conspiracy, of the offence of forgery under section 465 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. As far as the first of those contentions is concerned, after making some attempt to substantiate it, Mr. Kotval had ultimately to abandon it, though he did not formally give it up. In my opinion, on a plain reading of the complaint, it is impossible to say that respondent No. 1 has charged the petitioner therein with the substantive offence of forgery under section 465 of the Indian Penal Code and I need say no more about it. Mr. Kotval, however, strenuously urged the second contention set out above and, I am afraid, I must accept the same. I cannot say that the complaint does not seek to charge the petitioner with the offence of abetment of forgery, the abetment alleged being by conspiracy, though there is not a single fact averred in the petition on which such a charge could be founded beyond the two bald statements referred to in para 24 thereof to which I have referred above. 5. There can be no doubt that the complaint does seek to charge the petitioner with the offence under section 471 read with section 465 of the Indian Penal Code, of using a forged document as genuine knowing the same to be forged. Though there is no express averment, and no mention in the sections cited at the head of the complaint, of an offence under section 341 of the Indian Penal Code, the learned Magistrate has issued process under that section also. I must, therefore, proceed to consider whether sanction under section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is required in respect of the offence under section 465 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code; in respect of an offence under section 471 read with section 465 of the Indian Penal Code; and in respect of the offence under section 341 of the Indian Penal Code. Before I do so, it will, however, be convenient to refer to the relevant statutory provisions and to deal with the case law on the point. 6. Mr. Kotval on behalf of respondent No.1 has contended that, in order to attract the applicability of section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, four conditions are necessary viz., (1) the petitioner should be a public servant; (2) the petitioner should not be removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State or Central Government; (3) the petitioner must be a person employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State; and (4) the charge against the petitioner must be in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. As far as the first condition for the applicability of section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, in my opinion, there is not the slightest doubt that the petitioner is a public servant as defined in sub· clause (b) of the twelfth clause of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, as being in the service or pay of a corporation established by a State Act. Section 4 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, makes the Trustees of the Port of Bombay a body corporate, having perpetual succession and a common seal, and it cannot be disputed that the petitioner is a person in the service and pay of the Trustees of the Port of Bombay. 7. It was, however, sought to be contended by Mr. Kotval on behalf of respondent No.1 that section 79 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, is in conflict with the twelfth clause of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code and, the former being a special Act, must prevail over the latter in view of that conflict. It is his submission that the petitioner cannot be said to be a public servant if the test laid down by section 79 is applied. Under section 79 a person employed under the said Act is to be deemed to be a public servant within section 21 of the Indian Penal Code only for the purposes of certain sections specified therein which do not include sections 109, 341, 465 or 471. Under section 79 a person employed under the said Act is to be deemed to be a public servant within section 21 of the Indian Penal Code only for the purposes of certain sections specified therein which do not include sections 109, 341, 465 or 471. In this connection, however, it must be borne in mind that the twelfth clause of section 21 in its present form was only added by an amendment made in the said Code in the year 1964, long after the enactment of section 79 of the Bombay Port Trust Act which was introduced into the said Act in the year 1951. The former is a wider provision which includes the section mentioned in the latter. Apparently, since there is no conflict between the two statutory provisions, the Legislature has not thought it necessary to delete section 79 of the Bombay Port Trust Act. The highest that can be said is that section 79 of the Bombay Port Trust Act has now become superfluous after the introduction of the twelfth clause of section 21 into the Indian Penal Code, but there is no conflict between them. I have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this contention of Mr. Kotval and holding that the petitioner is a public servant as defined by section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. This, in fact, was not disputed before the learned Magistrate. 8. As far as the second ingredient is concerned, viz. that the public servant concerned must not be removable save with the sanction of the State or the Central Government, section 24 (1) of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, leaves no room for doubt whatsoever that the petitioner cannot be removed from office without the sanction of the Central Government. That condition of section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, therefore, also satisfied in the case of the petitioner. Whilst there can be no doubt that fulfilment of conditions Nos. 1,2, and 4 formulated by Mr. Kotval is necessary before section 197 (1) becomes applicable, I do not agree with him that the third condition formulated by him is also an essential condition for the applicability of that section. Whilst there can be no doubt that fulfilment of conditions Nos. 1,2, and 4 formulated by Mr. Kotval is necessary before section 197 (1) becomes applicable, I do not agree with him that the third condition formulated by him is also an essential condition for the applicability of that section. In my opinion, the proper construction of section 197 (1) is that the conditions for its applicability are only those which are laid down in the substantive part of sub-section (1), and clauses (a) and (b) thereof only deal with the further question which would arise if section 197 (1) is applicable viz., whose sanction is it that is required, that of the Central Government or of the State Government. In that view Dr the matter, it is not necessary for me to decide whether the petitioner before me was a person employed in connection with the affairs of the Union. In the event of my being wrong in the view, which I have taken on this point, I would, however, have no hesitation in holding that he is so employed, having regard to the scheme of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, which shows throughout, in a large number of sections, that the Port Trust and its officers are called upon to act in connection with the affairs of the Union. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the phrase "in connection with" is very wide in its ambit and it is, therefore, not necessary in order to fall within clause (a) or clause (b) of section 197 (1), as the case may be, that the activity in question should itself be an affair of the Union. It is sufficient if it has some connection with the affairs of the Union in general. I may point out that major ports, and the constitution and powers of Port Authorities, fall within Item 27in List I (Union List) in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and would, therefore, by virtue of Article 246, be within the exclusive legislative competence of the Union Parliament. Article 73 (1)(a) lays down that the executive power of the Union extends to all matters with respect to which the Parliament has power to make laws or, in other words, that the executive power of the Union Government is co-extensive with the legislative power of the Parliament. Article 73 (1)(a) lays down that the executive power of the Union extends to all matters with respect to which the Parliament has power to make laws or, in other words, that the executive power of the Union Government is co-extensive with the legislative power of the Parliament. It has not been disputed that Bombay is a major port and, under those circumstances, if I am wrong in the view that clauses (a) and (b) of section 197 (1) do not constitute conditions for the applicability thereof, I would hold that the petitioner is a person employed in connection with the affairs of the Union. 9. As far as the fourth condition for the applicability of section 197 (1) is concerned, several authorities were cited before me in regard to the interpretation of the expression "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty" occurring therein, but I need refer only to a few of them, as the legal position is now well-settled by decisions of the highest Court. The leading case on the subject, which is cited in almost every subsequent case, is the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor1 in which, in regard to section 270 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which is similar in terms to section 197 (l) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Suleman J. pointed out (at p. 51) that, obviously, the said section did not mean that the very act which is the gravamen of the charge and constitutes the offence should be the official duty of the public servant, "because an offence can never be an official duty." He then proceeded to lay down (at p. 52) that the impugned act must purport to be done in the official capacity with which the accused pretends to be clothed at the time, that is to say, "under the cloak of an ostensibly official act, though of course, the offence would really amount to a breach of duty." Varadachariar J., with whose judgment Gwyer C. J. (at p. 44) expressed complete agreement, approved of the test laid down in some earlier cases that "there must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it" (at p. 56). Applying that test, the Federal Court took the view that sanction under section 270 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, was necessary in respect of the charge under section 477-A of the Indian Penal Code in the said case, but that it was not necessary for the institution of proceedings under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant before them. The next decision to which I must refer is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shreekantiah Ramayya v. Slate of Bombay2 in which the accused, who were Government servants employed in the stores depot of the military at Dehu Road, near Poona, were charged with the offence of having, in pursuance of a conspiracy arranged to sell stores worth Rs. 4,000 illegally to the approver. No sanction under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code had been obtained in respect of the charges against accused No.2 and it was contended on his behalf that the conviction as well as the sentence passed upon him were, therefore, bad. Bose J., delivering the judgment of the Court, observed that it was obvious that "if section 197, Criminal Procedure Code is construed too narrowly it could never be applied, for of course it is no part of an officials duty to commit an offence and never can be." The learned Judge then proceeded to observe that it was not the duty of the Court "to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it," and the Court has, therefore, first to concentrate on the word "offence" occurring in section 197. He then observed (para. 19) that it was evident that the entrustment and/or dominion in the said case were in an official capacity, and it was equally evident that there could in that case be no disposal, lawful or otherwise, save by an act done or purporting to be done in an official capacity. The learned Judge stated that, therefore, the act complained of, viz. The learned Judge stated that, therefore, the act complained of, viz. the disposal, could not have been done in any other way; that if it was innocent, it was an official act; that if it was dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official act; but that, in either event, the act was official because the second accused could not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an official act viz., officially permitting their disposal, which he had done. The conviction as well as the sentence passed upon accused No.2 in the said case were, therefore, quashed for want of sanction under section] 97, Criminal Procedure Code. Still more illuminating is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu3 where an official of the Public Works Department, whose duty it was to disburse wages to workmen after drawing the same from the treasury, showed in the monthly acquaintance roll a sum of Rs.51 as having been paid to a Khalashi (menial servant) named Parma, in the month of April 1951, and the case of the prosecution was that there was, in fact, no person of that name and the thumb impression found in the acquittance roll was that of the appellant himself who had drawn the amount in a fictitious name. The appellant, who was charged with offences under sections 465 and 409, Indian Penal Code, was acquitted by the trial Court, but was convicted of both those offences by the High Court. The accused then appealed, by special leave, to the Supreme Court. Venkatarama Ayyar J., who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court, referred (para. 7) to the test laid down by Lord Simonds in the earlier Privy Council case of Gill v. King4. That test was whether the public servant, if challenged, could reasonably claim that, what he did, he had done in virtue of his office. The Supreme Court laid down the result of the authorities in the following, terms (para. 7) to the test laid down by Lord Simonds in the earlier Privy Council case of Gill v. King4. That test was whether the public servant, if challenged, could reasonably claim that, what he did, he had done in virtue of his office. The Supreme Court laid down the result of the authorities in the following, terms (para. 8) (p 312): “….It is not every offence committed by a public servant that required sanction for prosecution under section 197 (1), Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution. " Towards the end of the judgment it was stated (para. 13) that if what appeared on the face of the acquittance roll was true-and whether it was true or not was not a matter relevant at the stage of sanction-then the acts with which the appellant was charged fell within the scope of his duties, and could be justified by him as done by virtue of his office. It was held that sanction under section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was, therefore, required before the appellant could be prosecuted under section 465 or under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code and his conviction as well as the sentences passed upon him were quashed. In the case of Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari5 the law on the point was laid down in the following terms (para. In the case of Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari5 the law on the point was laid down in the following terms (para. 19) (p. 49) : ”……….There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." There is only one other case to which I need refer and that is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Virupaxappa v. State of Mysore6. The facts of that case were that, on February 23, 1954, the appellant, a head constable of police, caught one Nabi with 15 Packets of ganja and prepared a panchanama and seized the same showing incorrectly only 9 packets of ganja therein. On February 24, 1954 the appellant, however, prepared a new panchanama, antedated as of February 23, 1954, in which he falsely recited that the said 9 packets of ganja had been seized from a different person and that that person had run away throwing the bundle down on a road. The appellant prepared a report to the same effect. It was the case of the prosecution that he had prepared the false panchanama and the false report with the dishonest intention of saving Nabi who had actually been caught with the ganja on February 23, 1954 from legal punishment. On those facts, it was quite clear that the second panchanama was a forged document within the terms of section 463 read with section 464 (1) of the Indian Penal Code, in so far as the appellant had caused it to be believed that the said document was made at a time at which he knew it had not been made. The only question which arose in the appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the appellants prosecution was barred by the special rule of six months period of limitation contained in section 161 (1) of the Bombay Police Act, by reason of the same having been done "under colour or an excess of the duty or authority of the appellant as a head constable. It was observed (para. It was observed (para. 9) that when the colour was assumed as a cover or a cloak for something which could not properly be done in performance of the duty or in exercise of the right or office, the act was sought to be done under colour of the office or duty or right, and that (para. 10) the words used in section 161 (1) included acts done under the cloak of duty, even though not by virtue of the duty. Applying that test, it was held (para. 11) that whether the false panchanama and the false report were prepared on 23rd or 24th, the fact still remained that they were prepared under cover of the appellants duty to prepare a correct panchanama and a correct report, and that those acts were, therefore, done by the appellant under colour of a duty laid upon him by the Bombay Police Act. It was, therefore, held that section 161 applied and the appeal was allowed and the conviction as well as the sentence passed upon the appellant set aside. It may be pointed out that it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gorakh Tulji v The State7 that the words "acting under colour of duty" in section 161 of the Bombay Police Act have the same connotation as the words "purporting to act in the discharge of official duty" occurring In section 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The observations of the Supreme Court in Virupaxappas case are, therefore, equally applicable to the present case. I must proceed to consider whether the petitioner in the present case, if challenged, could reasonably claim that what he did was done by him in virtue of his office, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on merits which would have to be investigated at the trial and not at the stage of grant of sanction which must precede the institution of the prosecution. To put it in another way, as has been laid down in another case, I must proceed to consider whether the acts done by the petitioner bear such relation to his duties as estate manager that the petitioner could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did those acts in the course of the performance of his duty. 10. Turning to the facts of the present case in the light of the test emerging from the authorities discussed in the preceding paragraph, I fail to see how the commission of the alleged offence of abetment of forgery under section 465 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code could reasonably be challenged by the petitioner as consisting of acts done by him in virtue of his office. Under those circumstances, I hold that sanction under section 197 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code is not necessary in respect of the offence of forgery under section 465 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The matter, however, does not rest there. In the complaint dated April 18, 1972 filed by respondent No. 1 in the Court of the learned Magistrate, there is not a single fact stated on which the charge of abetment of forgery against the petitioner could be based and, as already stated above, all that the said complaint contains are two bald statements in para. 24 thereof that the petitioner had got the letter of resignation dated March 17, 1972 forged by hatching a plan along with accused No.2 and some other unknown persons. Mr. Kotval sought to rely on what he has called the background of the enmity between respondent No.1 and the petitioner which has been set out in the said complaint, but, I am afraid, whilst enmity may furnish the motive for the offence, it cannot be an ingredient of the offence, nor can it be said to be a fact or facts on which the offence could be said to be founded. I have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the charge of abetment of forgery contained in para. 24 of the said complaint is groundless, as stated in ground No 6 of the Revision Petition before me. I have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the charge of abetment of forgery contained in para. 24 of the said complaint is groundless, as stated in ground No 6 of the Revision Petition before me. Though that ground has not been set out in so many words in the application dated May 5, 1972 filed by the petitioner before the learned trial Magistrate, in. my opinion, the terms in which relief has been prayed for in para. 6 of that application are wide enough for the learned Magistrate to have made an appropriate order in that behalf. Under section 253 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he had the power to discharge the petitioner at any stage if a particular charge contained in the complaint was groundless, as I have held the charge under section 465 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code to be. The learned Magistrate should have exercised his power under section 253 (2) and, in my opinion, he has erred in not doing so. I, therefore, hold that, as the said charge is groundless, the accused must be discharged in respect of the same. 11. That brings me to the charge under section 4-71 read with section 465 of the Indian Penal Code which is also contained in para. 24 of the complaint dated April 18, 1972. Applying the test emerging from the authorities discussed above, I must proceed to consider whether the petitioner, if challenged, could reasonably claim that, in receiving and acting on respondent No.1s letter of resignation handed over to him, he was doing something in virtue of his office, or to put it in another way, whether the petitioners act of receiving the letter of resignation and acting upon it by accepting it bears such relation to his duties as estate manager that the petitioner could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that what he did was in the course of the performance of his duty. I have already referred earlier in this judgment to the relevant section of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879, and have pointed out that the Chairman of the Board was empowered under sub-section (2) of section 23 to delegate his powers under sub-section (1) of that section, which included powers of appointment, promotion, leave, suspension, fining, reducing or dismissing, or any other question relating to the services of the employees of a particular department, to the head of that department. Exhibit A to the Revision Petition in the present case shows that, in exercise of his powers under section 23 (2) of the Act, the Chairman had, on June 18,1970, delegated his powers in that behalf in regard to the employees of the estate department drawing not more than Rs. 350 per month to the Estate Manager. It would, therefore, be a part of the duties of the petitioner as the head of the estate department to receive letters of resignation and, if he thought fit, to accept the same. There can, therefore, be no doubt that, in receiving respondent No. 1s letter of resignation and accepting it, the petitioner could reasonably claim to have acted in the discharge of his duties. It was contended by Mr. Kotval that it was no part of the duties of the petitioner to receive and act upon a forged letter of resignation but, as pointed out by Bose J. in Shreekantiah Ramayyas case already cited above (para. 19), even if the act of the accused was a dishonest one, it was, in view of the position set out above, the dishonest doing of an official act, because the petitioner could not have received the letter of resignation or acted upon it save by the doing of an official act viz., accepting that letter of resignation. There is, therefore, no substance in this contention of Mr. Kotval which must be rejected. I hold that, as far as the charge in the complaint relating to section 471 read with section 465 is concerned, the last ingredient of section 197 (1) viz., that of acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty, is satisfied as far as the petitioner is concerned. Kotval which must be rejected. I hold that, as far as the charge in the complaint relating to section 471 read with section 465 is concerned, the last ingredient of section 197 (1) viz., that of acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty, is satisfied as far as the petitioner is concerned. I have already taken the view earlier in this judgment that the petitioner must be held to be a public servant who was not removable from office save with the sanction of the Central Government. In that view of the matter, all the conditions for the applicability of section 197 (1) are satisfied, as far as the charge under section 471 read with section 465 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, and I must hold that the sanction of the Central Government was required before the trial Court could take cognizance of the said offence. Following the course adopted by the Privy Council in the case of Yusofalli Noorbhoy v King8, the petitioner must, therefore, be discharged in respect of the said offence. 12. In the event of my being wrong in the view which I have taken on this point, I would, on a proper construction of the complaint filed by respondent No. 1, hold that the said charge is also groundless within the terms of section 253 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the petitioner would have to be discharged on that ground also. A proper construction of the complaint filed by respondent No.1 shows that the only knowledge which respondent No. 1 attributes to the petitioner of the fact that the letter of resignation dated March 17, 1972 was a forged document to his knowledge, is by reason of he himself having got it forged in conspiracy with others whom he abetted in the commission of that forgery. It is not as if the complaint contains a single other fact on the strength of which it seeks to impute the petitioner with knowledge that the said letter of resignation which was handed over to him was a forged document. It is not as if the complaint contains a single other fact on the strength of which it seeks to impute the petitioner with knowledge that the said letter of resignation which was handed over to him was a forged document. I have already held earlier in this judgment that the charge that it was the petitioner who had got the said letter of resignation forged by hatching a plan with accused No.2 and other unknown persons is entirely without foundation and that there is not a single fact stated in the complaint on which that charge could be based. In that view of the matter, it must follow that the charge of having fraudulently and dishonestly used that letter of resignation as genuine, knowing that it had been got forged by himself, is equally groundless, and the petitioner would, in any event, therefore, have to be discharged under section 253 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13. That leaves for my consideration only the charge under section 341 of the Indian Penal Code on which also the petitioner was arrested under the warrant of arrest on April 22, 1971. The facts on which that charge is based, though section 341 is not amongst the sections mentioned at the head of the complaint, are to be found in paras. 12, 13 and 18 of the complaint, in so far as the petitioner is alleged to have given orders to prevent respondent No. 1 from signing the muster and from having access to his table for doing his usual work, and also in so far as the petitioner is alleged to have refused to permit respondent No. 1 to remain in the office and to have asked him to get out when respondent No. 1 went into the petitioners chamber at about 3 p. m. on March 21, 1972. As far as these alleged acts of wrongful restraint are concerned there can be not the least doubt that they were purported to be done by the petitioner in the discharge of his official duties as the head of the estate department. As far as these alleged acts of wrongful restraint are concerned there can be not the least doubt that they were purported to be done by the petitioner in the discharge of his official duties as the head of the estate department. The petitioner being a public servant not removable from office without the sanction of the Central Government, all the conditions of section 197 (1) are satisfied in regard to this offence also, and the trial Court could not take cognizance of the same without the requisite sanction of the Central Government under section 191 (1). The petitioner must, therefore, be discharge~ in respect of this offence also. 14. In the result, I allow this Revision Petition, make the Rule absolute, and order that the petitioner be discharged in respect of the offences under section 465 read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, section 471 read with section 465 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as section 341 of the Indian Penal Code. As far as the substantive offence of forgery under section 465 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, in the view which I have taken above viz., that the complaint does not charge the petitioner with any such substantive offence, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for the same. Bail bonds cancelled. Rule made absolute.