JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - The Petitioner, who was a Revenue Inspector in the district of Ganjam under the administrative control of the Collector, was by an order Annexure-1 dated 24-12-1962 passed by the Collector placed under suspension pending initiation of departmental proceedings against him. Sixteen charges enumerated in Annexure-2 were framed against him and he was caned upon to put in his explanation in writing within 15 days and show cause why he should not be suitably punished. The Second Officer, Bhanjanagar was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. The Petitioner submitted a detailed explanation (Annexure-3) to all the charges which were considered by the Enquiry Officer who submitted his report (Annexure-A) to the Collector. On perusal of the report, the Collector found the Petitioner guilty of charges 1 and 6 only and exonerated him of the other charges. In the order Annexure-4 dated 22-8-1968 passed by the Collector, he has given detailed reasons in support of his findings and passed the following order of punishment: I am inclined to take lenient view and order that his two annual increments are stopped with cumulative effect and the period of suspension is treated as such. He further directed that the Petitioner be reinstated in service from the date of his joining. The Petitioner preferred an appeal against this order to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner (Annexure-5) but it was dismissed (Annexure-6). He thereupon filed the present petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders in Annexure 1, 4 and 6 on the twin grounds that principles of natural justice have been violated in not affording him a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the charges and substantiate his defence and that the explanation submitted by him had not been properly taken into consideration. 2. This application came up in the first instance before a Division Bench of this Court before whom it was urged on behalf of the Petitioner that on the authority of a Bench decision of this Court in Brahmananda Satpathy v. State of Orissa 1969 C.L.T. 874, the Petitioner was entitled to B further notice to show cause before the order of suspension was passed against him. Although the Bench felt that Brahmananda Satpathy v. State of Orissa 1969 C.L.T. 874, was distinguished on facts yet in view of their opinion that the law in that case has been somewhat widely stated, this case has been referred to a larger Bench to decide the question whether even in a case where the delinquent is not exonerated of 0.11 the charges and a minor penalty is imposed under Rule 13(i) to (v) of the Rule As, he is entitled to a further notice. This is how the case has come up before us. 3. Rule 13 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) enumerates the penalties which may for good and sufficient reasons be imposed on a Government servant. Item (iii) there of provides for withholding of increments or promotion and item (v) provides for suspension. Rule 16 which provides procedure for imposing minor penalties runs thus: 16. Procedure for imposing penalties- (1) No order imposing any of the penalties specified in Clauses (i) to (v) of Rule 13 shall be passed except after: (a) the Government is informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the allegations on which it is proposed to be taken, and given an opportunity to make any representation he may wish to make; (b) such representation, if any, is taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority; and (c) the Commission is consulted in oases where such consultation is necessary. (2) The record of proceeding in such oases shall include (i) a copy of the intimation to the Government servant of the proposal to take action against him; (ii) a copy of the statement of allegations communicated to him; (iii) his representation, if any; (iv) the advice of the Commission, if any; and (v) the orders on the case together with the reasons therefore. Admittedly the penalties imposed on the Petitioner in this case are minor penalties and consequently the procedure applicable for holding the enquiry against him is the one contemplated in Rule 16. Admittedly the penalties imposed on the Petitioner in this case are minor penalties and consequently the procedure applicable for holding the enquiry against him is the one contemplated in Rule 16. It is abundantly clear from Rule 16 that it does not require oral enquiry in oases where it is proposed to impose only the minor penalties and all that it requires are- (a) that the Government servant should be informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the allegations on which it is proposed to be taken; (b) giving of an opportunity to the Government servant concerned to make any representation he may wish to make; (c) that such representation is taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority; and (d) the Public Service Commission is consulted in cases where such consultation is necessary. It is not disputed that the Petitioner being not a Gazetted Government servant, consultation with the Public Service Commission is not necessary. Annexure 2 contains the allegations which are in the form of charges on the basis of which it was proposed to take action against him. A copy of the same was served upon the Petitioner and he was given an opportunity to submit his explanation on each of the charges. Both the Enquiry Officer and the Collector considered the explanation submitted by the Petitioner, and it is thereafter that the disciplinary authority, namely, the Collector, imposed on him the two punishments of stoppage of increments and suspension. We are, therefore, satisfied that the requirements of Rule 16 had been fully complied with and that the Petitioner cannot have any grievance on that score. 4. Mr. C.V. Murty learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submits relying on Rule 91 of the Orissa Service Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) that the order of suspension which is one of the penalties imposed on the Petitioner is bad by reason of the fact that requirements of Rule 91 of the Code had not been complied with. Rule 91 may be quoted: 91. Rule 91 may be quoted: 91. (1) When a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired or suspended is reinstated or would have been re-instated but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension the authority competent to order the re-instatement shall consider and make a specific order: (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty or for the period of suspension ending with the date of his retirement on super-annuation as the case may be, and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. (2) Where such competent authority holds that the Government servant has been fully exonerated or in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified, the Government servant shall he given the full pay to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired or suspended, as the case may be, together with any allowances of which he was in receipt prior to his dismissal, removal or suspension. (3) In other oases, the Government servant shall be given such proportion of such pay and allowances as such competent authority may prescribe: Provided that the payment of allowances under Clause (2) or Clause (3) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible; Provided further that such proportion of such pay and allowances shall not be less than the subsistence and other allowances admissible under Rule 90. (4) In a case falling under Clause (2) the period of absence from duty shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. (5) In. a case falling under Clause (3) the period of absence from duty shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless such competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose: Provided that if the Government servant so desires, such authority may direct that the period of absence from duty shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the Government servant. 5. Rule 91 thus deals with the case of a Government servant who has been either dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired or suspended, but is subsequently re-instated in service. We are not in this case concerned with the first three categories of oases. 5. Rule 91 thus deals with the case of a Government servant who has been either dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired or suspended, but is subsequently re-instated in service. We are not in this case concerned with the first three categories of oases. Ours is a case where a person who had been suspended is re-instated. A Government servant is suspended either during the pendency of a proceeding initiated against him or because suspension as a measure of punishment is imposed upon him as a result of a disciplinary proceeding. In the latter case, there would always be re-instatement following suspension unless he would attain the age of superannuation during the period he is under suspension. In a case where a Government servant is placed under suspension pending disciplinary proceeding against him, re-instatement would depend upon the nature of punishment ultimately inflicted on him. If the punishment is either dismissal or removal or compulsory retirement, there is no further re-instatement and Rule 91 would not apply. If, however, the punishment inflicted is one of the other-penalties enumerated in Rule 13, which include suspension, there would be re-instatement unless of course the Government servant attains the age of superannuation during the period he is under suspension. Rule 91 contemplates that where a Government servant is re-instated, the authority has to consider and make a specific Order (1) regarding pay and allowance payable to him for the period of his absence from duty and (2) whether such period of suspension should be treated as one spent on duty. The consideration of these questions depends on whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Government servant had been fully exonerated and in case of suspension whether it was wholly unjustified. If the authority forms the opinion that the Government servant had been fully exonerated and the suspension was wholly unjustified, Sub-rule (2) and (4) of Rule 91 require that he should be given fun pay to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended and that the period of his absence from duty should be treated as period spent on duty for all purposes. Where the authority cannot form such opinion as aforesaid, Sub-rule (3) provides that the Government servant shall be given such proportion of pay and allowances as the competent authority may prescribe, and Sub-rule (5) requires that the period of his absence from duty shall not be treated as period spent on duty unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose. 6. It is argued on behalf of the Petitioner that apart from the opportunity which was afforded to him to submit his explanation to the charges framed against him, the Petitioner was entitled to get a reasonable opportunity to show cause why his case should not be treated as one falling within the purview of Sub-rules (2) and (4) of Rule 91 and that as admittedly no such opportunity had been given to him, the order is liable to be quashed. The learned-Advocate General on behalf of the State, however, argued that Rule 91 does not in express terms lay down a duty on the part of the authority to give such an opportunity to the Government employee nor can the rule be said to lay down such duty by implication and that consequently the Petitioner was not entitled to any such opportunity. Neither side has cited before us any decision which has dealt with this precise question in relation to a case where suspension has been imposed as a punishment as distinct from a case where the Government employee had been placed under suspension during the pendency of a proceeding against him. We are, therefore, to decide this question on an analysis of the provisions contained in Rule 91 of the Rules. In oases falling under Sub-rules (2) and (4) thereof, the occasion to give such notice does not arise because the order contemplated therein is the one favourable to the delinquent. Cases covered by Sub-rules (3) and (5), however, stand on a different footing. What sometimes happens is that during the pendency of a proceeding against a Government servant, he is placed under suspension and during the period of suspension, he is not allowed his full pay but is given only a proportion of his pay called subsistence allowance. Where at the close of the proceeding he is either dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired, there is no re-instatement and consequently Rule 91 has no application. Where at the close of the proceeding he is either dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired, there is no re-instatement and consequently Rule 91 has no application. But where one of the minor penalties is imposed on him, the question arises whether having regard to the punishment ultimately imposed on him which is an index of the gravity of the delinquency with which he is charged there was any justification to place him under suspension during the pendency of the proceeding. It should be remembered in this connection that there is no rule that as soon as the proceeding is initiated against a Government servant he should invariably be placed under suspension. An order passed under Sub-rules (3) and (5) is bound to adversely affect the Government servant concerned and result in pecuniary loss to him. It is, therefore, that the Supreme Court in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh referring to Clauses (3) and (5) of Fundamental Rule 54 which substantially corresponds to Rule 91 of the Rules stated at page 243 thus: Consideration under this rule depending as it does on facts and circumstances in their entirety, passing an order on the basis of factual finding arrived at from such facts and circumstances and such an order resulting in pecuniary loss to the Government servant must be held to be an objective rather than a subjective function. The very nature of the function implies the duty to act judicially. In such a case if an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed is not afforded, as admittedly it was not done in the present case, the order is liable to be struck down as invalid on the ground that it is one in breach of the principles of natural justice. Their Lordships were dealing with a case where pending departmental proceedings against an Overseer, the latter was placed under suspension. It was ultimately held that the charges against the Overseer were not provide beyond reasonable doubt. But the departmental authorities held that the initiation of the proceeding and the suspension were not wholly unjustified. It was consequently ordered in that case that the period of absence from duty should be treated as period spent on duty only for the purpose of pension but that during that period, he should not be allowed any pay beyond what he actually received as subsistence allowance. It was consequently ordered in that case that the period of absence from duty should be treated as period spent on duty only for the purpose of pension but that during that period, he should not be allowed any pay beyond what he actually received as subsistence allowance. As this order was passed without giving an opportunity to the overseer to show cause, it was struck down. This case, is, therefore, clearly distinguishable on facts from the present case before us where suspension was ordered as a measure of punishment. The question whether such suspension is justified or unjustified does not further arise for consideration because the order itself shows that the suspension was fully justified. It is one of the punishments provided for in Rule 13 of the Rules, and the procedure that is required to be followed for imposing such penalty, namely Rule 16 of the Rules has been followed. That rule does not say that apart from informing the Government servant in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the allegations on which it is proposed to be taken and giving him an opportunity to make any representation he may wish to make, the disciplinary authority is required to give him a further opportunity to show cause before the actual punishment of suspension is imposed on him. The difference between this case and the one dealt with in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh lies in the fact that whereas in the Supreme Court case the order passed under Clauses (3) and (5) of Fundamental Rule 54 is in the nature of a consequential order, in the case before us the impugned order is an integral part of the punishment imposed on the delinquent after fully complying 'with the procedure prescribed for imposing such punishment. We are, therefore, of the view' that the Petitioner was not entitled to a further notice to show cause why the substantive punishment of suspension should not be imposed on him. 7. We are, therefore, of the view' that the Petitioner was not entitled to a further notice to show cause why the substantive punishment of suspension should not be imposed on him. 7. Our answer to the question raised in the order of reference is that the delinquent who, pending proceedings against him, had been placed under suspension, and on completion of the enquiry is not exonerated of all the charges and one of the minor penalties enumerated in Rule 13 (i) to (v) of the Rules is imposed on him, he is not entitled to a further notice before the punishment is imposed on him. That no such second opportunity is contemplated is clear from Rule 16 itself. In Brahmananda Satpathy's case 1969 C.L.T. 874, suspension was one of the substantive punishments imposed on him and consequently the principle enunciated in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh would not be applicable there to. We, therefore, hold that Brahmananda Satpathy v. State of Orissa 1969 C.L.T. 874 has not been correctly decided. Our conclusions, therefore, are: Where pending departmental proceedings a Government Servant is placed under suspension and at the conclusion of the enquiry one or more of the minor penalties enumerated in items (i) to (iv) of Rule 13 of the rules are imposed on him and he is reinstated in service, the authority concerned, before passing B specific order under Sub-rules (3) and (5) Rule 91 of the Code, has to give an opportunity to the delinquent Government servant to show cause why the proposed order should not be passed. Where, however, the penalty imposed is that the period of suspension should be treated as such, it cannot be construed as an order passed under Sub-rules (2) and (5) of Rule 91 of the Code and consequently the question of affording an opportunity to the delinquent to have his say against the proposed punishment of suspension does not arise. 8. In the result, this application fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. G.K. Misra, C.J. 9. I Agree. R.N. Misra, J. 10. I agree.