T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) ALL these revision applications arise out of the orders granting the petitioner conditional leave to defend in different suits filed against him by the different opponents of these revision applications in the court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad. The claim made by each of the opponents in all these suits is for the amount of Rs. 2 0 The contention of every opponent is that he has paid Rs. 2 0 to the petitioner as deposit for becoming a member of the proposed Sudhanshu Co-operative Housing Society. According to the opponents after the receipt of these amounts the petitioner failed in forming the Society and also failed in purchasing any land for the proposed Society. The opponents therefore claim that the petitioner should refund the amount of deposit given by each of them. As against this the main contention which is raised by the petitioner in all these suits is that each of the opponents had paid the amount of Rs. 2 0 not as deposit but as contribution towards the purchase of land for the Society. The facts of the case reveal that at an earlier stage the petitioner had entered into a Banakhat under which he had paid an earnest amount of Rs. 15 0 The petitioner has therefore raised a contention that the payment of Rs. 2 0 made by each of the respondents was a contribution towards the amount of Rs. 15 0 which he has paid towards the Banakhat ands therefore the amount was not liable to be returned. ( 2 ) IN their rejoinder-affidavits the opponents have reiterated their contention that amount of Rs2 0 paid by each of them represented a deposit which was liable to be returned. ( 3 ) ON these contentions the learned trial Judge gave the petitioner a conditional leave to defend. The condition imposed by him in each case was that the petitioner should deposit the amount of Rs. 1 0 within two weeks. It is against this order that the petitioner has preferred these revision applications. ( 4 ) THE question which arises to be determined in these applications is whether looking to the facts of the case the learned Judge of the trial Court was justified in imposing any condition at the time of granting the leave to defend. It is against this order that the petitioner has preferred these revision applications. ( 4 ) THE question which arises to be determined in these applications is whether looking to the facts of the case the learned Judge of the trial Court was justified in imposing any condition at the time of granting the leave to defend. The principles of law which should guide the court while granting leave to defend in the cases governed by the provisions of Order 37 C. P. C. are by now well-settled. If in such cases the defendant raises a triable issue which is also bona fide then the court is legally bound to grant to him an unconditional leave to defend. Imposition of a condition in cases where a bona fide triable issue is raised would obviously render the leave quite illusory and would virtually amount to pure refusal of leave to defend. The position is however different where the court finds that though a particular plea raised by the defendant prima facie involves a triable issue the same is raised purely for the purpose of delaying the proceedings of the suit or where the circumstances of the case as revealed from pleadings and other documents produced in the record point to the want of bona fides of the defendant. In such cases though the court may not withhold leave to defend it may grant the said leave by making it conditional on depositing a particular amount. ( 5 ) IT is thus evident that the special jurisdiction of granting or refusing to grant an unconditional leave to defend which a court enjoys under Order 37 C. P. C. is dependent upon the finding on the question whether the defendant raises a bona fide triable issue. It need not be emphasised that the procedure contemplated by Order 37 C. P. C. is a special departure from usual procedure under the Code according to which every defendant has got a right to defend his case in the manner best suited to him without being fettered by any condition. This procedure is therefore a very potent weapon in the hands of a court to shut out frivolous defences which are raised in some commercial causes mainly with a view to protract the proceedings of a suit. But greater the potency of a weapon the greater is the requirement of caution in handling the same. This procedure is therefore a very potent weapon in the hands of a court to shut out frivolous defences which are raised in some commercial causes mainly with a view to protract the proceedings of a suit. But greater the potency of a weapon the greater is the requirement of caution in handling the same. Therefore the court is expected to be very careful in its determination of a jurisdictional question viz. whether the plea raised by the defendant involves a bona fide triable issue or not. The decision of this question cannot be arbitrary or inspired by a more suspicion. It should find its justification from the facts and circumstances of each case. As held by Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 321 court cannot reach the conclusion that the defence is not bona fide arbitrarily because it is as much bound by judicial rules and procedure in reaching a conclusion of this type as in any other matter. In its another decision given in Milkhiram (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Chamanlal Brothers. A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 1698 the Supreme Court has warned that in such cases care has to be taken that the object of the rule to assist the expeditious disposal of commercial causes in not defeated and at the same time real and genuine triable issues are not shut out by unduly severe orders as to deposit. It should also be noted that the jurisdiction of the court to impose conditions for leave to defend depends solely upon its finding whether the plea raised in defence is bona fide or not in other words this finding is the one which involves a jurisdictional fact. ( 6 ) NOW so far as the facts of this case are concerned it can be shortly stated that while the main plea raised by the opponents in the plaint is that the amount of Rs. 2 0 they seek to recover from the applicant-petitioner was the amount of deposit liable to be refunded the plea raised by the petitioner is that this amount represented the contribution made by each of the opponents and as such it was not liable to be refunded. It is found that along with their plaints the opponents-plaintiffs have produced receipts purporting to be the receipts of the disputed amounts of Rs. It is found that along with their plaints the opponents-plaintiffs have produced receipts purporting to be the receipts of the disputed amounts of Rs. 2 0 These receipts clearly show that the suit amount of Rs. 2 0 the contribution towards the purchase of land for the Society. The amount is described in these receipts as meaning contribution for land. These receipts thus land prima facie support to the plea raised by the petitioner in his affidavit in answer to opponents suits. As against this there is absolutely nothing in the record except of course the interested words of the opponents to show that the disputed amount of Rs. 2 0 was paid as deposit. The petitioner has obviously raised a triable issue in his affidavit for leave to defend by contending that the suit amount of Rs. 2 0 an amount of contribution towards the price of land to be purchased for the Society is not liable to be refunded One important test of a triable issue is to find out whether the defendant would be able to resist the plaintiffs suit successfully if he proves his case. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative the plea does involve a triable issue. It cannot be gainsaid that in this case if the petitioner-defendant succeeds in proving the case set out by him he is likely to resist the opponent suit very successfully. In my opinion therefore there cannot be any doubt that he has raised a triable issue in all the suits. ( 7 ) IF the petitioner has raised a triable issue then the next question which would arise to be considered is whether this defence is not a bona fide one. While deciding this question we have necessarily to confine our attention to the pleadings and other documents produced in the case. This would be specially so when the learned trial Judge has not given reasons in support of his order. Now looking to the pleadings I do not find anything to justify a conclusion that this defence is raised by the petitioner either for the sake of raising it or for the sake of delaying the proceedings of the suit. There is absolutely nothing therein to suggest that this defence is not raised bons fide. Now looking to the pleadings I do not find anything to justify a conclusion that this defence is raised by the petitioner either for the sake of raising it or for the sake of delaying the proceedings of the suit. There is absolutely nothing therein to suggest that this defence is not raised bons fide. On the contrary the receipt which is produced along with the plaint gives some support to the plea raised by the defendant as noted above. Under the circumstances it is found that the learned trial Judge had absolutely no materials before him for coming to the conclusion that the defence raised by the petitioner lacked bona fides. ( 8 ) SHRI Parikh who appeared on behalf of the opponents however contended that even if it is believed that the petitioner has raised a triable issue and that he was not lacking in bona fides in raising this triable issue this court has no jurisdiction under sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code to interfere with such discretionary orders passed by the trial court. It was contended by Shri Parikh that it was for the trial court to exercise its discretion by reference to the record of the case and even if it is found that he has exercised this discretion erroneously that would not invoke the revisional jurisdiction of High Court and would not call for any interference. According to Shri Parikh clause (c) of sec. 115 of the C. P. Code which speaks about illegality or material irregularity has reference only to a jurisdictional fact and therefore unless it is found that the error committed by the trial court results in either want of exercise of jurisdiction or failure to exercise jurisdiction there would be no justification for any interference by this court. For this proposition he has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court given in Pandurang Dhondi Chowgule and others v Maruti Hari Jadhav and others A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 153 a Division Bench decision of this court given in United Industries v. M/s. Dalwadi and Co. A. I. R. 1969 Gujarat 18 and an unreported decision of V. R. Shah J. delivered on 12-2-1969 in Civil Revision Application No. 1086 of 1968. ( 9 ) IF a reference is made to sec. A. I. R. 1969 Gujarat 18 and an unreported decision of V. R. Shah J. delivered on 12-2-1969 in Civil Revision Application No. 1086 of 1968. ( 9 ) IF a reference is made to sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code it will be found that it contemplates the interference by the High Court:- revision in three types of cases namely (1) cases in which the subordinate court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law (2) cases where the subordinate court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction so vested and (3) cases where the subordinate court is found to have acted under exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Now the trial court had jurisdiction in this case to impose conditions for allowing the petitioner to defend only if it is found that the triable issue which the petitioner has raised is not raised bona fide and is raised merely with a view to delay the proceedings of the suits filed by the opponents. As stated above the court has jurisdiction to impose conditions only if it is found that the defence raised is not bona fide. In other words the jurisdiction of the trial court to impose conditions is dependent on its finding that the defence raised is not bona fide. This finding therefore involves a jurisdictional fact. Therefore if the trial court is found to have decided this jurisdictional fact quite arbitrarily and without any justification whatever from the material placed before him it can be successfully contended that by imposing a condition for leave to defend it has exercised jurisdiction which it did not possess. ( 10 ) A view similar to this was taken by the Supreme Court in Roshan Lal v. Ishwar Dass A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 646. That was a case governed by the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act 19 of 1947. There was a finding of fact that the premises in question in that case were newly constructed. This finding was supported by abundant evidence which had been carefully considered and accepted by the Rent Controller and by the District Judge. The Supreme Court held that High Court was in error in interfering with this finding which found justification from the record. This finding was supported by abundant evidence which had been carefully considered and accepted by the Rent Controller and by the District Judge. The Supreme Court held that High Court was in error in interfering with this finding which found justification from the record. But while making these observations Supreme Court accepted the principle that question whether the second floor of the premises was newly constructed or not was a jurisdictional fact on which depended the power of the Rent Controller to take action and that if the Rent Controller had wrongly decided this fact and assumed jurisdiction where he had none the matter would be open to reconsideration in revision. In Chanbe Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 942 Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the scope of sec. 115 C. P. C. It is held therein that if an erroneous decision of a sub-ordinate court resulted in its exercising jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercising jurisdiction so vested or acting with material irregularity or illegality in exercise of its jurisdiction the case for the exercise of powers of revision by High Court is made out. It is also observed in that case that if a subordinate court decides a jurisdictional fact erroneously and thereby assumes jurisdiction not vested in it then power of interference under sec. 115 C. P. C. becomes operative. ( 11 ) CONSIDERING the facts of the case I find that the view of the learned trial Judge that the defence raised by the defendant is not bona fide and therefore imposition of a condition for granting leave to defend is called for is based on no materials at all. There is absolutely nothing in record of the case to suggest even in the most indirect manner that the plea raised by the defendant petitioners in his defence lacks bona fides. If therefore the conclusion of the trial court is based on no material at all then it not only amounts to a manifest illegality in the exercise of the trial courts jurisdiction but it also amounts to a wrong assumption of jurisdiction for the purpose of imposing condition for leave-to defend and the provisions contained in clause (c) of sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code do apply to the facts of the case. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code do apply to the facts of the case. In this connection it would not be out of place to again refer to the decision given by the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar (supra) wherein it is observed that trial court cannot reach the conclusion that the defence is not bona fide arbitrarily and that the trial court is as much bound by judicial rules and judicial procedure in reaching a conclusion of this kind as in any other matter. It need not be emphasised that any conclusion as regards the existence of bona fides or malafides of a particular plea without going into the merits of the case cannot be reached in an arbitrary fashion. It must have some grounds either in the pleadings or in the circumstances of the case. If there are no such grounds then the decision which is under challenge ceases to be a discretionary decision. The question of using discretion would obviously arise in cases where two alternative views are possible. It cannot be said that such a decision amounts to a mere error because existence of error postulates a position wherein the view which is called erroneous is possible. But in cases wherein there is absolutely no material to support a particular view there is no scope for any contention that the view taken is erroneous or incorrect. The view which is merely arbitrary or fanciful is vitiated by a patent illegality and therefore results in exercise of jurisdiction not vested in law. Such cases would therefore be governed by clauses (a) and (c) of sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. ( 12 ) SHRI Parikh however put reliance upon the above referred Supreme Court decision of Pandurang v. Maruti. This decision contains the following observations relating to the provisions contained in sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code:-THE provisions of sec. 115 of the Code have been examined by judicial decisions on several occasions. While exercising its jurisdiction under sec. 115 it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross they may be or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. As clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sec. While exercising its jurisdiction under sec. 115 it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross they may be or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. As clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sec. 115 indicate it is only in cases where the subordinate court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can be properly invoked. It is conceivable that points of law may arise in proceedings instituted before subordinate courts which are related to questions of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that a plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the court which tries the proceedings. A finding on these pleas in favour of the party raising them would oust the jurisdiction of the court and so an erroneous decision on these pleas can be said to be concerned with questions of jurisdiction which fall within the purview of sec. 115 of the Code. But an erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the subordinate court which has no relation to questions of jurisdiction of that court cannot be corrected by the High Court under sec. 115. IN this case the Supreme Court was concerned with the construction of a decree and therefore the Supreme Court held that the question of construction of a decree had no relation to the jurisdiction of the court putting on a particular construction. The above quoted observations of the Supreme Court only reveal that a mere error of fact or law does not invite the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under sec. 115 of the Code but it would invite the said jurisdiction if the said error of fact or law which it considers has ultimately a reference to the jurisdiction or court. To put it in other words what the Supreme Court has conveyed is that if the error of fact or law is such that eventually it would result in a jurisdictional question then the interference of the High Court would be called for. To put it in other words what the Supreme Court has conveyed is that if the error of fact or law is such that eventually it would result in a jurisdictional question then the interference of the High Court would be called for. The question in the case before me is whether the courts finding about the existence of bona fides on the part of the defendant in raising the plea that the amount of Rs. 2 0 was not paid as a deposit but as a contribution towards the purchase of land is based on any evidence at all. If there is no evidence justifying such a conclusion about the bona fides of the defence then obviously the decision of the lower court would be arbitrary which results in illegality as well as a wrongful assumption of jurisdiction. Thus the decision of the Supreme Court on which reliance is placed by Shri Parikh has no application to the facts of this case. ( 13 ) SHRI Parikh thereafter relied upon the following observations made by Shah J. in Civil Revision Application No. 1086/68:-HOWEVER Mr. Vin learned advocate for the opponent urged that this court has no authority to revise the order of the learned trial Judge under sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Vins argument before me is that even if it were held that the learned trial Judge did not exercise his discretion properly still this error has no relation to the jurisdiction of the trial court and hence the order of the learned trial Judge cannot be revised under sec. 115 of the Code. As laid down by the Supreme Court in Pandurang v. Maruti A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 153 the High Court has power only to correct such errors of law as have relation to the jurisdiction of the court. It has also been held therein that the High Court has no power to rectify all those errors of law or irregularities which have no relation to the jurisdiction of the court. Since the learned trial Judge has jurisdiction to pass an order in his discretion and he passes an order in exercise of his discretion which may not be a proper order still the order passed by him is within his jurisdiction and no jurisdictional fact is involved in that order. Since the learned trial Judge has jurisdiction to pass an order in his discretion and he passes an order in exercise of his discretion which may not be a proper order still the order passed by him is within his jurisdiction and no jurisdictional fact is involved in that order. THESE observation are also not found helpful to the opponents-plaintiffs for the simple reason that in the case before me the finding of the lower court is found to be totally baseless and rests merely on arbitrariness and surmises. I have already quoted above the relevant observations of the Supreme Court in Pandurang v. Maruti on which Shah J. has put reliance and have shown how the error committed by the lower court is with regard to a jurisdictional fact. ( 14 ) SHRI Parikh drew my attention to a Division Bench judgment of this court given in United Industries v. Dalwadi and Co. A. I. R. 1969 Gujarat 18 wherein following observations are made:-IT appears clearly that the learned Judge of the City Civil Court on a consideration of the plaint and the affidavits was not satisfied that a bona fide triable issue was raised by the affidavits in reply and entertained a doubt as to the genuineness of the defence and he therefore did not grant unconditional leave to defend the suit but granted leave to defend subject to the condition of depositing Rs. 4 0 as security towards the plaintiffs claim This view taken by the learned Judge on a consideration of the plaint and affidavits may be correct or incorrect. It may even be wholly wrong. That is not a matter into which this court acting in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction can enter though we may point that on a consideration of the plaint and the affidavits we are satisfied that the learned Judge was right in granting to the defendants leave to defend the suit on condition of depositing Rs. 4 0in my opinion even these observations are not in any manner helpful to the opponents because in this case there is no question of the lower courts order being correct or incorrect As pointed out earlier this is not a case merely of an error either on facts or on law. 4 0in my opinion even these observations are not in any manner helpful to the opponents because in this case there is no question of the lower courts order being correct or incorrect As pointed out earlier this is not a case merely of an error either on facts or on law. It is a case wherein the decision of the trial court is found to be quite arbitrary and without any justification whatsoever from the facts of the case. ( 15 ) IN this view of the matter I find that the facts of this case fall squarely within the ambit of clauses (a) and (c) of sec. 115 of C. P. C. and if that be so the interference of this court with the order passed by the trial court would be justified. As pointed out earlier. this is found to be a case in which the applicant is entitled to defend his case unconditionally. ( 16 ) ALL these revision applications are therefore allowed and the order of the trial court imposing condition requiring the applicant to deposit the amount of Rs. 1 0 in each case is set aside. The petitioner is given unconditional leave to defend in all the suits. The rule is accordingly made absolute without any order as to costs in each of these cases. .