P. N. BHAGWATI, D. A. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THESE Letters Patent Appeals involve an interesting question of law relating to the scope of an appeal preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against a decision given by a Single Judge of the High Court in Second Appeal. The question is whether an appellant in such a Letters Patent Appeal is entitled to raise a new contention which has not been taken by him before the learned Judge hearing the Second Appeal or he is limited only to the contentions advanced by his at the hearing of the Second Appeal. The question is of some importance and it is necessary to examine it closely because there are conflicting decisions of this Court and the conflict has to be resolved. The facts giving rise to these Letters Patent Appeals are similar in material particulars and it would therefore be sufficient if we state the facts of only one of them namely Letters Patent Appeal No. 58 of 1968. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff in Letters Patent Appeal No. 58 of 1968 filed a suit against the defendent to recover possession of certain premises let to the defendant. The premises were situate in an area which formed part of the former State of Saurashtra. The case of the plaintiff was that the premises were new premises erected and let for the first time after 1st January 1951 and by reason of sec. 4 (2) of the Saurashtra Rent Control Act 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Saurashtra Rent Act) the premises were exempt from the applicability of the Saurashtra Rent Act and the plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover possession of the premises from the defendant under the ordinary law of landlord and tenant. The defendant in his written statement conceded that the premises were new premises erected for the first time after 1st January 1951 but according to him he was not the first tenant of the premises and the premises could not therefore be said to be let for the first time on or after 1st January 1951 and the exemption granted under sec. 4 (2) was accordingly not available and the premises were governed by the Saurashtra Rent Act. 4 (2) was accordingly not available and the premises were governed by the Saurashtra Rent Act. The defendant thus pleaded the protection of the Saurashtra Rent Act and contended that the suit was liable to fail as no ground was made out by the plaintiff which would entitle him to recover possession of the premises from the defendant under the Saurashtra Rent Act. The trial Court took the view that the premises were new premises erected for the first time after 1st January 1951 but as the letting of the premises to the defendant was not the first letting after 1st January 1951 the exemption under sec. 4 (2) could not be invoked by the plaintiff and the premises were governed by the Saurashtra Rent Act and since no ground under sec. 12 or 13 of the Saurashtra Rent Act was made out by the plaintiff he was not entitled to recover possession of the premises from the defendant. On this view the learned trial Judge negatived the claim for recovery of possession and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff being aggrieved by the decision of the learned trial Judge preferred an appeal against it but the learned District Judge who heard the appeal agreed with the view taken by the learned trial Judge and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff thereupon preferred a Second Appeal to this Court. The Second Appeal came up for hearing before Mr. Justice Sompura. The main contention urged on behalf of the plaintiff before Mr. Justice Sompura was that the premises were exempt from the applicability of the Saurashtra Rent Act by reason of sec. 4 (2) and the plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover possession of the premises from the defendant according to the ordinary law of landlord and tenant. This contention found favour with Mr. Justice Sompura. The learned Judge took the view that in order to attract the applicability of sec. 4 (2) of the Saurashtra Rent Act two conditions were required to be satisfied:- (1) the premises should be new premises erected for the first time on or after 1st January 1951 and (2) they should be let for the first time on or after 1st January 1951. The first condition was admittedly fulfilled in the present case and so far as. The first condition was admittedly fulfilled in the present case and so far as. the second condition was concerned that was also according to the learned Judge satisfied because the premises had not been let at any time before 1 January 1951 but they were let for the first time on or after that date. The learned Judge observed that what the second condition required was that the premises should not have been let at any time before 1st January 1951 but should be let for the first time on or after that date and not that the letting in question should be the first letting so that the second condition would not be satisfied if the premises were let a second or third or subsequent time. It was entirely immaterial to the applicability of sec. 4 (2) said the learned Judge whether the letting in relation to which the question of protection of Saurashtra Rent Act arose was the first letting of the premises or a second or third or subsequent letting so long as the premises had not been let out at any time before 1st January 1951 and the first time that they were let was on or after that date. The learned Judge held that since in the present case the premises were new premises which had not been let at any time prior to 1st January 1951 but were let for the first time after that date the exemption under sec. 4 (2) was applicable notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was not the first tenant of the premises and the premises were not governed by the Saurashtra Rent Act. The learned Judge in this view of the matter concluded that that plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the premises from the defendant under the ordinary law of landlord and tenant and passed a decree for eviction against the defendant. The defendant being aggrieved by the decree for eviction passed against him applied for a certificate of fitness under clause 15 of the Letters Patent and on such certificate being granted by Mr. Justice Sompura brought Letters Patent Appeal No. 58 of 1969 in this Court. Letters Patent Appeal No. 8 of 1970 is also brought before this Court in identical circumstances and the judgment of Mr. Justice Sompura brought Letters Patent Appeal No. 58 of 1969 in this Court. Letters Patent Appeal No. 8 of 1970 is also brought before this Court in identical circumstances and the judgment of Mr. Justice Sompura challenged in that Letters Patent Appeal is based on the same ground as the judgment impugned in Letters Patent Appeal No. 58 of 1968. In fact in disposing of the Second Appeal giving rise to Letters Patent Appeal No. 1970 Mr. Justice Sompura has followed his earlier judgment challenged in Letters Patent Appeal No. 58 of 1968. ( 3 ) WHEN these Letters Patent Appeals reached hearing before us the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants assailed the judgment of Mr. Justice Sompura on the ground that the learned Judge had fallen into an error in construing sec. 4 (2) of the Saurashtra Rent Act. They contended that on a proper construction the second condition of sec. 4 (2) limited the applicability of that section only to first letting of the premises and if there was a second or third or subsequent letting sec. 4 (2) had no application and the premises were governed by the Saurashtra Act. This contention raised an interesting question of construction of sec. 4 (2) of the Saurashtra Rent Act but for reasons which we shall presently state it is not necessary for us to decide this question as we find that there is another point on which it is possible to effectively dispose of these Letters Patent Appeals. That point arises in the following manner. ( 4 ) WHEN the suits were filed the Saurashtra Rent Act was in force in the Saurashtra area of the State of Gujarat. But during the pendency of the suits Gujarat Act 57 of 1963 came into force with effect from 31st December 1963 and it extended the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act to the Saurashtra area of the State of Gujarat and introduced sec. 51 in the Bombay Rent Act repealing inter alia the Saurashtra Rent Act. The defendants therefore raised a contention before us at the hearing of the Letters Patent Appeals that the Saurashtra Rent Act having been repealed and the Bombay Rent Act having been made applicable to the premises during the pendency of the suits the defendents were entitled to claim the protection of sec. The defendants therefore raised a contention before us at the hearing of the Letters Patent Appeals that the Saurashtra Rent Act having been repealed and the Bombay Rent Act having been made applicable to the premises during the pendency of the suits the defendents were entitled to claim the protection of sec. 12 (1) of the Bombay Rent Act and no decree for possession could be passed against them since they were at the date of the suit ready and willing to pay the standard rent of the premises and perform and observe the other conditions of the tenancy. This contention would seem to be unanswerable in view of the decision given by us this morning in Letters Patent Appeal No. 89 of 1970 (Valand Savaji Topu v. Bai Jaikunver XIV G. L. R. 410 ) and there can be no doubt that if this contention could be urged by the defendants it would afford a complete answer to the claim of the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the premises from the defendants. The plaintiffs however raised a preliminary objection against our entertaining this contention at the instance of the defendants and urged that this contention could not be allowed to be raised by the defendants in the Letters Patent Appeals because it had not been raised before at any earlier stage of the proceeding and even before Mr. Justice Sompura who heard the Second Appeal it had not been urged on behalf of the defendants. The plaintiff contended that it was not open to the defendants to urge for the first time at the hearing of the Patent Appeals a new contention which had not been taken by them before the learned Judge hearing the Second Appeal. This contention was sought to be supported by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kadi Municipality v. New Chhotalal Mills A. I. R. 1965 Gujarat 293 and we must state that the strongest reliance was placed upon it by the plaintiffs. The defendants on the other hand urged that there was no invariable rule that if a contention was not raised before the learned Judge hearing the Second Appeal it could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in the Letters Patent Appeal. The defendants on the other hand urged that there was no invariable rule that if a contention was not raised before the learned Judge hearing the Second Appeal it could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in the Letters Patent Appeal. It was ultimately a matter for the Court hearing the Letters Patent Appeal to decide in the exercise of its judicial discretion whether a new contention should or should not be allowed to be raised for the first time at the hearing of the Letters Patent Appeal. If the Court hearing the Letters Patent Appeal found that the contention sought to be raised on behalf of the appellant involved a pure question of law which went to the root of the matter the Court could always in the interests of justice permit such a contention to be raised for the first time even if it was not raised before the learned Judge hearing the Second Appeal. The defendants sought to support this contention by placing strong reliance on another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Hussein Dadu v. Bai Kunverbai (1971) 12 G. L. R. 610 The defendants submitted that the new contention sought to be raised by them involved a pure question of law relating to the applicability of sec. 12 (1) of the Bombay Rent Act and it went to the root of the matter because if it were decided in favour of the defendants the plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover possession of the premises from the defendants and their suits would fail. ( 5 ) NOW there can be no doubt that a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view in Kadi Municipality v. New Chhotalal Mills (supra) that a new point which has not been urged before the Judge hearing a Second Appeal cannot be allowed to be urged for the first time at the hearing of a Letters Patent Appeal. But equally another Division Bench of this Court has said in Hussein Dadu v. Bai Kunverbai that if a pure question of law going to the root of the matter is sought to be raised for the first time at the hearing of a Letters Patent Appeal it would be proper for the Court to permit it to be raised even if it has not been raised before the Judge hearing the Second Appeal. There is thus prima facie conflict between two decisions of Division Benches of this Court and it was therefore suggested by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs that this particular point should be referred to a larger Bench. But we do not think it necessary to make a reference to a larger Bench. The law as to the binding nature of precedents is now well-settled as a result of a special Full Bench decision of this Court in State v. Gordhandas (1962) 3 G. L. R. 269 and it has been stated in the form of several propositions in the leading judgment of K. T. Desai C. J. in that case. The fourth proposition formulated in that judgment is material for our purpose and it reads as follows :- (4 ). A Court is not bound by its own previous decisions that are in conflict with one another. If the new decision is in conflict with the old it is given per incuriam and it is not binding on a later Court. ALTHOUGH a later Court is not bound by the decision so given per incuriam this does not mean that it is bound by the first case. Perhaps in strict logic the first case should be binding since it should never have have departed from and was only departed from per incuriam However this is not the rule. The rule is that where there are previous inconsistent decisions of its own the Court is free to follow either. It can follow the earlier but equally if it thinks fit. it can follow the later. IT is therefore open to us to follow out of the two decisions of this Court in Kadi Municipality v. New Chhotalal Mills (supra) and Hussein Dadu v. Bai Kunverbai (supra) that which commends itself to us for our acceptance and we must accordingly proceed to consider which of the two decisions lays down the correct law. IT is therefore open to us to follow out of the two decisions of this Court in Kadi Municipality v. New Chhotalal Mills (supra) and Hussein Dadu v. Bai Kunverbai (supra) that which commends itself to us for our acceptance and we must accordingly proceed to consider which of the two decisions lays down the correct law. Is there any inviolable rule as seems to have been assumed in Kadi Municipality v. New Chhotalal Mills that a new point which has not been urged before the Judge hearing a Second Appeal can never be allowed to be urged for the first time at the hearing of a Letters Patent Appeal? We do not think so. If we look at the decision in Kadi Municipality v. New Chhotalal Mills it will be found that the Division Bench in that case did not examine this question on principle but merely followed three decisions of the High Court of Bombay namely Shripad v. Shivram A. I. R. 1934 Bombay 466 Sattappa Gurusattappay v. Md. Appalal Kazi A. I. R. 1939 Bombay 227 and Ramabai v. Raghunath A. I. R. 1952 Bombay 106. It is therefore necessary to consider what exactly these three decisions of the Bombay High Court laid down and what is the principle on which they proceeded. It will be apparent on a close scrutiny of these decisions that what these decisions laid down was that an appellant in a Letters Patent Appeal is not entitled as a matter of right to urge a new contention which has not been raised by him before the Judge hearing the Second Appeal and not that the Court hearing a Letters Patent Appeal has no power in a fit case to grant him permission to do so. The distinction made in these decisions of the Bombay High Court is between the right of an appellant to be heard on a new contention and the power of the court to grant permission to the appellant to raise a new contention. The former cannot prevail in a Letters Patent Appeal but the latter is not excluded. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out in Shripad v. Shivram (supra) :-FINALLY Mr. Walavalkar has pointed out two rulings of the Lahore Court of which I need only refer to the latter one viz. Teja Singh v. Gurcharan Singh 1930 Lah. 632. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out in Shripad v. Shivram (supra) :-FINALLY Mr. Walavalkar has pointed out two rulings of the Lahore Court of which I need only refer to the latter one viz. Teja Singh v. Gurcharan Singh 1930 Lah. 632. This is a judgment of a Division Bench including the Chief Justice of that Court. It lays down that it is a well-settled rule of law that an appellant is not entitled in an appeal under the Letters Patent to be heard on points which had not been raised before the Judge from whose judgment he has preferred the appeal. SO also in Sattappa Gurusattappay v. Md. Appalal Kazi (supra) Mr. Justice Broomfield speaking on behalf of the Division Bench said:-BUT that particular point has not been taken in any of the lower Courts and in accordance with the usual practice we have declined to allow it to be taken in the Letters Patent appeal. Mr. Kane who appears for the appellant cited Parbhu Lal v. Badri A. I. R. 1934 All. 719 in support of his right to argue the point before us In that case some decisions of the Privy Council have been referred to but we do not think that there is anything in these cases which affects the power of the High Courts to decide what matters they will consider in a Letters Patent Appeal. A Full Bench of the same High Court in Mahabir Sing v. Dip Narain Tewari A. I. R. 1931 All. 400 has recognized the practice according to which new points are not to be allowed to be raised in such appeals though it was held that that practice does not mean any absolute prohibition. In Shripad v. Shivram A. I. R. 1934 Bom. 466 our own High Court has held that in an appeal under the Letters Patent the appellant is not entitled to be heard on points which had not been raised before the Judge from whose judgment the appeal has been preferred. We think the practice is salutary and we see no reason why we should depart from it in this case. We think the practice is salutary and we see no reason why we should depart from it in this case. THESE observations from the decisions of the Bombay High Court and particularly the portion underlined by us clearly show that there is no rule of law that an appellant in a Letters Patent Appeal cannot be heard on a point which has not been raised by him before the Judge hearing the Second Appeal. It is merely a rule of practice which has been adopted by the courts since long and that rule of practice also does not go to the length of debarring an appellant in a Letters Patent Appeal from ever being able to urge a new contention which has not been raised by him before the Judge hearing the Second Appeal. What it prescribes is merely this that an appellant in a Letters Patent Appeal shall have no right to be heard on a point which has not been raised by him in the Second Appeal but it does not take away the power of the court hearing a Letters Patent Appeal to permit the appellant in a fit case to urge a new contention not taken by him before the Judge hearing the Second The appellant has no right to insist that he shall be heard on a new contention but the Court always has the power to permit him to do so if the justice of the case so requires. It is true that there are observation in Ramabai v. Raghunath (supra) which might at first blush seem to suggest that an appellant can never be permitted in a Letters Patent Appeal to raise a contention which has not been urged by him before the Judge hearing the Second Appeal but if closely read they would show that what the Division Bench wanted to emphasize was that the appellant in such a case would not be entitled to urge a new contention in the Letters Patent Appeal. Mr. Justice N. H. Bhagwati speaking on behalf of the Division Bench pointed out that Mr. Mr. Justice N. H. Bhagwati speaking on behalf of the Division Bench pointed out that Mr. Bhalerao would not under the circumstances be within his rights if he wanted to argue a point which he had not argued before Chainani J. This distinction between the right of an appellant in a Letters Patent Appeal to urge a new contention not raised before the Judge hearing the Second Appeal and the power of the Court hearing a Letters Patent Appeal to permit the appellant to do so in a proper case in the interest of justice thus runs clearly through all these decisions of the Bombay High Court. But it seems that the Division Bench in Kadi Municipality v. New Chhotalal Mills did not correctly appreciate this distinction and laid down a broad proposition that a new point which has not been urged before a Judge hearing a Second Appeal cannot be allowed to be urged for the first time at the hearing of a Letters Patent Appeal on the erroneous assumption that it was supported by these decisions of the Bombay High Court. This proposition must be regarded as too wide a statement of the law on the subject. It would be more appropriate to say that an appellant in a Betters Patent Appeal is not entitled as a matter of right to be heard on a new point which has not been urged by him before the Judge hearing the Second Appeal. The appellant cannot insist that he must be heard on such new point as he can in regard to a point urged by him before the Judge hearing the Second Appeal But the Court always has the power to permit the appellant to raise a new contention if it is necessary in the interest of juts ice tood so. That power of the Court is not taken away by any rule of law and it would indeed be most unwise to take it away by a rule of practice. Of course the Court would not ordinarily permit a new contention to be raised by an appellant if the contention raises a question of fact and cannot be determined without fresh investigation of facts. Of course the Court would not ordinarily permit a new contention to be raised by an appellant if the contention raises a question of fact and cannot be determined without fresh investigation of facts. But if the contention is a pure question of law going to the root of the matter the Court may in the exercise of its judicial discretion permit such contention to be raised in aid of justice. That is what the Division Bench of this Court did in Hussein Dadu v. Bai Kunverbai. The Division Bench pointed out in that case that the question which was sought to be raised before it for the first time in the Letters Patent Appeal was a pure question of law which went to the root of the matter and therefore even in the Letters Patent Appeal it would be proper to permit the appellant to raise it. We must confess with the greatest respect to the learned Judges who decided that case that they were right in allowing the new contention to be raised by the appellant in the Letters Patent Appeal before them. It is true that they did not indicate the principle on which they proceeded in allowing the new contetion to be raised but the principle is clear and indisputable. We have already discussed it. ( 6 ) NOW here in the present case the contention sought to be raised on behalf of the defendants was that since the Bombay Rent Act became applicable to the premises during the pendency of the suits the defendant in each suit was entitled to claim protection of sec. 12 (1) of the Bombay Rent Act as he was ready and willing to pay the standard rent of the premises there being no dispute as to this fact and no ground for recovery of possession under the Bombay Rent Act having been made out the plaintiff in each suit was dis-entitled to recover possession of the premises the defendant. This contention raises a pure question of law and goes to the root of the matter. If well-founded it would completely displace both the suits. We do not therefore see any reason why we should not permit the defendants to raise this contention before us in the Letters Patent Appeals even though it was not urged by them at the hearing of the Second Appeals before Mr. Justice Sompura. If well-founded it would completely displace both the suits. We do not therefore see any reason why we should not permit the defendants to raise this contention before us in the Letters Patent Appeals even though it was not urged by them at the hearing of the Second Appeals before Mr. Justice Sompura. So far as the merits of this contention are concerned they are concluded by the decision given by us in Letters Patent Appeal No. 89 of 1970. (Vanand Savaji Tapu v. Bai Jaikunver XIV G. L. R. 410) There we have taken the view that ever) in a case where the premises were. by reason of sec. 4 (2) exempt from the applicability of the Saurashtra Rent Act at the date when the suit for recovery of possession was filed the Bombay Rent Act would be applicable to the premises and the defendant would be entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (1) of the Bombay Rent Act if the suit was pending at the date when the Bombay Rent Act was extended to the Saurashtra area of the State of Gujarat by Gujarat Act 57 of 1963. The defendant in each case before us would therefore be entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (1) of the Bombay Rent Act and since no ground for recovery of possession under the Bombay Rent Act has been made out by the plaintiff in either case the claim of the plaintiff for the recovery of possession of the premises from the defendant must fail in both cases. ( 7 ) WE therefore allow the Letters Patent Appeals set aside the decree for possession passed by Mr. Justice Sompura in both cases and dismiss both suits so far as they relate to the claim for possession. There will be no order as to costs all throughout in both cases. .