Judgment G.N.Prasad, J. 1. The petitioner is the plaintiff of a title suit pending in the court of the second Additional Munsif, Begusarai. He is aggrieved by the order of the learned Munsif, dated the 6th February, 1971, whereby his petition for amendment of his plaint has been rejected. 2. The suit was filed by the plaintiff on the 1st July, 1969. In the plaint two schedules were appended. Schedule I was with respect to 14 kathas 7 dhurs of land comprised in Plots Nos. 26, 27 and 28 of village Amarpur Kiratpur. Schedule II related to approximately 1 katha out of the land of Schedule I falling towards Plots Nos, 24 and 25 which belong to the defendants. In regard to Schedule I land it was mentioned in the first paragraph of the plaint that the plaintiff had taken settlement in respect of it from the then landlord for agricultural purpose by virtue of a hukumnama in the year 1350 Fasli, In paragraph 7 of the plaint it was alleged that the defendants, who had land on the boundary, had the advantage of amalgamating and dispossessing the plaintiff by and by from the land which he had taken in settlement and they had, in fact, forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff from Schedule II land in the month of Baisakh, 1373 Fasli. The reliefs which the plaintiff claimed were firstly, an adjudication, on the facts, to declare him to be bona fide settlee from defendant 2nd party with a right to retain possession over the settled land and as such for declaration of his title and confirmation thereof. The second relief claimed was for a decree for recovery of possession over Schedule II land and for restoring the land to the plaintiff by evicting the defendants through court. Certain consequential reliefs were also claimed which it is not necessary to refer at this stage. 3. On the 5th February, 1971, the suit was transferred to the court of the second Additional Munsif from the permanent court and on the same day the plaintiff put in a petition for amendment of the plaint, praying substantively that during the pendency of the suit i.e., on the 31st January, 1971, the defendants had dispossessed the plaintiff from the entire area of 14 Kathas 7 dhurs of land mentioned in Schedule I of the plaint. This prayer of the plaintiff was naturally opposed on behalf of the defendants and it was rejected by the court substantively on the two grounds; one that it enlarged the dispute requiring an adjudication of the court and the second that it had been made at late stage and as such it was not bona fide. 4. It is difficult to see upon what material the court could come to the conclusion that the prayer for amendment was not bona fide. Upon the allegations made in the amendment petition total dispossession from Schedule I land occurred in January, 1971. Without going into evidence it was obviously not possible for the court to say that this was a false allegation. Therefore this remark ought to have been reserved by the court after evidence was led before it. If the dispossession took place in January, 1971, as alleged, it was obviously not possible for the plaintiff to seek any amendment of the plaint earlier than on the 5th February, 1971. It is true that by reason of the amendment petition the court was inconvenienced, because it had asked for a ready suit from the permanent court in order to proceed with its trial. By reason of the amendment petition it was not able to try the suit. But merely because the court was inconvenienced, it is not possible to draw the conclusion that the prayer for amendment was not bona fide. Amendments are allowed at very late stages, sometimes even at the appellate or the second appellate stage. Therefore a prayer for amendment cannot be branded as mala fide on the mere ground that it is made at a late stage or that by reason of such a prayer the Court is inconvenienced. 5. Coming to the question as to whether the proposed amendment would enlarge the scope or the subject of the controversy in the suit it is enough to refer to the relevant portions of the plaint which I have already summarised above. The plaintiff had claimed to have acquired title over the entire Schedule I land on the basis of hukumnama from the previous landlord in 1350 Fasli (corresponding to 1942-43) and the first relief which the plaintiff sought was for declaration of title to the land of which he claimed to be a bona fide settlee from defendant second party and for confirmation of his possession. This confirmation of possession was obviously sought with respect to the whole of Schedule I land minus the area of approximately I katha mentioned in Schedule IT. In other words, the form of the suit, as originally laid, was that the plaintiff sought from the court a declaration of his title to the entire area of 14 kathas 7 dhurs described in Schedule I of the plaint and for confirmation of possession thereon. In addition, the plaintiff sought a decree for recovery of possession over Schedule II land upon the footing that till the date of the institution of the suit he had been dispossessed from 1 katha only. By the amendment petition all that the plaintiff now seeks is that in addition to a declaration of his title over the entire area of 14 kathas 7 dhurs covered by his hukumnama of the year 1350 Fasli a decree for recovery of possession should be passed in his favour not merely With respect to the small area of approximately 1 katha but over the whole of Schedule II land on account of certain subsequent events mentioned in the amendment petition. It is manifest that this was not a case of enlarging of the subject-matter of controversy in the suit. The property in dispute was not merely on approximate area of 1 katha mentioned in Schedule II of the plaint; the dispute from the very inception was in respect of the entire Schedule I land over which the plaintiff had sought declaration of his title and over a very substantial portion of which he had already sought a decree for confirmation of his possession. The substance of the amendment petition, therefore, is in respect of the first relief sought in the plaint. Rather the second relief sought by the plaintiff was that a decree for recovery of possession should be passed not merely in respect of 1 katha or so but over the entire Schedule I land over a very substantial portion of which the plaintiff had earlier sought a mere confirmation of his possession. A change of relief from con firmation of possession to recovery of possession of the nature sought in the present case cannot be said to constitute an enlargement of the scope or of the subject-matter of the suit. 6. A change of relief from con firmation of possession to recovery of possession of the nature sought in the present case cannot be said to constitute an enlargement of the scope or of the subject-matter of the suit. 6. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the opinion that the prayer for amendment of the plaint was unreasonably refused by the trial court. I, therefore, set aside the impugned order and direct the plaint to be amended as prayed for by the plaintiff. 7. It is manifest that reasonable opportunity should be given to the defendants, who would like to contest the suit, for filing additional written statement. It will also be necessary for the trial Court to consider whether or not by reason of the amendment hereby ordered any consequential order relating to valuation or court-fee has to be passed in the suit. The application is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.