M. U. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition involves a simple question of law as regards the interpretation of clause (b) (ii) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (Act No. 25 of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The original petition namely H. M. P. No. 5 of 1965 was filed under sub-sec. (i) of sec. 12 of the Act for annulment of the marriage on the grounds covered by clause (d) namely that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnent by some person other than the petitioner. The petitioners case was that his marriage with the respondent-wife was solemnized according to Hindu religious rites on June 1 1964 at Kubernagar in Ahmedabad. At that date he did not know that the respondent was pregnant. He came to know about it only in the month of October 1964 The respondent wife delivered a child on October 25 1964 The respondent wife is now staying with her parents at Ankleshwar. It was on this allegation that the petition was filed on June 14 1965 The respondentwife contested the petition by her written statement wherein she inter alia contended that her betrothal with the petitioner took place in March 1963 when her brother was in service at Anand. She went to liv. with her brother at Ankleshwar on the transfer of her brother to Ankleshwar. She contended that during this period the petitioner used to visit her brothers place at Ankleshwar very often that he had come twice and for the last time in January 1964 the petitioner came again to Ankleshwar; that by that time both came in close contact and in January 1964 there was sexual intercourse between them. She contended that the petitioner used to see her secretly and that she had disclosed the fact of her pregnancy to the petitioner one month prior to the marriage and that fact was also known to the parents of the petitioner. She contended that the petition was not filed within one year of their marriage and could not be entertained. ( 2 ) THE learned Civil Judge Senior Division Narol before whom this petition was filed raised a preliminary issue as regards the maintainability of the petition in view of the provisions in sec. 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act. She contended that the petition was not filed within one year of their marriage and could not be entertained. ( 2 ) THE learned Civil Judge Senior Division Narol before whom this petition was filed raised a preliminary issue as regards the maintainability of the petition in view of the provisions in sec. 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act. He found relying upon a Bombay decision that the petition was not maintainable. The decision relied upon was the one of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Patel and Chandrachud JJ. in Sawlaram v. Yeshodabhai A. I. R. 1962 Bom. 190 decided on September 4 1961 wherein the view taken is that sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act 1897 (Act No. 10 of 1897) does not apply in the case of a petition filed under sec. 12 (1) (d) of the Act as condition in sec. 12 (2) (b) (ii) is not complied with. It is against this decision that the present second appeal has been filed. ( 3 ) IT is admitted that the proceeding has been instituted not within one year from the date of the marriage. Sec. 12 of the Act deals with voidable marriages and the grounds on which a marriage may be annulled by a decree of nullity. The relevant ground which has been urged is one which falls under clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 12 of the Act. Sec. 12 (1) (D) provides12 Any marriage solemnized whether before or after the commencement of this Act shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds namely:- (A) (b) (c) x x x x x (d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner. SUB-SEC. (2) reads 12 Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1) no petition for annulling a marriage (B) on the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) shall be entertained unless the court is satisfied (ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of a marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriages solemnized after such commencement within one year from the date of the marriage. (iii) x x x x x xsub-SEC. (2) of sec. (iii) x x x x x xsub-SEC. (2) of sec. 12 provides that a petition for a decree of nullity on any of the four grounds shall not be entertained unless the Court is satisfied that the proceedings have been instituted within one year from the date of the marriage. The provision is a mandatory one and creates a bar to the entertainment of the petition under sec. 12 (1) (d) unless the Court is satisfied that the proceedings are instituted within one year from the date of the marriage. It does not prescribe a period of limitation. Clearly therefore sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act 1897 will have no applicability in such a case. The Bombay High Court in Savlaram v. Yeshodabai (supra) has dealt with a similar situation and has taken the view that the conditions laid down in sec. 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act does not prescribe a period of limitation for filing a petition by the plaintiff; it is in terms mandatory and prohibitory and provides that the Court shall not entertain the petition if the conditions laid down therein are not satisfied. These conditions are in absolute terms and they cannot be relaxed. Condition (ii) in clause (b) is self evident and if the examination of the petition discloses that the condition is not fulfilled the Court must dismiss the petition. It has been held that a petition filed for nullity of marriage on the ground mentioned in sec. 12 (1) (d) on the day on which the Court opened after long vacation during which vacation the period mentioned in sec. 12 (2) (d) (ii) ended cannot be entertained. Thus I am fortified by this Bombay view and I must accordingly hold that the petition was rightly not entertained. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. ( 4 ) MR. N. H. Bhatt learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant had tried to contend before me that the Bombay view is not correct and that I should refer the matter to a larger Bench. But I am inclined to take the same views as the Bombay view. In my opinion the language of the section is mandatory and deals only with the entertainment of the petition and does not refer to limitation. But I am inclined to take the same views as the Bombay view. In my opinion the language of the section is mandatory and deals only with the entertainment of the petition and does not refer to limitation. I therefore do not see any reason to grant the necessary certificate. Leave to file Letters Patent Appeal is thus refused. The matter is not referable to a larger Bench. ( 5 ) AFTER I had delivered judgment in this second appeal but before I signed it Mr. N. 14. Bhatt appeared with Mr. S. G. Shah learned advocate of the respondent and asked for a further hearing of this appeal only so far as the question of grant of certificate for filing Letters Patent Appeal is concerned. He had submitted that there is a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court which took a different view and he wanted to make some submissions on this point. I had therefore fixed the matter for rehearing this day. The learned advocates have appeared and made their respective submissions. On behalf of Mr. Bhatt Mr. Chokhawala has appeared for the appellant and has urged that a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande and others A. I. R. 1942 All. 429 while dealing with a case under sec. 9 (1) (c) of Provincial Insolvency Act (V of 1920) has taken the view that sec. 10 of General Clauses Act (X of 1879) applies to all creditors applications filed under sec. 9 of the Act and consequently if the period of three months from the act of insolvency expires on a day when the court is not sitting a creditors petition of insolvency can be validly presented on the next day when the court is sitting. Now sec. 9 (1) (c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act 1920 (5 of 1920) provides that a creditor shall not be entitled to present an insolvency petition against a debtor unless the act of insolvency on which the petition is grounded has occurred within three months before the presentation of the petition. The section thus provides not a condition precedent to the entertainment of the insolvency application but prescribes the period within which the insolvency petition has to be filed by a creditor. The section thus provides not a condition precedent to the entertainment of the insolvency application but prescribes the period within which the insolvency petition has to be filed by a creditor. Sec. 12 (2) (b) (ii) with which I am concerned in this matter does not prescribe a period of limitation; but as aforesaid it lays down a condition precedent to the entertainment of the application for seeking a relief of nullity of marriage on the ground that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 12 of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1) no petition for annulling a marriage on the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) shall be entertained unless the Court is satisfied that the proceedings have been instituted in the case of a marriage solemnised before the commencement of this Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriages solemnised after such commencement within one year from the date of the marriage. Thus what is laid down is a condition precedent for the entertainment of an application of a petition seeking annulment of marriage and not a prescription of a period of limitation for filing an application. The Full Bench decision which deals with the Provincial Insolvency Act can have thus no applicability. It was contended that one years period in the instant case fell within the period of vacation; but that is no ground. A matter which requires to be filed within the period and which period falls during the vacation can be entertained as an urgent application and there is no bar to the competent Court to entertain such an application even during vacation. Again sec. 9 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. and this very contention has come to be considered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Kaku Chenchuramana Reddi v. Palapu Arunuchalam A. I. R. 1935 Mad. 857 wherein the Full Bench has taken the view that sec. 9 (1) (c) is a condition precedent to the filing of the petition that is to say the petitioning creditor must on the day when he presents his petition have in view some act of insolvency which the debtor has committed within the preceding three months. 857 wherein the Full Bench has taken the view that sec. 9 (1) (c) is a condition precedent to the filing of the petition that is to say the petitioning creditor must on the day when he presents his petition have in view some act of insolvency which the debtor has committed within the preceding three months. The Full Bench has further observed:- A fraudulent preference is an act of insolvency and as sec. 9 (1) (c) does not provide a period of limitation but is a condition precedent as soon as three months period expires from the date of transfer by a debtor to a creditor the transaction ceases to be impeachable by other creditors under the Insolvency Act and the transfer ceases on that day to be an act of insolvency. An insolvency petition cannot therefore be presented where three months have expired during the vacation just after the vacation. This Full Bench decision has been followed by the Nagpur High Court in Chintaman Laxman v. Ramgopal Raghunathdas and others A. I. R. 1948 Nag. 385. The learned Judge has dissented with the view taken by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court and has taken the view that the period of three months prescribed under sec. 9 (1) (c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act is not a period of limitation but is a condition precedent to the filing of the insolvency petition itself. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Muradan Sardar v. Secretary of State A. I. R. 1939 Cal. 313 has followed the Full Bench Madras decision. An earlier decision of the Bombay High Court delivered by J. C. Shah J. (as he then was) in Mokshamadanlal v. Hariprasad Vishnuprasad A. I. R. 1956 Bom. 650 has taken the view that sec; 9 (1) (c) of Provincial Insolvency Act 1920 does not prescribe a period of limitation for presentation of a petition by a creditor for adjudication but sets out a condition precedent and by applying the rule contained in sec. 14 of the Limitation Act a petition filed after the expiry of three months cannot be made to conform to the strict requirement of sec. 9 (1) (c)of the Provincial Insolvency Act. 14 of the Limitation Act a petition filed after the expiry of three months cannot be made to conform to the strict requirement of sec. 9 (1) (c)of the Provincial Insolvency Act. In the Bombay case it was held that where the petition for adjudicating the respondent an insolvent was lodged in the insolvency Court at Broach on 23-4-1951 which had no jurisdiction to entertain thepetition the proceeding taken in the Insolvency Court at Borivali on 15-11-1951 could not be regarded as an extension of the proceeding filed in the former Court and the petition must be regarded as presented on 15-11-1951. The petition having been presented more than three months after the date on which the act of insolvency occurred it must be regarded as not complying with the requirement of sec. 9 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Dealing with the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in 1942 All. 429 Shah J. has observed:- The learned Judges who constituted the Full Bench arrived at their decision on different grounds. Iqbal Ahmad C. J. and Plowden J. expressed the opinion that the period of three months in sec. 9 (1) (c) was a period of limitation but they observed that even if it were not sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act applied to petitions for insolvency. They also expressed the opinion that a petition for adjudicating a debtor an insolvent was not a suit appeal or application for which a period of limitation was prescribed by any special or local law and therefore the sections referred to in sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act did not apply thereto. The learned Judge has then referred to the observations of Dar J. and Dar J. held that sec. 9 (1) (c)prescribed a period limitation for an application under a special law and by the operation of sec. 29 (2) sec. 4 of the Limitation Act applied to a petition for adjudication. The Court in that case refused to accept the view that sec. 9 (1) (c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act did not prescribed a period of limitation taken by the Madras High Court in Chenchuramana Reddi v. Arunachalam 1935 Mad 857 (A. I R. V 22) (FB) (B) and the Calcutta High Court in Muradan Sardar v. Secy. of State 1939 Cat. 313 (A. I. R. Y 26 ). 9 (1) (c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act did not prescribed a period of limitation taken by the Madras High Court in Chenchuramana Reddi v. Arunachalam 1935 Mad 857 (A. I R. V 22) (FB) (B) and the Calcutta High Court in Muradan Sardar v. Secy. of State 1939 Cat. 313 (A. I. R. Y 26 ). Shah J. has then observed that:-IT is difficult to appreciate the distinction between a petition and an application within the meaning of sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. However in view of the proviso enacted by the Parliament by Act III of 1950 the question whether in the circumstances the petition for adjudication in Raja Pandes case may be regarded as maintainable is academic. BUT for reasons hereinbefore mentioned I am unable to agree with the view that sec. 9 (1) (c) prescribes a period of limitation and is not in form and substance a condition on the strict compliance of which alone a petition for adjudication can be maintained. AS aforesaid he has taken the view that sec. 9 ( c3 does not prescribe a period of limitation for presentation of a petition by a creditor for adjudication but sets out a condition precedent and by applying the rule contained in sec. 14 of the Limitation Act a petition filed after the expiry of three months cannot be made to conform to the strict requirement of sec. 9 (1) (c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. With respect I agree with the reasoning of Shah J. which again having been delivered before 6the appointed day and on the bifurcation of the bigger bilingual Bombay State is binding to me. In my opinion therefore Mr. S. G. Shah learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent who has relied upon the Madras Full Bench decision and on Nagpur Bombay and the Calcutta High Court decisions is right when he contends that sec. 10 of the General Clauses Act will not be attracted in the instant case especially when I am here concerned with a case falling under sec. 12 (1) (d) read with sec. 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 I cannot therefore accept Mr. Chokhawalas contention that this is a fit case in which I should grant a certificate to the appellant for filing Letters Patent Appeal. 12 (1) (d) read with sec. 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 I cannot therefore accept Mr. Chokhawalas contention that this is a fit case in which I should grant a certificate to the appellant for filing Letters Patent Appeal. ( 6 ) THE decision given by me earlier on September 26 1972 thus stands and leave to file Letters Patent Appeal is Refused. .